CHAPTER –IV
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND ITS IMPACT ON VALUE CREATION: SURVEY BASED EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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4.1 Introduction

India is a strong emerging force on the global map. Its growth is enabled by progress and development across sectors by public and private enterprises and is built on the foundation laid down by the government and regulators that encourage transparency in business dealings, accountability, and good governance. As India aspires to its rightful position as a global leader, the focus will be on Corporate India and on Indian markets. Corporate India has a key role in nation-building and corporate governance is an integral part of the broader governance of the country.

Research provides robust evidence that companies that exhibit sound corporate governance generate significantly greater returns when compared to companies that exhibit poor corporate governance. (Sen, 2012). It is observed in Chapter II of majority of the studies in the area of the corporate governance have been carried out to study the relationship between corporate governance practices and its impact on the firm valuation or the profitability, however, this study is being carried out the measure the impact of corporate governance on value creation of the companies. In Chapter 3, it is found that corporate governance practices positively affect the value creation of the companies. The present study has been carried out to contribute towards the development of more suitable and widely acceptable corporate governance practices, which is one of the objectives of this research work. The purpose here of this study is not only to generate statistics but also to obtain insight from the executives, professionals regulators, investors on the corporate governance practices and its impact on the value creation of the companies.

It is attempted in this chapter to find out the opinions and perceptions of the cross-section of interested groups on various issues relating to the concept of Corporate Governance. For this purpose a survey is conducted through the Questionnaires and response is obtained for corporate governance practices in India and its impact on the corporate word from the following professionals and executives:

1. Company secretaries (Practicing as well as in Employment)
2. Chartered Accountants
3. Cost Accountants
4. Executives of Bombay stock exchange
5. Executives of National stock exchange
6. Retail Investors
7. Executives of Institutional Investors
8. Officers of Registrar of Companies
9. Directors of the Companies

In this chapter, the opinions received from the respondents have been examined in a survey type of method. The empirical analysis has been carried out with the help of the categorical and qualitative opinions collected by circulating the questionnaire i.e. quantitative method. The quantitative method is generally used when the problem at hand is concerned with questions, concepts and attributes and tests the relationship between the answers to questions and tests a specific theory when factual data is available along with supporting evidence (Creswell, 1998).

This part of study intends to fill the gap between present regulatory framework of the corporate governance and real corporate governance practices, to accomplish the main objective to carry out a systematic study of corporate governance practices and its impact on value creation of the company by qualitative analysis in addition to the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 3 of this study. The research design followed has been essentially descriptive and explorative one in nature considering objectives identified. This chapter is divided into two sections,

section one explains the methodology and the second section deals with data analysis.

A Structured instrument was developed to study the operationalization of corporate governance practices in India as an effective tool for the value creation of the companies. The questionnaire was canvassed to 250 target respondents keeping in view their willingness to participate in the research, of which 157 responded. The survey analyzed the behavior of all the important variables on corporate governance as an effective tool for the value creation of the companies. The questionnaire was designed in such a way that it would project the exact data required by the researcher. Multi-item measures were used to provide stronger construct validity as single-item measures may not address all of the aspects of the multidimensional constructs. It is believed that more questions under the same construct would enable examination of the construct from different angles (Foster, 1997) . This study uses a Likert Scale with equal intervals between response categories like comprising close-ended questions.

The questionnaire in this study contained 09 questions with sub-questions make a total of 90 questions. All these questions are classified under 7 parts. Part – I elicits the perception of the respondents the concept of corporate governance. Part –II of the questionnaire deals with the obstacles that obstruct effective corporate governance practices in India,   whereas the Part-III explore the various enablers which makes the practices of the corporate governance effective and efficient. Part- IV of the questionnaire deals with the relationship between corporate governance practices in India and its impact on the value creation of the companies. Part- V of the questionnaire collects the views of respondents about the suggested norms to be implemented for strengthening the current state of corporate governance practices in India and Part –VI deals with the statements evaluating the overall questionnaire to check its validity and reliability. Finally the Part –VII elicits the Personal Profile (demographic details) of the respondents

as well as their level of knowledge and understanding about the corporate governance practices in India.

The pilot study consisted of presenting a set of a questionnaire comprising of individual questions with a view of collecting the primary data on practices, awareness, and practicability of objective and effectiveness of corporate governance practices. The pilot study was done by administering a pre-test questionnaire to a group of practicing selected directors of the listed companies, company secretaries, chartered accountants, and executive of the ministry of corporate affairs, who were directly or indirectly practicing corporate governance. The group taking part in the study were informed about the objective of the questionnaire and were asked to evaluate the questionnaire keeping in view the research objectives and were permitted to make necessary changes in the questionnaire wherever required. The questionnaire was then edited accordingly. The pre-test reframed questionnaire was then presented to a group of three experts who examined and suggested changes. A pilot study of the questionnaire was conducted in order to bring about the evaluation of all important variables on corporate governance practices (Smith, Qualitative Psychology, 2003)

The last draft of the questionnaire was then finalized as per the suggestions of the pilot study and the advisors and after that questionnaire was prepared to be introduced to the respondents in the exploration **(Annexure-II).**

4.2. Research Methodology

4.2.1 Study population and sample (questionnaire)

A questionnaire is a list of carefully structured questions selected after considerable testing with a view to eliciting reliable responses from a chosen sample (Collis, 2003), Similarly, a questionnaire is a pre-formulated written set of questions to which respondents record their answers, usually on the basis of rather closely defined alternative (Sekaran, 2003) . That is, the value of the questionnaire method is that all of the information collected relates to research

questions that will help the decision-maker address the current business problem (Zikmund, 2010) As a result; the questionnaire survey is the most frequently used method in the social science field. In the questionnaire method, all respondents are asked the same questions in the same circumstances (Thorpe, 2008).

The reasons for using a questionnaire in this research are as follows. First, it is the most common method of data collection in survey research because it assures the anonymity of respondents and enables them to respond more freely and at their convenience. This has a positive effect on the credibility of the research, as the data gathered are believed to be representative of the respondents' knowledge of the subject. Second, it is suitable for an individual researcher who has limited resources in terms of time and cost. Third, it can be distributed to large numbers of respondents, which lends greater credibility to the data collected.

As mentioned earlier, the main aim of this part of the study is to investigate the perceptions of stakeholders concerning the current state of the corporate governance of listed companies in India. Thus, the study was designed to survey five different groups of stakeholders identified as respondents who could provide the required information for data collection in relation to corporate governance practices in India. The stakeholders groups are: (1)Company secretaries (Practicing as well as in Employment) (2)Chartered Accountants (3)Cost Accountants (4)Executives of Bombay stock exchange (5) Executives of National stock exchange (6)Retail Investors (7) Executives of Institutional Investors (8) Officers of Registrar of Companies (9) Directors of the Companies.

The main reason for choosing these nine groups was based on previous research in different countries that had identified these participants as the most relevant groups in relation to the issue of corporate governance (Goodwin, 2002) & (Wanyama, 2009). The information about participants was collected from the website of the ICAI, ICSI, Stockbrokers and from the personal relation of the researcher.

4.2.2 Content of the questionnaire

Many different types of questions can be used in research, including personal factual questions, factual questions on other topics, informant factual questions, questions about attitudes and beliefs, questions about normative standards and values, and questions about knowledge (Bel, 2011). A copy of the questionnaire used in this study is provided in Appendix 3. The final questionnaire in this study is divided into the following parts.

1. Concept of corporate governance

This part of the questionnaire was designed to obtain respondents' perceptions of the concept of corporate governance in the Indian context. The first question elicited respondents' opinions regarding the definition of corporate governance by providing three definitions of the term. The answers for this question ranged from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' on a five-point scale, Strongly Agree = 5, Agree = 4, Indifferent = 3, Disagree = 2 and Strongly Disagree = 1. The second question focused on views from various study groups regarding the significance of corporate governance in India. The answers for this question ranged from ranking from 1 to 9 amongst the Shareholders, Investors, Managers/CEOs, Employees, Creditors, Government, Customers, Auditors, and Local community. These statements are related to the first objective of the study i.e. to study the corporate governance disclosure practices in India.

2. Obstacles to corporate governance

This section aims to elicit more details on possible obstacles that might affect corporate governance practice in India, including weak legal controls and law enforcement; culture of the India community; weak accounting and auditing profession; poor-quality accounting and finance education; weak infrastructures of financial institutions; lack of legal and regulatory systems that govern companies' activities; government interference in business activities; the state of the Indian economy; the costs of practicing good corporate governance outweigh the benefits; poor financial and non-financial disclosure; and a good relationship

between the company and the external auditors. The answers for this question ranged from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' on a five-point scale, Strongly Agree = 5, Agree = 4, Indifferent = 3, Disagree = 2 and Strongly Disagree = 1. These statements are related to the first objective of the study i.e. to study the corporate governance disclosure practices in India.

3. Enablers that improve corporate governance

This part of the questionnaire endeavors to obtain respondents' opinions regarding the enabling factors that could improve corporate governance practice in companies. Enabling factors include: ensuring wide adoption of international accounting and auditing standards; using training and other means of support; developing incentive programs for compliance with the principles of corporate governance; establishing corporate governance education programs at universities; establishing an institute of directors for training, raising awareness and education for CEOs, directors, and board members; enhancing professional accounting and auditing bodies; participating in international events, conferences, meetings, and committees dealing with corporate governance; encouraging research into corporate governance in the India; learning from the experiences of other countries concerning corporate governance practice; and initiating regional corporate governance partnership programs with international organizations such as the OECD. The answers for this question ranged from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' on a five-point scale, Strongly Agree = 5, Agree = 4, Indifferent = 3, Disagree = 2 and Strongly Disagree = 1. These statements are related to the second objective of the study i.e. study various indicators of corporate governance practices in India.

4. Corporate governance and its impact on value creation.

This part of the questionnaire aims to elicit the views of the respondents regarding the relationship of the various components of corporate governance and its impact on the value creation of companies. This part of the questionnaire is divided into two questions. The first question elicited respondents' opinions regarding the most appropriate tool for measuring the value creation amongst Economic Value

Added (EVA), Market Value Added (MVA), Return on Investment (ROI), Return on Asset (ROA), Tobin's q. Further, the second question elicited respondents' opinions regarding the impact of various components of corporate governance on value creation. The answers for this question ranged from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' on a five-point scale, Strongly Agree = 5, Agree = 4, Indifferent = 3, Disagree = 2 and Strongly Disagree = 1. These statements are related to the fourth objective of the study i.e. the impact of corporate governance on Value creation of the Companies under the Study.

5. Measures to strengthen corporate governance practices

This section deals with the suggestion for improvement in various components of corporate governance to strengthen the current practices of corporate governance practices in India. The opinions of the respondent were taken regarding the improvement suggested in following components of the corporate governance: (1) Composition and role of the board of directors (2) board committees (3) Enhanced monitoring of group entities (4) Related party transactions (5) Disclosures and transparency (6) Accounting and Audit (6) Investor participation in meetings of listed companies. The statements in this section are derived from suggestions developed by analyzing the deficiencies in the current corporate governance framework of India. The answers for this question ranged from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' on a five-point scale, Strongly Agree = 5, Agree = 4, Indifferent = 3, Disagree = 2 and Strongly Disagree = 1. These statements are related to the fifth objective of the study i.e. recommend new components of the corporate governance through which the value of the companies from shareholder angle can be maximized.

6. Demography information

This part of the questionnaire attempts to obtain demographic information from respondents (age, position, working experience, educational level, and academic major). Demographic information helps to describe participants' (manager/CEO, the board of directors, audit committee members, internal auditors, and

accountants) characteristics when the researcher is analyzing the results of the research. Further, personal information and demographics are useful for the researcher to justify various perceptions among groups.

In general, the aim of the questionnaire survey in this study is to obtain perceptions of current corporate governance practices in India. Hence, the questionnaire needs to be devised in such a way that it is specific enough to elicit answers to the questions but general enough to ensure that respondents do not reveal any sensitive information. As mentioned earlier, closed-ended questions offer a selection of answers from which the respondent is asked to select one. For this reason, questions in this instrument are closed-ended and have been constructed according to the five-point Likert scale, as advocated by (Bel, 2011) (Hussey, 1997) for cases similar to the current study.

4.2.3. Data Analysis Techniques

The questionnaires that were completed in all respects were only considered for the analysis. The raw data collected was further converted into numerical data, coded and fed into a computer for analysis and storage. It was stored in the form of a data file using MS Excel. The data collected were coded and subjected to statistical analysis. Consultation with the expert and available statistical package for social sciences (SPSS version 15) software was used for data analysis. The statistical analysis of the variables in the study has been performed using the following tests:

- ✓ Descriptive Statistics,
- ✓ Rank order
- ✓ Cronbach alpha
- ✓ One way ANOVA
- ✓ The Kruskal–Wallis test

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a study, to simply describe what is or what the data shows and to present quantitative descriptions in a manageable form. They provide simple summaries about the sample and the measures. Together with simple graphics analysis, they form the basis of virtually every quantitative analysis of data. Descriptive statistics helps to simplify large amounts of data in a sensible way.

In this study, frequency distribution, percentages, graphs, Mean and Standard Deviation used for better understanding and presentation of raw data.

Cronbach alpha

Instrument reliability was tested by evaluating the Cronbach alpha coefficient, which is the usual method accepted by researchers. (Smith, Qualitative Psychology – a Practical Guide to Research Methods, 2003) Coefficient alpha indicates the degree of internal consistency among items in the questionnaire. Further, it also suggests how well items in a set are positively correlated to each other. (Sekaran, 2003) Although the range of Cronbach alpha is from 0 to 1, values closer to 1 are accepted to have greater internal consistency. Any value above 0.6 is considered to be good and lesser than that as poor. (Nunnally, 1981)

In this present study, Consultation with the expert and available software data analyzed and the reliability was calculated. Cranach's alpha was calculated to find the reliability factor for all the main research variables.

Kruskal–Wallis test

Kruskal–Wallis is a non-parametric test that will be adopted to test the differences between respondents' perceptions (manager or CEO, members of the board, audit committee members, internal auditors, and accountants). It is a test of one-way, between-group analysis of variance that allows a comparison of three or more groups (Pallant, 2001), and it is used to test several independent samples. Consequently, in the present study, the Kruskal–Wallis test is used to establish any differences in average responses across the five groups in their answers to

each question. When the result of the Kruskal–Wallis test is significant, it indicates that at least one of the five groups in the current study is different from at least one of the others. In this study, the Kruskal–Wallis test has been conducted at a 95% level of confidence (Silver, MS, 1997).

