

CHAPTER II
INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA
ON
ŚABDAVRTTIS

CHAPTER II

INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA ON ŚABDAVṚTTIS

The present chapter gives a brief analysis of Śabdavṛttis treated by the Sanskrit poeticians and attempts to show the influence of Nyāya philosophy on them.

The treatment of Śabdavṛttis in connection with the problem of meaning is given an important place in Sanskrit Śāstras. It has attractdd the attention of philosophers, grammarisns and poeticians throughout the ages. In ancient India the philosophers such as Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiyākaraṇas and rhetoricians have devoted much thought to the problem of meaning and evolved different theories to explain manyfold aspects of Śabdavṛttis. The Śāstrakāras differ among themselves and hold diversant views about the nature and purpose of vṛttis on their own grounds. Being a Śāstra dealing with the relation of śabda and artha (sāhitya), the Alaṅkāraśāstra naturally has to make its own contribution to the problem of vṛttis. But a perusal of the rhetorical works gives an impression that the poeticians have given more attention to the discussion of Rasa and Alaṅkāra then to Śabdavṛttis. Even though Ānandavardhana has made monumental contribution to the treatment of vṛtti, yet he is confined only to the treatment of vyañjanā. A few works have been written on the problem of vṛttis such as Mukulabhaṭṭa's Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā.

Mamata's Śabdavyāpāravicāra (which is almost a summary of the discussions contained in his KP), Appaya's Vṛttivārttika and Āśādhara's Trivenikā. From a study of the rhetorical works it is known that the Alāṅkāraśāstras mainly follow the views of Vikakaranaśāstras and Mīmāṃsakaśāstras in their treatment of Śabdavṛttis. As far as the influence of Nyāya philosophy on this particular aspect is concerned, there is not much of it in Sanskrit poetics. The following analysis will clarify the points on which the influence of Nyāya philosophy is observed. We shall briefly discussed here only such points or cases as reveal Nyāya influence without dwelling much on details.

II.1 Concept of Vṛtti and Its Kinds

The term Vṛtti in Sanskrit literature has been used in a number of senses. Āśādhara defines¹ vṛtti as a function by which a word conveys a particular meaning. Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa in his Vṛttidīpikā,² a work on grammar says that vṛtti is the cause of Śābdabodha, a relation of word and its meaning which is congenial to the presentation of that meaning from that word. Gadādhara in his Śāktivāda³ defines vṛtti as a will (icchā) or indication (saṁketa) in the form of 'let this word indicate this meaning' and 'this meaning is to be understood from this word'. The terms like vyāpāra and kriyā are said to be synonyms of vṛtti.⁴ Viśvanātha in his SD⁵ uses the term śakti for vṛtti while many other writers restrict the word śakti to only

Abhidhā, the primary function of the word, one of the vṛttis. The word vyāpāra has been used in the sense of vṛtti as is known from the work, Śabdavyāpāravivācāra of Mammāṭa. In the second ullāsa of KP also Mammāṭa uses the term vyāpāra in the sense of vṛtti.⁶ Thus vṛtti is used in the sense of power or function of a word.

There is a great difference of opinion regarding the number of vṛttis among the philosophers, grammarians and poeticsians. Mahimabhaṭṭa recognises Abhidhā alone as a vṛtti. The Naiyāyikas accept two vṛttis, śakti and lakṣaṇā⁷ while poeticsians accept three vṛttis- Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā.⁸

II.2 Abhidhā, the Primary Function of Word

The primary function of meaning, Abhidhā (denotation) conveys the realisation of the meaning which belongs to the word. Naiyāyikas used the term Śakti for Abhidhā. "The relation existing between pada and padārtha is Śakti".⁹ It is defined as a god-ordained convention that such and such meaning should be understood from such and such word.¹⁰ According to this definition each word in every language is capable of conveying a particular sense because the God has so willed it. This is the view of the prācīna Naiyāyikas. The Navya-Naiyāyikas say 'icchāmātram śaktiḥ', thereby intimating that even the human will can endow words with meanings as in the case of proper names like 'Devadatta' etc. Thus it is seen

that Naiyāyikas identify Śakti and saṅketa or icchā. On the other hand the Mīmāṃsakas consider Śakti as an independent padārtha. They say it is apprehended from the convention. When a man ascertains that a particular word has a convention in respect of a particular sense then only he recognises the power of the word to express that particular sense. But some influence of Nyāyāśāstra is also seen in this connection.

