

CHAPTER IV
INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA
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Most of the Sanskrit rhetoricians have allotted a major portion to the treatment of Alaṅkāras in their works. On close examination it is found that some of the poeticsians have been greatly influenced by some Nyāya principles, logical terms and concepts on the basis of which they have attempted to classify and formulate some figures of speech. The present chapter makes an attempt to identify the Alaṅkāras based on Nyāya terms and concepts and to analyse them.

IV.1 Principle of Āśrayāśrayibhāva and Anvayavyatirekibhāva

It is known that the Alaṅkāras are classified into Śabdālaṅkāra, Arthālaṅkāra and Ubhayālaṅkāra as they pertain to the word or to the sense or to both. The simple classification of Śabdālaṅkāra and Arthālaṅkāra is started from Rudraṭa's time. But Rudraṭa does not mention the Ubhayālaṅkāras. The AP appears to be the earliest known work to mention the third division.¹

It is interesting to note that for the classification of Alaṅkāras Sanskrit Poeticsians follow two principles, Āśrayāśrayibhāva and Anvayavyatirekibhāva. These two

principles seem to have their beginning in Rājānaka Tilaka's commentary on THE KASS of Udbhata wherein he gives these principles by which the Alaṅkāras are decided as belonging to śabda or artha. It is the discussion on the Śleṣa Alaṅkāra, its definition and illustration in Udbhata that brings the issue to a head and results in the clear formulation of the principle of the classification of Alaṅkāras into those of śabda and those of artha.

In the Vivṛti on Udbhata's illustration of Artha-Śleṣa Tilaka says that Guṇa, Doṣa, or Alaṅkāra is classified into that of śabda or artha by the principle of Anvaya and Vyatireka.² In Udbhata's illustration:

स्वयं च पल्लवानाम्भास्वत्करविशजिनी ।

प्रभातसन्ध्यैवास्वापकलकुण्ठे हितप्रदा ॥ (KASSP. 40)

if we replace bhāsvatkara-virajita by bhanu-dīpyamāna, then, the Alaṅkāra disappears due to the change of words. Since the Alaṅkāra here depends upon the presence or otherwise of certain words it is case of Śabdālaṅkāra. It is clear that Tilaka is propounding the principle of Anvaya-Vyatireka for deciding an Alaṅkāra as belonging to śanda or artha.

V. Raghavan believes that Mammata accepts the principle of Anvaya-Vyatireka in his KP from Tilaka.³ As he says:

The text of Tilaka is found reproduced to some extent by Mammata.

But the formal actual inclusion of these two principles in the theoretical structure is made by Mammata and then by Ruyyaka. Mammata clearly mentions that the Gunās, Doṣas and Alaṅkāras are characterised as belonging to śabda or to artha only by the principle of Anvaya and Vyatireka. To quote his words :

इह दोषगुणालंकाराणां शब्दार्थगतत्वेन यो विभागः
सः अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेव व्यवतिष्ठते । तथाहि
कष्टत्वादि गाढत्वाद्यनुप्रासादयः व्यर्थत्वादि
प्रौढ्याद्युपमादयस्तद्भावतद्भावानुविधायित्वादिव
शब्दार्थगतत्वेन व्यवस्थाप्यन्ते ।
(KP. IX. P. 518)

Mammata also mentions Āsrayāśrayibhāva and explains that even to determine the Āsrayāśrayibhāva one has to use Anvaya-Vyatireka principle. Hence it is better to distinguish Śabdālaṅkāras from Arthālaṅkāras through the principle of Anvaya-Vyatireka.⁴

Ruyyaka differs from Mammata in that he propounds Āsrayāśrayibhāva as the differentiating principle. He in his AS says:

लोकवदाश्रयाश्रयिभावश्च तत्तदलंकारनिबन्धनम् ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ तु तत्कार्यत्वे प्रयोजकौ,
न तदलंकारत्वे । तदलंकारप्रयोजकत्वे तु
श्रौतौपमादेशपि शब्दालंकारत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।
तस्मादाश्रयाश्रयिभावेनैव चिरंतनमतानुसृति
रिति -----
(AS. II, P. 751)

Concluding the deliberations of Mammata's views at the close of the consideration of the view of Tilaka, Ruyyaka explains that the Anvaya-Vyatireka theory can prove śabda or artha only as the kāraṇa. Resorting to that theory one can only say that a certain Alaṅkāra is the kārya either of śabda or of artha. If one Alaṅkāra of a śabda is due to the presence of śabda then Śrautopamā, which due to the anvaya of 'iva' is actually an Arthālaṅkāra, will be a case of Śabdālaṅkāra. But there is no Alaṅkāra or special figurative beauty added to the poem by its being a case of Śrautopamā with the anvaya of the word 'iva'. So there is no Alaṅkāra as there is 'iva' and it will be contradictory and absurd if one has to say that since there is iva-śabdānvaya, it is a case of Śabdālaṅkāra. Further, Śrautopamā can never be anything but an Arthālaṅkāra. So the Anvaya-Vyatireka theory must be discarded.

Now both these principles are the principles of Nyāya philosophy. According to Nyāyaśāstra, Āśrayāśrayibhāva is a relation existing between two objects (dravya) like avayavi-avayavi, guṇa-guṇi, kriyā-kriyāvān and jāti-vyakti. Naiyāyikas explain their relations viz., Saṁyoga and Samavāya on the principle of Āśrayāśrayibhāva. Saṁyoga-saṁbandha takes place between two objects only (dravyayoh eva saṁyoga) out of which one becomes the Āśraya and the later Āśrayi.⁵ For instance, a bird is sitting on the branch

of a tree. Here exists the relation of Samyoga between the bird and the branch, out of which the former is Āsrayi and the latter is Āsraya. Samyoga-saṁbandha is temporary. The Samavāya-relation is explained by Kaṇāda as kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ,⁶ the relation of cause and effect. Keśavamiśra, the Naiyāyika, in his TB defines it as ayutasiddhayoḥ saṁbandhaḥ,⁷ the inherent and inseparable relation between the two objects. Ayutasiddha means proved to be not joined (\sqrt{y} join) or proved to be not separated (if \sqrt{y} separate) that is, things that are always together until one of them is destroyed. For example, the relation of avayava with avayavi (e.g. tantu and paṭa) out of which avayava is Āsraya and avayavi is Āsrayi. Thus the relation of either Samyoga or Samavāya is in fact one of Āsrayāśrayibhāva.

Secondly, Anvaya and Vyatireka are two technical terms of Nyāya philosophy. The relation of Vyāpti which obtains between hetu and a sādhya is basically of two types; the positive and negative invariable concomitance, technically known as Anvaya and Vyatireka.⁸ Anvaya is defined in the Nyāya texts as yat-sattve yat-sattvam and Vyatireka as yadabhāve yadabhāvaḥ. The conception of Anvaya-Vyatireka is very important in Navya-Nyaya. The invariable concomitance between sādhya and sādhana through the force of which the sādhana enables us to draw the conclusion, can be expressed in two ways, Anvaya and Vyatireka. Naiyāyikas classify the relation of Vyāpti in three categories such as Anvaya-vyāpti,

Vyatireka-vyāpti and Anvayavyatireki-vyāpti. The hetu also is designated as Kevalānvayi, Kevalavyatireki and Anvaya-vyatireki. Similarly, Mammāṭa and his followers also classifies the Alaṅkāras into śabda, artha and Ubhayālaṅkāra. The principle of Anvaya-vyatireka is based on kāraṇa-kārya relation. As, according to Nyāya, kāraṇasattve kāryasattvam or dhūmasattve vahnīsattvam and kāraṇābhāve kāryabhāva or vahnibhāve dhūmābhāva similarly poeticians also hold the view imply in their propositions śabdasattve alaṅkārasattvam and śabdābhāve alaṅkārabhāva. From this point of view Mammāṭa's principle of classification is based on the Nyāya principle of relation particularly of vyāpti. And Ruyyaka's principle of Āśrayāśrayibhāva is based on the Nyāya theory of relation of Samyoga and Samavāya.

By advocating the relation of Āśrayāśrayibhāva Ruyyaka stresses the relation existing between the śabda and artha or both with Alaṅkāra and resulting into kāvyaśaundarya. In case of Sabdalaṅkāra this śaundarya is based on śabda. So śabda is Āśraya and śaundarya is Āśrayi. This is the same in the case of Arthālaṅkāra.