4.3. Data Analysis

4.3.1 Reliability of the Structured Questionnaire

Reliability refers to the extent to which a scale produces consistent results if repeated measurements are made on the characteristics. One of the popular approaches for assessing reliability includes the Internal Consistency Reliability method which is used to assess the reliability of a summated scale where several items are summed to form a total score. Instrument reliability was tested by evaluating the Cronbach alpha coefficient, which is the usual method accepted by researchers (Smith, Qualitative Psychology, 2003). Coefficient alpha indicates the degree of internal consistency among items in the questionnaire. Further, it also suggests how well items in a set are positively correlated to each other (Sekaran, 2003). Although the range of Cronbach alpha is from 0 to 1, values closer to 1 are accepted to have greater internal consistency. Any value above 0.6 is considered to be good and lesser than that as poor (Nunnally, 1981). An overview of all the Cronbach alpha coefficients is illustrated in the table:

Reliability Statistics

Table 4.1

Summary of Indicators and Reliability Alpha Score

Measures	Cronbach alpha coefficients	N of Items
1. List of possible definitions of Corporate Governance		
2. Obstacles that affect Corporate Governance		
3. Enablers that improve Corporate Governance		
4. Corporate Governance and value creation of companies	0.982	74
5. Measures to strengthen corporate governance practices		
6. Overall evaluation		

The Cronbach alpha coefficient was calculated in order to check if the items that make up perception of the respondents toward the prevalent corporate governance practices in India, obstacles that affect the good corporate governance practices in India, Enablers that improves the corporate governance practices, to check the perception of the respondents toward the relationship between the corporate governance practices and value creation of the companies and about the measures to be taken to strengthen the corporate governance practices Testing the scale for reliability revealed that for all above statements Cronbach alpha coefficient of 0.982. Therefore, this scale is considered reliable.

4.3.2 Validity of the Structured Questionnaire

In this empirical investigation, while undertaking this research study, the structured questionnaire was given to respondents and results of measurement of the criterion wise validity and overall means score is given in the tabular form. It had total number of VI parts inclusive of the concept of corporate governance; Obstacles that affect corporate governance, Enablers that improve corporate governance, Relationship between corporate governance and value creation and measures to strengthen the corporate governance practices – (Part I to V); and also their overall opinion respectively (Part -VI) (Naresh K. Malhotra , David F. Birks, 2007)

Table 4.2

Table Showing Comparison of Mean Scores of Extent of Respondents' Impact of

Corporate Governance on Value Creation of Companies: An Indian Experience

Respondent's Opinion with respect to Criteria		Respondent's Opinion with respect to Criteria		Difference in Mean Count (Column 2- Column4)
Part –II to V	Mean Score	Part – VI (Question 8.1 to 8.4)	Mean Score	
1	2	3	4	5
Obstacles that affect corporate governance	4.24	Various obstacles affect to the effective implementation of corporate governance practice in India	4.56	-0.32
Enablers that improve corporate governance	4.38	Corporate Governance practices in India can be improved with the aid of enablers	4.49	-0.11
Corporate governance and value creation of companies	4.15	Corporate governance practices are positively related to the value creation of the companies	4.15	0.00
Measures to strengthen corporate governance practices	4.61	Existing corporate governance practices needs to be strengthened	4.61	0.00
Overall Average	4.34		4.45	-0.11

Convergent Validity has been measured by comparing mean scores of scale with other measures of the same construct. It becomes clear from the table that the means of the same construct were measured and less variation was observed in the given question categories and the average score was found to be as similar. The majority of the Respondents were found as placed between 'Strongly Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree with Category'.

4.3.3 Respondents' Profile

The main aim of this survey was to collect the views of Company Secretaries, Chartered Accountants, Cost Accountants, Executives of Bombay stock exchange, Executives of National stock exchange, Retail Investors, Executives of Institutional Investors, Officers of Registrar of Companies and Directors of the

Companies with regard to the corporate governance practices followed by the Indian corporates and its impact on value creation of the companies. Therefore, these questionnaires were circulated to the respondents from a wide range of different age groups, qualifications, experience, etc. The present section presents the overall profile of the respondents in terms of their age, educational background, professional qualification, employment, and work experience.

The age group of the respondents

All the respondents were divided into five age groups as specified in table 4.3

Table 4.3

Age Group of the Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	30 years or less	22	14.0	14.0	14.0
	31–40 years	34	21.7	21.7	35.7
	41–50 years	57	36.3	36.3	72.0
	51–60 years	27	17.2	17.2	89.2
	More than 60 years	17	10.8	10.8	100.0
	Total	157	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.3 illustrates the distribution of respondents based on age. The results show that 14.0% of those surveyed were less than 30 years old, while 21.7% and 36.3% of the respondents were aged 31–40 and 41–50 years old, respectively. 17.2 % of respondents were aged 51–60 and 10.8% were over 60 years old. Overall, 86.0% were at least 31 years old, 64.3% were more than 40 years old, and one-fourth of the participants were more than 50 years old. However only 10.8% of the respondents were more than 60 years old, these results are consistent with expectations because people who work at top management (CEOs and board members) usually acquire their jobs after attaining many years of experience. The same is presented here with the help of pie chart as shown in Graph number 4.1:

Chart 4.1

Age Group of Respondents

Legend:
- 30 years or less
- 31–40 years
- 41–50 years
- 51–60 years
- More than 60 years

Values shown: 10.83%, 14.01%, 21.66%, 36.31%, 17.20%

The mix of respondents indicates that highly experienced respondents having age 4 0years or more makes about 64.34 % of the total respondents. This indicates that respondents with more experience and knowledge are higher which can be helpful in any discussion related to corporate governance's practices and measures required to improve the corporate governance practices as well as how corporate governance helps the company to create the value for the stockholders.

Gender of the respondents

The respondents of the survey are consist of the male and female both, table number 4.4 shows the gender of the total respondents:

Table 4.4
Gender of the Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	128	81.5	81.5	81.5
	Female	29	18.5	18.5	100.0
	Total	157	100.0	100.0	

From the above table, it is observed that 81.5 % of the respondents are male and 18.5 % are female. The same is presented in the pie chart graph number 4.2

Chart 4.2

Gender of the Respondents

Gender

Male
Female

18.47%

81.53%

From the above table and Graph, we can interpret that there are 157 respondents were chosen for the analysis. Out of which 128 of the respondents are male while 29 of them are female.

Education Qualification of the Respondents
Graduate

In order to obtain views of Company Secretaries, Chartered Accountants, Cost Accountants, Executives of Bombay stock exchange, Executives of National stock exchange, Retail Investors, Executives of Institutional Investors, Officers of Registrar of Companies and Directors of the Companies. Educational qualifications of the respondents have been divided into two groups: respondents holding graduate degrees [Table 4.5] postgraduate degree [Table 4.6] and professional qualification [Table 4.7].

Table 4.5

Education Qualification of the Respondents

Graduate				
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	156	99.4	99.4	99.4
	No	1	.6	.6	100.0
	Total	157	100.0	100.0	

From the above table, it is observed that 99.4 % of the respondents are graduate

The same is presented in the pie chart graph number 4.3

Chart 4.3

Graduate Respondents

Graduate

The mix of respondents indicates that respondents having graduation makes about 99.4% of the total respondents. This indicates that respondents with graduation can be helpful in proper discussion related to corporate governance practices and their impact on corporate value creation.

Post Graduate

Table 4.6

Education Qualification (Post Graduate) of the Respondents

Post Graduate		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	143	91.1	91.1	91.1
	No	14	8.9	8.9	100.0
	Total	157	100.0	100.0	

From the above table, it is inferred that 91.1% of the respondents are post graduated. The master level knowledge of the respondents' lead proper discussion related to corporate governance practices and its impact on corporate value creation.

Professional Qualification

<center>Table 4.7</center>

<center>**Professional Qualification of the Respondents**</center>

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	79	50.3	50.3	50.3
	No	78	49.7	49.7	100.0
	Total	157	100.0	100.0	

From the above table, it is inferred that 50.3% of the respondents are holding a professional qualification and 49.70% of the respondents are not holding any professional qualification, the same is shown in graph number 4.4

<center>**Chart 4.4**</center>

<center>**Respondents having Professional Qualifications**</center>

From above chart it is clear that 50.32% of the respondents are holding professional qualification like CA, CS, CMA, and CFA, who are practicing the corporate governance in their day to day professional life and are having the clear-cut understanding about the prevalent corporate governance practices, this implies that their opinion can be very useful to understand the state of corporate governance practices in India and its impact on shareholders' value creation.

Work Experience:-

Table 4.8

Work Experience of the Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Less than 10 years	23	14.6	14.6	14.6
	10-20 years	33	21.0	21.0	35.7
	More than 20 years	101	64.3	64.3	100.0
	Total	157	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.8 shows that 14.6 % of the respondents had less than ten years of work experience in the field. Almost one-fifth (21.0%) had 10–20 years of work experience. Those with work experience more than years comprised 64.3% of the sample, More than eight out of 8 (85.4%) had at least 10 years of work experience, this can be useful to know about awareness and practicability of objective and effectiveness of corporate governance as a tool of shareholders value creation. The same is shown in graph number 4.5.

Chart 4.5

Work Experience of the Respondents

Job position-wise

Table 4.9

Job position of the Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Respondent Category				
Valid	Company secretary	30	19.1	19.1	19.1
	Chartered Accountant	35	22.3	22.3	41.4
	Cost Accountant	14	8.9	8.9	50.3
	Executive –BSE	3	1.9	1.9	52.2
	Executive –NSE	3	1.9	1.9	54.1
	Retail Investor	35	22.3	22.3	76.4
	Executive of Institutional Investor	4	2.5	2.5	79.0
	Officer of Registrar of Companies	8	5.1	5.1	84.1
	Directors of the Companies	25	15.9	15.9	100.0
	Total	157	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.9 shows the distribution of the respondents by job position. The lowest percentage is that of the executives of national stock exchange and Bombay stock exchange 1.9 % and 1.9 % respectively, followed by executives of Institutional investors 2.5 % and officers of a registrar of companies 5.1%. The percentages for Chartered Accountants, Company Secretaries, Cost Accountants are 22.3% and 19.1%, and 8.9 % respectively and 50.3 % in aggregate. However, 22.3% of the respondents are retail investors. In general, 50.3% of respondents comprised of professional about 49.7% of the respondents are comprised of executives of stock exchanges, Institutional Investors, Registrar of Companies. The respondents are consist of the proper balance of the people practicing corporate governance in their day to day professional or business life. The same is shown in graph number 4.6

Chart 4.6

Job position/Category of the Respondents of the Respondents

Respondent Category

Legend:
- Company secretary
- Chartered Accountant
- Cost Accountant
- Executive -BSE
- Executive -NSE
- Retail Investor
- Executive of Institutional Investor
- Officer of Registrar of Companies
- Directors of the Companies

Values: 19.11%, 22.29%, 8.92%, 1.91%, 22.29%, 2.55%, 5.10%, 15.92%

Level of knowledge of respondents Understanding the concept of corporate Governance

A question was asked to the respondents, to rate their knowledge about the corporate governance practices on Likert scale of 1 to 5, (1= beginner, 2 = Basic Knowledge, 3= Average Knowledge, 4= Working Knowledge, 5 = Expert Knowledge) and based on the responses given by the respondents they can be classified as shown in table no.4.10

Table 4.10

Level of Knowledge about Corporate Governance practices

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Beginners	0	0	0	0
	Basic Knowledge	19	12.1	12.1	12.1
	Average	26	16.6	16.6	28.7
	Working	60	38.2	38.2	66.9
	Expert	52	33.1	33.1	100.0
	Total	157	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.10 shows the distribution of the respondents based on the degree of the knowledge possessed by the respondents about the corporate governance practices and it appears that around one-third of respondents i.e. 33.1% possess the expert-level knowledge and 38.2 % of respondents possesses working-level knowledge, whereas 12.1% and 16.6 % of the respondents possess basic knowledge and average level knowledge respectively and the 0% of the respondents are the beginners. The same thing is shown by the same is shown in graph number 4.6

Chart 4.7

Level of Knowledge about Corporate Governance practices

Rate your understanding about corporate governance

From the above chart, it is clear that the majority of the respondents possess sound knowledge of corporate governance practices.

4.3.4. Descriptive Analysis

The descriptive statistics of data consist of frequencies and percentages for responses and overall mean scores, standard deviations and rankings for respondents according to the level of agreement in each group of questions. Further, a mean group is utilized in order to provide an understanding of respondents' perceptions regarding different questions. The questionnaire in this study utilizes a five-point Likert scale ('strongly disagree', 'disagree', 'neutral', 'agree', 'strongly agree') in most of the questions to measure the average mean of different groups of perceptions. (Robson, 2002) argues that 'Weights of 1, 2, 3, 4,

and 5 are assigned to these alternatives, with the direction of weighting depending on whether the statement is positive or negative (e.g., 5 for a 'strongly agree' with a positive statement, and 'strongly disagree' with a negative statement'. Such a ranking order is particularly important for this study because it indicates respondents. This technique can help the researcher describe the characteristics or average scores and the variability of scores in the sample (Zikmund, 2000). The current study uses descriptive statistical measures (such as means, frequency distribution, percentage, rank, and standard deviation) to analyze the current state of corporate governance in India. Descriptive statistics is a general means to explore the data collected and summarized in the form of graphs and tables. This is usually the initial procedure undertaken in order to observe and obtain a general idea about the data. The following section presents the descriptive statistics for each variable in this study.

Concept of Corporate Governance

In this section, the investigation of stakeholders' perceptions of the concept of corporate governance in India was divided into two. The first part determined the respondents' attitudes towards three definitions of corporate governance. The study participants were given a list of possible definitions of corporate governance, which were constructed from the contrasting theoretical standpoints of shareholder and stakeholder theories. The second part relates to the significance of stakeholders of the implementation of good corporate governance practices in listed companies.

