Chapter II

Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*: Dhvani as Poetic Language

The Indian theory of poetic suggestion, developed and formulated by Ānandavardhana in his classic work *Dhvanyāloka,* has surprising parallels with that of the West. The concept of dhvani, which could be translated in English as suggestion, is a term derived from linguistics and means sound. The sound in its final verdict suggests the phonological structure or identity of the word. Dhvani as poetic suggestion similarly justifies and establishes a third potency of language called vyañjanā (suggestion), which accounts for the principle of the highest kind of poetry. For this the dhvani critics had to fight a long philosophical battle with the logicians and the philosophers, especially the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, who believed that language had only two functions of meaning – the primary (abhidhā) and secondary (lakṣaṇā). Dhvani theory has a wider efficacy because it could account for both the figurative and non-figurative aspects in poetry.

Although the Indian theory of dhvani and its Western counterpart have been developed at different times under different circumstances, there are many similarities between the 9th century and the 19th century formulations of the theory of suggestion as poetic language. Though the Indian theory of suggestion was an extension of the philosophical theorizing of language practised by grammarians, philosophers, and logicians and was basically a semantic theory having none of the mystical overtones of its Western counterpart developed under the influence of Blake, Coleridge, Poe, Mallarmé and Yeats, it was similar to its Western counterpart in propounding that the essence of poetic language lies in suggestion working at multiple

levels of meaning. Both the theories had adopted different methodologies but nevertheless showed that emotion in poetry is essentially suggestive. The dhvani theroists lacked the notion of the "symbol," which is actually the foundation of the symbolist movement in the West.

Ānandavardhana lived during the time of king Avantivarman in the later part of the ninth century. A Kashmiri, and a poet, he was aware of the tradition of literary criticism that had originated in Kashmir during the reign of Jayāpida in the later half of the eighth century. The grammarian Kṣīraswāmin, the poets Dāmodara and Manoratha, the rhetorician Vāmana and the critic-poet Udbhaṭa were among the prominent members who graced the court of Jayāpida. Udbhaṭa was appointed as the chief of the court, which was more an academic body than a political one. This academy of poets and intellectuals had access to the rich library of Sanskrit and Prakrit classical works. They were aware of the works of the rhetoricians like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin and of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra.* But not before Udbhaṭa did anyone take up Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* as an important work that could shape the direction of poetics. The early poeticians Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, defined alaṁkāra (figures of speech) and guṇa (qualities)-rīti (style) as the soul of poetry respectively. Though they were aware of rasa, they had not given due importance to it and mentioned it as just any other figure of speech.

It was Udbhaṭa who brought *Nāṭyaśāstra,* the ancient manual on dramaturgy, into the sphere of general poetics. He had written a commentary on *Nāṭyaśāstra,* which might have inspired the commentaries of Lollāṭa, Śankuka and Abhinavagupta. These commentaries were significant in establishing rasa as the bedrock of the poetic tradition. Ingalls comments:

> The importance of this new interest is inestimable, for as we shall see, it was by bringing Bharata's doctrine of the rasas, the flavors or moods of a theatrical piece, into a general theory of literature that Ānanda arrived at a critique which finally could furnish workable criteria of literary excellence.[1]

It is unlikely that Udbhaṭa was unaware of the term "dhvani" or its semantic function as the term "dhvani" was used by Manoratha, a contemporary of Udbhaṭa. Perhaps, Udbhaṭa deliberately leaves it untouched, according to Pratīhāra Indurāja, his commentator, to work on the older extants. But the two important aspects of the Indian poetic tradition "rasa" and "dhvani," which were left to be developed later by Ānandavardhana into a full-fledged system had their origin in Udbhaṭa.

Ānandavardhana established suggestion (dhvani) as the soul of poetry ("Kāvyasyātma dhvanih,") which can be said to be an extension of the rasa theory. The object of a dramatic art is the realization of rasa, according to Bharata. Ānandavardhana also qualifies rasa as the object of any art, but rasa, according to him, can never be stated but be always suggested and it is only the suggested emotion which is charming and enhances the aesthetic value of a work of art. He declares:

> Our effort has all along been to make it clear that the poets do well to have the sole intention of infusing suggested sentiments, etc. into their works, and not merely to exhibit our enthusiasm in propounding a novel doctrine of suggestion.[2]

Apart from *Dhvanyāloka*, he has also written many other books. In *Dhvanyāloka* he has referred to two of his previous works, the *Arjunacarita* "The Adventures of Arjuna" and *Viṣambāṇlīlā*, "The Sports of the Bowman Love." His other works include a book on metaphysics called *Tattvāloka*,

one on Buddhist doctrines known as *Dharmottartvivrti* and a poem called "Devīśataka."

The purpose of *Viṣambāṇlīlā* was to give instructions in poetry. In describing insentient things as sentient, Ānandavardhana remarks, "This is a well-known procedure of great poets and has been described in detail for the instruction of poets in the *Viṣambāṇlīlā*" (4.7). Ānandavardhana quotes the verses from *Viṣambāṇlīlā* in *Dhvanyāloka* to illustrate the different varieties of dhvani. So, according to Ingalls, "The *Viṣambāṇlīlā* was Ānanda's first work propounding the new doctrine of suggestiveness, in a play or narrative written quite appropriately in Prakrit, for Prakrit was the language in which this style of suggestiveness first became popular and it may well have been from Prakrit that Ānanda's interest in dhvani was first stimulated."[3] *Viṣambāṇlīlā* might have been the earliest book illustrating the doctrine of dhvani but *Dhvanyāloka* is the first book which develops this theory systematically.

II

Ānandavardhana's dhvani theory was greatly influenced by Bhartṛhari's sphota theory. In *Dhvanyāloka*, Ānandavardhana has acknowledged his indebtness to Bhartṛhari's theory. Ānandavardhana derived the term "dhvani" which in ancient linguistic term meant sound-unit and applied it to the study of poetry. He, therefore, remarks in *Dhvanyāloka*:

> ...they [the grammarians] gave the name dhvani to the sounds of speech that are heard. In the same manner,

men otherwise, who knew the true essence of poetry, have followed the example of the grammarians by giving the title dhvani to that verbal entity which contains a mixture of denotative and denoted elements and which is designated as "a poem." They did so because of the similarity [to acoustical *dhvani*] in its being a manifestor [of suggested meanings just as the heard sounds manifest words.][4] *[Dhvanyāloka 1.131 A]*

In sphoṭa theory, the sentence is taken as a single semantic unit. Just as a word is divided into roots and suffix, and a phrase is divided into lexical units, a sentence is divided into constituent words to articulate the different grammatical functions. But a sentence as a whole gives the meaning. The sentence meaning is first perceived and then the meanings of the individual words.

The sentence is an indivisible and integral linguistic unit whose meaning is conveyed by an "instantaneous flash of insight or intuition" known as pratibhā. Sphoṭa theory speaks in similar terms as the Gestalt theory of psychology in the West. The sentence as a whole exists as the primary/basic unit of meaning, the words do not build up the meaning.

Bhartṛhari considers the logical interpretation of an utterance faulty. So also Ānandavardhana tries to look beyond the denotative meaning in a work of art. Sometimes an utterance can give an altogether different meaning from the individual word-meanings put together according to Bhartṛhari. Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion is an application of Bhartṛhari's linguistic theory in the field of poetics.

Bhartṛahari defines dhvani as "sound-born sounds" which is quite similar to what the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas believed. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas

described sounds of speech as a series of sounds where only the last sound leads to cognition. Moreover, going by their analogy of the reverberations of a bell, the sounds heard are actually born of other sounds and not the original sound produced by speech organs. This is exactly like ripples created and spread when a stone is thrown in the pond. The last wave that reaches the shore is not directly created by the stone but rather by the preceeding waves, hence it is wave produced wave and not a stone-produced wave. Maṇḍana Miśra's analogy of a jeweller trying to perceive the genuineness of a precious stone is quite apt here. Like the reverberating bell and the waves produced in the pond, the jeweller's constant gaze at the stone helps in increasing his clarity of perception. Each phase of his gaze adds to newer perception, ultimately the series of perception leading to his cognition. It is the last cognition in the series which leads to his final, complete perception. Bhartṛhari's own analogy of a student trying to learn a verse by-heart is described in the following śloka :

> *yathāmnvākaś śloko vā sodhatvam upagacchati*
> *āvṛttyā na tu sa granthaḥ pratyāvṛtti nirśpyate.*
>
> After repeated reading the student gets the verse by-heart. It is only the last reading which results in his memorizing the verse through a process of storing the number of memory traces of the previous traces.
>
> *[Vākyapadiya I.83]*

Similarly the term "dhvani" which Bhartṛhari refers to as "phoneme-manifestor," i.e., which manifests the semantic content of a word through a series of cognition, can be used for denoting the word "suggestion," as it is analogous to the reverberating sounds of the bell.

III

Besides the two well-known functions of language, the literal (abhidhā) and the metaphorical (lakṣaṇā), the Dhvani theorists claimed that there is a third potency of language called suggestion (vyañjanā). And suggestion is the proper function of poetic language.

