CHAPTER VI

NYĀYA METHODOLOGY
AND
SANSKRIT POETICS

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The present chapter makes an attempt to show how the poeticians have employed the Nyāya methods, style and language in their works.

VI.1 Nyāyaśāstra as Vādaśāstra

Nyāyaśāstra is mainly a Vādaśāstra. It is specially a science of methods. The Nyāyasūtra of Gautama (c.100 A.D.) are devoted to the methods of argumentation, disputation and dialectics. Out of the sixteen padārthas[1] enumerated by Gautama all, except the prameya (object of valid knowledge) are directly related to the method of disputation.

Kathā

In the NyS Gautama uses the term kathā for debate. He says kathā is of three types: Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā.

VĀDA consists in the putting forward of statements by two parties, pakṣa and pratipakṣa, in which there is the procedure of establishing and confuting by means of pramāṇas (proofs) and tarka (hypothetical reasoning), neither of which is quite opposed to the main thesis (siddhānta) and both of which are conducted in accordance with the method of reasoning.[3] Vāda basically meant for the discernment of truth or the real nature of the thing

under investigation and imparting the truth to the other party. Hence, in Vāda there is no consideration of victory or defeat.

JALPA possesses the above characteristics of Vāda. Moreover, it establishes or confuts the statement by means of Chala (quibble), Jāti (futile rejoinder) and Nigraha-sthānas (grounds of defeat).[4] In Jalpa, the procedure is similar to that of Vāda, but the aim is to establish one's own position by defeating the opponent.

VITANDĀ (wrangling) is a kind of disputation when there is no establishining of the counter-view.[5] Thw Vaitāndika does not care to establish his point, but keeps on crtticising and condemning the proofs employed by the other party. Vaitāndika confines himself to merely criticising the opponent's view. The Vārttika defines Vitandā as criticism only (dūṣanamātram vitandā).

Gautama emphasises the role of Jalpa and Vitandā in theoretical discussions. Some people transgress all bounds of reasoning through excessive partiality for their own theories. In that case one should be practical and employ Jalpa and Vitandā for the purpose of protecting one's own determination regarding the real nature of things, just as the hedge of thorns is put up for the protection of sprouting seeds.[6]

A Jalpavādin aims at parapakṣadūṣaṇa as well as svapakṣasādhana; a Vitaṇḍāvadin is merely concerned with parapakṣadūṣaṇa and does not care for svapakṣasādhana. Vāda is carried on with the person who is willing to learn or to impart knowledge, while Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā are carried on with persons who are perverse in their ignorance and too proud to learn. Thus, whereas Vāda aims at the ascertainment of truth, Jalpa aims at the establishing of a counter-thesis, and in Vitaṇḍā even this is absent.

VI.2 Devices of Debata

Chala, Jāti and Nigrahasthānas are auxiliaries to Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā. These devices can never themselves be the direct means in supporting or establishing a thesis but only in condemning they can independently serve as such. Gautama defines Chala as वचन विघातोऽर्थविकल्पो- पपत्या छलम्(NyS I-२-१०)It consists in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a meaning other than the intended one. It is of three kinds: vāk-chala(verbal quibble), sāmānya-chala (generalising quibble) and upacāra-chala (figurative quibble).

Jāti is defined by Gautma as:
साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः (NyS. I. 2. 18).

It is a kind of futile objection. It is of twenty four kinds such as utkarṣasama, apakarṣasama etc.

Apart from this Gautma has also enumerated the methods
of debate like 'Tarka' etc., which are useful in the
process of disputation. The successors of Gautama like
Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra etc. developped
these methods further. Prominent Buddhist dialecticinas
like Dharmakīrti, Diṅnāga etc also made significant
contribution in thier development. This methodology
reached its climax in the period of Navya-Nyāya.
Prof. Solomon remarks [7]

> Navya-Nyāya evolved a new method and gave ॑ (ः)
> different turn to the growth of dialectics. ⁊

Originally these methods developed as dialectics or oral
debates. But then they were also employed in written
works. Thus, the style of a Sanskrit polemical work
has often assumed the tone of an oral or verbal debate.
The scholars have structured their arguments even in their
written works just as one would be involved in a practical
debate and argue with his opponents, refute the opponents'
proposition and establish his own thesis. This has
resulted into the arguments developing as the discussion
of pūrvapakṣa and uttarapakṣa or siddhāntapakṣa. This
methodology was so appealing that all the śāstras in
Sanskrit have almost spontaneously adopted it and shaped
their own thoughts in a dialectical form in stead of
descriptive or commentatorial presentation.

The Nyāya influence in their style is a foregone conclusion. Naiyāyikas took a leading role in transforming the descriptive style of prakaraṇa works into a dialectical one. Navya-Naiyāyikas wrote their works entirely in this new methodology of dialectics. Hence the works like Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, works of Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa, Gadādhara and many others are very rich in dialectical wealth. In fact, they are known as vāda-granthas only. While studying all those Nyāya works one gets confused in deciding the pūrvapakṣa and the siddhāntapakṣa. But they are identified in some cases by direct mention of the names of the persons or by terms like 'kecit', 'eke', 'apare', 'nanu'....iti', 'cet', na ca...vācyam, nāpi.. and so on and so forth. These expressions to indicate pūrvapakṣa have also overflowed into works of other śāstras. We shall see some illustrations from works on Poetics below.

① परस्परप्रतिक्षेपकविकल्पार्थेनि वाकारेण ङि या
परस्परप्रतियोगिकत्वविशिष्टोपमा तद्विषयवृत्यन्तर
निरपेक्षव्यक्तिबोध्या तद्विषयव्यक्ति निरपेक्ष–
वृत्यन्तरबोध्या वा भवति सोपमेयपमेति
पर्यवस्यति ।   (Appaya Dīkṣita, Citramīmāṃsā, p. 179-80)

2. तत्रोपमानोपमेययोः प्रमेयत्वैनैक्येऽपि प्रातिस्विका–
साधारणधर्मावच्छेदेन भेदसत्त्वादिति चेत् न ।
केवलान्वयि धर्मव्यतिरिक्तद्रव्यत्वादिनापि

तत्रोभयारैक्यसंभवेन तद्दोषनादुद्वस्थ्यात् । ननु
यद्धर्मावच्छेदेनोपमेयत्वं यस्योपनिबध्यते तद्धर्मी-
वच्छेदेन तस्योपमेयत्वमनन्वय इति लक्षणमिति
चेन्मैवम् । 'शमी राघव इव' इत्याद्यनन्वये अव्याप्तिः।

Alaṅkāraraghava, P. 46.

3. अनुमानसिद्धा च घ्राणरसनत्वाद्धि घ्राणरसनादि
पदानाम्, आनन्त्यात्, व्यभिचाराश्च व्यक्तिनाम-
भिधेयताया अकल्पनात् । न च ज्ञानगोत्वादि-
रूपया गोत्वादिज्ञानरूपया वा प्रत्यासन्या प्रत्यक्षेण
परिकल्पितासु सकलतदीयव्यक्तिष्वभिधायाः कल्पने
नास्ति दोष इति वाच्यम् । सामान्यप्रत्यासत्ते-
र्निराकरणात् । गौरवदोषस्यानुद्धाराश्च । (RG. P. 183).