Definitions of corporate governance

This section examines respondents' perceptions regarding the definition of corporate governance. Participants were asked three questions: the first related to the shareholder model; the second was about stakeholders who affect or were affected by the company's decision, and the third was about the stakeholder irrespective of whether they affect or are affected by the company's decision. Respondents were requested to indicate their opinion on a five-point scale ranging

from strong disagreement to strong agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

Table 4.11

Frequency (N), Percentage Distribution (%), Mean and Standard Deviation (SD) of Responses towards the Statements on Definition of Corporate Governance

Sr. No.	Statements	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with its shareholders to ensure that it acts in accordance with the interests of those shareholders.	3.62	1.118	3
2.	Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all stakeholders who are affected by or affect the organization's operations and decisions.	4.06	0.527	2
3.	Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all members of society, irrespective of whether they affect or are affected by the organization's operations and decisions.	4.52	0.938	1

Table 4.11 shows the respondents' views on the three definitions of corporate governance. The mean of responses of definition 3 defined corporate governance in terms of an organization's relationship with all members of society, irrespective of whether they affect or are affected by the organization's operations and decisions. The participants strongly agree with this definition (mean =4.52, SD 0.938).

Definition 2 defined corporate governance as an organization's relationship with all stakeholders who are affected by or affect the organization's operations and decisions this definition received comparatively less support to the agreement (mean = 4.06, SD = 0.527).

Whereas definition 1 which defines corporate governance as the organization's relationship with only its shareholders to ensure that it acts in accordance with the

interests of those shareholders. The participants have disagreed or indifferent in their opinion (mean =3.62, SD 1.118).

So based on the agreement of the respondents with the definition of the corporate governance the definition 3 is ranked as 1, whereas definition 1 and 2 is ranked as 3 and 2 respectively.

Significance of implementation of corporate governance in India

The survey also inquired about the significance of the implementation of good corporate governance practices in Indian companies to shareholders, investors, managers/CEOs, employees, creditors (banks, suppliers), customers, auditors, the government and the local community. To calculate a summary rank-ordering, the attributes with the first rank given the lowest number (1) and least preferred attribute were given the highest number (9) and then summarized rank order is obtained by calculating the rank score. The total lowest score indicates the first preference ranking. Table 4.12 shows the total rank score and rank order.

Table 4.12
Responses towards Significance wise ranking of stakeholders of
Corporate Governance Practices

Stakeholders of corporate governance	Rank									Total rank Score	Rank order
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
Shareholder	138	17	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	178	1
Investor	17	106	5	4	25	0	0	0	0	385	2
Manager/CEO	1	1	3	43	2	10	5	92	0	1025	7
Employees	0	2	118	12	3	4	14	2	2	577	3
Creditors	0	27	11	0	0	98	0	20	1	844	5
Government	0	0	3	2	4	36	98	12	2	1053	8
Customer	0	0	0	94	15	1	33	6	8	808	4
Auditor	1	0	14	0	13	7	1	2	119	1244	9
Local Community	0	4	1	2	95	1	6	23	25	951	6
Total	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157		

The results in Table 4.12 show that the respondents believed that shareholders are the main beneficiaries of good corporate governance and for the corporate governance practices are significant as with the rank score 1st. The majority of respondents agreed with the importance of applying good corporate governance to

Investors, employees, customers which ranked 2nd, 3rd and 4th respectively. Corporate governance is of moderate importance for creditors, local community and manager/CEOs as opined by the respondents by allotting rank 5th, 6th and 7th respectively. The government was ranked at 8th position amongst 9 positions by the respondents for the importance of corporate governance. Whereas the least important beneficiary was the auditors. In general, these findings show that respondents believe that these corporate governance practices are significant to all nine stakeholder groups, with varying levels of agreement.

Possible obstacles affect the practice of corporate governance

This section investigates the sixth objective with respect to the obstacles that might affect the implementation of corporate governance in India. To achieve this objective, the participants were provided with a list of obstacles and asked to rate the extent to which they thought these obstacles might affect the development of corporate governance in India. They used a standard five-point Likert scale to indicate their level of agreement (1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = Indifferent, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree.

Table 4.13
Showing obstacles that affect corporate governance

Sr.No.	Obstacles	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	Weak legal controls and law enforcement	4.37	1.44	7
2.	culture of Indian the community	4.12	1.25	8
3.	The present state of accounting and auditing profession	3.24	1.29	11
4.	The present state of Accounting and finance education	4.44	0.97	5
5.	Policies of financial institutions	3.75	1.72	10
6.	Legal and regulatory systems that govern companies' activities	4.83	0.54	1
7.	Government interference in business activities	4.49	0.95	4
8.	The state of the Indian economy	3.89	1.10	9
9.	The costs of practicing good corporate governance outweigh the benefits	4.41	1.35	6
10.	Excess financial and non-financial disclosure	4.51	1.10	3
11.	The good relationship between the company and the external auditors	4.78	0.748	2

The results in Table 4.13 show that respondents agreed with the majority of items listed as barriers that might affect the implementation of corporate governance in the, with mean scores ranges from 4.12 to 4.83. Respondents ranked 'Legal and regulatory systems that govern companies' activities' and 'Good relationship between the company and the external auditors' as the first and second possible barriers, with mean scores of 4.83 and 4.78, respectively. However, their level of agreement differed as indicated by the variation in the mean scores.

'Excess financial and non-financial disclosure 'was ranked as the third possible barrier (mean = 4.51), while the 'Government interference in business activities' was ranked as the fourth barrier (mean = 4.49). Respondents ranked 'poor quality accounting and finance education' as the fifth barrier (mean = 4.44). 'The costs of practicing good corporate governance outweigh the benefits' was ranked as the sixth possible barrier (mean = 4.41) Respondents ranked 'Weak legal controls and law enforcement' as a seventh possible obstacle to the good corporate governance (mean= 4.37). 'Culture of Indian the community' marked as one of the barriers to practice good governance incorporates, by the respondents (mean = 4.12).

Table 4.13 shows that respondents considered the aforementioned items the main barriers that might affect the implementation of corporate governance. Barriers such as 'The state of the Indian economy', and 'Policies of financial institutions' (mean = 3.89 and 3.75 respectively) were not given as much importance. The least important barrier was the 'Present state of accounting and auditing profession' (mean = 3.24).

Enablers improve the practice of corporate governance in India.
This section investigates the sixth objective, which is possible enablers that could enhance the implementation of corporate governance in India to achieve this objective, the participants were given a list of enablers and asked to rate the extent to which these enablers could enhance the implementation of corporate governance practice in India. The participants used a standard five-point Likert

scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

Table 4.14

Showing enablers that Improve corporate governance practices

Sr.No.	Enablers	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	Ensuring wide adoption of international accounting and auditing standards	3.97	1.72	8
2.	Using training and other means of support	3.97	1.55	7
3.	Developing incentive programs for compliance with principles of corporate governance	4.46	1.11	6
4.	Establishing corporate governance education programs at universities	4.48	0.89	5
5.	Establishing an institute of directors for training, raising awareness and education for CEOs, directors and board members	3.94	1.68	9
6.	Enhancing professional accounting and auditing bodies	4.55	1.20	3
7.	Participating in international events, conferences, meetings, and committees dealing with corporate governance	4.67	0.90	2
8.	Encouraging research into corporate governance in India	3.87	0.74	10
9.	Learning from the experiences of other countries concerning corporate governance practice	4.72	0.61	1
10.	Initiating regional corporate governance partnership programs with international organizations such as the OECD	4.52	1.19	4

The results in Table 4.14 show that respondents agreed with the importance of majority items in enhancing the implementation of corporate governance in Indian companies. Most items recorded mean scores above 4.00. Majority of the respondents ranked 'Learning from the experiences of other countries concerning corporate governance practice' (mean=4.72, SD =0.61) and 'Participating in international events, conferences, meetings and committees dealing with corporate governance' (mean = 4.67, SD =0.90) as the first and second enablers. Enhancing professional accounting and auditing bodies was ranked third (mean = 4.55, SD = 1.20).

Table 4.14 shows that the participants also agreed with the importance of the following statements (with mean scores between 4.46 and 4.52): Developing incentive programs for compliance with principles of corporate governance; Establishing corporate governance education programs at universities; Initiating regional corporate governance partnership programs with international organizations such as the OECD; The less important items included the following: Using training and other means of support; Ensuring wide adoption of international accounting and auditing standards; Establishing an institute of directors for training, raising awareness and education for CEOs, directors, and board members; Encouraging research into corporate governance in the India (with mean scores below 4.00).

Tools to measure value creation of companies

This section investigates the fourth objective, whether the corporate governance practices in India affects to the corporate value creation or not? To achieve this objective, the participants were given a list of tools that are useful to measure the value creation of companies and asked to rate the extent to which these tools are useful to measure the value creation of companies. The participants used a standard five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

Table 4.15
Showing agreement of respondents towards the tools to measure the value creation of companies

Sr. No.	Measures	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	Economic Value Added (EVA)	4.81	0.48	1
2.	Market Value Added (MVA)	4.20	0.58	2
3.	Return on Investment (ROI)	3.89	1.07	5
4.	Return on Asset (ROA)	4.06	1.56	3
5.	Tobin's q	4.03	0.73	4

The results in Table 4.15 show that respondents agreed with the majority of tools to measure the value creation of companies listed in the respective question. The respondents ranked 'Economic Value Added (EVA)' (mean=4.81, SD =0.61) and

'Market Value Added (MVA)' (mean = 4.20, SD =0.58) as the first and second tools to measure the value creation of the company. Return on Asset (ROA) ranked third (mean = 4.06, SD = 1.56). Respondents also agree with the 'Tobin's q' as a tool to measure the value creation of companies and have ranked 4th amongst the list of 5 attributes, however, the least important tool was 'Return on Investment (ROI)' (mean = 3.89).

Relationship between corporate governance and value creation

In order to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and value creation in line with the fourth objective of the study, five statements identifying the relationship between various components of corporate governance and corporate value creation were listed out and respondents were asked to evaluate the statements on 5-Likert scale ranging from Strongly Agree = 5 to Strongly Disagree = 1.

Table 4.16

Showing responses to the relationship between components of corporate governance and value creation

Sr. No.	Statements	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	Composition of boards, especially their independence in law and in spirit from the company's management; results into value creation of the company	4.17	1.45	4
2.	Composition and independence of key committees such as the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration committee leads value creation of Company	4.49	1.07	2
3.	Independence of the companies' auditors and the quality of audit of its financial statements create the value of a company	4.45	0.923	3
4.	Careful balancing of the interests of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders creates a value of the company	4.68	0.552	1
5.	Corporate governance practices adopted by the company does not affect the value creation of the companies	1.90	1.17	5

From the above table, it is evident that respondents expressed agreement with all most all the statements showing the relationship between corporate governance

and corporate value creation except statement 5. 'Careful balancing of the interests of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders creates a value of the company' this statement is ranked 1st by the respondents (mean=4.68, SD = 0552).

Table 4.16 shows that the participants also agreed with the of the following statements showing the relationship between corporate governance (with mean scores between 4.17 and 4.49) Composition of boards, especially their independence in law and in spirit from the company's management; results into value creation of company; Independence of the companies' auditors and the quality of audit of its financial statements creates a value of company; Composition and independence of key-board committees such as the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration committee leads value creation of Company.

With statement 5 'Corporate governance practices adopted by the company does not affect to the value creation of the companies' almost all the respondents are disagree and it is ranked 5th, So none of the respondents agreed with the statement 'Corporate governance practices adopted by the company does not affect to the value creation of the companies'.

Measures to strengthen corporate governance practices
This section aims to investigate the current state of corporate governance practices and to know the perception of the respondents about the measures to strengthen the current state of corporate governance practices in India. For developing the statements in this section the measures to strengthen the corporate governance practices were developed based on the practical issues in the implementation of good corporate governance practices. The statements asked in this section were developed based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, based on the corporate governance principles the statements were classified in following seven categories ; (1) Composition and role of board of

director (2) Board committees (3) Enhance monitoring of group entities (4) Related parties transaction (5) Disclosures and transparency (6) Accounting and Audit (7) Investor participation in meeting of Companies, in all the categories of statements respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Composition and role of the board of director

In this category of the 13 statements suggesting the measures to strengthen corporate governance practices through the proper board composition and by the improvement of role board of directors were developed and respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Table 4.17

Showing responses towards the statements on strengthening the corporate governance practices through board composition and role of the board of directors

Sr.	COMPOSITION AND ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	There is no need to change the current requirement of a minimum of 3 directors in the public limited company.	1.39	1.024	13
2.	There is a need to increase the minimum number of directors in the public limited company from 3 to 6 or more.	3.96	1.702	11
3.	Gender diversity positively affects the decision-making process of the corporate board	4.40	1.192	6
4.	There should be at least one independent women director on the board of the company	4.19	1.297	9
5.	Director should vacate his office if he remains absent for all the meetings held in the last 12 months.	4.02	1.443	10
6.	The expertise matrix of the board should be regularly disclosed to the shareholders.	4.70	0.655	2
7.	There should be an age of retirement for the Independent Directors.	4.34	1.279	8

8.	The company should conduct at least one updation program for all the directors on changes in applicable laws and regulations.	4.62	0.694	3
9.	The quorum for a board meeting is required to be increased from a minimum of 2 directors to 3 directors and out of the one director should be an independent director.	4.52	1.113	4
10.	The maximum number of directorship of directors in listed companies should be reduced	4.43	1.272	5
11.	If the Independent director retires before the term, he/she should give details of reasons for resignation to the shareholders.	4.73	0.634	1
12.	There should be an appointment with the lead Independent director.	4.36	1.291	7
13.	There should be at least one exclusive meeting of Independent directors should be held in a financial year.	3.88	1.759	12

In relation to the board composition and role of directors, Table 4.17 shows that the states with the highest level of agreement were 'If Independent director retires before the term, he/she should give details of reasons for resignation to the shareholders.' (Mean = 4.73, SD = 0.634). The table also shows that means of the ten out of thirteen statements are 4.00 or above, and respondents have shown their agreement with the majority of the measures suggested towards strengthening the corporate governance practices in India through the board process and board composition. The statement 'Expertise matrix of the board should be regularly disclosed to the shareholders.' had the second-highest level of agreement at (mean = 4.70, SD = 0.655). It reveals from the table that there was more support 'Company should conduct at least one updating program for all the directors on changes in applicable laws and regulations' with mean scores of 4.26 and 4.14, respectively. About eight out of 10 respondents agreed with the statement 'shareholders have the right to vote in general meetings' (mean = 4.62, SD = 0.694), which was ranked third.