The primary (vācya) meaning of the word is the conventional meaning accepted through usage. The part of the word which conveys the literal meaning is called abhidhāvṛtti (denotative function). This is the meaning usually given in the dictionary. The following verse describes the source from which the meaning of a word can be known:

Śaktigraham vyākaraṇopamānakośāptavākyād vyavahārataśca
vākyasya śeṣād vivṛter vadanti sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhaḥ

> The meaning of the words can be learnt by different ways and the eight ways are: grammar, analogy or comparison, lexicon, rest of the sentence/passage in the context, explanation by the learned, worldly usage, testimony of the trust-worthy and the proximity of a known word.[5]

But the question of an additional meaning raises some semantic problems. The situation when a sentence conveys a meaning not stated by its words arises only when there is a break-down of the sentence's syntactical or logical meaning. So we invoke a secondary meaning. This secondary meaning (bhākta) is an extended meaning which emerges when the primary meaning is inapplicable or impeded.

Abhinavagupta searches for the etymological roots of the word "bhākta" and receives four meanings. The word is derived from "bhakti" which means association. Bhakti is also derived from "bhāga" or "portion." In a sentence like "the boy is a lion" some portion of the lion is attached to the boy like "fierceness" or "might." This transfer of some qualities or gunas to the boy in the above example conveys a metaphor or gauṇa.

Bhakti is "attachment," "love" or "affect." It is the affective meaning which arises out of the eagerness of the speaker to emphasize a particular aspect of a word sense, like the "might" in the boy. Bhakti also comes from the "blocking" or "breaking" (bhanga) of the primary meaning. The secondary meaning comes to the fore when there is a syntactical incongruity.

Metaphor, as Roman Jakobson defines, is a form of linguistic disturbance in which a word from one linguistic chain or field is transplanted into another in order to heighten the meaning. Poetic language, he believed, is more dislocated and thus more metaphoric in quality.

I. A. Richards, on the other hand, considers all language to be metaphorical in a broader sense because to speak referentially at all, there is a need to "sort" *this* from *that*. He divides metaphor into two parts: tenor and vehicle. Tenor is the abstract meaning, whereas vehicle is the concrete or figurative one. He illustrates it in the phrase, "Now is the winter of our discontent." Here discontentedness is the tenor and winter is the vehicle. However, the vehicle carries a host of other meanings; it adds the ideas of bitterness and barreness, and so does more than illustrate the tenor.

The Indian philophers and poeticians have dealt with metaphor in great detail like the Western theorists. The Indian theorists classified indication into two groups -- relation based indication (lakṣaṇā) and resemblance–based (sādṛśyamūla) or metaphorical indication (gauṇi). The relation-based indication (saṁbandhamūla lakṣaṇā) can be further divided into discarding indication (jahallakṣaṇā) and non-discarding indication (ajahallakṣaṇā). In discarding indication (jahallakṣaṇā), for example, "the country mourned the death of its leader," "the country" actually means the people of the country. In non-discarding indication (ajahallakṣaṇā) the literal sense is not totally abandoned. In the example, "The spears rushed into the city," "spears" actually mean spearmen because the spears also come along with the spearmen.

Mammaṭa sub-divides the metaphorical indication into *sāropā* (attributive indication) and *sādhyāvasānikā* (determinative indication), by Mammaṭa. "The bramhin boy is a fire" is an example of *sāropā*, which is a super-imposition of the metaphorical word (fire) on the base (boy). The sentence signifies the similarity of the boy with the fire. As the fire flares up easily so does the boy, who is immediately provoked. Similarly the phrase, "he is a lion" is an example of *sāropā* (the attributive variety of indication). The metaphorical word or object and the base or subject are given an identity each but are mentioned separately. In the determinative variety of indication (sādhyāvasānikā), the identity of the object merges with the subject. In the example, "he is a real fire," the metaphorical word "swallows" its base. So also in the sentence, "the fox is coming," the cunning of the fox is attributed to the man and the two are merged. The viśaya (tenor), i.e., the man and the viśayi (vehicle), i.e., the fox are

connected with some kind of similarity between them, but instead of being superimposed as in *sāropā,* their resemblance is internalized. The metaphors in Western literature have a far greater degree of the "swallowing" effect; for instance, "the fire of Rome addressed the "senate" refers to Cicero. We understand the sentence on the basis of a perceived resemblance.

The rūḍhilakṣaṇā (conventional indication) is similar to the Western term for "dead metaphor." The words, initially used as metaphors, later on became literal. The special semantic effect of lakṣaṇā (secondary indication) almost ceases in the course of time and it is brought into the sphere of abhidhā or common usage.

Sanskrit critics had given a lot of importance to the metaphorical use of language. This is evident in their elaborate exegesis on metaphors (lakṣaṇā). In Indian poetics metaphor is considered as a poetic device; a means to an end--the evocation of rasa; whereas, metaphor in the context of Western poetics has deeper significance and applies to the entire range of poetic expression and semantic value.

The type of indication can be represented as :


Bhākta (Indication)
lakṣaṇā (Relation-based)
Gauṇi
(Resemblance-based metaphor)
Jahallakṣaṇā
(Discarding
indication)
ajahallakṣaṇā
(Non-discarding
indication)
sādhyāvasānā
(determinative
indication)
sāropā
(attributive indication)
Relation of the
locus and the
located
association
cause and
effect
contradiction
similarity

IV

The third function of language, as Ānandavardhana says, is dhvani. Dhvani and bhakti are not identical. They have different roles to play in poetry. Vyañjanā (suggestion) forms an important part of speech activity, but since Ānadavardhana was interested to show vyañjanā as an aesthetic element in poetic language he developed the concept of dhvani which is the predominant vyañjanā applied to poetry in its most appealing nature. Dhvani does not occur in the instances where the suggested meaning plays a secondary role.

Ānadavardhana does not recognize all unstated meaning as dhvani. Those utterances which are left incomplete either syntactically or in terms of their logical implications are not examples of dhvani, because Ānandavardhana does not see any suggestion in logical implication or presupposition.

Dhvani is not any kind of suggestion as found in the figures of speech like samāsokti, ākṣepa, paryāyokta, dīpaka, sankara etc. Dhvani is found only where the suggested sense is predominant.

Ānandavardhana wanted to bring suggestion into a wholly new semantic category. So he did not accept the older definitions of suggestion which were categorized as figures of speech like samāsokti, akṣepa, paryāyokta, dīpaka, sankara. To do this he invented the distinction between predominant and subordinate suggestion, and he called the predominant suggestion dhvani and left out figure of speech as examples of subordinate suggestion.

He distinguishes three types of poety: true poetry, in which the unspoken part dominates (dhvani kāvya); second-grade poetry in which the unspoken part plays a secondary role (guṇībhūtavyaṅgya kāvya) and third-grade poetry in which the whole

importance is attached to the beauty of language and external figures (citra kāvya). True poetry, then, is poetry dominated by suggestion or unexpressed sense. W. M. Urban distinguishes between what poetry says explicitly, and what it says implicitly, "Poetry means what it says, but it does not always say all that it means. There is a great deal of unexpressed reference."[6] The theory of dhvani, like any other new theory, was not without opposition. Ānandavardhana had taken many of the objections seriously and refuted them in the first chapter of his book. The major arguments put forward by anti-dhvani theorists, Ānandavardhana says, can be classified into three categories. One group denies the existence of any other type of sense except the denotative sense. A word denotes a meaning and there can be no other meaning signified by that word. For them the primary meaning is the one ultimate meaning. They are the abhâvavâdins who deny the existence of dhvani. Another group accepts the existence of another sense over and above the primary sense and calls it bhākta, which means an associative or secondary meaning. Bhākta includes both the gauṇi or the metaphorical and lakṣaṇā, i.e., the relational sense. Accordingly, the words and their senses can denote the primary meaning (abhidhā) and the secondary meaning (lakṣaṇā). Even if the abhidhā or primary meaning does not convey the sense, there is lakṣaṇā (secondary meaning) which explains everything. So there is no need for inventing another "word" to designate another type of meaning. These bhāktavādins call dhvani a secondary or associated meaning. Still there are others, while acknowledging the concept of dhvani, say that dhvani is undefinable; it can be exprienced, but cannot by any means be explained. These critics are called anākhyeyavādins.

The abhāvavādins disagree with dhvani theorists on three points. They say that poetic language is distinct from scientific /ordinary language and

this distinction is brought about by the various tools of embellishment such as figures of speech (alaṁkāra), qualities (guṇa), style (rīti) and other modes of linguistic ornamentation. The older poeticians had very carefully detailed all the sources that impart beauty to a poem and dhvani does not come under any of these sources that impart beauty. Their second argument is similar to the first: there cannot be any other definition beyond what the early poeticians have reckoned as the source of beauty. The third argument suggests that if dhvani is claimed as a source which provides sweetness and beauty to a poem it must not be given a separate name and entity. Hence, the argument goes, there is no need to propagate an old theory with the enthusiasm of a new. Of the three groups of critics, the abhāvavādins, suffer from judgement of error, the bhāktavādins from indecision, and the anākhyeyavādins from insufficient knowledge.