4. अमी सामाजिका रसानुभववन्तः, ये ये विवक्षित-
चेष्टाविशिष्टास्ते ते रसानुभववन्तः । यथा
तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारानुभवितारस्तथा चेमे चेष्टाविशिष्टाः ।
तस्माद्रसानुभववन्त एवेति ।

(Taking up the <u>Anumāna</u> in its veriety
sāmānyatodṛṣṭa (based on analogy) Viśveśvara
in his <u>camatkāracandrikā</u> proves Rasa.
syllogistically.)

The poeticians like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Vāmana mainly devote their works to formulate the poetic theories of Alaṅkāra, Guṇa, Doṣa and Rīti. Their works are mostly free from dialectical arguments. It is Ānandavardhana who for the first time in Sanskrit poetics employes the dialectical method in his great work DhA. In the first Uddyota, he presents three views as pūrvapakṣa and deals them logically and even employes terms like 'avyāpti', ativyāpti and asambhava etc. The DhA. may be considered as a good model of dialectical work and his successors have adopted this model. Afeer Ānandavardhana came Mahimabhaṭṭa who in the beginning of his VV declares his aim of refuting dhvani theory, and devotes his entire work for it. Ruyyaka wrote a commentary on VV to show the validity of the dhvani theory. This dialectical argumentations for and against the dhvani theory have continued upto Jagannātha and to some extent even thereafter. The method of dialectics has fascinated the post-Ānandavardhana theorists like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Vidyādhara, Appaya, Jagannātha, Devaśaṅkara, Viśveśvara, Yajñeśvara etc., who attempt to attack the loop-holes in the opponent's viewpoints and then established their own theory. This tendency somehow seems to have increased in the period of Jagannātha and thereafter. It is found that the works written by the poeticians in the period of Navya-Nyāya (12th century onwards) and very rich in dialectics.

VI.3 Threefold Objective of the Nyāyaśāstra

Vātsyāyana in his NBh considered three elements to be the main concern of the Nyāyaśāstra. They are: uddeśa (enumeration of the concept), lakṣaṇa (definition) and parīkṣā (examination).[8] Uddeśa is the mention by name of what is to be enumerated.[9] Lakṣaṇa is the statement of the disti̇ctive quality which belongs only to the thing defined and to none else.[10] According to Uddyotakara definition is made for demarcating or particularising the objects from others.[11] Tarkadīpikākāra rightly says;

व्यावृत्तिर्व्येवहारो वा रक्षणस्य प्रयोजनम् ।(TB,p.18)It is usually translated as 'definition'. In fact a lakṣaṇa points out not the thing to be defined but the defferntia or the particular characteristics possessed by the thing defined alone and which is not common to others. The technique of definition, however, in which the Navya-Naiyāyikas evence such a deep interest, was not clearly developed in the early school. Vātsyāyana states, the purpose of definition is to differntiate an entity from those which does not possess the nature or essence(tattva) of that entity. Thus in so far as the term 'nature' or 'essence' remains vague in meaning, the notion of lakṣaṇa also remains vague. The new school attempts to avoid the vagueness by specifically mentioning that the purpose of definition is to distinguish the lakṣya from all entities that are different from it (etara-

vyāvartakatvam). Thus, the <u>lakṣaṇavākya</u> of the Naiyāyikas shall usually consists of two parts : <u>lakṣya</u> and <u>lakṣaṇa</u>.

It is not an easy task to formulate a logical definition, as per the strict rule of the Nyāyaśāstra. A definition according to Nyāyaśāstra should be free from the three defexts viz., <u>avyāpti</u>(being too narrow), <u>ativyāpti</u>(being too wide) and <u>asambhava</u>(impossibliity).[12] An illustration would make this clear.

If a cow is defined as '<u>kāpilatvam gotvam</u>', the definition suffers from the defect of <u>avyāpti</u>, as all cows that are not <u>kapila</u>(tawny) would be thereby excluded.[13] and only a few number of cows having a tawny colour will be covered by this definition. The definition thus will become too narrow (<u>avyāpta</u>).


⟵ avyāpti (narrow)

Now, if '<u>paśutvam gotvam</u>' is proposed as a definiton of a cow it also will not be correct as the cow undoubtedly possesses <u>paśutva</u>, but <u>paśutva</u> is also found in other animals like horses, buffaloes etc., which are, not cows.[14] Thus this <u>lakṣaṇa</u> will be too wide, possessing the <u>doṣa</u> of <u>ativyāpti</u>.

⟵ ativyāpti (wide)

Ativyāpti implies that the lakṣaṇa covers the lakṣya completely and in addition extends to other objects.

Again, if 'ekaśafatvam gotvam' is proposed as a definition of cow it will suffer from the defect of asambhava, as no cow possesses ekaśafatva(having one hoof) or undivided hoofs).[15] Thus it will lead to the fault of asambhava.

⟸ asambhava (impossible)

So 'sāsnādimattvam' (having dew-lap), according to Naiyāyika, is the correct definition of cow as sasnā is possessed by a cow only.

Apart from these three defects thre are other defects like 1. ātmāśraya 2. anyonyāśraya(itatetarāśraya or parasparāśraya) 3. cakraka 4. aprasiddha which are to be avoided in a definition.

1. Ātmāśraya(self-dependance) is a logical defect and a type of circularity. It takes place whenever we explain a concept by using the same concept in some way or other in our explanation. Nyāya defines it as: स्वज्ञानसापेक्ष-ज्ञानविषयत्वमात्माश्रयः (TB.P.17)For example: गोभिन्न वृत्तित्वे सति गोमात्रवृत्तिजातिमत्त्वं गोलक्षणम् । Prof. Matilal explains it nicely using modern symbols:[16]

X is self-dependent if X is explained as an

object of some cognition which dependent upon

a cognition of X (sva-graha-sāpeksa-graha-

visayatvam ātmāśrayatvam).

2. Anyonyāsraya is one of the logical defects from which
the definition must be free. It is defined as:

स्वज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानविषयत्वमन्योन्याश्रयः or

परस्परज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानाश्रयः अन्योन्याश्रयः । (TB. p.18)

where the object to be defined depends on the other which

also depends on the first object. For example:

महिषभिन्नत्वं गोत्वं गोभिन्नत्वं च महिषत्वम् ।

The knowledge of gotva depends on mahisatva and vice verse.
Prof. Matilal explains it as: [17]

X and Y are nutually dependent if X is explained

as an object of cognition which is dependent

upon a cognition of Y and Y in its turn is explained

as an object of cognition which is dependent a

cognition of X (sva-graha-sāpeksa-graha-sāpeksa-

graha-visayatvam anyonyāsrayatvam).

3. Cakraka is sometimes related to another defect i.e.
anavasthā (regressus ad infinitum). But anavasthā,
in certain cases like in the question whether the chicken
comes first or the egg has to be tolerated. But it is
to be devoided in the logical definition.