IV.2 Further Classification of Arthālaṅkāras

Ruyyaka in his AS makes an attempt for the first time to classify the Arthālaṅkāras on the principle of Nyāya. He evolves three categories such as Tarkanyāya, Vākyaanyāya

and Lokanyāya.⁹ The figures based on Tarka are two- Kāvyaalinga and Anumāna; the Alaṅkāras like Yathāsaṁkhyam, Paryāya, Parivṛtti, Parisaṁkhyā, Arthāpatti, Vikalpa, Sammucaya and Samādhi are based on Vākyanyāya; and the Alaṅkāras such as Pratyanika, Pratipa, Milita, Tadguṇa, Atadguṇa and Uttara are based on Lokanyāya. We may note that Ruyyaka does not give any justification for such a classification. Even the commentator Jayaratha and the later rhetoricians who accept this classification do not give us any rationale. He does not define either of the term 'Tarka' and 'Nyāya'. But his categorisation of Alaṅkāras stands definitely on some rationale otherwise it would not have been unanimously accepted by his successors only with some slight modifications here and there. Unlike Ruyyaka however, Vidyānātha, Appaya and Jagannātha include Arthāntaranyāsa also in the category of Tarkanyāya. Modern scholars have taken the term 'Tarka' in the general sense of reasoning and according to them reasoning should be the result of poetic imagination. Logical perfection may not be present in the figures based on Tarka.¹⁰ It may be presumed that logical perfection is not insisted upon for the constitutions of all these three figures based upon Tarka but they should not lack in any way the poetic beauty.

Here the two terms 'Tarka' and 'Nyāya' must be defined carefully. To consider the term Nyāya. No doubt, he does not refer to the technical sense of the term Nyāya such as

pañcāvayavavākyaṃ nyāyaḥ or pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇam nyāyaḥ. But it definitely refers to the logical principle on the strength of which Ruyyaka's classification is based. From the Alaṅkāras groupdd under the heads like Tarkanyāya, Vākanyāya and Lokanyāya it appears that he classifies them keeping in view the Śāstras such as Tarkaśāstra, Vākyaśāstra or Mīmāṃsā and others like the Laukika Vyavahāra. Again, a close study of Alaṅkāras grouped under Tarkanyāya category reveals that the term Tarka decidedly refers to Tarkaśāstra in which Anumāna and Līnga occupy the place of prime importance. The perfection of hetu or līnga is quite necessary for a valid Anumāna. The poeticians have definitely used the terms like Anumāna and Līnga in the sense in which they are used by the Naiyāyikas and they have also insisted on the same kind of perfection. Unlike the Naiyāyikas, however, they deal with the objects of beauty in poetics. As Bhāmaha rightly points out, the poetic Anumāna differs from Nyāyānumāna in this respect because the sphere of Nyāya is altogether different from that of poetics.¹¹ Still, Ruyyaka consciously makes an attempt to categorise them as Tarkanyāyamūlaka and thereby differentiates them from the general sense of the term. Therefore, Tarkanyāyamūlaka means the figures based on the principles as given in the Tarkaśāstra. Similarly, the Alaṅkāras like Yathāsaṁkhya, Arthāpatti refer to the Mīmāṃsāśāstra in which these terms have been used in technical sense. This may be considered as a case of influence of Nyāya of Ruyyaka and his successors.

IV.3 Tarkanyāyamūlaka Alaṅkāras

A number of Nyāya concepts and terms have been taken up by the poeticians for formulating their figures of speech, which reveal the conceptual influence of Nyaya school. The Alaṅkāras like Anumāna, Kāvyaśiṅga and Arthāntaranyāsa based on Tarkanyāya are the examples of such influence. As it is not possible and not necessary here to deal with the development of these Alaṅkāras in historical perspective. We analyse them on the basis of some of the important definitions given by some prominent poeticians.

IV.3.1 Anumāna Alaṅkāra (Inference)

As far as the Anumāna Alaṅkāra is concerned nothing new is added to the Nyāya concept of Anumāna by the rhetoricians. All the rhetoricians accept the Nyāya concept and present it with hardly any difference. Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Udbhaṭa do not recognise this Alaṅkāra. Rudraṭa is the first among the ancients to include it under the large group of figures based on Vāstava. Bhoja, Mammata, Ruyyaka, Vidyānātha, Vidyādhara, Viśvanātha, Appaya Dikṣita, Jagannātha and even his successors deal with Anumāna Alaṅkāra. Jagannātha's definition of Anumāna is anumitikaraṇamanumānam.¹² This definition is exactly identical with the Naiyāyika definition of it as found in the works like Tarkasaṅgraha.¹³ He refers to the views of both old and new Naiyāyikas with regard to the nature of Anumiti-karana.¹⁴ Old Naiyāyikas think that the liṅga

which is cognised as sādhya-vyāpya is Anumitikaraṇa.¹⁵ But Navyas like Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana accepts the cognition of such a liṅga as Anumiti-karaṇa. In order to distinguish poetic Anumāna from the practical Anumāna of the Naiyāyikas Jagannātha states that the poetical Anumāna should contain camatkāra (aesthetic beauty).¹⁶

Rudrāṭa gives two types of Anumāna - 1. where sādhya is mentioned first and then sādhana. 2. where sādhana is mentioned first and then sādhya. Rudrāṭa attempts to extend the nature of Anumāna and to differentiate it from the Nyāya concept. But his attempt does not gain any significance as pointed out by Mammāṭa who refutes his view. As the order of sādhana and sādhya does not make any difference Mammāṭa does not accept such a division.¹⁷

In the Vāgbhaṭālaṅkāra, Vāgbhaṭa defines Anumāna as follows:

प्रत्यक्षाल्लिङ्गो यत्र कालत्रितयवर्तिनः ।
लिङ्गिने भवति ज्ञानमनुमानं तदुच्यते ॥ (P. 58)

Where from a seen reason (liṅga) knowledge of liṅgi existing in all the three kālas (past, present and future) arises that is Anumāna.

Here, the word kālatritayavartin is very significant. This reminds us three divisions of Anumāna made by Gautama and his commentator Vātsyāyana. Gautama divides Anumāna into three kinds viz., pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodrṣṭa.¹⁸ This is

the oldest division available . Pūrvavat Anumāna occurs where one infers the effect from the cause, e.g. one infers that rain will fall when clouds gather in the sky.¹⁹ Seṣavat is the opposite of this e.g. when one infers the cause from the effect. When one sees a river in floods he infers that there must have been heavy rain somewhere up in its course.²⁰ All cases of inference other than these two fall under sāmānyatodrṣṭa.²¹ Thus, if after seeing a person in one place one finds^{him} in another place some time later we know that he must have gone from the first place to the other during the interval. We see the sun in morning in the east and find him in the west in the evening. We therefore infer ādityasya gamanam from the east to the west during the course of the day, though his movement is not directly perceived.

According to Vāgbhaṭa, Anumāna Alaṅkāra is of three types viz., Atītānumāna, Vartamānānumana and Bhavasyānumāna. Their examples are given in order as follows:

1. Atītānumānam

नूनं नद्यस्तदाभूवन्नभिषेकाम्भसा विभ्राः ।
अन्यथा कथमेतासु जनः स्नानेन शुध्यति ॥ (p. 58)

Definitely the rivers were created from the waters of the abhiṣeka of the Lord, otherwise how does a man get purified by taking batha in them.

Here one infers the purifying capacity of rivers due to the water being that of the Lord's abhiṣeka by the

purification of people because of their bath into those rivers.

The commentator explains it clearly in the following manner:

नूनं विभोर्जिनस्याभिषेकाम्भसा नद्यस्तदाभूवन् ।
 अन्यथा एतासु नदीषु जनः स्नानेन कथं
 शुध्यति । नदीस्नानेन शुद्धिरैतल्लिङ्गं लिङ्गी च
 विभोरभिषेकाम्भसा तदाभूवन्निति । एषोऽतीता-
 नुमानालङ्कारः । (P. 58)

Thus the Atitānumāna of Vāgbhaṭa corresponds to the Śeṣavat type of Anumāna of Naiyāyikas.