While Ānandavardhana's work itself is an answer to the third category of critics, the anākhyeyavādins, he had to make an attempt at refuting the first two – the abhāvavādins and the bhāktavādins. His argument against the former was that dhvani is not a mere beauty accessory; rather it is the very soul of poetry. He gives the analogy of a charming woman with beautiful ornaments. The ornaments as external features definitely add to the woman's beauty but charm is something intrinsic to her and does not necessarily depend on the ornaments or individual features. A charming woman can still be charming without the ornaments, but it is not always true for the other way round, i.e., ornament does not bring charm. Similarly, dhvani is the "charm" and alaṁkāras, guṇa-rīti etc. are ornaments. The latter may help to make a poem attractive but only dhvani brings out its charm.

The bhāktavādins recognized the importance of secondary usage of words but did not believe in the power of suggestion, which was above the secondary usage. Though the logicians tried to explain away all the meanings and functions of words through lakṣaṇā or the senondary meanings, that was simply not enough to explain the special faculty needed to understand poetry or a piece of literature. Ānandavardhana, therefore, distinguishes between the two types of meanings – the explicit and the implicit meaning.

Many later writers, some of whom were also the contemporaries of Abhinavagupta, had strongly opposed the dhvani theory. Mukulabhatta in his *Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā* tried to include dhvani under lakṣaṇā. He defined lakṣaṇâ as any other sense other than the denotative sense. He broadens his definition of lakṣaṇā to accommodate all other ideas/meanings other than the primary meaning. In this sense, dhvani also comes under the purview of lakṣaṇā and loses its unique identity as a semantic function beyond lakṣaṇā.

Suggestion, Ānandavardhana says, does not occur at the level of metaphoric meaning (bhākta). The metaphoric function is a super-imposed activity of the word located in the "intermediate sense." The literal meaning (abhidhā) is directly conventional and is grasped immediately. But the secondary meaning is only indicated due to the intervention of the primary meaning. So some anti-dhvani theorists claim that since secondary meaning is also an unstated meaning it can be accepted as a suggestive function. To this, dhvani theorists argue that there is a suggestion which arises out of the secondary meaning. And this suggestion is not subjected to any impediment or cannot be explained by the secondary function. In the example, "the village on the Ganges," there is a syntactical incongruity, because a village cannot exist on the stream of a river. So we admit the secondary meaning

here, i.e., "the banks of the Ganges." But "Ganges" also suggest the notion of coolness and sanctity. We do not arrive at the third meaning by resolving the incongruity of the primary meaning. Ānandavardhana terms this as the third potency of language called suggestion. Analysing the above example we arrive at the three stages of meaning. First, by the direct relation of the word "Ganges" to its meaning, we understand the stream. The stream takes us to its related meaning, "the banks of the stream," by the indirect relation of one meaning to another meaning. And third, "the banks of the river" suggests a third meaning of "coolness" by further removing the relation of the second meaning to the third.

Mukulabhaṭṭa's definition, according to Ānandavardhana, is defective because the secondary meaning operates only in the case where the literal sense is impossible, inconsistent and discarded; whereas dhvani can function along with the literal sense. The literal sense can retain its identity where suggestion is intended. Where the secondary meaning conveys only an idea, dhvani conveys either an idea, a figure of speech or an emotion (rasa).

The secondary meaning, according to Ānandavardhana, does not occur without abhidhā (primary sense). The secondary meaning can function only upon an expressed sense which is not a pre-requisite for vyañjanā (suggestion). Suggestion follows intonation, music, dance, gesture and other unarticulated contextual factors.

Dhanaṁjay, the author of *Daśarūpaka* (a treatise on drama) and his brother Dhanika, the commentator of the book, have found dhvani equally redundant, as have the Mīmāṁsaskas of the Prabhākara school for very different reasons. The Dhanaṁjay brothers deny dhvani's function claiming

that it can be included in "*tātparyavṛtti*" (sentential purport). For the followers of the Prābhākara School, on the other hand, all the semantic functions come under the primary function (abhidhā) including dhvani.

The concept of *tātparyavṛtti* assigns all the functions like secondary meaning and dhvani to the verbal comprehension of a sentence. The individual word meanings lose their identity in a sentence. The cluster of words in a sentence interact with each other and the mutual relation among them, known as saṁsarga, brings out the meaning. The meaning conveyed by the sentential purport is suggested, according to Dhanika. Abhinavagupta refutes this view by saying that the sentential purport conveys the syntactical connection in a sentence. The syntax conveys the primary meaning. The power of tātparya (sentential purport) exhausts after conveying the syntactical connection. Dhvani, therefore, has to be assigned a different function. Dhanika, however, believes that the power of syntax can be extended beyond its logical connection between the different word meanings.

The Prabhākar school, with its doctrine of anvitābhidhāna, considers dhvani as the function of abhidhā (primary denotation.) This transcends the meaning of a word from its mere literal sense. The meaning of a word keeps extending like the course of an arrow which goes further each time it is shot with force and swiftness. The dhvanivādis reject this theory because there would be no restriction on the scope of meanings, and a sentence may never come to a stop. They answer them with the arguments of the abhihitānvayavādins who relate abhidhā (denotation) only to its definite conventional meaning. The denotative meaning cannot justify all the meanings in a sentence. If it does so its objectivity and relevance is lost. There is another level of meaning which arises, not as a logical sequence but

due to the power of the context. So for suggestion another semantic power of the word has to be taken and this is what Ānandavardhana call dhvani. He illustrates the scope of suggestion with the following example:

> Go your round freely, gentle monk;
> the little dog is gone.
> Just today from the thickets by the Goda
> Came a fearsome lion and killed him.[7]
>
> *[Dhvanyāloka, 1.4]*

If we go step-by-step from the primary to the secondary to the suggestive meaning we will find that the primary meaning and the suggested meaning are completely different from each other to the degree of being opposites.

This verse from the point of view of literal meaning is an injunction. A certain lady seems to be the speaker of this verse. A monk comes to the forest everyday to collect flowers for worship. The forest happens to be the secret meeting place of the woman and her lover. She feels disturbed by his intrusion. She wants to prevent him from coming to this place but does not say so directly. Rather she invites him to come to the place more often because the dog who used to frighten him is killed by a lion dwelling in the forest. The monk would be delighted to find the removal of the cause of his fear, but the cause of this removal, i.e., the lion, is more frightening. Obviously the monk wouldn't think of visiting the forest any more. Though the dog is gone something more ferocious has replaced it. The verse suggests a prohibition but is spoken in the form of an invitation. The function of the literal meaning (abhidā) ceases after conveying the primary sense, that of invitation: "Go your round freely..." The sense of prohibition has to be conveyed by some other power of words. The secondary usage

(lakṣaṇā) is not applicable here since the primary meaning doesn't get blocked. It is only the power of dhvani which conveys this prohibition. Since dhvani is supposed to be prominent here, the literal meaning is not totally relegated; it gets subordinated to the suggested because the dhvani comes through abhidā.

Mammaṭa's comments on the verse seem quite apt. The monk visiting a house for flowers must have been warned by the pet dog. So he goes into the forest. Had he been frightened by the dog in the forest, the woman would not have needed to invent a lion for frightening him further. By asking the monk to go to the house without any hesitation since the dog has been killed, she actually prohibits him from coming to the forest by suggesting that a fierce lion dwells in the forest. The suggestion aims at two things: first, the monk can again go to the house as usual fearlessly; second, by hearing of the lion he will no longer go to the forest. The purpose of the woman and the monk are thus served.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka,* was a fierce and fatal criticism of dhvani theory. A Naiyāyika, Mahimabhaṭṭa discarded dhvani on the ground that every other function of a word other than the denotative can be included in inference (anumāna). Therefore to invent a new term like dhvani would be superfluous. Rasa is also inferred through the causes and after-effects of emotions. In one of his aphorisms, he alters *Dhvanyāloka's* definition of dhvani to suit his own purpose thus :

> *Vācyastadanumito vāyatrāthorthāntaram prākāśayati*
> *Sambandhatah kutaścit sākāvyānumitirityuktā.*
>
> *(Vyaktiviveka, 1:25)*

kāvyānumiti or poetic inference occurs wherever the literal meaning reveals a different meaning through inference.[8]

The implied meaning is always inferred from the expressed meaning. So, Mahimabhaṭṭa argues, there is no need to create a new function called dhvani. According to him what the dhvani theorists call suggestion is not a verbal activity at all, but inferential reasoning. When the meaning of a sentence gives rise to another meaning, the other meaning is understood through a further reasoning called inference. He claims that words have only one power: the denotation. The word either surrenders its own meaning or gives rise to another. It only seems to convey different meanings due to differences in the conditions of its use. So Mahimabhaṭṭa claims that another meaning of the word is actually another use of the word. The dhvani theorists contested Mahimabhaṭṭa's argument saying that even the inferred meaning is still verbal because the meaning arises from the words. Ānandavardhana refutes the anumāna (inference) theory on the basis of a lack of an invariable relation between the primary and the suggested sense on which inference depends. For example, the fire in the woods is inferred from the smoke rising there. The relationship/interdependence that exists between the fire and the smoke is absent in the light and the pot. There is no such binding relation between the light and the pot, where the light reveals the pot