Apart from this, another important feature of Nyāya methodology is the excessive stress on lāghava (simplicity or parsimony) and Gaurava (prolixity), which are to be taken into consideration while formulating a definition. So many definitions and explanations fulfiling all the logical requirements and conditions are found to be rejected in Nyāya works because of either Lāghava or Gaurava. Like Grammarians who are famous for brevity (cf. अर्धमात्राकाघवेन पुत्रोत्सवं मन्यन्ते) the Naiyāyikas also emphasise these two conditions the most.

Parīkṣā is the examination of the validity of a definition. Nyāya defines it as:
$$\text{लक्षितस्य लक्षणमुपपद्यते न वेति विचारः परीक्षा} \mid \text{(NBh.p.7)}$$
In parīkṣā with the help of pramāṇas and tarka the ascer-tainment is made whether the defined object (lakṣita) confirms, in fact to the definition as given. After formulating a definition, one proceeds to show why and how his definition adequately meets the acceptable standards or the necessary requirements of a definition and how the defined object is appropriately characterised by the definition. This eventually leads him to a discussion, and a criticism of the rival theories showing inadequacy of the rival definitions of the same concept. This constitutes an important feature of Nyāya methodology.

Looking from such a perspective in Alaṅkāraśāstra the tradition of defining is started from Bharata and Bhāmaha. The other rhetoricians coming after them also define the objects in a similar vein. But one thing to be noted is that their definitions are not definitions in the strictly Naiyāyika sense of the term. They do not fulfil the logical conditions which are necessary for a definition. That is why the later poeticians find scope to find fault with them while examining their definitions as per the rules of the Nyāyaśāstra. Jagannātha and Yajñeśvara Dīkṣita etc., aim at making a critical review of the previous definitins of poetic objects before formulating a definition of their own. Side by side their criticism also speaks how their definitions are logically correct and fulfills the conditions. Since the task of defining the object is the hardest of tasks only a few have succeeded in their undertaking. Another important factor which motivated these Navya-Ālaṅkārikas, was that the Navya-Naiyāyikas were also engaged in a similar task. Thus the Naiyāyikas' influence and inspiration gave rise to a new trend in the treatment of the śāstric topics of poetics and gradually becomes its distinct characteristic. It became a sacrosanct tradition as it were, all the scholars who followed Jagannātha fell in the stream of this tradition almost gaḍḍalikāpravāhanyāyena.

The rhetoricians of the last phase of Navya-Nyāya
logic have taken a leading role in this respect and
thereby they have made Alaṅkāraśāstra so complicated that
the Alaṅkāra works of the last phase are hard nuts to crack.
Minds boggle in getting at the implications and essence
of their definitions. No doubt they have exhibited
their deep scholarship of Nyāyaśāstra and distinguishes
themselves from their predecessors, but it has also
contributed to the loss of its originality and saukumārya.
Some of the examples are given here:

(a) यन्निष्ठकारणतानिरूपितकार्यताश्रयत्वेन यद्बुद्धिस्थं
तेन विना तस्यास्तित्वमात्रोपनिबद्धो विभावनालंकारः ।
P.153.

(b) उपमेयतावच्छेदकप्रकारकशून्यत्वे सति
उपमानतावच्छेदक प्रकारकोपमेय प्रतीतिः । (SSS, P.445)

(c) अलङ्कारत्वं च रसादिभिन्नव्यङ्ग्यभिन्नत्वे सति
शब्दार्थान्यतरनिष्ठा या विषयितासम्बन्धावच्छिन्ना
चमत्कृति जनकतावच्छेदकता तद्वच्छेदकत्वात् ।
अनुप्रासादिविशिष्ट शब्द ज्ञानादुपमादि विशिष्टार्थ
ज्ञानाच्च चमत्कारोदयान्नेषु क्षणसमन्वयः ।
शब्दार्थयोर्यो निष्ठ चमत्कृति जनकताया
विषयितयावच्छेदकत्वेन तद्विशेषणीभूतानुप्रासो-
पमादेस्तन्निष्ठवच्छेदकनावच्छेदकत्वात् । रसवद्-
चालङ्कार संग्रहाय व्यङ्ग्योपमादिवारणाय च
भेदद्वयगर्भ सन्त्यन्तीपादानम् । (Vaidyanātha
Alaṁkāracandrikā, P.2.)

VI.4 Padakṛtya Method

Padakṛtya is a method used by the Naiyāyikas for examining the correctness and logical relevance of each and every word constituting the definition (dalaprayojana). This is known as a ☐ commentatorial or expository method. As per this method an attempt is made to show how each and every word in that definition is relevant and how it contributes to the total intended sense convincingly and adequately and that it is indespensible and valid. If the definition is found faulty it is remodelled either by modifying words or by adding more words until it becomes perfect and flawless. This method is also called dalavyāvṛtti. Candrasiṁha Paṇḍita, a Naiyāyika has names his entire gloss on TS as Padakṛtya.

Navya-Naiyāyikas of Gaṅgeśa and post-Gaṅgeśa period (12th century onwards) use this method profusely and by means of it accept or reject the definitions of proponents and opponents. This trend has influenced the Alaṅkārikas also. The prominent figures who arrest our attention for adopting this technique are Viśvanātha, Appaya, Śobhākara, Viśvanāthadeva, Viśveśvara Paṇḍita, Jagannātha, Devaśaṅkara etc. Because of such tendency of theirs we do not find originality in their theoretical discussions but rather dialectical war-fares. Alaṅkāraśāstra of this period is quite different in its nature and objective from that

in its earlier period. It now becomes a veritable
dialectical discipline like Navya-Nyāya and Navya-Vyākaraṇa.
Hence Ālaṅkārikas of this period need to be distingushed
from their predecessors and be designated as Navya-
Ālaṅkārikas.

Some of the examples which show how the poeticians
have employed the Padakṛtya method, are given below:

Viśvanātha in the first chapter of his SD uses
the Nyāya method of Padakṛtya to examine the definition of
kāvya given by Mammaṭa and shows how it contains the
faults like avyāpti and ativyāpti as follows:

Mammaṭa's Definition of kāvya:

तद्दोषौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणावनलंकृ~~ती~~ पुनः क्वापि।

(KP, p. 13)

Padakṛtya

1. (tat) adoṣau - First of all Viśvanātha examines the word
adoṣau and shows the fault of avyāpti in the definition.
He argues if kāvya is defined as a piece ◯ free from fault
thṣn the varse, 'nyakkāro' etc., would not be a poem as it has
the fault vidheyāvimarśa. But it has been admitted to be
a specimen of the highest type of poetry as it contains
suggestion. Therefore the definiton is avyāpta (too narrow)
as it excludes the poetic verse in question which is
universally acknowledged to be the best type of poetry from
the province of poetry.

2. sagunau - This term is a inappropriate, says Viśvanātha.
Mammaṭa himself has declared that the qualities such as
mādhurya are the properties of rasa alone and not of
anything else. But in the definition, sagunau is shown
as the adjective of śabdārthau and gunas are said to be
the properties of word and sense. This leads to inconsistency
and does not logically define the object.

3. analṅkrti - Following the words of Vātsyāyana,
atattvavyavacchedako dharmah, Viśvanātha says that the
term analaṅkrti in the definition is irrēlavant. Figures
of śabda and artha even when they are present serve
merely to highten a kāvya. They are not the essence of
the poetry.