2. Vartamānumāna

This corresponds to the Sāmānyatodrṣṭa Anumāna which is generally based on the commonly known principles. For Example:

मुखप्रभावाधितकान्तिरस्या द्रोषाकरः किंकरतां विभर्ति ।
 तल्लोचनश्रीहृतिसापराधान्यब्जानि नैचैत्किमयं क्षिणेति ॥
 (P. 59)

As is seen in the case of a servant who does not tolerate the insult of his lord and takes immediate revenge on the defaulter, in the same way the moon as a servant takes revenge on the lotuses who being jealous of the nāyikā's beauty tries to take that away.

3. Bhaviṣyānumāna

In the Bhaviṣyānumāna one infers the future incident from the present effect, technically saying one infers the effect from its cause. This exactly happens in case of Pūrvavat Anumāna.

For Example:

जंभभित्ककुभ ज्योतिर्यथा शुभ्रं विजृम्भते ।
उदेष्यति तथा मन्यै खलुः सखि निशाकरः ॥ (P.58)

Here one infers an object of future i.e. the rising of moon by looking into the present object or cause i.e. the whiteness of the direction of Indra.

This categorisation is Vāgbhaṭa's contribution to Sanskrit Poetics which clearly speaks of Nyāya influence in disguise.

Viśvanāthadeva in his Sāhityasudhāsindhu (SSS), a notable work on Sanskrit poetics deals with Anumāna Alaṅkāra, which according to him, is of three types, viz., anvayavyāptika, vyatirekavyāptika and anvayavyatirekavyāptika. But he does not define them. He gives two examples only anvayavyāptika type of Anumāna-Alaṅkāra.

For example :

वचनमुपचारगर्भं दूरादुद्गमनमासनं सकलम् ।
इदमद्य मयि तथा ते यथासि नूनं प्रिये कुपिता ॥
(SSS. P. 496)

Here the hero infers the anger of the heroine. It can be said in the following Nyāya style as is rightly explained by the editor:

इयं नायिका मां प्रति प्रकुपिता उपचारवचनात्
उद्गमनात्, आसनदानादिसकलकौपहेतुमत्त्वच्च
यत्र यत्र उपचारवचनादिप्रयोगः तत्र तत्र कौपभावः
यथा कान्चिदपरा नायिका तथा चैयमत एवैयं
मां प्रति प्रकुपिता । (P. 496-7)

In Nyāyaśāstra anvaya is defined as yat sattve yat sattvam (hetusattve sādhyasattvam). In the example given above, from hetu i.e. upacāravacana, udgamana etc., sādhya i.e. kopa of nāyikā is inferred. So the vyāpti, yatra yatra upacāravacanādiprayogaḥ tatra tatra kopabhāvaḥ occurs and thus a the Anumāna is entitled anvayavyāptika.

Jayaratha in his commentary Vimarśini on AS identifies two types of Anumāna viz., svārthanumāna and parārthanumāna. In the example furnished by Ruyyaka:

यथा रन्ध्रं व्योम्नश्चतुर्जलदधूमः स्थगयति
स्फुलिङ्गानां रूपं दधति च यथा कीटमणयः ।
यथा विद्युज्जालोज्ज्वलनपरिपिङ्गाश्च ककुभः
स्तथा मन्ये लम्नः पथिकतरुषण्डे स्मरदयः ॥

(P. 550)

He explains this verse smoke etc., having the characteristic of three essentials helps us in infereing the fire expressed by the word 'dava'. The commentaror, however, identifies it as an example of svārthanumāna for, in this the person himself reaches the definite knowledge of his own parāmarśa.²²

For parārthanumāna, since there is no example in Ruyyaka's text Jayaratha himself furnishes one :

तदस्ति तेषां तमसि प्रसर्पिणां
निशाचरत्वं यदि पारमार्थिकम् ।
ततः प्रिये संनिहितैस्त्र वासरे
कथं नु तत्संचरणं भविष्यति ॥

(P. 552)

IV.3.2 Kāvyaṅga Alaṅkāra (Poetical Cause)

Udbhata is the first to mention Kāvyaṅga which, he says, occurs when something becomes the cause of recollection. Bhāmaha does not mention Kāvyaṅga, but mentions hetu and rejects it as an Alaṅkāra. Daṇḍin accepts it but Vāmana again rejects it. It is Udbhata who accepts it and calls it Kāvyaṅga which term thereafter stayed with this Alaṅkāra. The commentator, Pratihārendurāja clarifies that the hetu of the logicians is related with the wordly objects and followed by pakṣadharmatva and anvayavyatireka. Hence that does not create any charm. But the hetu of the kāvya is of different nature and creates a special charm. Hence the term hetu is rejected from and the word kāvya is incorporated in the definition.²³ Jagannātha defines Kāvyaṅga as:

अनुमितिकरणत्वेन सामान्यविशेषभावाभ्यां चानालङ्कितः
प्रकृतार्थोपपादकत्वेन विवक्षितोऽर्थः काव्यलिङ्गम् । (R.G.P. 628)

The expression 'anumitikaṛapatvena' excludes Anumāna where the hetu is a means of inference. The hetu in this figure brings poetic charm when it is not expressly mentioned by an ablative or an instrumental case but is suggested. A case of Kāvyaṅga presents invariably a case for inference also but the poet does not want to convey it to the readers. In Anumāna the poet or the speaker draws the conclusion for the readers. In Kāvyaṅga the reader himself gets the knowledge of Anumiti due to some reasoning.

A clear demarcation between Kāvyaalinga and Anumāna is given for the first time in the KP of Mammaṭa. He defines Kāvyaalinga as a figure where the cause takes the form of the sense of a sentence or that of a word and Anumāna consists in the presentation of what is deduced (sādhya) and the cause for such a deduction (sādhana). As in logic, in Poetics also the cause of the Anumāna has three aspects.²⁴

1. It serves as an attribute to the particular case (pakṣa).
2. It must be present in a positive case (sapakṣa).
3. It must be absent in a negative case (vipakṣa).

Ruyyaka in presenting these two figures follows Mammaṭa. He further observes that in Anumāna something not known before is inferred while in Kāvyaalinga what is known already is supported by the presentation of a cause.

Kāvyaalinga definitely differs from Anumāna because it gives stress on hetu and not on the process of Anumāna. Daṇḍin's Hetu Alāṅkāra is in fact Kāvyaalinga but it has been made more distinct by adding the term 'kāvya' to it. Accordingly it comes under Tarkanyāya and has been rightly included among Tarkanyāyamūlaka Alāṅkāras.

IV.3.3 Arthāntaranyāsa Alāṅkāra (Corroboration)

Vidyānātha, Appaya and Jagannātha hold that Arthāntaranyāsa Alāṅkāra is based on Tarkanyāya. Jagannātha defines

सामान्येन विशेषस्य विशेषेण सामान्यस्य वा
यन्समर्थनं तदर्थान्तरन्यासः । (RG. P. 634)

When a general proposition corroborates a particular proposition or when a particular proposition corroborates a general proposition the figure Arthāntaranyāsa takes place. Jagannātha generally follows Ruyyaka but here he differs from him. According to Jagannātha the corroboration of a general by a particular or of a particular by a general is based on some logic; for, a general consists of particulars, and the particular forms part and parcel of the general. Therefore Arthāntaranyāsa is a figure based on Tarkanyāya. For example :

उपकारमेव कुरुते विपद्गतः सद्गुणो निनराम् ।
मूर्च्छां गतो मृतो वा रोगानपहरति पारदः सकलान् ॥
(RG. P. 634)

IV.4 Hetvābhāsas as Alaṅkāras

Hetvābhāsas are invalid reasons which appear to be hetu but in fact do not possess the characteristics of valid reasoning. The word Hetvābhāsas is used in two senses : first it means a fallacious reason, secondly, it means fallacy or the defect which renders a reason fallacious. It is interesting to note that Yajñeśvara Dīkṣita in his Alaṅkārarāghava (Part II) has treated Hetvābhāsas as sub-types of Anumāna Alaṅkāra. He perhaps for the first time and perhaps for the only time treats Hetvābhāsas also as Alaṅkāras.

Unlike Bhāmaha and the Agnipurāṇakāra who treat Hetvābhāṣas as poetic blemishes, Yajñeśvara enumerates, under the treatment of Anumāna Alāṅkāra four Hetvābhāṣas viz., Asiddha (with its three types), Viruddha, Satpratipakṣa and Bādha.