Mahimabhaṭṭa's arguments against dhvani theory are based on his postulate that inference is precise, accurate and logical, whereas suggestion is vague and subjective; inference can include suggestion, which can be inferred from the expressed sense. Poetic inference, he says, is based on

the expressed sense and rejects other types of extra-linguistic suggestions. What Mahimabhatta ignores is that poetry appeals more to imagination and emotion than to logical reasoning. By excluding the whole range of suggestive language from the scope of poetry he limits the function of literature and converts it into a logical reasoning. Moreover, only dhvani can explain how negative meaning arises from a positive assertion as the verse "Go round..." in the example above shows. The Mīmāṃsakas view dhvani as part of what they call arthāpatti, which etymologically means postulation *(āpatti)* of fact (artha). It is a means of cognition of a fact which is otherwise incomprehensible. Arthāpatti is immediate inference to resolve a logical contradiction. For example, when we use the sentence, "the fat Devadutta never eats during day time" it can be inferred that he eats at night. Here the contradiction "*Fat* Devadutta *never eats*" is resolved by means of arthāpatti (immediate inference or material implication) that he must be eating at night. Jesperson has a similar view about the function of suggestion when he says:

> In all speech activity there are three things to be distinguished: expression, suppression and impression. Expression is what the speaker gives, suppression is what he does not give, though he might have given it and impression is what the hearer receives. It is important to notice that an impression is often produced not only by what is said expressly, but also by what is supressed. Suggestion is impression through suppression.[9]

After the individual word meanings of a sentence have been conveyed, the saṁsarga (mutual relation of the words) or the meaning of the

sentence is conveyed through the postulation of fact. According to Abhinavagupta, rasa is always suggested. Suggestion is not logical like inference, where the knowledge of one thing is inferred from another.

Now one wonders if the dhvani theorists are not unnecessarily dragging meaning as a mental activity when they try to assign even the motive for metaphor to a special linguistic function. It is difficult to determine where the verbal operation stops and the mental process starts. The dhvani theorists themselves suggest no definite limits to the scope of verbal meaning.

Kuntaka's *Vakroktijīvita* and Bhoja's *Śṛngāraprakāśa* cannot be called works on anti-dhvani theory in clear terms. Both try to seek another name for dhvani. Kuntaka's theory vakrokti or obliqueness of poetic operation is an all-pervasive term which includes figures, style, quality, decorum, suggestion in vakrokti. What dhvani is for Ānandavardhana vakrokti is for Kuntaka. He does not deny the existence of dhvani altogether; rather he alters the definition of the poetic soul (kāvyātmā) by shifting the emphasis from dhvani to vakrokti.

Bhoja merely uses a different terminology for dhvani and calls it tātparya (purport/intention). He classifies tātparya into three types – abhidhīyamāna (denoted sense); pratīyamāna (implied sense); and dhvanirūpa (a form of suggested sense). He says that the function of tātparya and dhvani are analogous to the field of non-poetic and of poetic discourse respectively.

The dhvani theory accepts the principle of monosemy which requires that a sentence be a complete and unified utterance.A meaningful utterance should have a context. Words, Bhartṛhari says, only have a dictionary meaning, but the meaning of a sentence is its purpose. When context is so integrally related to the meaning of an utterance, Ānandavardhana's attempt to limit the purport (tātparya) of a sentence to its grammatical sense and talk of another semantic power, suggestion, to account for what is only the most legitimate meaning of an utterance seems redundant. The meaning and suggestion of a sentence is, after all, analysed in terms of contexts.

But unlike the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, who believed that meaning depends solely on the words expressed, Ānandavardhana established that there are many indicators of meaning, mostly non-verbal, beyond the expressed sense, like intonation, gesture, pure sound, socio-cultural context. In this sense, the expressive symbols (vācakas) and indicative signs (bodhakas) and even music which is emotion devoid of verbal communication, all form part of langauge. Language can include, as Charles Fries remarks, "even the set of deviations from the norms of the sound segments that signal the meaning that a speaker is drunk, the whispering of an utterance that signals the meaning that the content of it is secret, and the unusual distribution that is the cue to a metaphor."[10]

V

In *Dhvanyāloka,* Ānandavardhana defines the scope of dhvani as poetic language and classifies its varieties. A major defect with most of the Sanskrit theorists, including Ānandavardhana, was their attempt to present as detailed a classification as possible. One tends to agree with A. B. Keith who said, "In the sub-divisions of which India is so fond there is often much ingenuity in finding legitimate grounds of distinction, but there is always present the tendency to lose sight of the broad and important lines of demarcation while concentrating on minutiae."[11]

Though Ānandavardhana does not "lose sight of the broad" his classification of the varieties and sub-varieties of dhvani becomes quite tedious. He claims that the varieties of dhvani are endless but restricts his division of dhvani broadly into two types: avivakṣitavācya which is based on lakṣaṇā (indication) and is also called lakṣaṇāmūla and vivakṣitānyaparavācya, based on abhidhā (denotation), and is called abhidhāmūla. He further sub-divides the two categories of dhvani. This classification of dhvani, according to Ānandavardhana, can be represented as:


Rasa
Alaṁkāra – **Dhvani** – Vastu
avivakṣitavācya
(unintended denotation)
lakṣaṇāmūla
(indication based)
vivakṣitānyaparavācya
(extended denotation)
abhidhāmūla
(denotation based)
atyantatiraskṛtavācya
(suggestion of discarded denotation – literal meaning set aside)
Based on Jahallakṣaṇā
arthantarasamkramitavacya
(suggestion of progressive denotation - literal sense shifted)
Based on ajahallakṣaṇā
asaṁlakṣyakrama
(suggestion of undiscerned sequentiality - non sequential)
all varieties of rasadhvani
saṁlakṣyakrama
(resonant suggestion – sequential)
alaṁkâradhvani and vastudhvani
(word-based)
Śabdaśaktimūla
(sense-based)
arthaśaktimūla

By delineating the varieties of dhvani that Ānandavardhana mentioned in *Dhvanyāloka*, I am particularly interested to show how he demonstrated the distinction between the suggestive and secondary functions of language and how he fights a case for the distinctive use of suggestion in poetic language by providing examples from Indian literary texts.

The two main types of dhvani – avivakṣitavācya and vivakṣitānyaparavācya are further sub-divided into two types based on the two varieties of lakṣaṇā -- ajahallakṣaṇā corresponding to arthāntarasaṁkramitavācya dhvani where the suggestion is based on progressive denotation and jahallakṣaṇā corresponding to atyantatiraskṛtavācya dhvani where the denotation is totally set aside.

Arthāntarasaṁkramitavācya (suggestion of progressive denotation) is the sub-variety of avivaksitavacya dhvani (unintended denotation) where the literal sense is shifted to something else. Ānandavardhana gives an example of this sub-variety :

Virtues blossom
when admired by men of taste.
When graced by the sun's rays
a lotus becomes a lotus.

ravikiraṇānugṛhītani kamalāni kamalāni.[12]

[Dhvanyāloka, 2.1b A]

The reiteration of the word "lotus" brings in the meaning forcefully. The literal sense of the second "lotus" is blocked which brings in the secondary meaning and the secondary meaning suggests the beauties of the lotus.

This sub-variety of dhvani can be compared to what Empson calls "the pregnant use of words of the type "A is *A*"[13] where the logical meaning of a word is weaved into its emotional content.

The second sub-variety of avivakṣitavācya (unintended denotation) is atyantatiraskṛtavācya (suggestion of discarded denotation) where the literal meaning is wholly set aside. Ānandavardhana cites examples where sometimes one word suggests the meaning. An example where a word serves as the suggestor is quoted from sage Vyāsa :

> *saptaitāḥ samidhāḥ śṛihaḥ*
> these seven are the kindling sticks of royalty.[14]
>
> *[Dhvanyāloka 3.1 A]*

To take another example from Valmiki:

> *ravisaṁkrantasaubhāgyastuṣārābṛtamandalaḥ*
> *niḥsvāsāndha ivādarśacandramā na prakāśate.*
>
> *[Dhvanyāloka 2.1c A]*

> The sun has stolen our affection for the moon, whose circle now is dull with frost and like a mirror blinded by breath shines no more.[15]

The words "kindling sticks" and "mirror blinded" serve as suggestors in both the examples given above. The kindling sticks (samidhāḥ) used as the base for the sacrificial fire, has completely lost its primary sense and simply means the seven virtuous deeds which make a king successful. The phrase "mirror blinded" refers to the moon in this case. A mirror is "blinded" only when things are not clearly seen or reflected on it. Ascribing

this quality to the moon suggests the loss of beauty, coolness and other properties generally associated with the moon. So the verse suggests that in winter the sun is dearer to us than the moon.