Jagannātha in his RG profusely uses the method of
padakrtya while explaining and examining the logical
validity of the definitions of alaṅkāras given by
predecessors. After rejecting the definitions of alaṅkāras
which do not appear to him logical, he completely
formulates new ones. The following one is an example
which shows that all the terms in his definition are
significant andfulfilthe logical need. Jagannātha's
method of defining objects, therefore, provides the
best examples of Padakrtya.

Definition of sasandeha :

साहृश्यमूला भासमानविरोधिका समबला नानाकोख्यव-
गाहिनी धी रमणीया ससंदेहालंकृति: । (RG.P.340)

Padakṛtya

1. sādṛśyamūlā - This adjective is used to remove the
fault of atvyāpti. If it is not given there would not be
any difference between sasandeha alaṅkāra and common
sandeha(doubt). To clarify it Jagannātha gives the
following example:

अधिरोप्य हरस्य हन्त चापं
परितापं पशमय्य बान्धवानाम् ।
परिणेष्यति वा न वा युवायं
निरपायं मिथिलाधिनाथपुत्रीम् ॥ (RG. P.340)

This is an example of sandeha, and not of sasandeha
alaṅkāra, for, in this statement of the people of the
Mithilā there is only doubt. To differentiates the
sasandeha alaṅkāra from the common sandeha,the term
'sādṛśyamūlā' is used. It means that the cognition of
doubt should be as the result of the knowledge of
similarity. Any doubt cannot constitute this alaṅkāra.

2. bhāsamānavirodhakā(dhih) - 'having only apparent
contradiction'. This term differentiates sasandeha
alaṅkāra from the Mālārūpaka alaṅkāra which has more
than one aprastuta expressed in poetical superimposition
while in Sasandeha the superimposition is suspended.

If this term is absent in the definition, it will lead to ativyāpti, for, the definition will be alplicable to the Mālārūpaka.

3. samabalā - To differentiate Utprekṣā alaṅkāra from Sasaṅdeha this term is used. The alternative which is predicated is more powerful in Utprekṣā, while in Sasaṅdeha all the alternatives are equally powerful (samabalā).

4. nānākotyavagāhinī - Though the adjectives bhāsamāna-virodhakā and samabalā imply that the alternatives should be ₍any, this term is used to make this point more clear.

5. ramaṇīyā - This adjective excludes ordinary doubts which arise in the wordly life in the form of sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā.

At last Jagannātha says that in the absence of the three terms i.e. nānākotyavagāhinī, ramaṇīyā and sādṛśyamūlā the definition will define only doubt and not Sasaṅdeha alaṅkāra which is different from an ordinary doubt.

VI.5 Poeticians of Navya-Nyāya Period

The poeticians who flourished during the period of Navya-Nyāya (after Gaṅgeśa) reveal the influence of Nyāyaśāstra in a gradually increasing degree in regard to their language, method, style, technical terms and

and principles of Navya-Nyāya etc. From among those
poeticians only those who have earned illustrious name
by making valuable contribution to Sansktit poetics are
introduced here. Some of these poeticians are masters
of both the poetics and the Nyāya have composed works in
both the fields. Some of them who have written only
on Alankāraśāstra through their works clearly prove
deep knowledge of Nyāyaśāstra.

1. Śobhākara

Sobhakara (1500 A.D.), the author of the Alankāra-
ratnākara derives inspiration from the Nyāya system and
uses some of the important techniques of Navya-Nyāya in
his work. G. Parthasaradhy Rao who has made a critical
study of his work, remarks:[18]

> It has to be noted here that Śobhākara lived at a
> time when 'Navyanyāya' (Modern Logic) was making its
> initial progress taking the scholars of the day
> under its sway and as a consequence there developed
> a tendency in the scholars to view any matter
> critically setting aside the views and conventions
> of the earlier writers. This is the period when
> the great lōgician Gangeśopādhyāya, the author
> of the 'Tattvacintāmani' flourished. Śobhākara
> sufficiently imbibed in the characteristics of
> this new age and so his writings in the Alankāraratnākara

have a colouring of modern logic. His references to
to the aphorisms of Gautama, the Vrtti he composed
under the definition of the figure 'Sandeha', the
definition of 'Samāsokti' where he brought in a
new term 'avacchedaka', the arguments he presented
while establishing the view that the common
characteristic (Sādhāranadharma)in 'upamā' can be
of twenty four kinds, the stress he gave that
qualities (gunas) can be twentyfour only as
enumerated by the logicians and finally the
arguments he presented while extending the scope
of different figures, splitting them wherever
necessary and introducing several new figures with
narrow differences, amply bear testimony to the
fact that he was influenced by the thoughts of
modern logic.

We have quoted Dr. Parthasaradhy Rao in extenso only
to show how and in how many different ways does
Śobhākara reveal the Nyāya influence so deeply imbibed
in the entire fabric of his work on Poetics.

2. Viśvanāthadeva

Viśvanāthadeva(1552 A.D.) is the author of three works
on poetics viz., Citramīmāṁsā, Mṛgāṅkalekhā and Sāhitya-
sudhāsindhu. Among these works only SSS is published. 9
Dr. Ram Pratap, the editor of SSS says[19] that following

the Nyāya method of defining the objects, Viśvanātha
formulates the definitions of doṣa in the 5th chapter
and of alaṅkaras in the 8th chapter with a deliberate
attempt to make them entirely free from all logical faults.
Further, because of his adopting the style of NavyaNyāya,
Dr. Ram Pratap remarks, some of the portions of his
texts are not clear.

3. Appaya Dīkṣita

Appaya Dīkṣita is a great name in the history of
Sanskrit literature. A versatile scholar and a prolific
writer, he has to his credit the authorship of over one
hundred works, including at least three on literary
criticism. His Citramīmāṁsā is a scholarly work on
Alaṅkāraśāstra, dealing with the definitions of
arthālaṅkāras given by predecessors and their discussions
in the light of his own definitions. Vṛttivārtika is a
shot treatise on sematics, and Kuvalayānanda is a work
on Sanskṛit poetics dealing with arthālaṅkāras only.

All these works exhibit his deep scholarship of
Navya-Nyāya. While reading them, readers must face
lot of probabilities offered by Appaya, which are
presented in a language that strictly follows the track
of the Nyāya philospphy. Dr. Satyanarayana Chakraborty
remarks:
20

The very approach of Appaya Dīkṣita in discussing the figures of speech betrays the style of Nyāya philosophy.

Though his Citramīmāṁsā and Vṛttivārtika are written in a lucid style, yet in a quite a number of cases, the mode of argumentation is that of a mature Naiyāyika. Examples of such Naiyāyika technicalities will be discussed later at the proper place. Here we may simply point out that Appaya, a scholar of great genius, flourished in an age of Navya-Nyāya and could not but adopt the Navya-Nyāya methods, style and language.

4. Yajñeśvara Dīkṣita

Yajñeśvara Dīkṣita (1600A.D.) has written three Alaṅkāra works viz., Alaṅkārarāghava, Alaṅkārasūryodaya and a commentary on Kāvyaprakāśa. Besides being a poetician he is also a great Naiyāyika. He has wrtiten two Nyāya works, Śāstracūḍamaṇi and Vivaraṇojjīvinī. His deep study of Nyāya method of defining the objects is revealed from his treatment of the Alaṅkāras in his work, Alaṅkārarāghava from which an example is already given in this chapter.