Kesavamīśra, for example, in his Alaṅkāraśekhara says:

शक्तिरीश्वरैच्छा या संकेत इत्युच्यते । (P. 11)

His definition seems to be formulated on the basis of the definition of Śakti as given by the Naiyāyikas like Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and Viśvanātha who in their Śaktiśāstra and NSM have given similar definitions of Śakti. The concept of Śakti as the will of God (īśvarecchā) is accepted by the ancient logicians. Kesavamīśra, therefore, seems to follow the view of the prācīna Naiyāyikas as recorded in the NSM of Viśvanātha.

Again, Jagannātha's treatment of Abhidhā also exhibits an influence of Nyāya. Though he mainly follows grammarians in the treatment of Abhidhā, yet we can trace the Nyāya influence on it on the basis of two points. Jagannātha defines Abhidhā in the following words:

शक्त्याख्योऽर्थस्य शब्दगतः शब्दस्यार्थगतौ वा
सम्बन्धविशेषोऽभिधा । (RG. P. 176)

He further explains it as अर्थस्य शब्दगतः etc. Now the terms anuyogi and pratiyogi are two concepts of Navya-Naiyāyikas meaning respectively 'substratum' and 'dependent'. Abhidhā

otherwise called Śakti is a particular relation (sambandhaviśeṣa) between the śabda and artha. The relation being connected with two objects one of them is technically called 'pratiyogika' and the other 'anuyogin'. But in the absence of any deciding factor in the present context both of them can be called pratiyogins or anuyogins. Defining Abhidhā in this manner Jagannātha postulates a relation of anuyogi and pratiyogi between that of śabda and artha only. To maintain the absolute validity of an expression the logicians have postulated certain relations. Since the validity of an expression involves both epistemic and ontological consideration it is difficult to determine the exact nature of Śābdabodha. Words hold different position in Śābdabodha and also signify something more than what they are to express. As such there is no unique property characterising them. In a stipulative way the logicians try to characterise them through certain relations. To avoid ambiguity and multiplicity the Naiyāyikas have generalised certain relations. Anuyogitā-Pratiyogitā is one of such relations. It determines the pratiyogi (counter-co-relate) and the anuyogi (subjunct). But anuyogi may refer to different things on different occasions in case of absence, (abhāva) the anuyogi is the locus of absence. For instance when we say there is absence of pot on the ground (bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti). we understand that ground the anuyogi and ghaṭa as pratiyogi. When it is conceived as a relation the absence of pot e.g. pot it is said to be connected with its locus (bhūtala) through such a relation.

Though Jagannātha brings into the discussions of Abhidhā the relation of anuyogi and pratiyogi yet he is not able to reach a definite conclusion because of the complicated nature of the relation of sabda and artha.

Secondly, Jagannātha presents the Naiyāyika view of Śakti in the following words :

अस्मान्पदादयमर्थोऽवगन्तव्य इत्याकारेश्वरैश्चैषाभिधा । तस्याश्च
विषयतया सर्वत्र सत्त्वान्पदादीनामपि घटादिपदवाच्यता स्यात्
अतो व्यक्तिविशेषोपधानेन घटादिपदाभिधात्वं वाच्य-
मित्यपरं । (RG. PP. 176-7)

Nāgeśa, the commentator clearly says that the word 'apare' refers to Naiyāyikas.¹¹ Here Jagannātha seems to refer the views of Gadādhara and Viśvanātha who were his elder contemporaries.

Apart from this in Appaya Dīkṣita's treatment of Abhidhā the influence of Nyāyasāstra is observed. In his Vṛttivārtikam while referring to the types of meaning Appaya refers twice to the views of the Naiyāyikas at length without mentioning the name of the author or his work.¹²

After explaining the nature of Śakti Appaya proceeds to discuss its three-fold classification in details. The classification of Abhidhā made by Appaya seems to have some relation with the divisions of pada made by the Naiyāyikas. So here before entering into the discussion of Appaya's treatment of Abhidhā and acquaintance with the view of the Naiyāyikas on the matter is necessary.

The Naiyāyikas define pada as one endowed with an expressiveness (Śakti) and classify it into four types - yaugika, rudha, yogarudha and yaugikarudha.¹³ In bringing out the characteristic features of these four types of padas, the Naiyāyikas point out that a term which signifies a concept conveyed by its component parts is one of yaugika type. This is exemplified by such term as pācaka and the like. As regards the rūdha type of word they maintain that the meaning pertaining to the word as a whole signifies the concept quite independent of the meaning belonging to the component member. This is illustrated by such term as 'Go', 'Maṇḍapa' and the like. What is understood by 'Go' is not a moving thing but an animal possessing a particular physical form. Similarly what is meant by the term 'Maṇḍapa' is not one who drinks gruel but the covered area.