The second variety of dhvani which is based on abhidhā (denotation) is vivakṣitānyaparavācya (extended denotation), also known as abhidhāmūla (denotation based) where the literal meaning is intended but subordinated. This is further sub-divided into asaṁlakṣyakramavyangya (suggestion of non-sequential) and saṁlakṣyakramavyangya (resonant of suggestion). Asaṁlakṣyakrama-vyangya is one where the suggested sense is of undiscerned sequentiality, i.e., the suggested sense is produced without any apparent sequence with the primary sense. In saṁlakṣyakramavyangya the sequence of the literal and the suggested sense is apparent. The difference between the discernible and undiscernible sequentiality is that in the former, the literal sense is first perceived, and after sometime the suggested sense is perceived, whereas in the latter there is no noticeable gap between the perception of the literal and of suggested sense. Though there is some momentary gap between the two the perception is so fast that the sequence of the literal and suggested sense becomes imperceptible.

Although Ānandavardhana called this second variety, vivakṣitānyaparavāya as the soul of dhvani *(dhvaner ātmā)*, he gives more importance to the sub-variety asaṁlakṣyakramavyangya (suggestion of undiscarded sequentiality), because the poetic emotions, rasa etc. are suggested through this. The non-sequentiality of the primary and the suggested sense helps in realizing the rasa immediately in the readers by rousing their sthāyibhāvas (permanent moods). Rasa can be suggested from a

single phoneme, case ending, grammatical number, suffixes, verbal prefixes, tenses, compounds, words, sentences or even the work as a whole.[16] *Rāmāyaṇa* and *The Mahābhārata* are the two exemplary classical epics, according to Ānandavardhana, where the work as a whole suggests a single rasa in spite of the interplay of various emotions suggested by a plurality of suggestors. *Rāmāyaṇa* suggests *karuṇa* rasa and *The Mahābhārata śānta* rasa.

All varieties of rasadhvani come under asaṁlakṣitakramavyangya (the imperceptible sequence type). The instances of vastu and alaṁkāra dhvani are found in saṁlakṣitakramavyangya (resonant suggestion). Saṁlakṣitakramavyangya, where the suggested sense is perceived after the literal sense, is sub-divided into śabdaśaktimūla (based on words), arthaśaktimūla (based on meaning) and sometimes ubhayaśaktimūla (based on both types). Saṁlakṣitakramavyangya is also compared to the reverberation of a bell. As we hear the resonance of the bell only after striking the bell, similarly the suggested meaning is apprehended within a momentary interval after the literal meaning is understood. F. Wisemann gives a similar analogy of the chimes of a bell:

> We seem at times to glimpse behind a word another sense, deeper and half hidden, and to hear faintly the entry of another meaning, in and with which others begin to sound, and all accompany the original meaning of the word like the sympathetic chimes of a bell. Hence, that deep and sonorous ring in words which is lacking in artificial and invented languages; and hence also the multiplicity, the indefiniteness, the strange suggestiveness and evasiveness of so much poetry.[17]

Ānandavardhana quotes from Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita* to illustrate the kind of suggestion based on the power of abhidhā:

atrāntare kusumasamayayugamupasaṁharannajṛṁbhat
griṣmābhidhān: phullamallika dhavalāṭṭahaso mahākālah

Meanwhile the long period named summer,
meanwhile the God of Destruction,
When the market stalls are white with the laughter
whose terrible laughter is white
of their blosssoming jasmine flowers,
as jasmine flowers,
expanded as it put an end to the two months of spring.
yawned as he put an end to the aeons of time. [18]

[Harṣacarita 19-20]

I have used two types of fonts to represent the denotative sense and the suggested sense. Bāṇa is actually describing the transition of seasons from spring to summer. Whereas this seems to me an example of an implicit metaphor, Ānandavardhana considers the verse as having a suggested meaning. He thinks that since there is no word like "as" relating the two meanings in the form of a figure of speech like simile or metaphor we should look at the suggested meaning.

Arthaśaktimūladhvani (meaning-based suggestion) is a type of suggestion based on the power of meaning. Whereas sabdaśaktimūla dhvani (word based suggestion) suggests either an idea or a figure of speech arthaśaktimūladhvani is usually appreciated for its suggestion of emotions, rasa etc. Ānandavardhana gives a beautiful example of arthaśaktimūladhvani:

evamvadini devarsau parsve pituradhomukhi
lilakamalapatrani ganayamasa parvati
*[*Kalidasa, *Kumara Sambhava, 6.84]*

While the heavenly visitor was speaking, Parvati,
standing with lowered face beside her father,
counted the petals of the lotus in her hand.[19]

While the sage and Parvati's father are discussing Parvati's marriage with Siva, Parvati is delighted at hearing this. But she cannot express her delight infront of the elders because it was considered indecent. Her gestures, however, of lowering her face and counting the lotus petals definitely suggest her bashful concealment of emotions (sthayibhava) of love like joy, fear, anxiety, eagerness. The verse does not directly suggest srngara rasa but by suggesting the emotions (vyabhicaribhavas) associated with srngara rasa like agitation (avega), instability (capalya), shyness the verse, in a way suggests srngara rasa.

All Indian theorists invariably agree that the ultimate aim of reading poetry is the relishing of rasa. Bhatta Lollata, Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Bhoja and Visvanatha borrowed Bharata's rasa theory and applied it to poetry. However, it was Anandavardhana who said that rasa is the end for the attainment of which dhvani should be the means. A poem of extraordinary charm must, therefore, have a suggested rasa. Since emotions are psychological states, they cannot be anyway directly conveyed. Emotions are always suggested. So creating a separate semantic activity to suggest emotion is not required.

VI

Ānandavardhana discusses three types of dhvani: Vastu-dhvani; alaṁkāra-dhvani and rasa-dhvani. Vastu-dhvani is the suggestion of a thing or an idea; alaṁkāra-dhvani is the one where a figure of speech or alaṁkāra is suggested; rasa dhvani is where a rasa is suggested. Of these he claims for rasa dhvani a superior status.

Abhinavagupta, however, differentiates between two types of dhvani: a workaday variety; the other used specifically in poetry. He claims that all the other types of dhvani except rasa dhvani come under the first category. He further divides the first category into vastu-dhvani and alaṁkâra-dhvani. They can be expressed verbally through a literal form. But this cannot hold true for rasa-dhvani. Abhinavagupta remarks:

> ...rasa is something that one cannot dream of expressing by the literal sense. It does not fall within workaday expression. It is, rather, of a form that must be tasted by an act of blissful relishing on the part of a delicate mind through the stimulation (anurāga) of previously deposited memory elements which are in keeping with the vibhāvas and anubhāvas, beautiful because of their appeal to the heart, which are transmitted by [suggestive] words [of the poet]. The suggesting of such a sense is called rasadhvani and is found to operate only in poetry. This, in the strict sense of the word, is the soul of poetry.[20]

However, the theory of rasa-dhvani has also parallels in Aristotle's theory of "mimesis-catharsis" and Longinus' "sublime-transport." The

complementary terms, dhvani/mimesis/sublime and rasa/catharsis/transport are required for the realization of art-experience. Here the first bunch of terms suggest what inheres "objectively" in the work and the latter category describes the impact on the readers. Longinus's concept of the "sublime" comes quite close to "dhvani" theory. Longinus defines the sublime as "elevated language" or that which "consists in a certain excellence and distinction in expression" and implies that it is from this source that the greatest writers acquire their pre-eminence." He further explains this process:

> For the effect of elevated language is not to persuade the hearers, but to entrance them; and at all times, and in every way, what transports us with wonder is more telling than what merely persuades or gratifies us.[21]

Longinus can be said to be the classical antecedent of the New Critics. The process of anuramana, described by the dhvani theorist, is like the sound-waves produced in the ringing of the bell. For this effect of resonance the referential language has to be different from the emotive language because the "rigour-haunted" and "economy-ridden" language, according to I. A. Richards, cannot account for the emotive language.

Aristotle's mimesis and Longinus's term for imitation are two quite different notions. Mimesis is the imitation of nature or human nature, while for Longinus imitation is the stimulus derived by younger writers from the older masters. Longinus's notion sounds similar to what the Indian theorists believed that "*pratyakṣa* is not the *pramāṇa*," that is, creativity should not be a mere imitation of the living/present entities but should be handed down by the canons and past practice of older masters. Longinus's idea and the

Indian concept of imitation anticipate the neo-classical doctrine, "to study classics is to study nature."[22] It also finds parallel in T. S. Eliot's concept of "Tradition" where the past is the reckoning force for the present.

Eliot also talks something similar to the Sanskrit critics' regarding the functions of poetry:

> I suppose it will be agreed that every good poet has something to give us besides pleasure, there is always the communication of some new experience, or some fresh understanding of the familiar, or the expression of something we have experienced but have no words for, which enlarges our consciousness or refines our sensibility.... Without producing these two effects it simply is not poetry.[23]

The aim of poetry, besides giving aesthetic pleasure, is also to instruct ethical values (puruśārtha). While the Vedas (śāstras) and history also instruct, they do so as a teacher and a friend respectively. But the instructions kāvya (literature) gives are like those of a loving wife (kāntāsammitataya upadeśa) who is irresistably sweet. Abhinavagupta admits that aesthetic enjoyment is the main goal of poetry but the instructions given by poetry are different from instructions given by other types of literature, i.e., poetry has a moral value; it is spritually instructive. Abhinavagupta sounds much like the New Critics, like, I. A. Richards for whom poetry has a therapeutic value and takes the position of religion and morality in the modern age.