5. Jagannātha

Jagannātha was a great scholar of Navya-Nyāya. His magnum opus, the RG exhibits his deep erudition in the

Nyāyaśāstra. He himself holds a rare epithet: padavākya-pramānapārāvāriṇa wh(i)ch is found in a colophon of the ²¹ printed text of his Manoramākucamardinī; the epithet appropriately praises his scholarly attainment in the three gerat śāstras -Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya. In the beginning of RG he declares that he had received the knowledge of the Nyāyaśāstra from his father, Perubhaṭṭa whom he refers to in glowing terms.²² The whole scholastic atmosphere in and around the age of Jagannātha was surcharged with the Navya-Nyāya. In his age Navya-Nyāya was on the peak of its development both in the Navadvīpa of Bengal and Mithilā in Bihar with the great Naiyāyikas like Jagadīśa Tarkālankāra, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, Rājacuḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita and Venkatadhvarin and many others flourishing in that period. Jagannātha could not avoid their influence even while composing his work on poetics and he reveals it in his Navya-Nyāya language and style.

6. Viśveśvara Paṇḍita

Viśveśvara Paṇḍita (18th Century A.D.), also known as Parvatīya Viśveśvara Pāṇḍeya has earned great reputation both as a Naiyāyika as well as an Ālankārika. He had wielded his pen with ease in both the areas and compose (ʔ) many works like Tarkakutūhalam and Dīdhitipraveśa in Nyāya and Alankāramuktāvali, Alankārapradīpa and

Alaṅkārakaustubha in Alaṅkāraśāstra. The editor of the
Tarkakutūhalam rightly remarks that Viśveśvara's
Alaṅkārakaustubha is written in the style of Navya-Nyāya.
In refuting the views of other Ālaṅkārikas and in
establishing his own position he mainly follows the
mehtod of Navya-Naiyāyikas. His other rhetoric works also
exhibit his liking for the logical precision and technical
expression so peculiar to the Navya-Nyāya style.

7. Devaśaṅkara Purohita

Devaśaṅkara Purohita, the author of Alaṅkāramañjuṣā
(18th century A.D.) was also well-versed in Nyāyaśāstra. The
learned editor Prof. S.M. Katre rightly remarks:[23]

> It seems our author was primarily a logician
> and/secondarily a poet...(sic)

only

His constant use of Navya-Nyāya style of highly technical
expression speak of him more as a logician than a poetician.
It is intɔresitnɡ to note that Devaśaṅkara in his work
refers twice to Akṣapāda Gautma, the promulgato⸫ of the
Nyāya system and once to the Naiyāyikas in general.

Extracts from the works of the above authors are
presented below to show the language, technical terms, style
and method which reveal the clear influence of Nyāya.

VI.6 Use of Navya-Nyāya Language

One will be definitely surprised while looking at the rhetorical works written in the garb of the Nyāya-Nyāya language. The authors and the commentators of such works of the Navya-Nyāya period adopt the Navya-Nyāya langauge in such a fashion that the works of poetics seem to be the works of Navya-Nyāya, rich in technical terms, logical techniques, long compounds and dialectical style. Because of this peculiarity all these works become quite technical in nature and difficulat to understand.

It is well-known that the language of the Navya-Nyāya is one of the distinctive feature of Indian logic. It gives an unique status to Navya-Nyāya and also distinguishes it from other śāstras in Sanskrit. It is altogether different from the commonly known Saṁskrit language. Even the language of Prācina Nyāya system has got no similarity with that of Navya-Nyāya. Some of the passages from the rhetoric texts are produced here as specimen:

(a) समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-चमत्कृति निष्ठ कार्यतानिरूपित-
समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न जनकतानिरूपित विषयिता-
सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नावच्छेदकतावच्छेदक मनुप्रसारि-
विशिष्ट तच्छब्द गतानुपूर्ष्युपमादि विशिष्ट तदर्थगता-
धर्मा: । तत्रातिव्याप्ति वारणाय नाट्यकार्यतानिरूपित
समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न कारणतानिरूपित विषयिता
सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नावच्छेदकतानिरूपितावच्छेदकत्व-

मव्यलङ्कारीयान्वस्वरूपसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नं वाच्यम् ।

(AM., P. 242).

(b) तथा अरविन्दमिव सुन्दरमित्यत्रेवार्थे साद्दश्येऽर-
विन्दस्य निरूपितत्वं संसर्गेणान्वयः । तस्य च
प्रयोजकता संसर्गेण सौन्दर्ये । एवं चारविन्द निरूपित-
साद्दश्यप्रयोजक सौन्दर्यवद्भिन्नमिति । अरविन्दमिवेत्यत्र
त्वरविन्द निरूपित साद्दश्य वदिति निपातजन्योपस्थिति
प्रयोज्यप्रकारता निरूपित विशेष्यता - निपातजन्योपस्थिति-
प्रयोज्य विशेष्यतान्यतरभिन्न विशेष्यता संसर्गेण
नामार्थप्रकारकबोधे एव विशेष्यतया विभक्तिजन्योपस्थि-
नेर्हेतुत्वादिवार्थस्य नत्रर्थस्येव भेदसंसर्गेण
नामार्थविशेष्यत्वे विशेषणत्वे च न दोषः ।

(RG. P. 247)

(c) ननु कथमत्र दूषकता । सत्यनुशासनसिद्धान्ते शाब्दसा-
मग्र्याः परिपूर्णत्वेन नत्र्विलम्बे मानाभावात्,
कविसम्प्रदायप्रयुक्तत्वं ज्ञानस्याद्धेतुत्वात् च । न हि
शाब्दबोधे नत्र्युपक्षणीयं गौरवान्मानाभावाद्
व्यभिचाराच्चेति चेत्, उच्यते ।

प्रकृतप्रतीतिस्थलानमत्र दूषकताबीजम् ।
तथाहि - यथायं पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात् । यत्र धूमः
तत्र वह्निः । वह्निव्याप्य धूमवानयं तस्माद् वह्निमानय-
मिति साम्प्रदायिक पञ्चावयवप्रयोगः । नत्र पर्वते
वह्निः धूमो यतः वह्निव्याप्तिर्धूमे धूमेन च पर्वते
भवितव्यं पर्वतावधेयो वह्निरित्येतादृशप्रयोगकारी निगृह्यत
इति सर्वसिद्धम् ।   (SSS. P. 199-200)

VI.7 Navya-Nyāya Technical Terms

With the use of Navya-Nyāya language poeticians also
use the technical Nyāya terms in their works. Mainly
the poeticians of later period who flourished in and after
the development of Navya-Nyāya logic employed Naiyāyika
terms while explaining their poetic concepts. Among
them are Jagannātha, Yajñeśvara, Devaśankara, Viśvanāthadeva,
Viśveśvara Paṇḍita and ŚobhākaraMitra whose works are
well-known and are available to us in a published form.
Because of the incorporation of the Nyāya terms which
have particular significance and connotation these works
have not attracted as many scholars as they otherwise should.
Some of the technical terms are illustrated and explained
below:

1. Avyāpyavrttitvam

In RG, Jagannātha, while discussing the adjective
adoṣau of Mammaṭa's definition of poetry remarks as follows:

न च संयोगाभाववान्वृक्षः संयोगीति वदंशभेदेन ।
दोषरहितं दृष्टमिति व्यवहारे बाधकं नास्तीति
वाच्यम । 'मूले महीरुहे विहंगमसंयोगी, न शाखायाम्'
इति प्रतीतेरेवेदं पद्यं पूर्वार्धे काव्यमुत्तरार्धे तु न
काव्यमिति स्वरसवाहिनो विश्वजनीनानुभवस्य
विरुद्धाव्याप्यवृत्तितया अपि तस्यायोगात् । (RG.P.8)

Here the term of our special interest is Avyāpyavrttitva.
The author of Tarkadīpikā defines Avyāpyavrttitva as
svātyantābhāvasāmānadhikaraṇatvam (simultaneous presence
of saṁyoga in one locus of the referent of sva-pada and
its absence in other locii).