Statements nine ('The quorum for board meeting is required to be increased from minimum 2 directors to 3 directors and out of them one director should be independent director.') and ten ('The maximum number of directorship of directors in a listed companies should be reduced') ranked fourth and fifth, with mean scores of 4.01 and 4.00, respectively. The board members and audit committee members strongly agreed with statement a8, with mean scores of 4.52 and 4.43, respectively.

The participants agreed with the statement 'Gender diversity positively affects the decision making the process of corporate board' (mean = 4.40, SD = 1.192), which was ranked sixth. The statements ranked seventh and eighth were 'There should be an appointment of lead Independent director.' and 'There should be the age of retirement for the Independent Directors.' (Mean = 4.36 and 4.34, respectively). Respondents have shown their agreement with 'There should be at least one independent women director in the board of the company' and 'Director should vacant his office, if he remains absent for all the meeting held in last 12 months.' With (mean= 4.19, 4.02 respectively)

Statement one, two and thirteen ('There is a need to increase a minimum number of directors in public limited company from 3 to 6 or more.', There should be at least one exclusive meeting of Independent directors that should be held in a financial year and 'There is a need to increase a minimum number of directors in public limited company from 3 to 6 or more'.) ranked the lowest among the thirteen statements, with a mean score of range between 1.39 to 3.88, indicating less support from the respondents.

Overall, the findings indicate that the respondents agreed with majority items, with an overall mean of more than 4. Therefore, the majority of participants agreed, albeit to varying degrees, on the suggestions given to improve corporate governance practices in India through the proper board composition and role of the board of directors.

Board committees

This part of question 7 is consists of 5 statements suggesting the measures to strengthen corporate governance practices, through the proper board committees and respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Table 4.18

Showing responses towards the statements on strengthening the corporate governance practices through Board committees

Sr. No	BOARD COMMITTEES	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	The audit committee should review the utilization of the fund invested in a subsidiary company.	4.27	1.314	4
2.	The remuneration committee should recommend the remuneration of all key managerial persons instead of the only remuneration of the board of directors.	4.42	1.075	3
3.	At least one-third of members of the nomination and remuneration committee should be Independent Directors.	4.53	1.196	2
4.	The listed entity shall constitute a Stakeholders Relationship Committee	4.94	.259	1
5.	Listed entities should constitute an information technology committee that, in addition to the risk management committee, will focus on digital and other technological aspects.	3.85	1.705	5

Table 4.18 illustrates the respondents' views concerning strengthening the corporate governance practices through the suggestions relating to a board committee. Statement 4 elicited the respondents' opinion on whether the listed entity shall constitute a Stakeholders Relationship Committee. Most of the respondents agreed with this statement (mean = 4.94, SD = 0.259), which ranked first among five. Almost all respondent groups supported this statement.

The second-ranked statement, 3, focused on whether the 'at least one-third of members of nomination and remuneration committee should be Independent Directors.'(mean = 4.53, SD = 1.196). Respondents agreed with the third-ranked statement 'Remuneration committee should recommend the remuneration all key

managerial persons instead of the only remuneration of the board of directors'
(mean = 4.42, SD = 1.075).

Statement 1 asked the respondents 'Audit committee should review the utilization of
the fund invested in the subsidiary company' the statement ranked fourth in terms of
the level of agreement (mean = 4.27, SD = 1.314). However the respondents have
given less support to the statement 5 'Listed entities should constitute an information
technology committee which, in addition to the risk management committee, will focus
on digital and other technological aspects.' and have given rank 5 out of the five
statements (mean = 3.85, SD = 1.705).

Enhance monitoring of group entities

Part 4 of the question 7 investigate respondents views regarding the use of
'enchantment group entities monitoring' as a measure to strengthen the good
corporate governance and Respondents were asked to indicate their level of
agreement with 3 statements suggested, on a five-point scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Table 4.19
**Showing responses towards the statements on strengthening the corporate
governance practices through Enhancement of monitoring of group entities**

Sr. No	ENHANCED MONITORING OF GROUP ENTITIES	Mean	SD	Rank
1	At least one Independent Director on the board of directors of the listed entity shall be a director on the board of directors of an unlisted material subsidiary, incorporated in India.	4.69	0.489	1
2.	Where a listed entity has a large number of unlisted subsidiaries dedicated group governance unit comprising the members of the board of the listed entity should be formed.	3.81	1.695	3
3.	The secretarial audit should be extended to all material unlisted Indian subsidiaries.	4.50	1.274	2

Respondents registered the highest level of agreement with the statement 'At least one Independent Director on the board of directors of the listed entity shall be a director on the board of directors of an unlisted material subsidiary, incorporated in India.' (mean = 4.69 ,SD = 0.489) Statement 3 ('Secretarial audit should be extended to all material unlisted Indian subsidiaries.') ranked second (mean=4.50, SD=1.274). However statement 2 ('Where a listed entity has a large number of unlisted subsidiaries dedicated group governance unit comprising the members of the board of the listed entity should be formed') get a less support from the respondents and have shown least agreement with statement 3 and it is ranked on 3rd position out of three statements (mean=3.81, SD = 1.695).

Overall, all items recorded mean scores between 3.81 and 4.69, indicating that the majority of participants agreed about the enchantment group entities monitoring' as a measure to strengthen the good corporate governance.

Related party transactions

This part of question 7 examines the respondents the views on the suggested statements to strengthen corporate governance practices by the improvement of disclosure and approval practices for the related party transactions and respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Table 4.20
Showing responses towards the statements on strengthening the corporate governance practices through disclosure and approval practices for the related party transactions

Sr. No	RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	Related party transactions should be disclosed half-yearly	4.06	1.503	2
2.	Related party payment relating to Brand /Royalty in excess of 5% of the total revenue of the listed entity should be made after prior approval of the majority of shares holders.	4.63	0.915	1

Table 4.20 illustrates the respondents' views concerning the strengthening the corporate governance practices through the suggestions relating to approval and

disclosure practices relating to related party transactions. Statement 2 elicited the respondents' Related party payment relating to Brand /Royalty in excess of 5% of the total revenue of the listed entity should be made after prior approval of the majority of shares holders.' Most of the respondents agreed with this statement (mean = 4.63, SD = 1.503), which ranked first among the two. Almost all respondent groups supported this statement.

Respondents had also given their agreement toward the statement 2 'Related party transactions should be disclosed half-yearly' (mean = 4.06, SD = 0.915), so the respondents have supported both the statements toward the improvement prevailing practices relating to related party transitions.

Disclosures and Transparency

Responses on statements suggesting strengthening corporate governance practices through the improvement in current disclosures and transparency practices were taken in this section of the question 7 and Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with 3 statements suggested, on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Table 4.21
Showing responses towards the statements on strengthening the corporate governance practices through improvement in current disclosure and transparency practices

Sr. No.	DISCLOSURES AND TRANSPARENCY	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	Only a soft copy of the annual report should be given to all shareholders who have registered their email addresses either with the company or with the depository unless the shareholder specifically asks for a physical copy.	4.05	1.564	4
2.	The updated list of all credit ratings obtained by the listed entity be made available in one place, which would be very helpful for investors and other stakeholders.	4.38	1.185	3

3.	In addition to financial disclosures, a listed company should also disclose a change in financial indicators along with the reasons.	4.76	0.486	1
4.	The Listed company should maintain a separate section on the website for disclosers to be made as per the SEBI (Listing obligations and disclosure requirement) regulations and update the same on a regular basis.	4.68	0.591	2

In relation to the disclosures and transparency, Table 4.21 shows that the states with the highest level of agreement were 'In addition to financial disclosures a listed company should also disclose a change in financial indicators along with the reasons.' (Mean = 4.76, SD = 0.486). The table also shows that means of all the four statements were 4.00 or above, and respondents have shown their agreement with all of the measures suggested towards strengthening the corporate governance practices in India through the improvement in disclosure and transparency practices. The statement 'The Listed company should maintain a separate section in the website for disclosers to be made as per the SEBI (Listing obligations and disclosure requirement) regulations and update the same on regular basis.' had the second-highest level of agreement at (mean = 4.68, SD = 0.591). It reveals from the table that there was more support 'Updated list of all credit ratings obtained by the listed entity be made available at one place, which would be very helpful for investors and other stakeholders' and 'Only a soft copy of the annual report should be given to all shareholders who have registered their email addresses either with the company or with the depository, unless the shareholder specifically asks for a physical copy', with mean scores of 4.38 and 4.05 respectively. Statements nine ('The quorum for board meeting is required to be increased from minimum 2 directors to 3 directors and out of them one director should be independent director.') and ten ('The maximum number of directorship of directors in a listed companies should be reduced') ranked fourth and fifth, with mean scores of 4.01 and 4.00, respectively.

Therefore, all of the participants agreed, albeit to varying degrees, on the suggestions given to improve corporate governance practices in India through the improvement in current disclosures and transparency practices.

Accounting and auditing

Respondents of nine groups were asked to opine about, strengthening the prevalent corporate governance practices in India, through the changes in current auditing and accounting practices suggested in statements of this part of question 7. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of the five principles on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Table 4.22

Showing responses towards the statements on strengthening the corporate governance practices through improvement in current Accounting and Auditing practices

Sr. No	ACCOUNTING AND AUDIT	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	If the auditor has expressed any modified opinion(s) in respect of audited financial results, the listed company should disclose the cumulative impact of the same on profit or loss, net worth, total assets, turnover/total income, earning per share, total expenditure, and total liabilities in Annual report.	4.48	1.264	3
2.	Reasons for the resignation of the Auditor should be disclosed to the shareholders.	4.43	1.183	4
3.	Disclosure of credentials and Audit fees of the auditor in the annual report	4.60	0.783	1
4.	Ind- AS must be adopted by the listed company	4.50	1.090	2

In relation to the statements relating to accounting and auditing asked to strengthen corporate governance practice, Table 4.22 shows that the states with the highest level of agreement (88.7%) were 'Disclosure of credentials and Audit fees of the auditor in the annual report' (mean = 4.60, SD = 0.783). Table 4.19 also shows that all means of the nine groups are 4.00 or above; the statement 'Ind-AS must be adopted by the listed company' had the second-highest level of agreement (mean = 4.50, SD = 1.090). The table reveals that there was positive support for the other two statements also, with mean scores of 4.48 and 4.43, respectively and have been ranked 3rd and 4th respectively. In short, the

respondents have shown their agreement with all the four statements suggesting changes in prevalent accounting and auditing practices.

Investors' participation in meetings the companies

This part of question 7 investigates the seventh objective with respect to suggesting the recommend new components of corporate governance that can improve corporate governance practices in India. To achieve this objective, the participants were provided with a list of statements suggesting changes in prevalent practices in relation to meeting proceedings and thereby by enhancing the role of investors in meeting proceedings, to rate the extent to which respondents agree with the changes suggested in the statements thought these they used a standard five-point Likert scale to indicate their level of agreement (1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neutral, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree).

Table 4.23

Showing responses towards the statements on strengthening the corporate governance practices through enhancement of the role of investors in meetings

Sr. No	INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN MEETINGS OF LISTED COMPANIES	Mean	SD	Rank
1.	Annual general meetings of the listed company should be held within 4 months from the end of the financial year to improve the participation of shareholders in the annual general meeting.	4.50	0.985	3
2.	Proceedings of the Annual general meetings should be webcast	4.54	1.190	2
3.	E-voting facilities should be provided to all the shares holders.	4.92	0.392	1
4.	Stewardship responsibility should be imposed on every institutional Investor.	3.81	0.579	4

Table 4.23 shows the participants' responses concerning the enhancement of role investors' role in meetings of the companies. The statement 'E-voting facility should be provided to all the shares holders.' registered the highest level of agreement (mean = 4.92, SD = 0.392).

The majority of participants also agreed with the statement 'Proceedings of the Annual general meetings should be webcast'. This statement ranked second out of four items, with an overall mean score of 4.54 (SD = 1.190).

Table 4.23 shows that the participants agreed with statement 1 ('Annual general meeting of the listed company should be held within 4 months from the end of the financial year to improve participation of shareholders in annual general meeting.'), with a mean score of 4.50 (SD = 0.985) and this statement is ranked 3rd amongst four statements. However, the respondents have shown weak agreement with statement 4 ('Stewardship responsibility should be imposed on every institutional Investor.') with the mean score of 3.81 (SD = 0.579)

4.3.4. Hypothesis Testing:

Kruskal Wallis Test

The survey has been conducted to get the responses from the nine categories of the respondents consisting of Company Secretaries, Chartered Accountants, Cost Accountants, Executives of Bombay stock exchange, Executives of National stock exchange, Retail Investors, Executives of Institutional Investors, Officers of Registrar of Companies and Directors of the Companies. All the respondents have given responses to the same questionnaire. So the respondents belong to different populations, moreover, the Responses obtained from the respondents are numerical scores that have the strength of ranks and the collected data is not normally distributed. Considering the characteristics of the data the non-parametric tests are more suitable for analyses of the data.

Kruskal–Wallis is a non-parametric test that is adopted to test the differences between respondents' perceptions. It is a test of one-way, between-group analysis of variance that allows a comparison amongst groups. Kruskal–Wallis test is used to establish differences in average responses across the nine groups in their

answers to each question. When the result of the Kruskal–Wallis test is significant, it indicates that at least one of the nine groups in the current study is different from at least one of the others. In this study, the Kruskal–Wallis test has been conducted at a 95% level of confidence.

Definitions of corporate governance

Ho1= The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories is equal for the level of agreement about the best definition of Corporate Governance.

Table 4.24

Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents' Views Regarding the Best Definition of Corporate Governance

Statements	Group means position									Overall Mean Value	Kruskal–Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	3.66	3.61	3.61	3.67	3.67	3.59	3.64	3.63	3.65	3.62	.68	**
2.	4.07	4.07	4.10	4.08	4.10	4.09	4.07	4.10	4.07	4.06	.43	**
3.	4.07	4.07	4.10	4.08	4.10	4.09	4.07	4.10	4.07	4.52	.30	**

	a. Kruskal Wallis Test b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category * Significant ** Not significant
No.	**Statements
1	Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with its shareholders to ensure that it acts in accordance with the interests of those shareholders.
2	Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all stakeholders who are affected by or affect the organization's operations and decisions.
3	Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all members of society, irrespective of whether they affect or are affected by the organization's operations and decisions.