1. Asiddha

He defines Asiddha Alāṅkāra as the reason which does not remain present in its pakṣa and gives its three kinds, namely Āsrayāsiddha, Svarūpāsiddha and Vyāpyatvāsiddha. He, however, gives the examples only of Āsrayāsiddha and Vyāpyatvāsiddha and omits that of Svarūpāsiddha.

(a) Āsrayāsiddha

In the TB a instance of Āsrayāsiddha is given as gaganāravindam surabhiḥ aravindatvāt sarojāravindavat.²⁵ Here we find that viz., a sky-lotus simply does not exist because it is only an imaginary thing. Āsrayāsiddha thus lacks the very first requisite of a valid hetu viz., pakṣadharmatvam.

Yajñeśvara gives the following example of Āsrayāsiddha Alāṅkāra:

अनुत्पन्नः पुमानेवः भवति प्रसवायुधः ।

असौ भवेदितरथा कथंकारमतिप्रियः ॥

(AR. P. 218)

In this example the āśraya, the person who is not born creates charm in mind. The āśraya i.e. pumān is absent.

(b) Vyāpyatvāsiddha

It is explained as vyāpyatvam asiddham yasmin in which

the Vyāpyatva of the reason is not established i.e. in which the reason is not vyāpya or invariably associated with the sādhya. Yajñeśwara gives the following example of it:

बुधाः केसरिणः शार्वं त्वां वदन्ति मरुत्सुत ।
अन्यथा त्वं कथंकारं भवेत् चन्द्रनखायुधः ॥
(AR. P. 218)

In this example candranakhāyudhatva is the hetu and keśari-savatva is sādhya and the vyāpti between the two is not invariably connected. Since the hetu remains present in tiger, bears etc.

As mentioned above Yajñeśwara does not give example for Svarūpāsiddha.

2. Viruddha

It has been defined as sādhyaābhāvena tadvyāpta viruddhā-lamkṛtirmatā. The hetu pervades the locus of sādhyaābhāva. This means instead of tending to prove its proper sādhya the hetu proves exactly the opposite.

For example:

रामचन्द्र ! वदन्ति त्वां सर्वद्वैतविवर्जितम् ।
अन्यथा मद्विरे भासि सद्वितीयः कथं वद ॥
(AR P. 219)

Here the hetu sadvitīyatva does not prove its sādhya but actually proves its absence i.e. sarvādvitīyā.

3. Satpratipakṣa

It is defined as the reason for which there exists another reason of equal power proving the opposite of the

sādhya. The famous example is śabdo nityaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt śabdatvavat and śabdo nityaḥ kāryatvāt ghaṭavat. Here we note that while śrāvaṇatva seems to prove the nityatva of śabda, kāryatva proves anityatva with equal force.

For example:

रद्युत्तम ! त्वमिह पूर्णचन्द्रं वदन्ति यत्पूर्णकौ विभासि ।
स्तुवन्त्यचन्द्रं कवयः पूरैरपि यतः प्रकाशानिशयः प्रबन्धः ॥
(AR. P. 219)

Here one hetu, purṇakalobhanatvarūpa has another reason prakāśātīśayatva to prove its opposite.

4. Bādha

It is defined as sādhyaābhāva pramā yatra sa bādhālaṅ-
kṛtirmatā. It consists in having the negation of its sādhya
already ascertained by another proof. For example: agnirānu-
ṣṇaḥ dravyatvāt. We know by the perception of touch that
fire is hot.. Perception is a stronger proof than inference.
Uṣṇatva, which we through perception, contradicts the
anuṣṇatva which is intended to be proved by the reason
i.e. dravyatva.

Yajñeśwara gives the following example:

अपि कान्तारसञ्चारे रामो राजा न संशयः ।
अन्यथेष्ट कथंकारं भवैसिंहसन्स्थितः ॥ (AR. P. 220)

Here the kingship (rājatva) is proved by perception so the
hetu siṃhāsanasthitatva in the kāntāra contradicts the given
hetu.

All these clearly prove that Yajñeśwara Dīkṣita was

highly influenced by the Nyaya theory of Hetvābhāsa. He exactly formulates the definitions as given by the Naiyāyikas and fully accepts the divisions of the Hetvābhāsas made by Naiyāyikas.

IV.5 Pramānas as Alankāras

Another classification of Alankāras was made by rhetoricians taking into consideration the pramānas as Alankāras. This new classification started from Bhoja and later on developed by his successors. Pramānas as the source of valid knowledge have been given an important place in all the systems of Indian philosophy. Epistemology, an important branch of philosophical thought, mainly deals in the context of Indian Philosophies, with pramā, pramāṇa, pramātā and prameya. Among the philosophers of ancient India, Naiyāyikas are particularly known as prāmānikas because of their excessive emphasis on the doctrine of pramānas. Gautama in his NyS, therefore, considers pramāṇa as the first padārtha among the sixteen padārthas enumerated therein. Naiyāyikas even define the term 'Nyāya' as pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇam nyāyah.

Pramāṇa literally means the principal instrument (karana) of valid knowledge(pramā). According to the Nyāyaśāstra pramā (cognition) is of four types: Pratyakṣa, Anumiti, Upamiti and Śabda. The most important causes (karana) of these four types of knowledge are called Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna (comparison) and Śabda (valid

testimony), the source of attaining valid knowledge.

The different schools of Indian philosophy are not unanimous about the nature and number of pramāṇas. The materialistic Cārvāka recognises perception alone, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika accept only two (perception and inference), the Sāṃkhya recognises three (perception, inference and analogy), the Nyāya recognises four (with addition of śabda), the Prābhākaras admit five with arthāpatti, the Vedāntins and the Bhāttas recognise six with anupalabdhi and the Paurāṇikas add two more sāmbhava and aitihya.

IV.5.1 Bhoja

Bhoja in his Śr.P treats Pramāṇālankāras in śāstric terminology viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti, sāmbhava and abhāva.²⁶

According to Bhoja, the two means of knowledge, Darśana the mutual seeing and śravaṇa (hearing of each other) by which love may developed between two lovers, bring in a long digression into the Pramāṇas. Bhoja takes Darśana as comprising all Pramāṇas based on Pratyakṣa, which is Darśana par excellence, namely, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Sāmbhava and Abhāva. Similarly, Śravaṇa is taken by Bhoja as all Pramāṇas based on Śabda, which is Śravaṇa par excellence, namely, Śabda, Aitihya, Śrutānumāna, Śrutopamāna, Śrutārthāpatti and Śrutasāmbhava.

Bhoja divides Pratyakṣa into six kinds: sākṣāt, pratibimba, pratibhāna, utprekṣā, smṛti and svapna. Bhoja defines Anumāna as līngadarśanāt līngapratipattir anumānam. He gives six varieties of it : sāmānyatodrṣṭa, viśesatodrṣṭa, pratyakṣatodrṣṭa, parokṣatodrṣṭa, vidyamānaviśaya and avidyamānaviśaya. All these are varieties of svārthānumāna. Parārthānumāna, Bhoja says, partakes of the character of śabda and hence each dealt with under śabdālaṅkāra. Bhoja quotes Gautama's Nyāyasūtra I.1.6. on Upamāna. But he classifies it into six kinds : sādharmyopamāna, vaidharmyopamāna, mudropamāna, śilpopamāna, sāngnopamāna and abhiprāyopamāna. According to Bhoja, the fourth part of the syllogism called Upanaya is Upamāna. Bhoja quotes here Vatsyāyana's Bhāṣya. Bhoja has argued for the superiority of Upamāna among pramāṇas and concludes that this does not mean that the other pramāṇas are unnecessary. Bhoja bases his reply here on what Vatsyāyana says in reply to the point raised by himself regarding the separate enumeration in the opening padārtha-samuddēśa sūtra of categories which can be included in one or the other. Bhoja divides arthāpatti into two kinds: drṣṭārtharthāpatti and śrutarthāpatti. The former is divided again into six kinds: pratyakṣa-pūrvikā, anumāna-pūrvikā, upamāna-pūrvikā, śabda-pūrvikā, arthāpatti-pūrvikā, and śabda-pūrvikā. Again, Sāmbhava is of six kinds : sāmbhāvana, sāmsaya, vitarka, prāyovāda, sāmpratyaya and pratyayānusandhi. Then Bhoja deals with Abhāva Alāṅkāra and its six kinds : prāgbhāva,

pradhvaṃsabhāva, itaretarābhāva, atyantabhāva, sāmbandhābhāva and sarvābhāva. Abhāva is a padārtha to the Naiyāyikas whom Bhoja deserts here. The Naiyāyikas recognise only four varieties of Abhāva viz., prāgabhāva, pradhvaṃsābhāva, atyantābhāva and anyonyābhāva. Certain ancient Naiyāyikas recognise a sāmayika-abhāva. Bhoja's sāmbandhābhāva is ancient Naiyāyikas' sāmayika-abhāva and sarvābhāva is not different from atyantābhāva. Bhoja then takes up the six pramāṇas of the Śravaṇā-class. As related to the Śabdapramāṇa Bhoja speaks of other six minor pramāṇas, śabdāntara, abhyāsa, saṃgna, sāṃkhya, guṇa and prakaraṇa. All these are not necessary for our purpose so we have left them.