The *rasa* theory was an attempt to indicate the character of the emotional effect, i.e. the nature of enjoyment experienced by the spectator in witnessing a play. Hence, in ultimate analysis, it was an attempt to define the purpose of drama, or in later aesthetic thought, of any work of art, for in Indian aesthetics, artistic delight in all cases is comprehended in terms of rasa. Aesthetic experience is, therefore, "the act of tasting of the rasa, of immersing oneself in it to the exclusion of all else."[24]

Bharata has stated in the sixth chapter of *Nātyaśāstra* the process of realization of rasa. Rasa is born out of the combination of *vibhāvas* (causes of emotions), *anubhāvas* (after effects of emotions) and *vyabhicāribhava* (transient moods) with *sthāyibhāva* (basic emotions). *Vibhāvas* are of two kinds, *ālambanā* and *uddīpanā*.



Alambana is the determinant towards which an emotion is manifested, such as the hero and the heroine. *Uddīpanā* are environment factors that excite an emotion, for example, spring, flowers, moonlight etc. *Anubhāvas* are the external manifestations of emotion such as the movement of the eyebrows, glances and smile. The *vyabhicāribhāvas* are the accessory moods which

come and go helping in the manifestation of rasa; they are transitory mental states that accompany and help to intensify the dominant and permanent emotional mood – the *sthāyibhāva.*

Bharata mentions thirty-three transient moods and eight permanent emotional moods: the eight basic emotions corresponding to the eight rasas are :

Sthāyins	***Rasas***
Rati (the sexual emotion)	*Śṛngāra* (love)
Hāsa (laughter/amusement)	*Hāsya* (the comic)
Śoka (grief/distress)	*Karuṇa* (pathos)
Krodha (anger)	*Raudra* (anger)
Utsāha (masterfuleness/energy)	*Vira* (the heroic)
Bhaya (fear)	*Bhayānaka* (fear)
Jugupsâ (disgust)	*Bibhatsa* (disgust)
Vismaya (wonder)	*Adbhuta* (wonder)
Śama (subsidence)	*Śanta* (serenity)

The basic emotion, when not properly and adequately nourished, does not turn into rasa, it remains in the state of emotion. In the same way, any feeling other than the basic emotions always remains an emotion and does not reach the stage of rasa. It is also said that when a basic emotion like love has as its ālaṁbanā-vibhāva (determinant) a king or a god, and not lovers it evokes no rasa but remains only a feeling.

When *rasa* or *bhāva* (emotion) is evoked inappropriately, *rasābhāsa* or *bhāvabhāsa* (a semblence of rasa or emotion) is the result. For example, if love in the hero is not reciprocated, or if the emotion is depicted in another person other than the hero, the result is śṛngārabhāsa

(the semblence of the emotion of love) and not the fully-fledged śṛṅgāra rasa. A manifestation of *bhāva* under similar conditions would result in *bhāvabhāsā.*

It is the basic emotion that becomes rasa, but in the process ot undergoes a transformation and takes a totally different form. Rasa is quite different from emotion. Rasa is in all instances pleasurable, while emotions are painful in some instances. If rasa were painful, nobody would be inclined to experience it. Rasa is an experience whose nature is alaukika, i.e., transcending the bounds of worldly experience. As Abhinavagupta explains:

> Rasa is not of the nature of an ordinary effect, for it ceases to exist when vibhāvas and such are withdrawn. nor is it a preformed product which is merely revealed by vibhāvas and others. Rasa does not exist before the representation of vibhāvas and such. Rasa is a unitary entity in which any traces of vibhāvas and others are not perceived individually. In a drink prepared of sugar, pepper and other ingredients, there exists a unique sweetness, and the tastes of the individual ingredients are not discernable. So is rasa.[25]

The following passage from Eliot has resonances with the Indian theory of *rasa*:

> The effect of a work of art upon the person who enjoys it is an experience different in kind from any experience not of art. It may be formed out of one emotion, or may be a combination of several; and various feelings, inhering for the writer in particular words or phrases or

> images, may be added to compose the final result. Or, great poetry may be made without the direct use of any emotion whatever, composed out of feelings solely.[26]

Though the Indian theorists would talk of one dominant rasa throughout a work of art, they would agree with Eliot about poetic genres suggesting "various feelings," i.e., transient moods like devotional (bhakti) poems or poems on renunciation (nirveda) without using one dominant emotion.

Bharata's theory defining the process of rasa realization is interpreted differently by scholars. The four interpretations which have gained the widest acceptance are: *utpattivāda* (cause and effect relationship); *anumitivāda* (process of logical inference); *bhuktivāda* (process of universalization) and *abhivyaktivāda;* put forward by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śri Śankuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta respectively.

Lollaṭa considered the manifestation of rasa as a result of an intensification of the basic emotions. Thus, the emotion and *rasa* stand in the relation of cause and effect; when an emotion is intensified to the highest pitch, it turns into rasa. The rasa primarily resides in the character and secondarily in the actor who imagines himself the character. It does not reside in the poet or in the spectator.

The theory of logical inference of Śri Śankuka was based on the premise that rasa is a process of logical inference, where the spectator infers rasa when the vibhāvas or causes of emotions are placed before him. The actor by his acting imitates the character of the hero, and the spectator

identifies the actor with the hero, which leads him to the inference of rasa. A. Sankaran remarks on this point: "the emotions of the hero in ordinary life are manifested by causes, bodily effects and accompanying mental states and these when imitated by the actor become *vibhāvas* etc. The emotion that the audience have is but a reflex (anukāra) of, the real emotional mood – sthayibhava – of the character; and is called by a different name, viz. rasa."[27]

The theory of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was an improvement on the theories of both Lollaṭa and Śri Śanuka and paved the way for the more competent theory of Abhinavagupta. In Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's opinion, rasa is neither produced nor manifested. If emotion is evoked as it is, none would experience pleasure from such rasas as *Karuṇā* (pathos) or *bhayānaka* (fear). The experience would certainly be distasteful. He postulated three functions of words – (i) *abhidhā* (denotation); (ii) *bhāvakatva* (power of generalization); (iii) *bhojakatva* (process of relishing the generalized emotion). *Abhidhā* is the power of denotation. *Bhāvakatva* is typical of poetic language, it is the power of generalization through which the emotions are grasped in a universal way, without any specific individual properties, leading to a generalization called *sādhāraṇikarana* (universal transpersonalization.) Through the third function, *bhojakatva* (generalization), the emotion thus generalized is enjoyed, and this experience is always pleasurable.

Abhinavagupta tried to refute Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory because it was in conflict with the dhvani theory. Nevertheless, he benefits greatly from it, for his own interpretations of the *rasa* theory incorporates the salient features of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's interpretation.

Abhinavagupta differs from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka on the point that word possesses two functions called *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva* (the process of generalization and relishing). He rejects these functions on the basis that there is no valid authority for accepting them as different functions. His contention is that *bhāvakatva* is not different from vyañjanā (suggestion). The process of generalization is accomplished through the suggestive function in poetry, and hence there is no need to postulate another notion. Regarding the other function of relishing the emotion, Abhinavagupta contends that this is none other than the enjoyment of rasa or *rasapratiti*. The responsive reader has within him/her latent impressions of emotions experienced previously. These are known as purvavāsanā. The sthāyibhāvas lie dormant in the form of vāsanā. When he reads or witnesses a clear representation of appropriate causes, after-effects and accompanying mental states of emotions these latent impressions are evoked and developed to such a pitch, that they are realized in their universal form, devoid of personal or individual qualities (sādhāraṇikaraṇa). In this impersonalized state, the feelings are always pleasurable, and are enjoyed in the form of rasa.

Abhinavagupta speaks of seven obstacles lying in the way of rasa-realization. They are all the extraneous elements which break the unity of a state of consciousness, the unity that is required for the sahṛdaya (connoisseurs) to acquire the correct mood to enjoy rasa.

The first of these obstacles has been described as the lack of adequate realization of probability of things. The incidents presented in a literary composition must convince for their probability.

The second and third obstacles against enjoying a rasa laid down by Abhinavagupta pertain to the circumstances where the reader is unable to experience a generalized state of emotions. If the reader realizes the emotions existing in himself or in some other specific individuals, no generalization is possible. Again, if the reader is preoccupied with his own sorrows or joys, then too he is unable to react to the emotions presented in literature and to generalize them.

The fourth and fifth obstacles pertain to the lack of clarity of perception of things presented before the reader. If the causes and after-effects of emotions are not realized immediately, or if they are not sufficiently clear, the evocation of rasa is hindered. The absence of a properly brought out dominant element is the sixth obstacle to rasa. If the factors like causes, after-effect of emotions and the accompanying mental states are presented individually, a doubt may possibly arise as to which emotion is intended to be developed. This doubt is the seventh and last obstacle of rasa realization.