In sharp contrast to the yaugika and rūdha types of words the variety known as yogarudha is one in which the Śakti belonging to the component members and that belonging to the words as a whole conjointly bring a concept into light. For example the word, pañkaja, which neither refers to the objects which sprung from mud nor the land lotus (sthalapadma), but the lotus sprung from mud. The word pañkaja can etymologically convey the idea of all the objects growing from mud, for example, the lily as well through the Śakti belonging to its members alone, because lily also grows in water. But it is of no avail, because it militates against the dictum that the cognition of a content presented by the word as a whole stands in the way of

comprehension of the idea presented by its component members. The Naiyāyikas explain the cognition of the idea of the lily, from the term pañkaja and say that Abhidhā does not present the idea of lily, but what presents this content is the function of lakṣaṇā which is called into play only when the Abhidhā proves itself unable to present the intended meaning.

Yaugikaruḍha (both derivative and conventional) is that when their meanings are determined either by the potency of the whole or by those of the parts, for example, the word udbhidha. It means a germ or the sprouting of a seed or a sacrifice.

Appaya defines Abhidhā as the capacity to signify a meaning with the help of Śakti. In summing up the discussion on the issue Appaya maintains that the term pañkaja signifies the lotus of a particular kind through the words denotative power of the third yoga-rudha type. In this context he refers to the Naiyāyikas' view. According to Naiyāyikas in such cases both the ideas conveyed through Śakti belonging to the word as a whole and through Śakti pertaining to the component members are cognised and at a late stage, the term 'pañkaja' signifies the lily and other water-born flowers. In order to explain such cases the Naiyāyikas take help of lakṣaṇā which according to them presents the sense of one grown in the mud only. Appaya, however, does not subscribe to their viewpoint on this issue.

Secondly, Appaya records the viewpoints of the Naiyāyikas on the exact part played by the restrictive factors (abhidhā-niyāmakas). When the meaning is comprehended, it has no bearing on the context only because the particular word is used to signify that particular meaning. It is evident that the context does not regulate the function of Abhidhā. The inability of the context to restrict Śakti pertaining to terms is evident from non-recollection of contextual meanings, even in those cases where the particular word has not gained currency to signify that particular meaning. Thus the Naiyāyikas contend that the meaning is comprehended in all those cases where convention is present, even though it has no bearing on the context. On the other hand the recollection of the meaning related strictly to the context does not ensue in those cases where convention is not present. This view, therefore, controverts the thesis of the rhetoricians that the context and the other allied factors are competent to regulate the denotation of terms. Abhidhā is restricted by the dexterity of the comprehender in recollecting Śakti pertaining to the words. As the comprehender cognises for the first time the Śakti pertaining to a term, the knowledge that a particular term is endowed with the capacity to signify a particular meaning, the impression of that Śakti remains in him; as he subsequently cognises that a particular term, the impression deposited by that term regarding Śakti is awakened. As a result of it, he recollects the corresponding

idea and understand the meaning. The restriction of Abhidhā by the restrictive factors, therefore, is a myth. This restriction is made by the sensitiveness of the cogniser to the impression deposited by the word. In reply to the question as to what then is made by the restrictive factors, the Naiyāyikas hold that they go only to ascertain the intention of the speaker, and nothing else. In illustrating the point they cite the word 'Hari' which is treated as a multi-meaninged term in Sanskrit lexicons and say that though the term Hari is able to present a number of ideas, the context goes to determine the intention of the speaker and thereby to point out the exact meaning the signify which the particular word is used.

In this connection it is significant to note that if one accepts the yogarūḍha type of Abhidhā as its third type it straightway encroaches upon the concept and the area of rudhi lakṣaṇā. On account of this the area of the śabdaśaktimuladhvani will also be restricted. Even in the cases of Alaṅkāras like Samāsokti the aprākaraṇikāārtha will also have to be expressed by Abhidhā. Therefore, Śleṣa in such cases will not be suggested but expressed.

Thus, Appaya's treatment of vṛttis reveals that he has great respect for the Naiyāyikas whose views he records.