IV.5.2, Amṛtānanda Yogin

Amṛtānanda Yogin (1250 A.D.) in his Alaṅkārasaṃgraha (ASam) deals with Pramāṇas as Alaṅkāras. He quotes the following passage from the Tārikakarakṣā of Varadarāja, a Naiyāyika of great repute:

प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्वाकः कणादसुगर्तो पुनः ।
 अनुमानं च तच्चाथ सांख्यः शब्दं चैवैवम् ॥
 नैयायिकैकदेशिनोऽप्येवमुपमानं च कैचन ।
 अर्थापत्त्या सहैतानि चत्वार्यहं प्रभाकरः ॥
 अभावोऽप्रकृत्यैतानि भाट्टा वेदान्तिनस्तथा ।
 संभवेतिह्ययुक्तानि तानि वैरागिका जगुः ॥

(ASam, p. 60; Tārikakarakṣā, V. 51-54)

He then defines and explains with examples eight Prmāṇālaṅkāras viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna, āgama, upamāna, arthāpatti, abhya, sāmbhava and aitihya.

The Pratyakṣa Alāṅkāra is defined as the knowledge arising out of the connection of sense organs with the objects. It is of six types with regard to five jñānedriyas and one mind (manas). Again, it is of two types : nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. The former is only of the nature of pure perception devoid of any definite knowledge while the latter is the special knowledge having nāma etc., as its object.²⁷ The definitions and divisions of Pratyakṣa Alāṅkāra given by Amṛtānanda seem to be quite similar with the definitions and divisions of Pratyakṣa given by Nāiyāyikas.

He defines Anumāna Alāṅkāra as the knowledge of the hetumat i.w. sādhya by its hetu. It is of two types: drṣṭa and sāmānyato drṣṭa.²⁸

Āgama is defined as the upadeśa of a trustworthy person.²⁹ His definition is quite similar with the definition of āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ and āpta as yathārtha vaktā puruṣa given by Annambhaṭṭa in his Tarkasaṃgraha.³⁰

Upamāna Alāṅkāra has been defined as sādrśyāt sadṛśa jñānam, which is essentially not different from the Nyaya concept of Upamāna pramāṇa.³¹

Amṛtānanda also includes Abhāva of the Naiyāyikas as an Alaṅkāra. Abhāva has been accepted as a padārtha by the Naiyāyikas like Annambhaṭṭa of syncretic school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. There are in all four varieties of Abhāva: prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁsābhāva, atyantābhāva and anyonyābhāva.³² Ghaṭa-prāgabhāva exists before the production of the ghaṭa and it exists from time immemorial. When the ghaṭa is produced ghaṭa-prāgabhāva comes to an end. Pradhvaṁsābhāva is produced ~~is produced~~ when the ghaṭa is destroyed. Atyantābhāva is the absolute negatione.g. the absence of rūpa in air. Anyonyābhāva is illustrated by ghaṭaḥ paṭo na denying the relation of identity between ghaṭa and paṭa.³³

Amṛtānanda also in the light of this Naiyāyika doctrine of Abhāva, propounds Abhāva as an Alaṅkāra. He defines it as the absence of an object. He then proceeds to illustrate its four varieties though he does not define them individually. The illustrations are as follows:

1. Prāgabhāva:

अनभ्यासेन विद्यानामसंसर्गेण धीमताम् ।
अनिग्रहेण चाक्षाणां व्यसनं जायते नृणां ॥ (Aśvamp. 60)

2. Pradhvaṁsābhāva:

धृतिरस्तमिता रतिश्च वित्तं गेयमृतुर्निरुत्सवः ।
गतमाभरणप्रयोजनं परिशून्यं शयनीयमद्य मे ॥
(ibid.)

3. Anyonyābhāva:

कर्णोत्पलं न चक्षुस्ते न चक्षुः श्रवणोत्पलम् ।
इति जानन्नपि जनो मन्यते दीर्घनैत्रताम् ॥
(ibid.)

4. Atyantābhāva:

सव्यापसव्यन्त्यजनाद् द्विरुक्तेः पञ्चैषुबाणैः पृथगर्जितासु ।
दशासु शेषा स्वरु तादृशा या तथा नभःपुष्पतु कोरुकेण ॥
(ibid)

In the first example he has shown the absence of kāraṇa in kārya i.e. the absence of abhyāsa in vidyā; absence of sāmsarga in dhimati etc. In the second example the destruction of dhṛti, rati etc., is shown as pradhvaṃsābhāva. In the third example, 'karnotpala' is not identical with eyes and eye is śravaṇotpala. In the fourth example, the situation was completely absent.

IV.5.3 Appaya Dīksita

Appaya Dīksita also treats same eight pramāṇas as Alaṅkāras in his Kuvalayānanda. In the age when Appaya flourished, philosophers especially Naiyāyikas like Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya were seriously engaged with the problems of epistemology of which pramāṇa is the backbone. As Appaya was a good scholar of Nyāya as evinced from his language, style and his argumentative method he tried to incorporate pramāṇa doctrine in poetics and, in their light, framed figures of speech. Since we do not have something concrete as a mark of Nyāya influence in Appaya, we shall not attempt here a comprehensive treatment of his Pramāṇa-Alaṅkāras. Instead, we shift our attention to other great poeticians whose treatment of Pramāṇa Alaṅkāras reflects an influence of the Nyāya doctrine of Pramāṇa.

IV.5.4 Viśveśvara Paṇḍita

Viśveśvara Paṇḍita (1700-1750 A.D.) also deals with the same eight Pramāṇālaṅkāras in his Alaṅkārapradīpa viz., anumāna, pratyakṣa, upamiti, śabda, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi, saṁbhava and aitihya. He defines Anumāna as: vyāpyena vyāpakajñānamanumānam.³⁴ He defines śabd as : āptvākyam śabdaḥ³⁵ We must mention here that Viśveśvara is a Naiyāyika himself and he also authored some Nyāya works like Tarkakūṭuhalam etc. It is natuaally therefore, that he uses the Nyāya technical term like 'vyāpya' and 'vyāpaka' in the definition of Anumāna Alaṅkāra. Even the definition of Śabda Alaṅkāra is exactly similar to Gautama's definition of Śabda Pramāṇa.

IV.5.5 Devaśaṅkara Purohita

Devaśaṅkara (1750-1800 A.D.) in his Alaṅkāramañjuṣā (AM) treats Pramāṇas as Alaṅkāras under the heading Pramāṇālaṅkāravivecanam. According to his Pramāṇālaṅkāras occur where valid knowledge and its means are drawn upon by poets. Valid knowledge (pramā) says Devaśaṅkara, is of four kinds: Pratyakṣa, Anumiti, Upamiti, and Śabda, and accordingly their means are of four kinds viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda . The examples are as follows:

1. Pratyakṣa:

मुखं चन्द्रस्फिनिं त्वमृतकहरी सुक्तिसरणि-
 मुखा मोदोऽन्युच्येर्वपुःपि शिरीषप्रतिभटः ।
 धरेऽपूर्वे द्राक्षारस इह युवा कोऽपि सुकृती
 युवत्याः सम्भोगे त्वनुभवति सर्वेन्द्रियसुखम् ॥ (P. 223)

(The young damsel's face is bright like the moon; the continuous line of her sweet words is a wave of the nectar; the fragrance of her mouth is extremely intense; her body, too, vies with the sirīṣa flower; and there is grape-juice on her lower lip. A certain lucky youth in the course of his carnal enjoyment with the young damsel indeed directly experiences all the sensual pleasures of this earth.)