In the Nyāyaśāstra relations are broadly divided
into two categories, Vrttiniyāmaka (occurence-exacting)
and vrtyaniyāmaka (non-occurence-exacting). Saṁyoga is
a vrttiniyāmakasaṁbandha. This relation is known as
a relation of incomplete occurance (avyāpyavrtti).[24]
Because when a contact takes place betwen two substances
it occurs only in a part of them. When Jagannātha
discusses the term adosau (iṣadarthe nañ) he gives an
example of this Avyāpyavrtti nature of saṁyoga. He
uses this technical term and his words reminds one of
the definitions of this type as given by a famous Nyāya
work, Siddhāntalakṣaṇa of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. Gaṅgeśa
the term as follows:

अयं कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वादित्यादि सङ्ग्रहाय-
ssमानाधिकरणान्तम् । (P. १०)
----- अयं कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वादित्यत्र-
हेत्वधिकरणभूतेनतद्वृक्षे मूलावच्छेदेन कपिसंयोगा-
भावस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।

When a monkey is sitting on a branch of a tree, both
the presence and the absence of kapisaṁyoga are present
in the tree. Presence of monkey on the particular branch

and the absence of it ino other parts of the tree, like
its root etc. Therefore, samyoga of the monkey and the
tree is of an avyāpyavṛtti nature. Similarly, persons
who argue that adoṣau means having absence of defect in
one part of the poetry and presence of it in another,
define it as duṣṭam kāvyam but this is not correct,
says Jagannātha, because in the case of poetry the experience
that some part contain defect and some does not is not
universally accepted. Hence, doṣa in the definition as
poetry is not of the nature of avyāpyavṛttiva.

2. Avacchedaka

The conception of Avacchedaka in Navya-Nyāya is of
utmost importance from the point of view of subtle
analysis of ideas and their accurate expression. Though
the term Avacchedaka in Navya-Nyāya is generally used
in highly techical sense, yet instances are not rare in
which the term has been used only in the sense of an
adjective. Thus, if we want to make someone to
understand each and every case of fire or all the cases
of fire as distingusied from the pot or any other object,
then, according to the Navya-Nyāya technique, we would
say 'vahnitvāvacchinna' वह्रित्वावच्छिन्नस्य सर्वस्यैव
धूमादिमन्निष्ठ भाव प्रति योगितावच्छेदकीभूतत्
तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नत्वात् (Siddhāntalakṣaṇa
Jāgadīśi, p. 209.)

in which expression vahnitva or fireness is understood
to be the avacchedaka (limiter) of vahni. Here vahnitva
is an adjective of vahni in as mush as it differentiates
vahni from other objects. In this general sese avacchedaka
may be defined as that property which itself being one
of the primary meanings of a term, defferentiates the
primary meaning of that term from other objects.
Avacchedaka also means a determinig attribute.

Viśvanātha uses the term Avacchedaka to clarify
the figures between Rūpaka and Pariṇāma. He says :

अत एव रूपके आरोप्यस्यावच्छेदकत्वमात्रेणान्वयः ।
अत्र तु तादात्मेन । (SD, X , P. 26).

When we say mukham candraḥ what the word candra effects
is simply to tell us that the face is one which possesses
most of the qualities of the moon and it is similar to it.
It serves to distinguish the particular face from other
faces which do not possess any similarity of the moon.
Hence in Rūpaka what is superimposed (upamāna) is
construed simply as characterising or distingushing
the subject; but in Pariṇāma, the thing superimposed
(āropya) is construed as being completely identical.

Viśveśvara Paṇḍita also uses the term while
discussing Rūpaka alaṅkāra:

उपमानानवच्छेदकस्योपमेयानवच्छेदकसामानाधि-
करण्यप्रतीतेरेव विवक्षितत्वात् । (अलंकार-मुक्ताकलि, P. 14).

Viśvanāthadeva uses the term as follows:

उपमेयनावच्छेदकनिषेधविषयिका उपमेये
उपमाननावच्छेदकधर्मप्रतीतिः (SSS, P.433)

3. Siddhasādhana

Vidyādhara in his Ekāvali refutes the views of the opponents of the dhvani theory on the basis of two logical faults called Siddhasādhana and Vyāghāta which are generally mentioned by the Naiyāyikas. The Nyāyakośa defines Siddhasādhana as:

(सिद्धध्यिषाया असत्वे) प्रमाणान्तरेणावगतार्थसाधनम्
अनुमानम् । यथा पर्वते वह्निनिश्चयानन्तरमपि
पुनस्तत्साधनाय किह्रतं पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात् इत्यनुमानम् ।
(P.१०१)

Abhāvavadins deny dhvani on the strength on the argument that it is not found in some places. This argument, says Vidyādhara, is opened to the fault of Siddhasādhana for proving what is already proved. It is admitted that dhvani does not exist in Citrakāvya. If dhvani is considered as apprehended and further denied because it is not found anywhere it leads to the fault Vyāghāta.[25]

4. Vinigamanā

Vinigamanā is a Nyāya technical term. The Nyāyakośa defines it as anyatarapakṣapātinī yukti.

Jagannātha uses this term repeatedly in his RG.

We may consider one example below:

रचनावर्णानां तु पद्वाक्यान्तर्गतत्वेन व्यञ्जकतावच्छेदक-
कोटिप्रविष्टत्वमेव न तु व्यञ्जकत्वमिति यद्यपि
सुवचम्, तथापि पद्वाक्यविशिष्ट रचनात्वेन, रचना-
विशिष्ट पद्वाक्यत्वेन वा व्यञ्जकत्वमिति
विनिगमनाविरहेण चरादौ दण्डचक्रादेः कारणत्वस्यैव
प्रत्येकमेव व्यञ्जकतायाः सिद्धिरिति प्राच्यः । (RG.P.133)

While deciding the factors which are the suggestors of
dhvani Jagannātha refers to the view of the old ones and
says that there is not Vinigamanā, the argument definitely
proving any one side whether vyañjakatva resides in
padavākya characterised by racanā and varnas or in racanā
and varnas characterised by pada and vākya. Therefore,
just as danda, cakra etc., elements are considered to
be the cause of ghata, similarly all the elements like
pada, vākya, racanā etc should be considered as the
suggestors.