J. N. Mohanty gives a graphic representation of all the four interpretations of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* presenting the process of rasa realization and trans-personalization (sādhāraṇikaraṇa).[28]

Traditional view of Rasa (Bharata, Lollaṭa) :

(Rasa as aesthetic object)

Later Theory of Rasa (Śri Śankuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta) :



(Medium)

Vedantic Foundation of Abhinavagupta's Aesthetics :



According to Mohanty, Lollaṭa had a simplified view on rasa. For Lollaṭa, rasa is the emotion intensified and developed to the highest degree and it is located in the dramatic character. Lollaṭa held that rasa is physically produced (utpatti), whereas the other critics, Śankuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhihavagupta, believed that rasa was either manifested or relished. The audience relish the aesthetic bliss suggested in the play.

Mohanty analyses the impact of the Advaita philosophy of the Śaivite school on Abhinavagupta's interpretation of rasa. According to Abhinavagupta, rasa is essentially pleasurable, it is a state of bliss, self realization or self fulfillment. The state of bliss is equivalent to spiritual illumination where the spectator is raised above the sensual elements with refined sensiblilities. Abhinavagupta compares the relation between the aesthetic efficacy of the text and the reader's aesthetic experience with the relation between the *Upaniṣads* and knowledge of Brahman. According to the Śaivite school of philosophy, to which Abhinavagupta belonged, every form of pleasure is a manifestation of the spirit. But Abhinavagupta puts spirital bliss at a higher position than rasa and this, I think, is because aesthetic bliss unlike the spiritual bliss is not a permanent state of joy. Nevertheless, aesthetic experience is different from the spiritual experience only in quality and not in essence.

Viśvanāth says that rasa, experienced by sensible men, is indivisible, self-manifested, compounded of joy consciousness, and is closely related to the realization of the brahman. This lofty and sophisticated concept of the response to art has the Western equivalent in the aesthetic experience: "It is

emotion objectified, universalized; and raised to a state where it becomes the object of lucid disinterested contemplation and is transfigured into serene joy."[29]

I. A. Richards describes this aesthetic experience as "a systematization of impulses," which is a pre-condition of happiness. He does not call it "pleasure" but admits that it is a state of gratification. Richards uses behavioral psychology to explicate his theory. He defines aesthetic experience as something which satisfies the largest number of impulses. An ideal mental state, for him, is one where the largest number of appentencies are fulfilled, and the mind attains a state of calmness. He talks of a term "synaesthesia" which is the effect of poetry on the immediate consciousness where the opposites are reconciled. The reader attains harmony with the mundane world. "Synaesthesia" cannot be compared with rasa. Rasa is a transcendental joy. Aesthetic bliss is an impersonal or universalized experience, a state of the psyche but does not transcend the psyche. I would agree with the Indian poeticians who believed that aesthetic experience is a pleasant experience of an imaginative recreation of an emotion.

All the Indian schools of poetics borrowed Bharata's rasa theory, developed it and applied it to poetry. The Sanskrit critics invariably agreed that the ultimate aim of reading poetry is the relishing of the rasa. But where Ānandavardhana significantly differed from the traditional Alaṁkāra school was when he says that rasa is always suggested. The relation between vibhāvas (object) and rasa is that of the suggestor (vyangya) and the suggested (vyanjaka), whereas the followers of the Alaṁkāra school included rasa as an ornament of poetic language. But Ānandarvardhana's theory that

rasa is always suggested has a wider efficacy because stating a rasa directly by its name like śṛngāra or karuṇa fails to produce the feeling or apprehension of the emotions like love or pathos. Rasa is always relished when it is suggested or conveyed through objects.

Vibhāva or objects is the most important element in determining the rasa or aesthetic experience. Most of the theoretical systems in India and the West accept vibhāvas or objectification as a valid method of presenting objects in the phenomenal world for idealized, de-individualized, purely affectively efficient equivalents of them. These vibhāvas (objects) are the objective and stated material in the literary work; the emotion is the subjective and suggested product arrived at within the reader.

For T. S. Eliot, emotion can be expressed in art only through "objective correlative." Emotion, the content of property, strikes the readers through the organized and patterned form of the poem. The adequate and integral expression of the poet's emotion is termed "objective correlative." In his essay on Hamlet he remarks:

> Mr. Robertson is undoubtedly correct in concluding that the essential emotion of the play is the feeling of a son towards a guilty mother.... The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.... The artistic 'inevitability' lies in this complete adequacy of the

> external to the emotion; and this is precisely what is deficient in *Hamlet*. Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in *excess* of the facts as they appear.... His disgust is occasioned by his mother, but... his mother is not an adequate equivalent for it.... And it must be noticed that the very nature of the *donnees* of the problem precludes objective equivalence. To have heightened the criminality of Gertrude would have been to provide the formula for a totally different emotion in Hamlet; it is just *because* her character is so negative and insignificant that she arouses in Hamlet the feeling which she is incapable of representing.[30]

And this is exactly what the dhvani theorists would say regarding the suggestibility of rasa or emotion. According to Ānandavardhana, the essential emotion here signifies the dominant rasa. The objective correlative of a rasa, that is, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events involves the combination of causes and after-effects of emotions and the transient mood. Hamlet's disgust is one of the eight basic emotions, and Gertude is the ālambanā-vibhāva or determinant of Hamlet's disgust. The inadequacy of the external objects to the emotion is, according to Mammaṭa, rasa-dosa, while Kṣemendra would term it as anaucitya (inappropriate). Eliot's passage on Hamlet can be translated into the rhetorics of Sanskrit criticism, especially in terms of Ānandavardhana's theory of rasa-dhvani. But there is one major difference between the two: while Ānandavardhana would have disqualified the play as a failure on the dramatist's part, Eliot says that the "failure" inheres in the situation in the play. Apart from this difference, the central

proposition of Eliot that emotions are suggested through their sensuous equivalents is similiar to the Sanskrit theory of rasa-dhvani.

I. A. Richards and Susanne Langer do not think that the referential object suggests emotion. Langer, however, has a slightly different view of objectification when she says that the object is the work of art itself:

> How can we capture, hold and handle feelings so that their content may be made conceivable and presented to our consciousness in universal form without being understood in the strict sense, i.e., by means of concepts? The answer is: We can do it by creating objects wherein the feelings we seek to hold are so definitely embodied that any subject confronted with these objects, and emphatically disposed toward them cannot but exprience a non-sensuous appreciation of the feelings in question. Such objects are called works of art.[31]

However, to me, Eliseo Vivas' objection to Eliot's concept that a set of objects can possibly express or evoke the same "particular emotion" seems viable. Eliot demands a particularity of relationship between the object and emotion. Unlike Eliot, Abhinavagupta shows that the relationship between the object and emotion is always suggestive. It is a relatively complex and loose process of signification.

In socio-cultural context, the object-emotion bond is flexible, but Wimsatt and Beardsley state how poetry gives this bond stability and continuity:

> Poetry is a way of fixing emotions or making them more permanently perceptible when objects have undergone a

> functional change from culture to culture, or when as simple facts of history they have lost emotive value with the loss of immediacy. Though the reasons for emotion in poetry may not be so simple as Ruskin's "noble grounds for the noble emotions," yet a great deal of constancy for poetic objects of emotion – if we will look for constancy -- may be traced through the drift of human history.[32]

For example, Shakespeare's Shylock is an object of pathos or karuna rasa and the murder of the king in *Macbeth* is an object of horror or bhayanaka.

Cleanth Brooks notes how objective correlatives differentiate themselves into two types representing two basic ways of presenting emotion.[33] The first type consists in discursively presenting a sequence of events which provides the reason for the emotion; the second type consists in providing a symbol which is the suggestive equivalent of the emotion. He says that the two types are not mutually exclusive. Brooks believes that there is an evolution from the first type to the second, and this transforms a literary work from the "factual" to the "purely qualitative."

Though the dhvani theorists talked about events, motives, external causes as objects for suggesting rasa, they were not aware of the notion of a symbol which, I think, could have enriched their theory of suggestion. The New Critics seem more privileged than the dhvani theorists because of integrating symbol into Eliot's formulation of objective correlative. W. K.Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley also emphasise that in poetry emotions are presented in objects:

> The emotions correlative to the objects of poetry become a part of the matter dealt with—not communicated to the reader like an infection or disease, not inflicted mechanically like a bullet or knife wound, not administered like a poison, not simply expressed as by expletives or grimaces or rhythms, but presented in their objects and contemplated as a pattern of knowledge.[34]

Wimsatt and Beardsley make a distinction between what we call in Sanskrit poetics *laukika-kāraṇas* and *vibhāvas*. *Laukika-kāraṇas* are objects in real life and are factual reasons for intense emotion. But *vibhāvas* are objects in fictitious or poetic statement and suggest an emotion that is specific, permanent and less intense but "far wider." This emotion is suggested by "association" like metaphor.