Here it is noticed that the Pratyakṣa Alāṅkāra is based on direct experience. This reminds us of the definitions of Pratyakṣa given by the Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines Pratyakṣa as: indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam avyapdeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam (NyS I.1.4). Annambhaṭṭa defines Pratyakṣa as : indriyārthasannikarsajanyam jñānam.³⁶ Hence the knowledge which is directly obtained through the contact of sense organs with objects is called Pratyakṣa and in the example given by Devaśaṅkara direct experience, the young lover experiences is a testimony to this effect.

2. Anumāna

According to Devaśaṅkara, Anumāna is of two types: Rūpakasankirṇa and Śuddha. The examples are in order:

अनुमितौऽपि चमत्थितरैणुभिः
नगगतैश्शिशुभिः परिशङ्कितैः ।
व्यभिचचार न राघवसङ्क्षिप्तौ
जलितशत्रुनृणो ज्वलनौऽपरः ॥ (AR P. 224)

(The king named Rāghava who is another fire had burnt the straw in the form of his enemies did not act wrongly although on account of the dust raised by his forces he was inferred to be present by the frightened enemies taking shelter on the mountain.)

B. सरोजानां विकसनैः पतङ्गादितशब्दिनैः ।
 लतालीनालिसङ्घोर्भयैर्ज्ञाने ह्युदितो रविः ॥ (p.224)

(From the blooming of the lotuses, from the cries uttered by the birds and from the commotion caused among the bees lurking within the creepers it is learnt with certainty that the sun has risen.)

Here in both the examples how a sādhana helps in cognising a sādhya is shown exactly as it happens in the Nyāya-anumāna.

3. Upamāna

चापाकारे भ्रुवौ यस्मान्मुखं चन्द्रेण संनिभम् ।
 पुण्डरीके इव दृशौ तदयं माधवप्रभुः ॥ (p.224)

(This person is decidedly king Mādhava, since his eye-brows are bow-shaped, since his face resembles the moon and since his eyes are like lotuses.)

Upamāna is one of the pramāṇas of Naiyāyikas. It is the instrument of Upamiti or analogical cognition which consists in the knowledge of the connection between a name and the object expressed by it.³⁷ For producing this upamiti knowledge of similarity is necessary. Therefore Upamāna is

analogical cognition. A person happens to be ignorant of the exact meaning of the word gavaya, which is similar to cow and recollects the information conveyed by the assimilative proposition (atideśavākya). Then the assimilative cognition, 'This is the animal of the bovine species' denoted by the word 'gavaya' arises.

In this example king Mādhava is known from the analogical knowledge due to his similarity with other objects.

4. Śabda

(a) Vaidika-śabda :

नाथाय मृगया राज्ञमिति जानन्नपि स्वयम् ।
जहौ तं माधवो वीरो न हिंस्यादिति भावयेन् ॥ (p. 225)

(Although himself aware of the smṛti that hunting does not conduce to a sin in the case of kings, heroic Mādhava gave it up, establishing the Śruti that one must not kill other beings.)

The words Smṛti and Śruti are added by the translator. The smṛti-dictum is well-known but where from does he infer or refer to śruti is not clear.

(b) Laukika-śabda

इन्द्रप्रस्थं प्रति बली वलिष्ठैरभिवन्दितः ।
यातीति प्रस्तुतं लौकात्पैषवा राघवप्रभुः ॥ (p. 225)

(It is the current topic among the people that king Rāghava the mightiest Peśavā who is adorned even by the mightiest is setting out for Indraprastha.)

Śabda is one of the Pramāṇa of the Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines Śabda as Āptavākya (nyS I.1.6). So Śabda is a sentence uttered by a trustworthy person or āpta. According to Gautama it is of two kinds : Vaidika and Laukika. In the examples given by Devaśaṅkara he has shown two types of Śabda. Alaṅkāra as exactly found in the Nyāya works. Secondly, in the first example, he has shown the superiority of Sruti over Smṛti according to which the king Mādhava decided to not to kill other beings. The second example is based on the Laukika Śabdapramāṇa.

Thus Devaśaṅkara accepts only the above mentioned four Pramāṇa Alaṅkāras and not the remaining four. He opines that their field is duly covered by the four recognised by him; sāmbhava and ceṣṭā can be included in Anumāna; aitihya in śabda and anupalabdhi in pratyakṣa. Therefore, his treatment of these Alaṅkāras reveals a deep Nyāya influence on him, for, he accepts only those four pramāṇas which are accepted by the Naiyāyikas and includes the other pramāṇas in them just as Naiyāyikas do. Again, the definitions of pramā and pramāṇa given by him are quite similar to those found in the Nyāya works.

IV.6 Other Nyāyaśāstra related Alāṅkāras

(1) Dr̥ṣṭānta (Exemplification)

Dr̥ṣṭānta, one of the Arthālaṅkāras, is first propounded by Bhāmaha. Indurāja, the commentator of Udbhaṭa named it as Kāvya-dr̥ṣṭānta. It is so named to distinguish it from the Dr̥ṣṭānt of Nyāyaśāstra. Except Vāmana almost all the Ālaṅkārikas accept it. According to Mammata, Ruyyaka, Viśvanātha and Appaya Dīkṣita etc., Dr̥ṣṭānta is a figure where the upamāna, upameya and the common property are presented as if reflected i.e. where no yathā, iva etc., are used; but the meaning of one sentence is a reflection as it were of that of another sentence. Viśvanātha defines it as: दृष्टान्तरु सधर्मस्य वस्तुनः प्रतिबिम्बनम् । (SD.P.36)

He gives the following example:

अविदितगुणापि सत्कविभणितिः कर्णेषु वमन्ति मधुधारा ।
अनधिगतपरिमलापि हि दृशन्ति दृशं मालतीमाला ॥
(SD.P.36)

Dr̥ṣṭānta is one of the sixteen padārthas enumerated by Gautama in his Nyāyaśāstra. It is one of the five syllogistic statements (pañcāvayavavākya) otherwise called Udāharana. It has been mainly discussed in the context of Anumāna. It is defined by Gautama as:

लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः ।
(NY5 I.1.25)

In poetry and philosophy both Dr̥ṣṭānta is used to strengthen and to clarify the matter in hand. In both, the words like

yathā etc., (sāmyabodhaka) are not used. It is important to note that the two varieties of Drṣṭānta viz., sādharmyadrṣṭānta and vaidharmyadrṣṭānta as given by Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha are similar to those of the varieties available in the Nyāya works like TB of Keśavamīśra.³⁸

(2) Udāharana

Along with Drṣṭānta Udāharana is treated as an independent alāṅkāra only by Jagannātha and Parakāla Swami. Jagannātha defines it as follows: सामान्येन निरूपितस्यार्थस्य सुखप्रतिपत्तये तदेकदेशं निरूप्य तयोरवयवावयविभाव उच्यमान उदाहरणम् । (P. 175)
For example: अमिनीषुणोऽपि पदार्थो दौर्बल्येणैकेन निन्दितो भवति ।
निस्त्रिरसायनराज्ञो बन्धनौघेण लक्ष्मण इव ॥

The term Udāharana is defined in the NyS as:

साध्यसाधम्यात्तद्वर्तमानो दृष्टान्त उदाहरणम् । (NyS. I. 1. 36)

In this alāṅkāra the similarity is expressed by the words like yathā, iva etc., as in that of Nyāyasūtra i.e. parvate vahnimān dhūmavattvāt yathā mahānasaḥ.

(3) Viśeṣokti (Peculiar Allegation)

This alāṅkāra is introduced for the first time by Bhāmaha. Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Vidyādhara, and Viśvanātha follow Bhāmaha in this respect and define this Alāṅkāra in the same way. Viśeṣokti occurs when the effect is not produced in spite of the occurrence of its cause. Viśvanātha defines it as:

सति हेतौ फलभावो विशेषोक्तिः । (SD. P. 49)

He gives the following example:

धनिनोऽपि निरुन्माद। युवानोऽपि न चञ्चलाः ।
प्रभवेऽप्यप्रमत्तास्ते महामहिमशालिनः ॥ (SD. P. 49)

The concept of this Alaṅkāra is related to the Nyāya theory of causality. Naiyāyikas advocate asatkāryavāda, according to which an effect which is anitya gets produced from its cause which is nitya. For example, anitya ghaṭa is produced from nitya paramāṇu. According to the Naiyāyika theory, kārya does not exist in any form and at any place before its production. It is produced when kāraṇavyāpāra is undertaken. Even if the clay is present, a jar is not produced without the causal process of the jar maker. In the same way in the Viśeṣokti Alaṅkāra in spite of the cause being present, the effect is not produced. In the example given above youth, the cause of fickleness is present but it does not give rise to fickleness in the absence of the kāraṇavyāpāra.