The Kruskal–Wallis test (see Table 4.24) revealed that there were no significant differences between the perceptions of the nine groups for the following three statements: (1) Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with its shareholders to ensure that it acts in accordance with the interests of those shareholders. (p = 0.680); (2) Corporate governance refers to an organization's

relationship with all stakeholders who are affected by or affect the organization's operations and decisions. (p = 0.430); (3) Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all members of society, irrespective of whether they affect or are affected by the organization's operations and decisions. (p = 0.300). The overall mean value shows that the respondents have shown their strong agreement with the definition 2 and 3 respectively with the overall mean value 4.06 and 4.52, however, they have shown less support to the definition 1 with the overall mean value 3.62.

Obstacles that affect Corporate Governance

Ho2= The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories are equal for the level of agreement about the Obstacles that affect Corporate Governance.

Table 4.25

Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents' Views regarding the obstacles that affect corporate governance practices

Statements	Group means position									Overall Mean Value	Kruskal–Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	4.37	4.34	4.33	4.38	4.29	4.35	4.44	4.35	4.36	4.37	.640	*
2.	4.12	4.12	4.10	4.06	4.19	4.13	4.23	4.13	4.09	4.12	.055	*
3.	3.25	3.25	3.20	3.20	3.25	3.22	3.33	3.22	3.22	3.24	.086	*
4.	4.42	4.44	4.46	4.41	4.54	4.49	4.54	4.48	4.40	4.44	.133	*
5.	3.75	3.76	3.76	3.71	3.92	3.79	3.92	3.79	3.71	3.75	.111	*
6.	4.84	4.85	4.89	4.89	4.96	4.88	4.88	4.89	4.83	4.83	.785	*
7.	4.48	4.51	4.49	4.40	4.48	4.51	4.56	4.50	4.45	4.49	.109	*
8.	3.86	3.91	3.90	3.79	3.90	3.93	3.92	3.90	3.85	3.89	.951	*
9.	4.39	4.44	4.45	4.26	4.46	4.49	4.51	4.47	4.36	4.41	.505	*
10.	4.49	4.53	4.53	4.41	4.58	4.56	4.57	4.54	4.46	4.51	.229	*
11.	4.78	4.79	4.82	4.79	4.92	4.82	4.81	4.83	4.77	4.78	.071	*

	a. Kruskal Wallis Test
	b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category
	* Significant
	** Not significant
	Note: The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
No.	**Statements
1	Weak legal controls and law enforcement
2	Culture of Indian the community
3	The present state of accounting and auditing profession
4	The present state of Accounting and finance education
5	Policies of financial institutions
6	Legal and regulatory systems that govern companies' activities
7	Government interference in business activities
8	The state of the Indian economy
9	The costs of practicing good corporate governance outweigh the benefits
10	Excess financial and non-financial disclosure
11	A good relationship between the company and the external auditors

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test in Table 4.25 show that the nine groups share similar perceptions towards most of the statements regarding the obstacles that affect the good corporate governance practices in India. There were no statistically significant differences in the respondents' views concerning the following statements: (1) Weak legal controls and law enforcement (p = 0.640); (2) culture of Indian the community (p = 0.055); (3) Present state of accounting and auditing profession (p = 0.086); (4) Present state of Accounting and finance education (p = 0.133); (5) Policies of financial institutions (p = 0.111); (6) Policies of financial institutions (p = 0.785); (7) Government interference in business activities (p = 0.109); and (8) The state of the Indian economy (p = 0.951). (9) The costs of practicing good corporate governance outweigh the benefits (p = 0.505). (10) Excess financial and non-financial disclosure (p = 0.229). (11) The good relationship between the company and the external auditors (p = 0.071). The overall mean score in table 4.25 reveals that the participants have to opine their strong support and have agreed with the all the statements describing the obstacles to the good corporate governance in India with the mean score more than 4.00, however they are less agree with the statement 3, 5 and 8 with the mean score 3.24, 3.75 and 3.89

Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Ho3= The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories are equal for a level of agreement about the Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Table 4.26

Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents' Views regarding the Enablers that improve Corporate Governance

**Statements	Group means position									Overall Mean Value	Kruskal–Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	3.95	3.95	3.92	3.87	4.06	3.97	4.10	3.95	3.92	3.97	0.14	**
2.	3.97	3.97	3.95	3.91	4.04	3.98	4.11	3.98	3.94	3.97	0.08	**
3.	4.46	4.44	4.43	4.46	4.46	4.45	4.51	4.44	4.45	4.46	0.36	**
4.	4.47	4.47	4.46	4.45	4.52	4.48	4.52	4.47	4.45	4.48	0.10	**
5.	3.94	3.93	3.89	3.89	4.02	3.93	4.07	3.92	3.91	3.94	0.19	**
6.	4.54	4.56	4.54	4.45	4.58	4.57	4.60	4.55	4.51	4.55	0.77	**
7.	4.70	4.69	4.72	4.72	4.75	4.70	4.70	4.73	4.68	4.67	0.52	**
8.	3.85	3.88	3.87	3.83	3.94	3.89	3.91	3.88	3.84	3.87	0.70	**
9.	4.73	4.72	4.72	4.77	4.77	4.72	4.74	4.73	4.72	4.72	0.39	**
10.	4.52	4.54	4.51	4.38	4.56	4.53	4.57	4.52	4.49	4.52	0.45	**

a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category
* Significant
** Not significant
Note: The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

No.	**Statements
1	Ensuring wide adoption of international accounting and auditing standards
2	Using training and other means of support
3	Developing incentive programs for compliance with principles of corporate governance
4	Establishing corporate governance education programs at universities
5	Establishing an institute of directors for training, raising awareness and education for CEOs, directors and board members
6	Enhancing professional accounting and auditing bodies
7	Participating in international events, conferences, meetings, and committees dealing with corporate governance
8	Encouraging research into corporate governance in India
9	Learning from the experiences of other countries concerning corporate governance practice
10	Initiating regional corporate governance partnership programs with international organizations such as the OECD

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test in Table 4.26 show that the nine groups share similar perceptions towards most of the statements regarding the enablers that improve Corporate Governance practices in India. There were no statistically significant differences in the respondents' views concerning the following statements: (1) Ensuring wide adoption of international accounting and auditing standards ($p = 0.14$); (2) Using training and other means of support ($p = 0.08$); (3) Developing incentive programs for compliance with principles of corporate governance ($p = 0.36$); (4) Establishing corporate governance education programs at universities ($p = 0.10$); (5) 5Establishing an institute of directors for training, raising awareness and education for CEOs, directors and board members ($p = 0.19$); (6) Enhancing professional accounting and auditing bodies ($p = 0.77$); (7) Participating in international events, conferences, meetings and committees dealing with corporate governance ($p = 0.52$); and (8) Encouraging research into corporate governance in the India ($p = 0.70$). (9) Learning from the experiences of other countries concerning corporate governance practice ($p = 0.39$). (10) Initiating regional corporate governance partnership programs with international organizations such as the OECD ($p = 0.45$).

The overall mean score in table 4.22 reveals that the participants have opine their strong support and have agreed with the all the statements describing the enablers to the good corporate governance practices in India with the mean score more than 4.00, however they are less agree with the statement 1, 2, 5 and 8 with the mean score 3.97, 3.97, 3.94 and 3.87.

Tools to the measures value creation of companies.

Ho4= The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories is equal for a level of agreement about the tools to the measures value creation of companies.

Table 4.27

Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents' Views regarding the Enablers that improve Corporate Governance

**Statements	Group means position									Overall Mean Value	Kruskal–Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive - BSE	Executive - NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	4.81	4.80	4.80	4.79	4.83	4.81	4.83	4.81	4.80	4.81	0.17	**
2.	4.05	4.05	4.02	4.00	4.08	4.06	4.18	4.05	4.02	4.06	0.10	**
3.	3.88	3.91	3.88	3.82	3.98	3.89	3.90	3.88	3.87	3.89	0.85	**
4.	4.20	4.21	4.24	4.22	4.19	4.23	4.20	4.24	4.20	4.20	0.67	**
	a. Kruskal Wallis Test b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category * Significant ** Not significant **Note:** The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.												
No.	**Statements											
1	Economic Value Added (EVA)											
2	Market Value Added (MVA)											
3	Return on Investment (ROI)											
4	Tobin's q											

The Kruskal–Wallis test for question five showed that there were no significant differences (at $p < 0.05$) in the groups' answers to the following items: (1) Economic Value Added (EVA) (p = 0.17); (2) Market Value Added (MVA) (p = 0.10); (3) 3. Return on Investment (ROI) (p = 0.85); (4) Tobin's q (p = .300). The overall mean score revels that all respondents have shown their strong support toward the following three tools to measure the value creation of companies (1)Economic Value Added (EVA) (2) Market Value Added (MVA) (3) Tobin's q with the overall mean score of 4.81, 4.06 and 4.20, however, the respondent has shown least support toward their agreement with the 'Return on Investment (ROI)' as a tool to measure the value creation of the companies, with the mean score 3.89.

Relationship between components of corporate governance and value creation

Ho5 = The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories are equal for the level of agreement explaining the relationship between Corporate governance and value creation of companies.

Table 4.28
Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents' Views regarding the relationship between components of corporate governance and value creation

**Statements	Group means position									Overall Mean Value	Kruskal–Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	4.16	4.17	4.13	4.09	4.19	4.17	4.28	4.15	4.13	4.17	0.23	**
2.	4.49	4.48	4.48	4.52	4.52	4.49	4.56	4.49	4.48	4.49	0.20	**
3.	4.45	4.47	4.46	4.41	4.52	4.48	4.54	4.48	4.43	4.45	0.18	**
4.	4.67	4.67	4.67	4.64	4.71	4.69	4.71	4.68	4.66	4.68	0.31	**
5.	4.22	4.18	4.19	4.22	4.29	4.17	4.25	4.21	4.20	4.18	0.17	**
	a. Kruskal Wallis Test b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category * Significant ** Not significant **Note:** The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.											
No.	**Statements											
1	Composition of boards, especially their independence in law and in spirit from the company's management; results into value creation of a company											
2	Composition and independence of key- board committees such as the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration committee leads value creation of Company											
3	Independence of the companies' auditors and the quality of audit of its financial statements create a value of the company											
4	Careful balancing of the interests of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders creates a value of the company											
5	Corporate governance practices adopted by the company does not affect the value creation of the companies											

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test in Table 4.28 revealed no statistically significant differences in the groups' opinions of the relationship between various components of corporate governance and value creation of companies, in following statements : (1) Composition of boards, especially their independence

in law and in spirit from the company's management (p = 0.23) (2)Composition and independence of key board committees such as the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration committee leads value creation of Company (p = 0.20) (3)Independence of the companies' auditors and the quality of audit of its financial statements creates a value of company (p = 0.18) (4)Careful balancing of the interests of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders creates a value of the company (p = 0.31); (5) Corporate governance practices adopted by the company does not affect to the value creation of the companies (p = 0.17);

The overall mean score of the table 4.28 describes that there is the strong agreement of the respondents with the all the five statements showing, the relationship between the various components of corporate governance and the value creation of the company with the overall means score 4.17, 4.49, 4.45, 4.68 and 4.18.

Measures to strengthen corporate governance practices in India

A. Composition and role of the board of directors

Ho6 = The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories is equal for a level of agreement about the composition and role of the board of directors as measures to strengthen the corporate governance practices.

Table 4.29

Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents'
Views regarding
Board composition and role of directors as a measure to strengthen
corporate governance

**Statements	Group means position									Overall Mean Value	Kruskal–Wallis Test	
	Company Secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	1.41	1.39	1.34	1.43	1.33	1.32	1.34	1.33	1.43	1.39	0.36	**
2.	3.95	3.95	3.92	3.90	4.02	3.97	4.10	3.95	3.92	3.96	0.27	**
3.	4.40	4.38	4.41	4.41	4.46	4.43	4.48	4.42	4.38	4.40	0.14	**
4.	4.18	4.19	4.16	4.11	4.23	4.20	4.30	4.19	4.15	4.19	0.22	**
5.	4.01	4.02	4.00	3.91	4.08	4.03	4.14	4.03	3.98	4.02	0.02	*
6.	4.70	4.70	4.73	4.70	4.71	4.74	4.75	4.74	4.69	4.70	0.23	**
7.	4.32	4.36	4.37	4.29	4.33	4.41	4.46	4.39	4.29	4.34	0.25	**
8.	4.61	4.62	4.63	4.57	4.67	4.65	4.67	4.64	4.59	4.62	0.21	**
9.	4.50	4.54	4.56	4.45	4.58	4.59	4.61	4.58	4.47	4.52	0.61	**
10.	4.42	4.44	4.44	4.32	4.40	4.47	4.50	4.46	4.39	4.43	0.74	**
11.	4.73	4.74	4.73	4.72	4.69	4.74	4.75	4.74	4.72	4.73	0.43	**
12.	4.34	4.38	4.36	4.28	4.42	4.4	4.45	4.38	4.31	4.36	0.65	**
13.	3.86	3.86	3.83	3.76	3.92	3.88	4.00	3.86	3.83	3.88	0.31	**

a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category
* Significant
** Not significant
Note: The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

No.	**Statements
1	There is no need to change the current requirement of a minimum of 3 directors in the public limited company.
2	There is a need to increase the minimum number of directors in the public limited companies from 3 to 6 or more.
3	Gender diversity positively affects the decision-making process of the corporate board

4	There should be at least one independent women director on the board of the company
5	Director should vacate his office if he remains absent for all the meetings held in the last 12 months.
6	The expertise matrix of the board should be regularly disclosed to the shareholders.
7	There should be an age of retirement for the Independent Directors.
8	The company should conduct at least one updation program for all the directors on changes in applicable laws and regulations.
9	The quorum for a board meeting is required to be increased from a minimum of 2 directors to 3 directors and out of the one director should be an independent director.
10	The maximum number of directorship of directors in listed companies should be reduced
11	If the Independent director retires before the term, he/she should give details of reasons for resignation to the shareholders.
12	There should be an appointment with the lead Independent director.
13	There should be at least one exclusive meeting of Independent directors should be held in a financial year.

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test in Table 4.29 revealed statistically significant differences   (p = 0.02) in respondents' attitudes towards statement (5) Director should vacate his office if he remains absent for all the meetings held in last 12 months.'). The results represent variance in the level of agreement among the respondents, with some agreeing more than others.