II.3 Sources of Śaktigraha

Keśavamisra in his Alaṅkāraśekhara gives the following verse which refers to the different means of Śaktigraha :

कौशल्याकरणात्तौक्तिवाक्यशेषोपमादितः ।
प्रसिद्धपदसम्बन्धात् व्यवहाराच्च बुध्यते ॥
(P. 11)

This is directly from the Nyāyaśāstra where the same eight sources of Śakti (denotation) are found in a number of Nyāya works. Keśavamisra is possibly mentioning there from Viśvanātha's NSM and Jagadīśa's Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā where the verse occurs with slight variations. But the oldest standard work referring to them is the TC. The relevant verse is as follows:

शक्तिग्राहं व्याकरणोपमानकौषातवाक्याद् व्यवहारतश्च ।
वाक्यस्य शेषान् विवृतैर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः ॥
(TC. P. 649)

1. Vyākaraṇa: The meanings of the roots, terminations and rules are learnt from the Vyākaraṇa (dhātuprakāśikā śaktigrahaḥ vyākaraṇāt bhavati).

2. Upamāna: Analogy is the instrument of assimilative cognition which consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by it. This may be illustrated thus: A person happens to be ignorant of the exact meaning of the word gavaya. From a forester, he learns that a gavaya is similar to a cow; he goes to a forest, sees the animal called gavaya, which is similar to a cow and recollects the information

conveyed by the assimilative proposition (atideśavākya).


Then the assimilative cognition, 'this ⁽¹⁵⁾ the animal denoted by the word 'gavaya' arises.

3. Koṣa : The words which have several meanings are understood through the help of a dictionary.

4. Āptavākya: Śabdapramāṇa is defined as āptavākya. Āpta means a person who speaks the truth.¹⁴ Āptavākya or the direct statement of a trustworthy authority [○] is another way by which people generally understand the meanings of words.¹⁵ In this case the learning is conscious and deliberate. When parents or their relations directly point out with the finger the various persons and objects, and say to the child, 'this is your father' etc., the child can understand the relation between the words and the persons or objects denoted by them.¹⁶ We may also know the meanings of certain words when an authority tells us that such and such words denote such and such objects.

5. Vyavahāra : This is the most useful method for a child to learn the language. It is the most important among all the eight methods and is the natural way of observation in actual life. Jagadīśa, the great Naiyāyika says that the first and foremost method of learning the meanings of words is that of observing the use of language in actual life.¹⁷

6. Vākyaśeṣa : This method is used in obtaining the correct meaning of a word. The meaning of the word 'yava' (generally



used by the Āryas in the sense of the long-bearded barley, and by the Mlecchas in the sense of the panic seed) in the sentence yavamayas'carur bhavati. It is known to be the long-bearded barley from the rest of the passage i.e. yatrānyā auṣadhaya mlāyante athaite modamānā ivottiṣṭhanti (when the other plants droop down, these stand up as if they are happy).¹⁸

7. Siddhapadasānnidhya : Syntactic connection with the words already known. In the sentence 'The pika sings beautifully on this mango tree', the meaning of the word 'pika' is known to be 'cuckoo' from the presence of the other well-known words.¹⁹

8. Vivṛti: The meanings of words are known from a commentary giving the synonyms of the word, or describing the meaning.

II.4 Lakṣaṇā, the Secondary Function of Word

That brings us to the next function of word Lakṣaṇā (indication). The rhetoricians define Lakṣaṇā as:

मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रुढितौऽथ प्रयोजनात् ।
अन्यौऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत् सा लक्षणाः पिता क्रिया ॥
मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्युक्ते ययाऽन्यौऽर्थः प्रतीयते । (KP. II. 9)
रुढेः प्रयोजनाद्वासा लक्षणा शक्तिरपिना ॥ (SD. II. 5)
लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्धः, Alaṅkāraśekhara, p. 11.
शक्यसम्बन्धसहकारिणी वृत्तिर्लक्षणा ।
(Trivenīkā, p. 12)

When there is incompatibility of the primary meaning of a word, a secondary meaning, connected with the primary sense, and arising either through usage or through some intention of the speaker is also understood. This meaning is called the lakṣya meaning, and power, by which such a meaning arises, is called Lakṣaṇā. This function of the word, indicating a referent different from its normal and primary one, but somehow related to it, is also called upacāra; other terms like gaunivṛtti and bhakti are also used to refer to the secondary function of the word. As it is not possible to include all the meanings of the words under Abhidhā, there must be another vṛtti to explain the meanings which are not directly denoted but are indirectly indicated. Earliest indications of an attempt to explain such indicating power and indicated senses are found in the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama²⁰ and the Mahābhāṣya of Paṭaṅjali.²¹ As time went on Lakṣaṇā was accepted as an independent vṛtti.

Among rhetoricians themselves there is great divergence of opinion.²² Vāmana and the author of the Agnipurāṇa (AP)²³ treat Lakṣaṇā as one of the alaṅkāras based on similarity. Kuntaka also includes it under vācya and vācaka. With Ānandavardhana has come the scientific treatment of this power of word. Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa and others have mostly toed his line.