(4) Smṛti (Recollection)

This Alaṅkāra is propounded for the first time by Rudraṭa by the name Smarana. Narasimha Kavi names it as Smṛtimat. Sobhākara, Jayaratha, Jayadeva and Appaya call it Smṛti. Other rhetoricians have termed it as Smarana. Thus all the rhetoricians are not unanimous about its name but the concept of the Alaṅkāra is the same.. Viśvanātha defines it as : सद्दृशानुभवाद्भस्मृतिः स्मरणमुच्यते । (SD P.22)
A recollection of an object arising from the perception of something similar is termed as Smarana. For example:

अरविन्दमिदं वीक्ष्य शैलस्त्वञ्जनमञ्जुलम् ।
स्मरामि वदनं नस्याश्चारु चञ्चललोचनम् ॥
(SD P.22)

In this example the perception of the lotus on which khanjana bird was playing stirs up the impression which cause the remembrance of the face of the beautiful lady with tremulous eyes. There is similarity between the face and the lotus.

According to the Naiyāyikas the knowledge(jñāna) is of two types : Smṛti and Anubhava. Smṛti is that knowledge which is produced by impression called bhāvanā which is of two kinds : yathārtha (true) and ayathārtha(false). Both these types of knowledge arise in one's waking state. In dream all kinds of remembrance is false.

In the case of the Smṛti of Naiyāyikas the object which is once experienced by a person at some particular time, leaves some kind of impression on the mind of the person and when he again observes a similar object it strikes the hidden impressions which give rise to the knowledge of the object experienced before.

Similar is the nature of the Alaṅkāra called Smṛti. In the example given above, the sādrśya (similarity) existing between the lotus with the bee hovering over it and the face with tremulous eyes is an instrumental cause giving rise to the memory of the beautiful face by arousing the bhāvanā saṁskāra of the face-experience. But the difference in the Nyāya-smṛti and kāvya-smṛti is that in

poetics it must deal with some aesthetic object.

In the TB sādrśya, cintā, adr̥ṣṭa are mentioned as the causes of impressions which give rise to Smṛti.³⁹ Among poeticians Bhoja considers these causes as the base of this Alaṅkāra.⁴⁵

(5) Samāsokti (Speech of Brevity)

In case of Samāsokti Alaṅkāra it is interesting to note that the authors like Ruyyaka, Brahmatantra Parakālaswāmi and Narendraprabhasūri admit the Nyāya element as aprastuta. In Ruyyaka, however, we see for the first time instead of worldly objects occurring as aprastuta we find the elements of Nyāya and other sastras occurring as the elements of aprastuta. Ruyyaka in his AS gives the followign example and shows the superimposition of Nyāya objects on wordly objects:

स्वपक्षकीलालुक्तेरूपोदहेनो स्मरे दर्शयतो विशेषम् ।
मानं निराकर्तुमशेषयूनां पिकस्य पाण्डित्यमखण्डमासीत् ॥
(AS. P. 327)

Śri Kṛiṣṇa-Brahmatantra Parakālaswāmi in his Alaṅkāra-maṇihāra shows how in the treatment of the subject pertaining to Vedāntaśāstra the subject of Nyāyaśāstra is superimposed.

व्याख्या प्रथितमबाधं निवृत्तिपक्षं च साधुपक्षस्थम् ।
सद्भैतुमीश जगतां त्वां प्राप्यैष्टानि साधयन्ति बुधाः ॥
(P. 457)

Here, it is shown that as the persons cognised fire on the basis of its sādhanai.e. dhūma which is free from fallacies

like Bādha and Pratipakṣa, similarly, the wise persons attempt to obtain the Lord who is all pervasive. Here in the treatment of a topic relating with the philosophy of Vedānta superimposition of technical Nyāya concept has occurred.

यत्र त्वं नत्र श्रीरिति युवयोरसाहचर्यनियमोऽस्ति ।
व्याप्तिश्चैषाऽच्युत तत्साध्या सत्पक्षवर्तिनस्त्वच्चीः ॥

Again, here in the treatment of dharmaśāstriya subject (P. 458) superimposition of Nyāyaśāstriya topics like vyāpti and pakṣavṛttitva of hetu has occurred.

यस्मिन्निश्चितमच्युत साध्यं निःश्रेयसं वसत्यन्तः ।
तद्भक्तौ न्यायविदां स सपक्षस्यान्तर्गताधरगिरीन्दो ॥

Here in the treatment of Vedāntaśāstriya topic the superimposition of Nyāyaśāstriya objects such as sapakṣa has occurred.

पिप्रीषयेव नैऽच्युत कनकमुखर्या मखैर्जयति हि त्वाम् ।
बुधततिरेषा कथमिह न स्यान्सत्पक्षणा जहन्स्वार्था ॥

Here, in the treatment of a topic relating to Bhagavadgītā and Bhāgavata the superimposition of Nyāyaśāstriya objects has taken place.

हृदयमुक्तावलि करिशनिकण्ठीयानिवैरुचिसुभगः ।
प्रौढशिरैर्मणिदीधितिपरिचयपरभगवान् हरिर्जयति ॥

In this example, the treatment of a laukikavastu, śrīnivāsādi-vigraha the superimposition of the Nyāyaśāstriya topic has taken place. Through Samāsokti he refers to NSM of Viśvanātha, to Sitikanṭhīya, a Nyāya work of Sitikanṭha, to Raghunātha Siromaṇi and to his Dīdhiti, a commentary on TC of Gaṅgeśa.⁴¹

Vidyānātha in his Pratāparudriya similarly shows superimposition of the Tarkasāstriya objects on worldly objects.

गुरुप्रमाणेन निजेन सद्यस्तिरस्कृतोद्यत्प्रतिपक्षहेतौ ।
प्रतापरुद्रस्य समित्युद्देगौ खड्गे महत्स्वण्डनपण्डितत्वम् ॥

Here in the treatment of a lakika object, khadga there is imposition of Nyāya object such as pratipakṣa and hetu.

Narendraprabhasūri in his Alaṅkāramahodadhī similarly shows the superimposition of the objects of Nyāyaśāstra on worldly objects. The example :

सीमानं न जगाम यन्नयनयोनान्येन यत् सङ्गतं
न स्पृष्टं वचसा कदाचिदपि यद् दृष्टौपमानं न यत् ।
अर्थादापन्नितं न यन्न च यत् तत् किञ्चिदेणीदृशौ
लावण्यं जयति प्रमाणरहितं चैतश्चमत्कारकृतं ।
(P. 282)

In this upon the treatment of lāvanya the superimposition of pramāṇas has taken place.