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test for other statements in Table 4.29 show that the nine groups share similar perceptions towards most of the statements regarding the composition of board and role of the board of directors as a tool to strengthen corporate governance practice. There were no statistically significant differences in the respondents' views concerning the following statements: (1) there is no need to change the current requirement of a minimum of 3 directors in public limited company. (p = 0.36); (2) There is a need to increase a minimum number of directors in public limited company from 3 to 6 or more. (p = 0.27); (3) Gender diversity positively affects to the decision making process of corporate board (p = 0.14); (4) There should be at least one independent women director in the board of the company (p = 0.22); (6) Expertise matrix of the board should be regularly disclosed to the shareholders (p = 0.23 (7) There should be age of retirement for the Independent Directors.   (p = 0.25); (8) Company should

conduct at least one updation program for all the directors on changes in applicable laws and regulations (p =0.21) (9) The quorum for a board meeting is required to be increased from minimum 2 directors to 3 directors and out of the one director should be an independent director. (p = 0.61). (10) The maximum number of directorship of directors in listed companies should be reduced (p = 0.74). (11) If the Independent director retires before the term, he/she should give details of reasons for resignation to the shareholders. (p = 0.43). (12) There should be an appointment of lead Independent director (p = 0.65) and (13) There should be at least one exclusive meeting of Independent directors should be held in a financial year (p = 0.31).

Further, the overall mean value of all statement 1, 2 and 13 is less than 4.00, which shows that there is less agreement of respondents towards this statements, whereas the overall mean score of all other statements suggesting, the strengthening of corporate governance practices through the board composition and role of board of directors, is more than 4.00, which shows the strong agreement with that statements.

B. Board Committees

Ho7 =   The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories are equal for the level of agreement about board committees as a measure to strengthen the corporate governance practices.

Table 4.30

Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents' Views regarding
Board committees as a measure to strengthen corporate governance

**Statements	Group means position									**Overall Mean Value**	Kruskal–Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1	4.26	4.27	4.24	4.17	4.35	4.27	4.36	4.26	4.23	4.27	0.19	**
2	4.43	4.41	4.42	4.45	4.50	4.43	4.50	4.44	4.42	4.42	0.08	**
3	4.51	4.55	4.55	4.44	4.58	4.58	4.61	4.56	4.48	4.53	0.28	**
4	4.94	4.95	4.96	4.93	4.94	4.96	4.95	4.96	4.94	4.94	0.13	**
5	3.85	3.85	3.82	3.76	3.96	3.86	3.99	3.85	3.81	3.85	0.03	*

a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category
* Significant
** Not significant
Note: The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

No.	**Statements
1	The audit committee should review the utilization of the fund invested in the subsidiary company.
2	The remuneration committee should recommend the remuneration of all key managerial persons instead of the only remuneration of the board of directors.
3	At least one-third of members of the nomination and remuneration committee should be Independent Directors.
4	The listed entity shall constitute a Stakeholders Relationship Committee
5	Listed entities should constitute an information technology committee that, in addition to the risk management committee, will focus on digital and other technological aspects.

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test in Table 4.30 revealed statistically significant differences (p = 0.03) in respondents' attitudes towards statement 5 ('Listed entities should constitute an information technology committee which, in addition to the risk management committee, will focus on digital and other technological aspects.'). The results represent variance in the level of agreement among the respondents, with some agreeing more than others.

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test for other statements in Table 4.30 show that the nine groups share similar perceptions towards most of the statements

regarding the board committees as a tool to strengthen corporate governance practice. There were no statistically significant differences in the respondents' views concerning the following statements: (1) Audit committee should review the utilization of the fund invested in subsidiary company (p = 0.19) (2) Remuneration committee should recommend the remuneration all key managerial persons instead of the only remuneration of the board of directors. (p = 0.08); (3) At least one-third of members of nomination and remuneration committee should be Independent Directors. (p = 0.28) (4) 4.   The listed entity shall constitute a Stakeholders Relationship Committee (p = 0.13).

Moreover, the table 4.30 shows the overall mean of all the groups, the overall mean value of statement 1 to 4 is more than 4.00, which shows the strong support of the respondents towards the measures suggested to strengthen corporate governance practices, through the board committees, whereas statement 5 has the mean score of 3.85, which shows less agreement with the statement.

C. Monitoring of Group entities

Ho8 = The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories is equal for the level of agreement about enhanced monitoring of group entities as a measure to strengthen the corporate governance practices.

Table 4.31
Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents' Views regarding
Monitoring of group entities to strengthen corporate governance

**Statements	Group means position									Overall Mean Value	Kruskal– Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional	Officer of Registrar of	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	4.70	4.70	4.69	4.67	4.71	4.71	4.73	4.70	4.68	4.69	.281	**
2.	3.80	3.81	3.79	3.76	3.90	3.83	3.95	3.82	3.76	3.81	.071	**
3.	4.48	4.51	4.51	4.41	4.56	4.54	4.57	4.52	4.45	4.50	.587	**
	a. Kruskal Wallis Test b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category * Significant ** Not significant **Note:** The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.											
No.	**Statements											
1	At least one Independent Director on the board of directors of the listed entity shall be a director on the board of directors of an unlisted material subsidiary, incorporated in India.											
2	Where a listed entity has a large number of unlisted subsidiaries dedicated group governance unit comprising the members of the board of the listed entity should be formed.											
3	The secretarial audit should be extended to all material unlisted Indian subsidiaries.											

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test for other statements in Table 4.31 show that the nine groups share similar perceptions towards most of the statements regarding the monitoring of group entities as a tool to strengthen corporate governance practice. There were no statistically significant differences in the respondents' views concerning the following statements: (1) At least one Independent Director on the board of directors of the listed entity shall be a director on the board of directors of an unlisted material subsidiary, incorporated

in India. (p = 0.281) (2) Where a listed entity has a large number of unlisted subsidiaries dedicated group governance unit comprising the members of the board of the listed entity should be formed. (p = 0.71); (3) Secretarial audit should be extended to all material unlisted Indian subsidiaries. (p = 0.587).

The overall mean of statement 1 and 3 is more than 4.00 which shows the strong agreement of the respondents, with the use of monitoring of group entries corporate governance practices can be strengthened. Whereas respondents show less support to the statement 2 ('where a listed entity has a large number of unlisted subsidiaries dedicated group governance unit comprising the members of the board of the listed entity should be formed.') (Overall mean =3.81)

D. Related party transactions

Ho9= The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories are equal for the level of agreement about related party transactions as a measure to strengthen the corporate governance practices.

Table 4.32
Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents' Views regarding
Regulating related party transactions as a measure to strengthen corporate governance

**Statements	Group means position									Overall Mean Value	Kruskal–Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	4.04	4.05	4.03	3.90	4.10	4.07	4.17	4.06	4.01	4.06	.151	**
2.	4.62	4.65	4.65	4.56	4.69	4.67	4.70	4.66	4.59	4.63	.759	**
	a. Kruskal Wallis Test b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category * Significant ** Not significant **Note:** The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.											
No.	**Statements											
1	Related party transactions should be disclosed half-yearly											
2	Related party payment relating to Brand /Royalty in excess of 5% of the total revenue of the listed entity should be made after prior approval of the majority of shares holders.											

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test for other statements in Table 4.32 show that the nine groups share similar perceptions towards most of the statements regarding regulating related party transactions as a measure to strengthen corporate governance. There were no statistically significant differences in the respondents' views concerning the following statements: (1) Related party transactions should be disclosed half-yearly (p = 0.151) (2) Related party payment relating to Brand /Royalty in excess of 5% of total revenue of the listed entity should be made after prior approval of majority of shares holders (p = 0.759); The overall mean of both statements 1 and 3 is more than 4.00 which shows the strong agreement of the respondents, by regulating related party transactions as a measure to strengthen corporate governance.

E. Disclosures and Transparency

Ho10 = The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories are equal for the level of agreement about disclosures and transparency as a measure to strengthen the corporate governance practices

Table 4.33
Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents' Views regarding
Enhancement of disclosures and transparency as a measure to strengthen corporate governance

| **Statements** | **Group means position** | | | | | | | | | **Overall Mean Value** | **Kruskal–Wallis Test** | |
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	4.04	4.04	4.00	3.97	4.08	4.04	4.16	4.03	4.01	4.05	.052	**
2.	4.36	4.40	4.37	4.28	4.42	4.41	4.46	4.39	4.34	4.38	.157	**
3.	4.75	4.75	4.76	4.76	4.77	4.77	4.79	4.77	4.75	4.76	.557	**
4.	4.67	4.68	4.70	4.70	4.73	4.71	4.74	4.71	4.66	4.68	.014	*

	a. Kruskal Wallis Test b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category * Significant ** Not significant **Note:** The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
No.	**Statements
1	Only a soft copy of the annual report should be given to all shareholders who have registered their email addresses either with the company or with the depository unless the shareholder specifically asks for a physical copy.
2	The updated list of all credit ratings obtained by the listed entity be made available in one place, which would be very helpful for investors and other stakeholders.
3	In addition to financial disclosures, a listed company should also disclose a change in financial indicators along with the reasons.
4	The Listed Company should maintain a separate section on the website for disclosers to be made as per the SEBI (Listing obligations and disclosure requirement) regulations and update the same on a regular basis.

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test in Table 4.33 revealed statistically significant differences (p = 0.014) in respondents' attitudes towards statement 4 ('The Listed Company should maintain a separate section in the website for disclosers to be made as per the SEBI (Listing obligations and disclosure requirement) regulations and update the same on regular basis.'). The results represent variance in the level of agreement among the respondents, with some agreeing more than others.

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test for other statements in Table 4.33 show that the nine groups share similar perceptions towards most of the statements regarding the enhancement of disclosures and transparency as a tool to strengthen corporate governance practice. There were no statistically significant differences in the respondents' views concerning the following statements: (1) Only a soft copy of the annual report should be given to all shareholders who have registered their email addresses either with the company or with the depository unless the shareholder specifically asks for a physical copy. (p = 0.52) (2) The updated list of all credit ratings obtained by the listed entity be made available at one place, which would be very helpful for investors and other stakeholders (p = 0.157); (3) In addition to financial disclosures a listed company should also disclose a change in financial indicators along with the reasons. (p = 0.557)

Moreover, the table 4.33 shows the overall mean of all the groups, the overall mean value of statement 1 to 4 is more than 4.00, which shows the strong support of the respondents towards the measures suggested to strengthen corporate governance practices, through the enhancement of disclosures and transparency.

F. Accounting and audit

Ho11= The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories are equal for a level of agreement about accounting and audit as a measure to strengthen the corporate governance practices.

Table 4.34

**Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents'
Views regarding
Accounting and audit as a measure to strengthen corporate governance**

Statements	Group means position									Overall Mean Value	Kruskal–Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	4.47	4.49	4.49	4.34	4.56	4.51	4.55	4.50	4.44	4.48	.357	**
2.	4.41	4.43	4.40	4.29	4.42	4.43	4.49	4.42	4.38	4.43	.123	**
3.	4.60	4.60	4.59	4.61	4.60	4.61	4.64	4.60	4.59	4.60	.413	**
4.	4.50	4.48	4.47	4.53	4.52	4.49	4.55	4.49	4.49	4.50	.107	*

a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category
* Significant
** Not significant
Note: The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

No.	**Statements
1	If the auditor has expressed any modified opinion(s) in respect of audited financial results, the listed company should disclose the cumulative impact of the same on profit or loss, net worth, total assets, turnover/total income, earning per share, total expenditure, and total liabilities in Annual report.
2	Reasons for the resignation of the Auditor should be disclosed to the shareholders.
3	Disclosure of credentials and Audit fees of the auditor in the annual report
4	Ind- AS must be adopted by the listed company

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test for other statements in Table 4.34 show that the nine groups share similar perceptions towards most of the statements regarding the suggested changes in accounting and Auditing practices will strengthen corporate governance. There were no statistically significant differences in the respondents' views concerning the following statements: (1) If the auditor has expressed any modified opinion(s) in respect of audited financial results, the listed company should disclose the cumulative impact of the same on profit or loss, net worth, total assets, turnover/total income, earning per share, total expenditure, and total liabilities in Annual report. $(p = 0.357)$ (2) Reasons for the resignation of the Auditor should be disclosed to the shareholders. $(p = 0.123)$ (3) Disclosure of credentials and Audit fees of the auditor in the annual report. $(p = 0.413)$. (4) Ind- AS must be adopted by the listed company $(p = 0.107)$.

Moreover, the table 4.34 shows the overall mean of all the groups, the overall mean value of statement 1 to 4 is more than 4.00, which shows the strong support of the respondents towards the measures suggested to strengthen corporate governance practices, through the suggested changes in prevalent accounting and auditing practices.

G. Investors Participation

Ho12 = The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories are equal for the level of agreement about investor participation in meetings of listed companies as a measure to strengthen the corporate governance practices.

Table 4.35

Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents'
Views regarding
Accounting and audit as a measure to strengthen corporate governance

Statements	Group means position									**Overall Mean Value**	Kruskal– Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	4.48	4.50	4.49	4.44	4.54	4.51	4.56	4.50	4.46	4.50	.120	**
2.	4.52	4.56	4.55	4.45	4.58	4.58	4.61	4.56	4.50	4.54	.671	**
3.	4.91	4.93	4.93	4.89	4.85	4.93	4.92	4.93	4.91	4.92	.290	**
4.	3.81	3.79	3.81	3.82	3.83	3.82	3.84	3.82	3.80	3.81	.007	*

a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category
* Significant
** Not significant
Note: The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$.

No.	**Statements
1	Annual general meetings of the listed company should be held within 4 months from the end of the financial year to improve the participation of shareholders in the annual general meeting.
2	Proceedings of the Annual general meetings should be webcast
3	E-voting facilities should be provided to all the shares holders.
4	Stewardship responsibility should be imposed on every institutional Investor.

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test in Table 4.35 revealed statistically significant differences ($p = 0.007$) in respondents' attitudes towards statement 4 ('Stewardship responsibility should be imposed on every institutional Investor.) The results represent variance in the level of agreement among the respondents, with some agreeing more than others.

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test for other statements in Table 4.35 show that the nine groups share similar perceptions towards most of the statements regarding the use of Investors' participation in meetings of the company as a tool to strengthen corporate governance practice. There were no statistically significant differences in the respondents' views concerning the following statements: (1) Annual general meeting of the listed company should be held

within 4 months from the end of the financial year to improve participation of shareholders in annual general meeting. (p = 0.120) (2) Proceedings of the Annual general meetings should be webcast (p = 0.671); (3) E-voting facility should be provided to all the shares holders. (p = 0.290). Moreover, the table 4.35 shows the overall mean of all the groups, the overall mean value of statement 1 to 3 is more than 4.00, which shows the strong support of the respondents towards the measures suggested to strengthen corporate governance practices, through the enhancement of disclosures and transparency. However, the overall mean score of statement 3 is 3.81 which shows the less agreement of the respondents towards the suggested statement 'Stewardship responsibility should be imposed on every institutional Investor.'