Gautama in his NyS applies the term upacāra for this secondary function of words. He says that such transfer of

meaning is quite common, when the actual referent is closely related to the normal and primary referent. He enumerates with examples ten such relations.

1. Sahacarana (Association) ; e.g. yaṣṭikam bhojaya (feed the stick) In this sentence the Brahmin is referred to as 'stick', as he is always associated with the stick which he carries. Another example of the same relation is the use of the term kantaḥ(lances) for the lance-bearers' in the sentence, kuntāḥ praviśanti (the lance enter).

2. Sthāna(location) : e.g. mañcāḥ krośanti (the cots cry). Here the term 'mañcāḥ' (Cot) is used to refer to the children on the cot'.

3. Tādrthya (purpose) : e.g. kaṭam karoti (He makes a mat). The sentence means: 'He collects reeds for the purpose of making a mat'. Here the reeds intended for making a mat are referred to as mat.

4. Vṛtta (behaviour).: e.g. yamoṛaja. Here the term 'yama' is used in the sense of 'one who acts like Yama', 'god of death'.

5. Māna(measure) : e.g. adhakasaktavaḥ (one adhaka of flour). Here the term adhaka denoting the measure is used to mean that which is measured(adhakena mitāḥ saktavaḥ).

6. Dhāraṇa (weight) : e.g. tulācandanam (one tula of candana) Here the term tulā is used in the sense of that which is weight in the balance (tulāyam dhṛtam candanam).

7. Sāmipya (proximity) : e.g. gaṅgāyām gāvah caranti (the cows are grazing on the Ganges). Here Gaṅgā is used in the sense of the bank of the Ganges.
8. Yoga (inherent connection) : e.g. kṛṣṇah sātakah 'the black cloth'. The word black primarily means 'blackness' but here it means 'the thing having blackness'. The use of the term denoting quality for the thing qualified (e.g. 'I love beauty') comes under this.
9. Sādhana(cause): e.g. annam prāṇah (food is life). Here food which is the cause of life is referred to as life itself.
10. Ādhipatya (prominence): e.g. ayam kulam (He is the family) Here kula is used in the sense of the prominent person in the kula (family).

In this way, Gautama gives popular example of figurative usage from everyday life, the list is intended only to be illustrative, and not to be exhaustive. He also refers to the Mīmāṃsakas view that the primary meaning of every word is the universal and that the particular to which it refers in a sentence is known through the secondary function, upacāra; but he does not accept that view, since according to him a word means all the three things : universal, the form and the particular.²⁴

II.5 Definition of Lakṣaṇā

The definition of Lakṣaṇā given by Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana in his NSM is : lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhā tātparyā-anupapattitah.²⁵ The definition of Lakṣaṇā given by the rhetoricians like Jagannātha and Keśavamīśra are quite similar to this.²⁶ They seem to follow the view of the Naiyāyikas in defining Lakṣaṇā. Even Mammāṭa's definition appears essentially to be not different from the Naiyāyika's definition. He defines Lakṣaṇā as :

मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रुद्धिर्नैव प्रयोजनान्न ।
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत् सा लक्षणाशेषितक्रिया ॥
(KP. P. 40)

In this kārikā, Mammāṭa combines the definition, cause and the purpose of the Lakṣaṇā. The presence of Lakṣaṇā anticipates three things : 1. the incongruity of the mukhyārtha 2. connection between the vācyārtha and the Lakṣyārtha 3. any of the two purposes, Rūḍhi or Prayojana. Mukhyārthabādha is a real cause. But the Mukhyārtha-yoga is the svarūpa of the Lakṣaṇā, or, in other words 'śakya-sambandhā lakṣaṇā'. The term 'prayojanāt' explains the reason why Lakṣaṇā has to be accepted at all. His definition of Lakṣaṇā is accepted by almost all the Ālaṅkārikas including Viśvanātha. But Jagannātha and Keśavamīśra following the Naiyāyikas define Lakṣaṇā as śakya-sambandhā.

About the hetu or bīja of Lakṣaṇā there are two views : Anvayanupapatti and Tātparyānupapatti. Naiyāyikas accept

Tātparyānupapatti as the bīja of Lakṣaṇā. Though there is anvayānupapatti in cases like gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ, for, gaṅgā (the pravāha of Ganges) cannot be the adhikaraṇa of ghoṣa, still Tātparyānupapatti is to be accepted as the cause of Lakṣaṇā. For, in cases like 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām', there is no śakyārthabādha or anvayānupapatti but tātparyābadha is there. For what is meant to be conveyed is that dadhi should be protected from all the birds that destroy it and not from crows only. Jagannātha accepts tātparyānupapatti as the bīja of Lakṣaṇā and seems to follow the Naiyāyika view as stated in the NSM.