Abhinavagupta as well as Wimsatt and Beardsley consider objects of emotion as the the main concern of critical discourse. Objects (vibhāvas), for them, is an inclusive term which includes plot, character, style, theme and language. Abhinavagupta believes that all the objective content of poetry should aim at *rasaucitya* which is aesthetic and amoral. Abhinavagupta had perhaps anticipated what Wimsatt and Beardsley said at a later time:

> The more specific the account of the emotion induced by a poem, the more nearly it will be an account of the reasons for emotion, the poem itself, and the more reliable it will be as an account of what the poem is likely to induce in other-sufficiently informed-readers. It will in fact supply the kind of information which will enable reader to respond to the poem. It will talk not of tears, prickles, or other physiological symptoms, of feeling angry, joyful, hot, cold, or intense, or of vaguer states of emotional distubrance, but of shades of distinction and relation between objects of emotion.[35]

Taking into account of both what Abhinavagupta said and the New Critics reiterated later, I think, literary studies should concern itself with the internal objective structures in the work that evoke emotion.

Eliot criticises the Romantic tradition of expressing the poet's personal emotion and believes that poetry is not the expression of

personality but an escape from personality. This escape from personality is nothing but the impersonalization of the emotions into rasa. The poet's "personal emotions" are universalized and become universal emotions. The example of Vālmiki's utterance of the first verse is a compelling evidence of such an escape from personality. Vālmiki is overcome with grief at the killing and separation of the curlew's mate and utters these words:

> May you never find honor, Niṣāda,
> for everlasting years,
> who have shot the loving mate
> from this pair of curlew birds.
>
> *(Rāmāyaṇa 1.2.14)*

The hunter shots one of the pair of the mating birds and is thus cursed by Vālmiki. The *śoka* (grief) of Vālmiki turns into *śloka* that is the first verse. It is believed that the word *"śoka"* is etymologically responsible for the word *"śloka."*

Śoka (grief) is a painful experience and one never enjoys or relishes this emotion, but rasa is bliss or ānanda. *Śoka* turns into *Śloka* and gives delight (*ānanda*). Now what is it that transforms *Śoka* into *ānanda*? Ānandavardhana says it is the rasa which is blissful. Grief which is the basic emotion or bhava of karuṇarasa (compassion) is intensified and heightened and thus turns into rasa. The poet first felt the grief of the bird, then relished its grief by a process of turning his own grief into an impersonalized and universal grief. Abhinavagupta comments: "By relishing the bird's sorrow he has lost his own griefs within them."[36]

Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta differ on the issue whether the rasa already existed in the poet while uttering this verse. Their argument focus on various aspects of rasa-realization and the process of transformation of bhāva into rasa. Abhinavagupta tend, to disagree with Ānandavardhana who says that Vālmiki composed the verse in grief. Abhinavagupta argues that any composition is impossible while a person is suffering pain or grief. The poet did suffer agony but his agony was transformed into compassion which was responsible for the composition. The transformation, however, was quite fast.

For Ānandavardhana *Śoka* is intensified and becomes karuṇarasa. Abhinavagupta says that rasa is realized when basic emotion or *bhāva* of the person becomes one with whom s/he is empathizing. It is a melting process; melting of one's basic emotion. The slain curlew's mate's grief found response in the poet's grief. This correspondence of the poet's grief with that of the bird thus becomes impersonalized and universalized and turns into rasa. Since rasa is the aesthetic enjoyment of an emotion, *śoka* when aesthetically relished, transforms itself into karuṇarasa. Abhinavagupta, therefore, remarks:

> Where we have the basic emotion grief, a thought-trend that fits with the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* of this grief, if it is relished (literally, if it is chewed over and over), becomes a *rasa* and so from its aptitude (towards this end) one speaks of (any) basic emotion as becoming a *rasa*. For the basic emotion is put to use in the process of relishing: through a succession of memory elements it adds together a thought-trend which one has already experienced in one's own life to one which one infers in another's life, and so establishes a correspondence in one's heart.[37]

Daniel H. H. Ingalls adds that "the sympathetic response *(hṛdayasaṃvāda)* to the vibhāvas and anubhāvas is said to 'transcend the experience of the workaday world' (2.4L). Where the Westerner may think of empathy as rendering Hamlet's grief and problems as his own, Abhinava thinks of the process of empathy with, say Rāma, or with the grieving bird, as liberating one's personal memory of grief into a universal, impersonal flavor"[38]

Poetry transforms the basic emotions, which otherwise cause pain or pleasure to human beings in their everyday life, to something aesthetically pleasant. It is only when the emotions are impersonalized, they are transformed into rasa and give aesthetic delight. This is called *sādhāraṇikaraṇa* or generalizing of emotions. *Śoka* (grief) has been transformed into karuṇa rasa (compassion) in this *Śloka* (verse). Being transcended into rasa, the sting of grief attached to it has been removed so that it can now be enjoyed and shared by the whole humanity. The escape from personal grief and its transcendence to a universal phenomenon gives the verse its aesthetic delight. The Sanskrit theorists thus anticipate what Eliot is trying to say about impersonality in art.

Paul Valéry holds that the poet himself does not undergo any personal emotion in the poetic sense: that is, the poet does not experience the poetic state; he has to create it in others. Even this extreme view is reminiscent of Abhinavagupta.

For Abhinavagupta, aesthetic enjoyment in the reader follows aesthetic object (text). Poetic semantics culminates in rasa. And rasa is

always suggested, according to Ānandavardhana. The suggestive mode, then, is essentially a presentational mode, not discursive.

It is interesting to note that Ānandavardhana enlarged the term "meaning" by including all that is conveyed by a poem. There is the usual lexical meaning, the syntactic meaning and the metaphorical meaning. There is, however, a fourth order of meaning and it is the suggested meaning which enhances the value of a literary work because this brings about the realization of rasa.

Dhvani operates in terms of larger unities and not just at the level of the individual words because it explains the emotive, cognitive and socio-cultural meanings. The multiple meanings are unified and integrated into a rich and complex whole. Dhvani theory integrates what Philip Wheelwright calls "plurisignation" where the expressive language carries multiple meanings. As the Chinese saying goes, "The sound stops short, the sense flows on."[39] Dhvani is thus the outcome of the entire context of the poetic situation and by bringing in the element of rasa it anticipates the New Critical concerns of the concept of poetic language.

Notes:

[1] Daniel H.H.Ingalls, trans. *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1990) 7.

[2] Ānandavardhana, *Dhvanyāloka* (Varanasi: Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1940) 363-364.

[3] Ingalls 10 - 11.

[4] Ingalls 169. (*Dhvanyāloka* 1: 13 A)

[5] Jagadiśa, *Śabdaśaktiprakāśika* (Benaras: Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1934) 103.

[6] W. M. Urban, *Langauge and Reality* (George Allen and Unwin: London, 1939) 489.

[7] Ingalls 83. (*Dhvanyâloka* 1: 4 b.A)

[8] Mahimabhaṭṭa. *Vyaktiviveka*, ed. Madhusudana Misra (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1936) 105.

[9] Otto Jespersen Qtd by W. M. Urban, *Language and Reality* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1939) 12.

[10] Charles C. Fries, "Meaning and Linguistic Analysis," *Language* 30 (1954) 67n.

[11] A. B. Keith, *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (London: Oxford UP, 1920) 410.

[12] Ingalls 105. (*Dhvanyāloka* 2: 16 A)

[13] William Empson, *The Structure of Complex Words* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1951) 351.

[14] Ingalls 371. (*Dhvanyāloka* 3: 1 A)

[15] Ingalls 209. (*Dhvanyāloka* 2: 1 c A)

[16] Ingalls 453. (*Dhvanyāloka* 3: 16 A)

[17] F.Wiseman, "Language Strata," in *Logic and Language*, ed. A.G.N. Flew (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951) 13.

[18] Ingalls 302. (*Dhvanyāloka* 2: 21e A)

[19] Ingalls 311. (*Dhvanyāloka* 2: 22 A)

[20] Ingalls 81. (*Locana* 1: 4a A)

[21] Longinus, *On the Sublime*, ed. T.S. Dorsch (London: Penguin Books, 1969) 33.

[22] Longinus 35.

[23] T. S. Eliot, *Poetry and Poets* (London: Faber, 1957) 18.

[24] Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1968) XIX.

[25] Gnoli 274.

[26] T. S. Eliot, *Points of View*, ed. John Hayward (London: Faber, 1941) 30.

[27] A. Sankaran, *The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani* (Madras: University of Madras, 1929) 100.

[28] J. N. Mohanty, *Classical Indian Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000) 136–137.

[29] Krishna Rayan, "Rasa and Objective Correlative," in *Critical Thought*, ed. S.K. Desai and G.N. Devy (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1987) 114.

[30] T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays* (London: Faber, 1932) 145.

[31] Susanne Langer, *Feeling and Form* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952) 21.

[32] W.K.Wimsatt, *The Verbal Icon* (New York: University of Kentucky Press, 1954) 37.

[33] W.K.Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks, *Literary Criticism: A Short History* (London: Routledge, 1957) 672, 676.

[34] W.K.Wimsatt, *The Verbal Icon*, 37.

[35] W.K.Wimsatt, *The Verbal Icon*, 34.

[36] Ingalls 110. (*Locana* 1: 4 g)

[37] Ingall 117. (*Locana* 1: 5 A)

[38] Ingall 118.

[39] Lawrence Binyon, *Painting in the Far East* (New York: Dover, 1959) 158.