Overall evaluation

In order to get idea of the overall perception of respondents for the corporate governance and relationship of corporate governance and value creation of the companies, a question 8, consisting of 4 statement was asked and to examine the level of significance amongst all nine groups of the respondents, towards the overall evaluation following hypothesis was formed and the same is tested through the Kruskal–Wallis test.

Ho13 = The mean score for Different groups of respondent categories is equal for a level of agreement about the overall evaluation of corporate governance.

Table 4.36

Respondents Group Means and Kruskal–Wallis Tests Showing Respondents' Views regarding

Overall evaluation of corporate governance practices and the relationship between corporate governance and value creation

**Statements	Group means position									Overall Mean Value	Kruskal–Wallis Test	
	Company secretary	Chartered Accountant	Cost Accountant	Executive -BSE	Executive -NSE	Retail Investor	Executive of Institutional Investor	Officer of Registrar of Companies	Directors of the Companies		Significance	Result
1.	4.55	4.56	4.54	4.48	4.56	4.57	4.62	4.56	4.53	4.56	.157	**
2.	4.48	4.50	4.48	4.40	4.48	4.51	4.55	4.49	4.45	4.49	.245	**
3.	4.13	4.14	4.10	4.03	4.19	4.14	4.25	4.13	4.10	4.15	.342	**
4.	4.62	4.63	4.63	4.62	4.67	4.63	4.67	4.64	4.60	4.61	.163	**
	a. Kruskal Wallis Test b. Grouping Variable: Respondent Category * Significant ** Not significant **Note:** The Kruskal–Wallis test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question at *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.											
o.	**Statements											
1	Various obstacles affect the effective implementation of corporate governance practice in India.											
2	Corporate Governance practices in India can be improved with the aid of enablers											
3	Corporate governance practices are positively related to the value creation of the companies											
4	Existing corporate governance practices needs to be strengthened											

The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test for other statements in Table 4.36 show that the nine groups share similar perceptions towards most of the statements regarding Overall evaluation of corporate governance practices and the relationship between corporate governance and value creation. There were no statistically significant differences in the respondents' views concerning the following statements: (1) various obstacles affect the effective implementation of corporate governance practice in India. (p = 0.157) (2) Corporate Governance practices in India can be improved with the aid of enablers   (p = 0.245); (3) Corporate governance practices are positively related to the value creation of the

companies. (p = 0.342) (4) Existing corporate governance practices needs to be strengthened (p = 0.163)

Moreover, the table 4.36 shows the overall mean of all the groups, the overall mean value of statement 1 to 4 is more than 4.00, which shows the strong support of the respondents Overall evaluation of corporate governance practices and the relationship between corporate governance and value creation.

4.3.5 Descriptive statistics:

Table 4.37

Table showing descriptive statistics of the primary data collected

Descriptive Statistics						
	N	Mean	Skewness		Kurtosis	
				Std.		Std.
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Error	Statistic	Error
Gender	157	1.18	1.641	.194	.700	.385
Age Group of Respondents	157	2.89	.093	.194	-.678	.385
Graduate	157	1.01	12.530	.194	157.000	.385
Post Graduate	157	1.09	2.911	.194	6.557	.385
Professional Qualification	157	1.50	.013	.194	-2.026	.385
Work Experience	157	2.50	-1.098	.194	-.294	.385
Respondent Category	157	4.43	.311	.194	-1.400	.385
Valid N (listwise)	157					

Here the data on demographic details such as gender, age, education, profession, Age Group of Respondents, Professional Qualification, Work Experience and category based on job position of the respondent is available for which the skewness and kurtosis are not zero. So, it can be said that the data are not normally distributed and so further tests can be applied.

4.3.4. Hypothesis Testing: ANOVA Statistics

In order to find out that there is any difference between demographic features like gender, age group, professional qualifications, work experience, respondents category, etc. and responses given by the respondents on different parts of the questionnaire ANOVA test was used.

An effort has been made to find out the difference between various demographic features and responses of following statements of the questionnaire (1) Definitions of corporate governance (2) Obstacles that affect Corporate Governance (3) Enablers that improve Corporate Governance (4) Tools to measure Value Creation (Special Focus on EVA). (5) Tools to measure Value Creation (Special Focus on MVA). (6) Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practices. (7) Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Definitions of corporate governance

Ho14 = There is no significant difference between the gender of the respondent and the Level of Agreement about the best definition of Corporate Governance.

Table 4.38

ANOVA for gender with respect to Level of Agreement about the best definition of Corporate Governance

ANOVA						
Statements		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with its shareholders	Between Groups	1.481	1	1.481	1.186	.278
	Within Groups	193.589	155	1.249		
	Total	195.070	156			
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all stakeholders	Between Groups	1.446	1	1.446	5.347	.022
	Within Groups	41.917	155	.270		
	Total	43.363	156			
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all members of society	Between Groups	.390	1	.390	.442	.507
	Within Groups	136.820	155	.883		
	Total	137.210	156			

In order to analyze that there is any difference between gender of the respondents and level of agreement with various three definitions of corporate governance, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value for definition 1 is (0.278) and p-value for definition 3 is (0.57), which are greater than the (0.05), so, there is no significant difference between the gender of the respondents and level of agreement with various three definitions of corporate governance. However the p-value for definition 2 is (0.022) which is less than (0.05), so for definition 2, there is a significant difference between gender and level of acceptance of definition 2 of corporate governance.

Ho15= There is no significant difference between the Age of the respondent and Level of Agreement about the definitions of Corporate Governance.

Table 4.39

ANOVA for age with respect to Level of Agreement about the best definition of Corporate Governance

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with its shareholders	Between Groups	6.485	4	1.621	1.307	.270
	Within Groups	188.586	152	1.241		
	Total	195.070	156			
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all stakeholders	Between Groups	.871	4	.218	.779	.541
	Within Groups	42.492	152	.280		
	Total	43.363	156			
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all members of society	Between Groups	2.521	4	.630	.711	.586
	Within Groups	134.690	152	.886		
	Total	137.210	156			

In order to analyze that there is any difference between Age of the respondents and level of agreement with various three definitions of corporate governance, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value for definition 1 is (0.270), p-value for definition 2 is (0.57), and p-value for definition 3 is (0586), which are greater than the (0.05), so, there is no significant difference between age of the respondents and level of agreement with various three definitions of corporate governance.

Ho16= There is no significant difference between the Professional Education of the respondent and Level of Agreement about the definitions of Corporate Governance.

Table 4.40

ANOVA for a professional qualification with respect to Level of Agreement about the best definition of Corporate Governance

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with its shareholders	Between Groups	.860	1	.860	.686	.409
	Within Groups	194.210	155	1.253		
	Total	195.070	156			
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all stakeholders	Between Groups	.099	1	.099	.354	.553
	Within Groups	43.264	155	.279		
	Total	43.363	156			
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all members of society	Between Groups	.268	1	.268	.303	.583
	Within Groups	136.942	155	.883		
	Total	137.210	156			

In order to analyze that there is any difference between the professional qualifications of the respondents and level of agreement with three definitions of corporate governance, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value for definition 1 is (0.490), p-value for definition 2 is (0.553), and p-value for definition 3 is (0583), which are greater than the (0.05), so, there is no significant difference between professional qualifications of the respondents and level of agreement with various three definitions of corporate governance. So the level of agreement is not getting change if the respondent possesses the professional qualification.

Ho17 = There is no significant difference between Work Experience of the respondent and Level of Agreement about the definitions of Corporate Governance

Table 4.41

ANOVA for work experience with respect to Level of Agreement about the definition of Corporate Governance

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with its shareholders	Between Groups	2.260	2	1.130	.902	.408
	Within Groups	192.810	154	1.252		
	Total	195.070	156			
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all stakeholders	Between Groups	.377	2	.188	.674	.511
	Within Groups	42.987	154	.279		
	Total	43.363	156			
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all members of society	Between Groups	2.237	2	1.119	1.276	.282
	Within Groups	134.973	154	.876		
	Total	137.210	156			

As shown in Table 4.41 to analyze that there is any difference between work experience of the respondents and level of agreement with three definitions of corporate governance, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value for definition 1 is (0.408), p-value for definition 2 is (0.511), and p-value for definition 3 is (0.282), which are greater than the (0.05), so, there is no significant difference between work experience of the respondents and level of agreement with three definitions of corporate governance. So the level of agreement is not getting change if the work experience of the respondent changes.

Ho18 = There is no significant difference between Respondents Category of the respondent and Level of Agreement about the best definition of Corporate Governance

Table 4.42

ANOVA for job position wise category with respect to Level of Agreement about the definition of Corporate Governance

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with its shareholders	Between Groups	8.682	8	1.085	.862	.550
	Within Groups	186.388	148	1.259		
	Total	195.070	156			
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all stakeholders	Between Groups	2.696	8	.337	1.226	.288
	Within Groups	40.667	148	.275		
	Total	43.363	156			
Corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all members of society	Between Groups	7.123	8	.890	1.013	.429
	Within Groups	130.087	148	.879		
	Total	137.210	156			

As shown in table 4.42 to analyze that there is any difference between job position wise category of the respondents and level of agreement with three definitions of corporate governance, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value for definition 1 is (0.550), p-value for definition 2 is (0.228), and p-value for definition 3 is (0.429), which are greater than the (0.05), so, there is no significant difference between Job category of the respondents and level of agreement with

three definitions of corporate governance. So the level of agreement is not getting change if the job category of the respondent changes.

Obstacles that affect Corporate Governance

Ho19 = There is no significant difference between gender of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance.

Table 4.43

ANOVA for Gender of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance

ANOVA					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.166	1	.166	.151	.698
Within Groups	170.637	155	1.101		
Total	170.803	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between the Gender of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.698) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the level of Gender of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho20 = There is no significant difference between the Age of the respondent and the perception of obstacles that affect Corporate Governance.

Table 4.44

ANOVA for Age of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance

ANOVA					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	3.936	4	.984	.896	.468
Within Groups	166.867	152	1.098		
Total	170.803	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between Age of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance., the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.468) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the level of Age of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho21 = There is no significant difference between Professional Education of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance.

Table 4.45

ANOVA for Professional qualification of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance

ANOVA					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	14.087	8	1.761	1.663	.112
Within Groups	156.716	148	1.059		
Total	170.803	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between the professional qualifications of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance., the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.112) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the level of professional qualification of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho22 = There is no significant difference between the work experience of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance.

Table 4.46

ANOVA for work experience of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance

ANOVA					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	3.323	2	1.661	1.528	.220
Within Groups	167.480	154	1.088		
Total	170.803	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between work experience of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance., the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.220) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the level of work experience of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho23 = There is no significant difference between Job category of the respondent and the perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance.

Table 4.47

ANOVA for Job category of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance

ANOVA					
	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	14.087	8	1.761	1.663	.112
Within Groups	156.716	148	1.059		
Total	170.803	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between the job category of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.112) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no

significant difference between the level of job category of the respondent and perception about obstacles that affect Corporate Governance and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Ho24 = There is no significant difference between gender of the respondent and perception about Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Table 4.48

ANOVA for the Gender of the respondent and perception about Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

ANOVA					
ENABLERS THAT IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.360	1	.360	.478	.490
Within Groups	116.710	155	.753		
Total	117.070	156			

According to Table 4.48, the overall significance was 0.490 with an F value of 0.478. The level of significance was higher than 0.05 and this means that the Gender of the respondents does not show statistically significant difference with their perceptions about enablers that improve Corporate Governance. Therefore this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there is no statistical difference between the Gender of the respondents and enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Ho25 = There is no significant difference between the Age of the respondent and perception about Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Table 4.49

ANOVA for Age of the respondent and perception about Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

ANOVA					
Avg 4 ENABLERS THAT IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.702	4	.675	.898	.467
Within Groups	114.369	152	.752		
Total	117.070	156			

According to table 4.49, the overall significance was 0.490 with an F value of 0.898. The level of significance was higher than 0.05 and this means that the Age of the respondents does not show statistically significant difference with their perceptions about enablers that improve Corporate Governance. Therefore this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there is no statistical difference between the Age of the respondents and enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Ho26 = There is no significant difference between the professional qualifications of the respondent and perception about Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Table 4.50

ANOVA for professional qualifications of the respondent and perception about Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

ANOVA					
Avg 4 ENABLERS THAT IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.448	1	.448	.595	.442
Within Groups	116.623	155	.752		
Total	117.070	156			

According to table 4.50, the overall significance was 0.442 with an F value of 0.595. The level of significance was higher than 0.05 and this means that the

professional qualifications of the respondents do not show statistically significant differences with their perceptions about enablers that improve Corporate Governance. Therefore this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there is no statistical difference between the professional qualifications of the respondents and enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Ho27 = There is no significant difference between Work Experience of the respondent and perception about Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Table 4.51

ANOVA for Work Experience of the respondent and perception about Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

ANOVA					
Avg 4 ENABLERS THAT IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1.894	2	.947	1.266	.285
Within Groups	115.176	154	.748		
Total	117.070	156			

According to table 4.51, the overall significance was 0.285 with an F value of 1.266. The level of significance was higher than 0.05 and this means that the work experience of the respondents does not show statistically significant difference with their perceptions about enablers that improve Corporate Governance. Therefore this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there is no statistical difference between work experience of the respondents and enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Ho28 = There is no significant difference between Job category of the respondent and perception about Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Table 4.52

ANOVA for Job category of the respondent and perception about Enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

ANOVA					
Economic Value Added (EVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.273	1	.273	1.176	.280
Within Groups	35.994	155	.232		
Total	36.268	156			

According to table 4.52, the overall significance was 0.280 with an F value of 1.176. The level of significance was higher than 0.05 and this means that Job category of the respondents does not show statistically significant difference with their perceptions about enablers that improve Corporate Governance. Therefore this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there is no statistical difference between the job category of the respondents and enablers that improve Corporate Governance.

Tools to measure Value Creation (Special Focus on EVA).