II.6 Relations Causing Lakṣaṇā

Āśādhara in his Trivenikā explains three types of relations which cause Lakṣaṇā (lakṣaṇā prayojakasambandha).²⁷ They are according to him sāmyoga, samavāya and viśiṣṭabuddhiyogya. The definition of sāmyoga as given by him is : dravyayoreva samyuktabuddhihetuḥ sāmyogo guṇaviśeṣaḥ.²⁸ He explains a number of varieties of sāmyoga such as : vyāpya-vyāpakabhāvasāmyoga, dhāryadhārakabhāvasāmyoga, bhārtrbhāryātvam sāmyoga, ādheyādhārabhāvasāmyoga etc. His definition of sāmyoga is formulated on the basis of the definition of sāmyoga given by Keśavamīśra and Annabhāṭṭa.²⁹ Naiyāyikas accept sāmyoga as a guṇa.³⁰ Here also Āśādhara accepts sāmyoga as a guṇa as well as the cause of samyuktavyavahāra with the only difference

that he accepts a very large variety of sam̐yogas while Naiyāyikas accept only three types of it. Similarly his definition of samavāya, nityasambandhaḥ samavāya and its elucidation as the relation occurring between avayava and avayavi etc.,³¹ clearly reveals that he borrows the concept from some Nyāya work.³²

↑
connected
with Lakṣaṇā

II. 7 Tātparya, Another Function of Word

Sanskrit poetics have treated Tātparya in a significant manner. The treatment of Tātparya by some of the poetics also reveals the Nyāya influence.

Almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy, Grammar and Poetics recognise the importance of Tātparya in the understanding of sentence meaning. The Naiyāyikas define Tātparya as the intention of the speaker.³³ The intention of the speaker as an essential factor in śābdabodha is admitted by the Naiyāyikas. Some Naiyāyikas are even of the view that in common sentences like 'ghaṭam ānaya' the meaning of ghaṭa is understood by Tātparya. Otherwise the pot may indicate a piece of cloth in a particular context through Lakṣaṇā.³⁴ It is the incompatibility of the expressed sense with the intention of the speaker that prompts the hearer to interpret the sentence by resorting to Lakṣaṇā. In the sentence like 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ', the intention of the speaker gives the meaning, gaṅgātīra to the word gaṅgā. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the intention

need not be that of the actual speaker, but could sometimes be traced to the original author of the statement.³⁵

Some Naiyāyikas believe that Tātparya need not be treated as a separate condition of śābdabodha. It could be included under ākāṅkṣā itself.. Ākāṅkṣā is the need of a word for another in order to convey the intended meaning of the speaker,³⁶ In the sentence ayam iti putro rājñah puruṣopaśāryatām, it is knowledge of the speaker's intention that decides that the word rājñah (of the king) is to be construed with the word putra (son) and not with the puruṣa (man), to satisfy its ākāṅkṣā.

According to Gaṅgeśa and Viśvanātha the knowledge of the Tātparya is the fourth condition necessary for śābdabodha. Some are of the view that Tātparya is an all-embracing factor and it has apart to play in the working of the first three factors.³⁷ Naiyāyikas say that the contextual factors help only indirectly by showing the meaning intended by the speaker.³⁸ Some of the early Naiyāyikas, prominently Jayanṭabhaṭṭa, accept Tātparya as a separate Vṛtti. Navya-Naiyāyikas call this function as sāmsargamaryādā.³⁹

Abhinavagupta in his Locana refers to Tātparya as accepted by some Naiyāyikas as a separate vṛtti in the context of Abhihitānvayavāda while explaining the syntactic unity of a sentence. He speaks of four distinct functions of a word, Abhidhā, Tātparya, Lakṣaṇā, Vyañjanā and arranges them under

four separate classes.⁴⁰ In a sentence the individual words by their primary function, Abhidhā refer only to the isolated word-meanings. The syntactic relation of the words is conveyed by the Tātparyāsakti of words. The intention of the speaker gives a unified purposeful meaning of a sentence. Hence the words are considered to have the power to convey the syntactic relation among the various isolated word-meanings. Ānandavardhana also refers to the importance of the speaker's intention in conveying the meaning of a sentence.⁴¹ But he does not accept Tātparya as a separate vṛtti.