(6) Tulyayogitā (Equal Pairing)

Dealing with Tulyayogitā Alaṅkāra, Viśvesvara Paṇḍita in his Alaṅkārapradīpa first gives it s definitions on the generally well-known line as:

प्रकृतानामप्रकृतानामैव वा एकधर्मान्वयस्तुल्ययोगिता ।

Then he defines another type of Tulayayogitā as:

सपक्षविपक्षयोरुक्ति सामान्यमन्या तुल्ययोगिता । (P. 32)

Obviously this second Alaṅkāra of the same name is entirely based on the Nyāya concept and defined by the Nyāya terminology. It is clear that this second Alaṅkāra is not to be treated

as a sub-variety of the first one. By the term 'Anyā' given in the definition he perhaps means a kind of Tulyayogitā different from the commonly known Alaṅkāra of the name. This is further proved by the definition of Tulyayogitā given previously. Viśveśvara does not mention anyā tulyayogitā as a kind of Tulyayogitā Alaṅkāra. The terms used by him i.e. sapakṣa and vipakṣa are defined by the Naiyāyikas as niscitasādhyaṁ and niscitasādhyaḥbhāvaṁ respectively. As per the Nyāya-Anumāna theory a hetu cannot be present in both sapakṣa and vipakṣa. But, according to Viśveśvara, it can remain present in the sphere of poetry. He gives the following example:

ज्योत्स्नारसानुभूतिप्रौढसदङ्गाररुचिभाजः ।
हिमदीधितिना विहिताः सुतनु ! यकौरश्च यकवाकाश्च ॥
(7) Virodhābhāsa : (P. 32)

Viśvanāthadeva in his Sāhityasūdhāsindhu (SSS), while dealing with Virodhābhāsa Alaṅkāra gives the following example which interestingly reflects an influence of Nyāya :

न पक्षवृत्तिः न सपक्षवृत्तिः
विपक्षवृत्तिः करवालधूमः ।
तथापि नै विक्रमभूमिपाल
प्रतापवह्नैः प्रेमितिं करोति ॥ (SSS, p. 223)

This shows how even Nyāya terminology and concepts can be employed with a reversal to poetic ends. Here the presence of karavāladhūma, the hetu is neither present in pakṣa nor in sapakṣa and yet its presence in vipakṣa becomes means of inference of the fire of the valour of the king praised in

the verse. The author here refers to the terms and concepts of Nyaya with the help of paronomastic words. The same example is also given by the author as that of Apratītaḥ.

IV.7 Alaṅkāradhvani based on Tarkaśāstra

Narendraprabhasūri in his Naīrājayaśobhāṣaṇa explains Alaṅkāradhvani (Śabdaśaktimūlā) based on the object of Tarkaśāstra. The example:

अनियतसहचरवृत्तिप्रथितविशैर्धैकहेतवः कुभूतः ।
अन्तः प्रकौपवद्भि व्यक्तं गमयन्ति वीर विभुसूनेः ॥ (C.P. 26)

Here Vibhāvanā Alaṅkāra is suggested as vahnyanumiti has been shown without a valid vyāpti in spite of the fallacious nature of the hetu.

We have seen above how various concepts of Nyāya are imbibed into the structure of the poetic figures of speech also. As a result we find the Alaṅkāras like Anumāna, Kāvyaṅga, Dr̥ṣṭānta, Udāharana, Smṛti etc. In the matter of the types of Anumāna Alaṅkāra and Hetvābhāsa as Alaṅkāra the influence of Nyāya is very clear. The section of Pramāṇālaṅkāras also clearly reveals the impact of Nyāya. The principle of Āsrayāśrayibhāva and Anvayavyatirekibhāva are found to have some relation with the Nyāya concepts. In the Alaṅkāras like Anyatūlyalogitā we see the poetics

going a step further over the Nyāya concepts where the author says the hetu is present in vipakṣa also. Viśvanātha-deva even shows poetic examples where the Naiyāyika process is reversed or contradicted. The author like Parakālaswāmī would even blur the distinctions of prastuta and aprastuta by putting various sastric concepts including Naiyāyika ones in both the categories. Thus individual Nyāya concepts are included into the Ālaṅkārika fold attain the poetic charm and they are recognised as individual poetic figurative structures called Alaṅkāras and at a times even bypassed or surpassed as we just saw above. This is not difficult to explain since the primary concern of the Nyāya śāstra is the validity of thought and thought process and poetry organises various semantic structures. Logical validity or invalidity are therefore bound to enter the thought structure or poetic figures and when we recognise them as such that is when we see a Nyāya structure appearing in an expression they will naturally be recognised as such. The strikingness (camatkṛti) makes it a poem, the thought structure reveals the Nyāya concept which makes the rhetoricians recognise them as Nyāya-based Alaṅkāras.

1. शब्दार्थयोरलंकारौ द्वावलंकुरते समम् ।
एकत्र निहितौ द्वारः स्थानं ग्रीवामिव स्त्रियः ॥
AP. ch. IX 1. P. 173
2. काव्ये दोषगुणालंकाराणां च शब्दार्थगततयाऽन्वय-
व्यतिरेकाभ्यां विभागः क्रियते ।
KASS, ch. IV, P. 40.
3. B&P., P. 382.
4. योऽलंकारो यदाश्रितः स तदलंकार इत्यपि कल्पनायां
अन्वयव्यतिरेकावैव समाश्रयितव्यौ । तदाश्रयमन्तरेण
विशिष्टस्याश्रयाश्रयिभावस्याभावादित्यलंकाराणां
यथाकृत्निमित्त एव परस्परव्यतिरेको ज्ञायान् ।
Kp. ch. X P. 417.
5. द्रव्ययोरैव संयोग इति नियमादिति भावः ।
Dinakari, P. 87
6. इदेहमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः ।
Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 7.2.26
7. TB, P. 16.
8. अत्र पर्वतस्याग्निमत्त्वं साध्यं धूमवत्त्वं हेतुः ।
स चान्वयव्यतिरेकी अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च
व्याप्तिमत्त्वात् । TB, P. 32
9. AS, P. 538-612.
10. Shukla Chitra P., Treatment of Alamkāras in
Rasagangādhara, P. 197.

11. KA., ch. V. 30.

12. RG. ch. II, P. 400

13. TS., P. 25

14. तस्यश्च करणं व्याप्तिप्रकारकं लिङ्गनिश्चय-
इत्येके । व्याप्यत्वेन निश्चीयमानं लिङ्गमित्यपरे ।

RG. ch. II, P. 401

15. NSM., P. 286.

16. इदं च साधारणमनुमानं । अत्र च कविप्रतिभा-
क्लृप्तिवत्त्वेन चमत्कारित्वे काव्यालंकारता ।

RG. ch. II, P. 401.

17. साध्यसाधनयोः पैर्वापर्यविकल्पे न किञ्चिद्-
वैचित्र्यमिति न तथा दाशतम् । KP. ch. X, P. 427.

18. अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत्
सामान्यतौदृष्टं च । NS., I. 1. 5.

19. TB. P. 24.

20. Ibid

21. Ibid. P. 25.

22. AS, P. 552.

23. पक्षधर्मत्वान्वयव्यतिरेकानुसरणमर्थतया
यथा तार्किकप्रसिद्धा हेतवो लौकिकप्रसिद्ध वस्तुविषय-
त्वेनोपनिबध्यमाना वैरस्यभावमावहन्ति न

तथा काव्यहेतुः अतिशयेन सर्वेषां जनानां
योऽसौ हृदयसंवादी सरसः परार्थतन्निष्ठतया
उपनिबध्यमानत्वात् । अतः काव्यलिङ्गमिति
काव्यग्राहणमुपात्तम् । *Pratīhārendurājā, K.S.S.Tikā*

24. पञ्चधर्मान्वयव्यतिरेकित्वेन त्रिरूपो हेतु साधनम् ।
KP. ch. X, P. 426.

25. TB. P. 106.

26. Śr. P. Vol. II, P. 33.

27. ASam, P. 58.

28. Ibid., P. 58.

29. Ibid

30. TS., P. 34.

31. Nys., I.1.6.

32. अभावश्चतुर्विधः । प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ता-
भावोऽन्योन्याभावश्चेति । ॥

33. TS, P. 45.

34. Alamkāra-pradīpa, P. 49.

35. Ibid

36. TS., P. 22.

37. Ibid. P. 33.

38. TB., P. 99.

39. सदृशदृष्टचिन्तायाः स्मृतिबीजस्य बोधकाः ।

TB, P. 212.

40. सदृशदृष्टचिन्तादेरनुभूतपदार्थज्ञानोत्पत्तिः स्मरणम् ।

ŚrP., ch. X, P. 403.

41. पक्षे शितिकण्ठीयमिति न्यायग्रन्थविशेषः ।

तस्मिन्नन्तिवैला रुचिः आस्था तथा सुभगा । पौढः
शिरैमणिः चूडारत्नं तस्य दीधितिः प्रभायाः पक्षे
शिरैमणिदीधितिः न्यायग्रन्थविशेषः तस्य
परिचयतः संपर्कात् व्यासङ्गाच्च परभागवान्
गुणोत्कर्षवान् । परभागौ गुणोत्कर्ष इति कोशः ।
अत्र लौकिके श्रीनिवासदिव्यविग्रहव्यवहार
न्यायशास्त्रीयव्यवहारौपः ।

Alaṅkāramanīhāra, P. 527-8.