VI.8 Navya-Nyāya Methods

1. Śābdabodha

Śābdabodha means the verbal knowledge of a sentence.
The term is explained as - śabdajanyam śābdam, śābdaścāsau
bodhaśca śābdabodhah i.e. the knowledge which is
generated by the causal factor i.e. śabda is called

śābdabodha. It is the apprehention of sentence-meaning (vākyārthabodha). A vākya is a collection of padas. The meaning of a vākya is understtod by remembering the meanings of the individual word constituting that vākya. But the relation existing among those individual meanings is not understood when they are individually remembered. Hence, the understanding of the relation is a new product when the vākya is understood. So śābdabodha means the comprehension of the relation of the meanings of padas (anvayabodha).

The Navya-Naiyāyikas have propounded independent theory of Śābdabodha. According to them, only a determinate cognition (savikalpaka-jñāna) is embodied in, and conveyed by a sentence. Every sentence comprises of at least a subject (uddeśya) and a predicate (vidheya). In a Śābdabodha arising in hearer's mind from a sentence, the meaning of the chief substantive or qualifican in the nominative case plays the role of the leading concept (mukhyaviśesya) and all other concepts are directly or indirectly subordinate to it. The cognition arising from a sentence is always non-perceptual and the additional elements conveyed by a sentence, over and above the seperate concept conveyed by seperate words is the intended relation of the concept (padārthasaṁgarga). This sdditional elements which is the distinctive feature of a Śābdabodha is conveyed through the particular

juxtaposition of words (saṁsargamaryādā) and not through
the denotative or indicative power of words. For example,
the Śabdabodha of a simple sentence like 'caitraha grāmam
gacchati' will be as follows:

एकत्वावच्छिन्न ग्रामनिष्ठसंयोगानुकूल्य्यापारानुकूल-
कृतिमान् चैत्र: ।

In this sentence Caitra is the chief qualificand (mukhya-
viśeṣya) and other meanings are qualifiers. Caitra is
the agent and is the substratum of the agentness (kartṛtva)
which is the meaning of 'tiṅ', the verbal suffix (ākhyāta-
pratyaya). Kartṛtva is related to Caitra by the relation
of samavāya. The meaning of the root √gam 'go' is the
activity (vyāpāra) condusive to the contact (saṁyoga) of
the agent with the destination. The phala viz., the
contact of the agent with the destination and vyāpāra
are the meanings of the dhātu. Vyāpāra is related to the
kartṛtva by the ralation called anukūlatā. Saṁyoga is
related to vyāpāra by the realtion janyatā or anukūlatā.
The meaning of the substantive, grāma is the village and
the meaning of 'am', the accusative case-ending is
karmatva and ekatvasaṁkhyā. The ()saṁkhyā is related to
grāma by the relation of paryāpti. The import of village
is related to karmatva by the relation ofādheyatā. The
karmatva is related to saṁyoga by the relation of āśraya.
Thus finally we get the Śabdabodha as stated above.

With this background let us now examine how Jagannātha
employs the method of Śabdabodha in his RG:

While treating the prominent figures of speech like Upamā, Rūpaka etc., Jagannātha gives Śabdabodhas of the alaṅkāras and thereby attempts to bring out subtle distinctions between the figurative statements. In this task he follows mainly the Naiyāyikas though he also shows the Śabdabodha prakāras accepted by the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Mīmāṃsakas. As an example of the Śabdabodha of Upamā-alaṅkāra is given below:

अरविन्द निरूपित साहश्य प्रयोजका भिन्न सौन्दर्यवद् भिन्नमिति मुखम् (RG. P. 246)

Here, the expression ' अरविन्दसुन्दरं मुखं or अरविन्दमिव मुखं सुन्दरम् may apparently bring out sādṛśya in the same manner but there is some subtle differece underlying these expressions. Jagannātha gives the Śabdabodha according to the prācīna as well as the Navya-Naiyāyikas. The Navya-Naiyāyikas believe that sādṛśya is something different from the common property. The ancient ones, however, think that sādṛśya is identical with the common property. For example, in मुखं चन्द्र इव , sādṛśya is nothing but the common property of saundarya existing between the moon and the face and therefore this sādṛśya is not an independent padārtha.

Jagannātha first elucidates the example of samāsa-gatopamā i.e. aravinda sundaram. In this proposition accoridng to the well-known rule - निपातानि रिक्त नामार्थयो-रभेदान्वयः , abhedānvaya is to be accepted between aravinda

and sundara which would result in the Śabdabodha अरविन्दाभिन्नं सुन्दरम् ।   But such a Śabdabodha is prevented because in that case the word sundara being an adjective should have pūrvanipāta according to the rule विशेषणं विशेष्येण बहुलम् and उपसर्जनं पूर्वम् [26] and so the samāsa would have been sundarāravindam. Jagannātha contends that the part aravinda in the compound conveys by Abhidhā lotus only. Since the word 'iva' in the vigrahavākya, is elided , the word aravinda itself conveys the sense अरविन्द निरूपित साहश्य प्रयोजक (that which contributes to similarity woth lotus) by lakṣaṇā on the basis of tātparya. The part of the sense of the word aravinda i.e. prayojaka is related to the part of the sense sundara i.e.sundaratva through tādātmyasambandha. The whole sense of the proposiion is : अरविन्द निरूपित साहश्य प्रयोजका-भिन्न सौन्दर्यवद्भिन्नं (मुखम्) ।

Thus following the Naiyāyikas Jagannātha gives prathamāntamukhyaviśeṣyaka śābdabodha of Upamā-alaṅkāra.

As can be seen this attempt of Jagannātha is remarkable. It appears from the study of his work that the Śabdabodha method for him is not an exhibition of his technical erudition of śāstras as it may appear to a casual reader of first sight. Ramaswamy Shastri rightly remarks: [27]

The distinction between one figures of speech

and another as explained by their definitions

can be easily known from the forms of Śabdabodha

that are arrived at from the statemnt containing
this(| figures.

Jagannātha has been successful in handeling the method
of Śābdabodha for exploring thespecial traits of the
figurative statements. Strangely, however, Dr.ʌRamacᵃndrudu
remarks:[28]

    This śāstra (i.e. Alaṅkāraśāstra) has gained nothing
    by the introduction of this prakriyā.

But this does not seem to be correct. Śābdabodha being
a śāstric method had indeed halped in making logical
analysis of the figurative statements more sharp and
accurate and adding a greater clarity to the understanding
of the essential characteristics of the figures of speech.

2. Anugama

    Anugama is also a method of Navya-Nyāya logic,
Theterm Anugama means comprehension ofobjects in common
form (anugatarupeṇa sarvasaṅgraha). Anugama is defined
by Bhīmācārya as a common coṇotation, forexample, all the
ghaṭas have got the common connotation in theform of the
generic chracter like ghaṭatva.[29]Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa
defines Anugama as a common statemant. But is used aṣ
a method by the Navya-Naiyāyikas to make the definition
free from all kinds of possible ambiguities and to make
it easily comprehensible. It is applied for making a

single statement including diverse objects of the same
category as well as of the different categôry. There are
two types of Anugama ie. samsargamudrayānugama and
prakāramudrayānugana. In the first type of Anugama a
component part of a relation is qualified by another
relation, the component part of that relation is again
qualified by another relation and thereby a common statement
through the process of relation is made. It is done for
the sake of avoiding possible defect of the statement and
also for making the statement universal. The second
type of Anugama is through the process of mentioning the
prakāra with a view to eliminating the undesirable objects
for making the statement free from doubts.