Bhoja (1050A.D) in his Śṛṅgāraprakāśa treats Tātparya in a unique way.⁴² He has used the word in the general sense of the total meaning and divides it into three types, abhidhiyamānavācyā (expressed), pratīyamāna (implied) and dhvanirūpa (suggested).⁴³ Bhoja does not accept both the theories of Abhihitānvaya and Anvitābhidhāna but prefers a third view according to which the word convey the sentence meaning by their cumulative effect (samhatyakāritā).⁴⁴ In this regard he seems to follow Jayantabhaṭṭa who in his NM advocates this view by attributing the cumulative effect to the Tātparya śakti of words.⁴⁵

Dhanika in his commentary on Daśarūpaka on Dhanañjaya also treats Tātparya as a separate vṛtti. According to him Dhvani could be included in Tātparya and it is not necessary to recognise independent function called dhvani.⁴⁶ He refutes

the ghaṭapradīpanyāya given by Ānandavardhana to explain the relationship between the expressed and the suggested meaning, since the two senses are not as distinct as the the pot and the lamp. The relation between kāvya and rasa is vācyavācaka or lakṣyalakṣaka. There can be no limitation of the term Tātparya to the expressed sense. It can also include the whole range of the speaker's intention and cover all implications coming in the trend of the expressed sense.

Mammata in his KP refers to the Tātparya as a separate vṛtti for conveying the syntactic relationship among the various word-meanings according to the Abhihitānvaya theory. We will discuss them in detail in the context of Abhihitānvayavāda.

Viśvanātha in his SD repeats the same idea and refers to Tātparyavṛtti as accepted by the Abhihitānvaya theorist. It is the sentence as a whole that conveys the Tātparyārtha and so the power of Tātparya must rest with the sentence as a whole.⁴⁷ Many of the later rhetoricians have also refer to Tātparyavṛtti mainly on the basis of the statement of Abhinava and Mammata.

It is interesting to note that Jayantabhaṭṭa (10th century A.D.) in his NM was the first to bring forward the theory of Tātparya as a separate vṛtti. According to him the words in a sentence express their isolated word-meanings by the power of Abhidhā but the mutual relationship among the word-meanings is

indicated by Tātparyasakti. The function of Tātparyasakti is to reveal the meaning of words contained in a sentence as being mutually related. This power belongs to all the words generally and lasts till the intended meaning is finally produced.⁴⁸

The Tātparyavṛtti of the Prācīna school of Nyāya philosophy is the same as the saṃsargamaryādā of the Navya-Nyāya school. In the words of S.Kuppuswami Sastri⁴⁹:

The additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concept (padārthasaṃsarga) and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of a verbal judgement (vākyārtha), is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words (saṃsargamaryādā) and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words, (abhidhā or lakṣaṇā).

II. 8 Abhihitānvaya Theory

The abhihitānvaya theory advocated by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas does include the concept of Tātparya and as treated by poeticians particularly Mammaṭa it does not need some elaboration here. According to this theory the meaning of a sentence is a concatenation of the

individual entities expressed by the words. The individual words have in themselves a meaning which can be comprehended separately. On hearing a sentence, we first ~~an~~ understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after the other. Then we put together these meanings according to the three factors : ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi and as a result, get the meaning of the sentence.

As shown above, Abhinavagupta accepts Jayanta's modified form of Abhihitānvaya theory, not that of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas. The Abhihitānvaya theory though primarily propounded by the Mīmāṃsakas is also accepted by the Naiyāyikas. It is a fact that early Naiyāyikas like Gautama and Vātsyāyana have not discussed the problem of the sentence. They have discussed only the exact import of a word. But they believe that the sentence is only a collection of words, and the sentence - meaning is only the mutual association of the word-meanings.⁵⁰ After discussing in detail the various theories about śābdabodha held by various schools, Jayanta, perhaps for the first time, advocates a modified form of the theory.