Ho29 = There is no significant difference between gender of the respondent and perception about EVA (Economic Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

Table 4.53

ANOVA for Gender of the respondent and perception about EVA (Economic Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

ANOVA					
Economic Value Added (EVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.273	1	.273	1.176	.280
Within Groups	35.994	155	.232		
Total	36.268	156			

Table 4.53 shows that the computed p-value in regard to the gender of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation was 0.280, which is greater than 0.05. This is not signifying the gender of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation statistically. Therefore, these results further support the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference between the gender of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation of the companies.

Ho30 = There is no significant difference between the Age of the respondent and perception about EVA (Economic Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

Table 4.54
ANOVA for Age of the respondent and perception about EVA (Economic Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

ANOVA					
Economic Value Added (EVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1.499	4	.375	1.638	.167
Within Groups	34.769	152	.229		
Total	36.268	156			

Table 4.54 shows that the computed p-value in regard to the Age of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation was 0.167, which is greater than 0.05. This is not signifying the age of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation statistically. Therefore, these results further support the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference between the age of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation of the companies.

Ho31 = There is no significant difference between the professional qualification of the respondent and perception about EVA (Economic Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

Table 4.55

ANOVA for professional qualification of the respondent and perception about EVA (Economic Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

ANOVA					
Economic Value Added (EVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.613	1	.613	2.664	.105
Within Groups	35.655	155	.230		
Total	36.268	156			

Table 4.55 shows that the computed p-value in regard to the professional qualifications of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation was 0.105, which is greater than 0.05. This is not signifying the professional qualification of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation statistically. Therefore, these results further support the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference between the professional qualification of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation of the companies.

Ho32 = There is no significant difference between work experience of the respondent and perception about EVA (Economic Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

Table 4.56

ANOVA for work experience of the respondent and perception about EVA (Economic Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

ANOVA					
Economic Value Added (EVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1.536	2	.768	3.405	.036
Within Groups	34.731	154	.226		
Total	36.268	156			

Table 4.56 shows that the computed p-value in regard to the work experience of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation was 0.036, which is less than 0.05. This signifies the work experience of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation statistically. Therefore, these results not supporting to the null hypothesis that there is a statistical significant difference between the works experience of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation of the companies.

Ho33 = There is no significant difference between the job category of the respondent and perception about EVA (Economic Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation.

Table 4.57
ANOVA for the job category of the respondent and perception about EVA (Economic Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

ANOVA					
Economic Value Added (EVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.520	8	.315	1.381	.209
Within Groups	33.748	148	.228		
Total	36.268	156			

Table 4.57 shows that the computed p-value in regard to the Job category of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation was 0.209, which is more than 0.05. This is not signifying the job category of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation statistically. Therefore, these results further support the null hypothesis that there is a statistical significant difference between the works experience of the respondents and their perception about the EVA as a tool to measure the value creation of the companies.

Tools to measure Value Creation (Special Focus on MVA)

Ho34 = There is no significant difference between gender of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

Table 4.58
ANOVA for Gender of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

ANOVA					
Market Value Added (MVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	5.437	1	5.437	2.247	.136
Within Groups	375.047	155	2.420		
Total	380.484	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between the gender of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.136) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the level of the gender of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho35 = There is no significant difference between the age of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation.

Table 4.59
ANOVA for an age of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

ANOVA					
Market Value Added (MVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	9.461	4	2.365	.969	.426
Within Groups	371.023	152	2.441		
Total	380.484	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between the age of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.426) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the level of the age of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho36 = There is no significant difference between the professional qualification of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation.

Table 4.60
ANOVA for professional qualification of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

ANOVA					
Market Value Added (MVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.313	1	2.313	.948	.332
Within Groups	378.171	155	2.440		
Total	380.484	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between the professional qualification of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.332) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the level of professional qualification of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho37 = There is no significant difference between the work experience of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation.

Table 4.61

ANOVA for work experience **of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation**

ANOVA					
Market Value Added (MVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	9.718	2	4.859	2.018	.136
Within Groups	370.766	154	2.408		
Total	380.484	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between work experience of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.136) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the level of work experience of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho38= There is no significant difference between the job category of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation.

Table 4.62

ANOVA for the job category of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation

ANOVA					
Market Value Added (MVA)					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	33.236	8	4.155	1.771	.087
Within Groups	347.248	148	2.346		
Total	380.484	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between work experience of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to

measure Value Creation, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.87) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the level of work experience of the respondent and perception about MVA (Market Value Added) as a tool to measure Value Creation and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

The results of chapter III have reviled that, there is a positive relationship between corporate governance practices and the value creation of the companies. Moreover, the descriptive analysis of this chapter shows that majority of the respondents have shown their strong agreement with the statement 'corporate governance is positive affects to the value creation of the companies. In order to check that statistically any significant differences in the perception of the respondent about the statement and different demographic features of the respondents, the ANOVA test has been conducted and the result of the test according to different demographic features is as follows:

Ho39 = There is no significant difference between gender of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Table 4.63

ANOVA for Gender of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

ANOVA					
CG & Value Creation of the company					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.236	1	.236	.323	.571
Within Groups	113.484	155	.732		
Total	113.720	156			

According to table 4.63, the overall significance was 0.571 with an F value of 0.323. The level of significance was higher than 0.05 and this means that the gender of the respondents does not show a statistically significant difference with their perceptions about the relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation. Therefore this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there is no statistical difference gender of the respondent and their perception about the relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Ho40 = There is no significant difference between the Age of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Table 4.64
ANOVA for the age of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

ANOVA					
CG & Value Creation of the company					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.536	4	.634	.867	.486
Within Groups	111.184	152	.731		
Total	113.720	156			

According to table 4.64, the overall significance was 0.486 with an F value of 0.867. The level of significance was higher than 0.05 and this means that the age of the respondents does not show a statistically significant difference with their perceptions about the relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation. Therefore this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there is no statistical difference age of the respondent and their perception about the relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Ho41 = There is no significant difference between the professional qualification of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Table 4.65
ANOVA for the professional qualification of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

ANOVA					
CG & Value Creation of the company					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.186	1	.186	.254	.615
Within Groups	113.534	155	.732		
Total	113.720	156			

According to table 4.65, the overall significance was 0.615 with an F value of 0.254. The level of significance was higher than 0.05 and this means that the professional qualification of the respondents does not show a statistically significant difference with their perceptions about the relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation. Therefore this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there is no statistical difference professional qualification of the respondent and their perception about the relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Ho42 = There is no significant difference between the work experience of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Table 4.66

ANOVA for work experience of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

ANOVA					
CG & Value Creation of the company					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.144	2	1.072	1.480	.231
Within Groups	111.575	154	.725		
Total	113.720	156			

According to table 4.66, the overall significance was 0.231 with an F value of 1.480. The level of significance was higher than 0.05 and this means that work experience of the respondents does not show statistically significant difference with their perceptions about the relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation. Therefore this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there is no statistical difference work experience of the respondent and their perception about the relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Ho43 = There is no significant difference between Job category of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Table 4.67

ANOVA for the job category of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

ANOVA					
CG & Value Creation of the company					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	9.482	8	1.185	1.683	.107
Within Groups	104.238	148	.704		

ANOVA					
CG & Value Creation of the company					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	9.482	8	1.185	1.683	.107
Within Groups	104.238	148	.704		
Total	113.720	156			

According to table 4.67, the overall significance was 0.107 with an F value of 1.683. The level of significance was higher than 0.05 and this means that the job category of the respondents does not show a statistically significant difference with their perceptions about the relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation. Therefore this study fails to reject the null hypothesis and concludes that there is no statistical difference job category of the respondent and their perception about the relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and its impact on Corporate Value Creation.

Need to strengthen corporate governance practices

Ho44 = There is no significant difference between gender of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practises.

Table 4.68
ANOVA for Gender of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practises.

ANOVA					
Need to Strengthen Corporate Governance Practices					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.817	1	.817	.745	.389
Within Groups	169.960	155	1.097		
Total	170.777	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between the Gender of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance practices, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.389) is

greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between gender of respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance practices and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho45 =There is no significant difference between the Age of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practises.

Table 4.69

ANOVA for Age of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practises.

ANOVA					
Need to Strengthen Corporate Governance Practices					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.396	4	.599	.541	.706
Within Groups	168.381	152	1.108		
Total	170.777	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between the age of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance practices, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.706) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the age of respondents and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance practices and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho46 =There is no significant difference between the professional qualification of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practises.

Table 4.70

ANOVA for professional qualification of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practises.

ANOVA					
Need to Strengthen Corporate Governance Practices					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.255	1	.255	.232	.631
Within Groups	170.522	155	1.100		
Total	170.777	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between the professional qualification of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance practices, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.631) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the professional qualification of respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance practices and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho47 =There is no significant difference between work experience of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practises.

Table 4.71

ANOVA for work experience of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practises.

ANOVA					
Need to Strengthen Corporate Governance Practices					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.029	2	1.014	.926	.398
Within Groups	168.748	154	1.096		
Total	170.777	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between work experience of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance practices, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.398) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between work experience of respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance practices and the null hypothesis is accepted.

Ho48 =There is no significant difference between the job category of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards the Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practises.

Table 4.72
ANOVA for the job category of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance Practises.

ANOVA					
Need to Strengthen Corporate Governance Practices					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	12.804	8	1.600	1.499	.162
Within Groups	157.973	148	1.067		
Total	170.777	156			

In order to find out that there is any difference between the job category of the respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance practices, the ANOVA test was used to find out the significance of the difference between two variables. Since the p-value (0.162) is greater than the (0.05), hence there is no significant difference between the job category of respondent and perception of the respondents towards Need to strengthen Current Corporate Governance practices and the null hypothesis is accepted.

4.4 Conclusion

The primary objective of this part of the study was to explore the views and perceptions of different categories of respondents practicing corporate governance in India. The primary data were obtained from questionnaires designed to achieve this objective. Nine groups were selected to respond to a survey questionnaire: (1) Company secretaries (Practicing as well as in Employment) (2)Chartered Accountants (3)Cost Accountants (4) Executives of Bombay stock exchange (5) Executives of National stock exchange (6)Retail Investors (7) Executives of Institutional Investors (8) Officers of Registrar of Companies (9) Directors of the Companies. The survey sample represented a particular group having an interest in the corporate governance practices of India. An important part of this focus was that it did address the views of a wide range of other stakeholders who had an interest in the corporate governance of the companies, such as regulators, investors, Institutional Investors. The data were analyzed using the SPSS package, the Kruskal–Wallis test to identify any significant differences between groups and the ANOVA test to identify which differences were statistically significant. The questionnaire was divided into seven related sections, and each section consisted of one or more questions. In general, most statements in the questionnaire were supported by respondents.

The questionnaire data presented the age, gender, job position, education background, academic discipline, professional qualification and work experience of the survey respondents. Analysis of the collected data shows support, in general, for most of the items presented in the questionnaire. Most respondents agreed that the appropriate definition of corporate governance refers to an organization's relationship with all members of society, irrespective of whether they affect or are affected by the organization's operations and decisions. In relation to the significance of the implementation of good corporate governance in Indian companies to specific parties, the results indicated that most respondents in this survey agreed on the identified obstacles affects the current corporate governance practices in India, Enablers of good corporate governance practices,

tools to measures the value creation of companies, need for strengthening the current corporate governance practices, and relationship between corporate governance and value creation of companies. The main results of the identified measures to strengthen the corporate governance practices in India in this study indicate that most measures are agreed, with varying degrees, with the improvement of corporate governance practices of Indian companies.

Regarding possible barriers that might affect corporate governance practice, the results suggested that, in general, all of the possible barriers that respondents were asked about were considered important. Finally, in relation to the primary enablers enhancing the practice of good corporate governance in Indian companies, the survey results indicated that, in general, respondents from all groups agreed in principle that all of the items listed as a measures to strengthen the corporate governance practices, could improve the practice of effective corporate governance in India. Despite general agreement in opinions among respondents, there were some significant differences regarding certain items in the questionnaire; these differences were mainly in the degree of emphasis among the selected groups that participated in this study. This may be due to the different demographics of respondents such as age, gender, job position, education, professional qualifications, and experience.

These results were related to three objectives of this study: (1) identify corporate governance as understood in the Indian context (2) examine interested groups' perceptions about corporate governance principles in Indian companies and (3) identify the possible obstacles to, and enablers of, the implementation of good corporate governance India. Therefore, this empirical component of the study extends the literature and makes a significant contribution to knowledge. All the major findings can be summarised as under:

I. The first part identified which definition of corporate governance was suitable for the Indian context, and the second part discussed the significance of the implementation of good corporate governance practice

in listed companies to stakeholders. The descriptive results implied that the stakeholders believe that the stakeholder model is appropriate for India and that the implementation of corporate governance is important to all stakeholders.

II. Descriptive results reveal that most participants agreed that this list of possible obstacles might affect the enhancement of corporate governance in India. Further the current findings suggest that policymakers and regulators should focus more on dealing with the barriers that could affect the implementation of corporate governance in companies in India.

III. Enablers are important in improving the implementation of corporate governance in India. The results suggest that these enablers should be considered crucial to the development of corporate governance practice in listed companies in India because they could lead to enhancing good corporate governance practice, which is expected for the political, economic, social and cultural development of a country.

IV. The study findings show that the respondents' highest level of agreement with careful balancing of the interests of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders creates a value of the company. This implies that the board should always balance between the minority interest and controlling interest in order to create the shareholders' value.

V. This study witnessed that if independent director retires before the term, he/she should give details of reasons for resignation to the shareholders,' for strengthening the corporate governance practices.

VI. The Constitution of the stakeholders' committee is identified as one of the most important measures amongst the measures suggested on the basis of the board committee, in order to strengthen the prevailing corporate governance practices.

VII.   To strengthen the corporate governance practices, it is identified that the monitoring the group entities is also necessary, in addition to monitoring of particular entity and at least one Independent Director on the board of directors of the listed entity shall be a director on the board of directors of an unlisted material subsidiary, incorporated in India.

VIII.   Related party payment relating to Brand /Royalty in excess of 5% of the total revenue of the listed entity should be made after prior approval of the majority of shares holders.

IX.   The disclosures and transparency of the company can be improved through disclosures of change in financial indicators along with the results, by the board in addition to financial disclosures

X.   The results of the study show the highest agreement of the respondents with regard to the positive relationship between corporate governance practices and value creation of the companies.

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