This method is useful for making clarification of
object and giving it a general form without leaving any
scope for ambiguity. In this connection Prof. Guha says: [31]

> This method of Anugama had subsequently become
> very popular with the Sanskrit scholars in
> other fields of Sanskrit study also. The new
> school of grammarians in particular and almost
> all the scholars in other subjects of Sanskrit
> in general, were so fond of this technique of
> Anugama that even a casual reader of the new
> school of Sanskrit study in any branch would
> undoubteldy be convinced of the situation.

Jagannātha gives the definition of Kāvya as रमणीयार्थ-

प्रतिपादक: शब्द: ।(RG.P.3) In this if the meaning of the word

ramaṇīya is to be undgrstood in the general sense the

defect ativyāpti arises because the statements like 'you

are blessed with a son' etc., are sources of pleasure,

Hence they will be kāvya. To avoid this he explains

the ramaṇīyatā as केकिल्नराष्ट्रजनकज्ञानगोचरता । The

pleasure that is derived from the above statemnnt is only

Laukika in as mush as it is directly caused by a particular

man's worldly prosperity and so it is quite personal.

Again Jagannātha makes lokottaratva a synonym to camatkāra-

kāritva and accepts it to be a jātiviśeṣa to avoid the

lack of Anugama. This camatkāratva should be realised

only through one's experience and cannot be described

in words. This kind of lokottarāhlāda is the result of

Bhāvanā which is no other than the constant contemplation.

Here by substituting the word Bhāvanā for jñāna Jagnnnātha

slightly modifies his previous statement :

चमत्कारजनकभावनाविषयार्थप्रतिपादकशब्दत्वम् ।

(RG. P. 5)

and this has been necessitated by the following reason.

There may be some samūhālambanajñāna comprising of two

co-ordinate thoughts of which one may be of ramaṇīyārtha

and the other of aramaṇīyārtha. This kind of samūhālambana

jñāna also will have to be taken as camatkārajanakajñāna.

Such cases are excluded by replacing jñāna by Bhāvanā.

Bhāvanā being chain of cognitions , it can be connected
only with ramaṇīyārthas, under specual circumstances.
In other words one may be thinking of a particular object
again and again for a long time only if it is beautiful
as only beattiful objects can be the viṣaya of Bhāvanā.
Thus by substituting the word jñāna by Bhāvanā Jagannātha
modifies his definition as shown above.

Jagannātha gives two more amplified forms
of the definition as follows :

1. यत्प्रतिपाद्यतार्थविषयकभावनान्वं चमत्कारजनकतावच्छेदक
नत्त्वम् ।(RG.P.5)

2. स्वविशिष्टजनकतावच्छेदकार्थप्रतिपादकतासंसर्गेण
चमत्कारत्वबत्त्वम् ।

The second definition is made in Anugama style.
Not content with first Jagannātha gives second amplification
in Anugama style. He feels that the first one is much
cumbersome because it contains yacchabda and tacchabda,
which beign the words of uncertain meanings, hinder the
Anugama. Therefore, he gives the second modified Lakṣaṇa
which is comparatively simple according to the tradition
of Naiyāyikas as there will be no need of bringing many
things into Śābdabodha as in the case of the first
form of Lakṣaṇa. Thus the final Lakṣaṇa is:

स्वविशिष्टजनकतावच्छेदकार्थप्रतिपादकतासंसर्गेण
चमत्कारत्वबत्त्वम् । (RG. P.5)

Thus, after first defining kavya as चमत्कारत्ववत्व
Jagannātha specifies further and narrows down the meaning
of ramaṇīyatā to characterise the poetic delight exactly

by thrice resorting to the <u>Anugama</u> technique of the
Naiyayikas.

We can adduce many more examples from Jagannātha
and other poeticians of this later period but that is
not necessary. Our aim in this chapter was to illustrate
how the nyayamethodology, style, terminology and concepts
have the warps and woofs of the fabrics of the works of
Sanskrit poetics and in showing this by explaining the
Nyaya terms and concepts and illustrating them from
the works of poetics in the foregoing pages we hope
we have succeeded in our aim.

1. NyS. I.1.1

2. तिस्रः कथा भवन्ति - वादृ जल्पो वितण्डा चेति ।
   NBh. on NyS. I.2.1

3. प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चावयवो-
   पपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः । NyS. I.2.1

4. यथोक्तोपपन्नश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो-
   जल्पः । NyS. I.2.2.

5. स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा । NyS. I.2.3.

6. NBh. on NyS I.2.2.

7. Solomon E, Indian Dialectics, Vol. I., 36.

8. त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः - उद्देशो लक्षणं
   परीक्षा चेति । NBh. P. 17

9. तत्र नामधेयेन पदार्थमात्रस्याभिधानम् । ibid.

10. उद्दिष्टस्य तत्त्वव्यवच्छेदको धर्मो लक्षणम् । ibid.

11. Vārtikka of Uddyotakara on NBh. I.1.1.
    सर्वं हि लक्षणं इतरपदार्थव्यवच्छेदकम् ।

12. अनिर्यात्यव्याप्त्यसम्भवैर्निर्दोषत्रयरहितोऽसाधारणो
    धर्मो लक्षणम् । TB. P. 12

13. लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमानाधिकरणाभावप्रतियोगि-
    त्वम् - अव्याप्तिः । ibid.

14. अलक्ष्यवृत्तित्वमतिव्याप्तिः । ibid.

15. लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकव्यापकी भूता भावप्रतियोगित्वम्
असम्भवः । _ibid._

16. Matilal B.K. _Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation_,
p. 82.

17. _ibid_

18. G. Parthasāradhy Roa, _Alaṁkāraratnākara_
of Śobhākara Mitra, Intro. P. 3.

19. Rampratap, SSS., Intro. P. xlvii

20. Chakraborty, Satyanarayan, _A Study of the_
Citramīmāṁsā of Appaya Dīkṣita,
intro. P. lxxxii.

21. श्रीमन्पदृवाक्यप्रमाणपारावारीणपण्डितराजजगन्नाथ-
कृतौ मनोरमाखण्डन कुचमर्दिन्यां पञ्चसन्धिप्रकरण-
समाप्ति भगमात् ।

22. RG. P. 2.

23. Katre, S.L. AM., intro. P. XX.

24. TS, Dīpikā, P. 32.

25. _Ekāvali_, P. 25.

26. _Aṣṭādhyāyī_. 2.1.57 & 2.2.30.

27. Ramaswamy Sastri, _Jagannātha Paṇḍita_, P. 300

28. P. Ramacandradu, The contribution of Panditarāja Jagannātha to Sanskrit Poetics, P. 297.

29. Nyāyakośa, P. 18.

30. Guha, D.C., Navya Nyāya System of Logic, P. 291.