Mamṣaṭa in the second ullāsa of his KP presents the theory of vākyārtha upheld by the Abhihitānvayavādins as follows:

नात्पर्यार्थोऽपि केषुचित् । II. 6.
 आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासन्नधिवशाद्ध्ययमाणस्वरूपाणां पदार्थानां
 समन्वये नात्पर्यार्थो विशेषवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थः
 समुल्लसतीत्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम् ।

From the above presentation itself it is not very clear who, in fact are intended by the term 'abhihitānvayavādins'. Since the theory of Abhihitānvaya is advocated by both the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas it becomes difficult to decide whose view Mammāṭa is refering to. The subtle difference however is this : according to this concept the individual words of a sentence would denote only universals and it is through their anvaya that one gets the vākyārtha which, of necessity, must refer to particulars. The distinction between the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā theory of Abhihitānvayavāda is that while Naiyāyikas believe this anvaya as a result of Tātparyavṛtti, the Mīmāṃsakas believe it to be of lakṣaṇāvṛtti. Among the commentators of Mammāṭa's KP both ancient and modern there is a lot of controversy about whose abhihitānvayavāda Mammāṭa refers to. A host of commentators seem to believe that Mammāṭa accepts the view of Naiyāyikas and 'keṣucit' means Naiyāyikas.⁵¹ Many modern commentators like P.V.Kane, G.N.Jha believe that by the word 'keṣucit' Mammāṭa is refering to Mīmāṃsakas since the theory of abhihitānvaya was so popular and prevalent among the ancient Mīmāṃsakas.⁵² However, the word tātparyārtho'pi in kārika II.6. quoted above the presence of tātparya itself clarifies Mammāṭa's position and shows without doubt that he follows Nyāya and not Mīmāṃsa, because tātparya is a Nyāya term. ✓

Thus Mammaṭa seems to present the Abhihitānvayavāda mainly of Jayantabhaṭṭa, a prominent representative of the Prācīna school of Nyāya philosophy, who has given a status of vṛtti to tātparya and who considers tātparyārtha as vākyārtha. The facts that both the authors belong to the same age and hail from the same region also goes to corroborate this inference.

1. वर्तते शब्दार्थे प्रवर्ततेऽनयेति वृत्तिः । Trivenikā, p.1
2. वृत्तित्वञ्च शाब्दबोधहेतुशब्दार्थोपस्थित्यनुकूल-
शाब्दनदर्थसम्बन्धत्वम् । Vṛttivārttikā, p.1.
3. 'इदं पदमिमर्थबोधयतु' इति, 'अस्माच्छब्दादयमर्थो
बोद्धव्य' इति वैच्छा, संकैतरूपा वृत्तिः । Śaktivāda, p.5.
4. वृत्तिर्व्यापारः क्रिया चैति पर्यायशब्दाः । Trivenikā, p.4
5. तिस्रः शब्दस्य शक्तयः । SD., ch. II, p.26.
6. स मुख्योऽर्थस्तत्र मुख्यो व्यापारोऽभिधीयते ।
Kp. ch. II, p. 39.
7. संकैतो लक्षणा चार्थे वृत्तिः । Śaktivāda, p.1.
8. तिस्रो वृत्तयः पदानां भवन्ति, शक्तिर्लक्षणा व्यञ्जना चैति ।
Alaṅkāraśekhara, p. 11.
9. शक्तिश्च पदेन सह पदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः । NSM. p.295.
10. सा च ----- ईश्वरैच्छारूपा । आधुनिके नाम्नि
शक्तिरस्त्यैव, "एकादशैऽहनि पिता नाम कुर्यात्"
इति ईश्वरैच्छायाः सत्त्वात् । आधुनिकसंकैतिते तु न
शक्तिरिति सम्प्रदायः । नैयास्तु - ईश्वरैच्छा न
शक्तिः, किन्तु इच्छैव । NSM., p. 295.
11. अपरे नैयायिकाः । Nāgārjuna, Gurumarmapraśādikā,
p.147.
12. Vṛttivārttikam, p. 5 & 13.; cf. न्यायमते शक्तिस्त्रिविधा
योगः रूढिः योगरूढिश्चैति । Nyāyakośa, p. 855.

13. शक्तपदं, नचर्तुविधम् । NSM. P. 381.
14. आनौपदेशः शब्दः । Nys. I.1.7.
15. आप्तः खलु साक्षात्कृतधर्मा यथादृष्टस्याऽर्थस्य
चिरव्यापयिषया प्रयुक्त उपदेष्टा । NBh. on NYS I.1.7.
16. Nyāyakośa, p. 860.
17. व्यवहारादपि शक्तिगृहो यथा घटं नय गामानय-
इत्याद्यावपौद्यापाभ्यां पार्श्वस्थवाक्यस्य घटादिपदस्य
घटमात्रे शक्तिगृहो भवति । Ibid P. 859.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. सह-चरण-स्थान-तादृश्य-वृत्त-मान-धारण-
सामीप्ययोग-साधनाधिपत्यैभ्यो ब्राह्मण-मन्त्र-कट-
राज-सक्तु-चन्दन-गङ्गा-शाटकान्न-पुरुषैवत-
नङ्गावैऽपि तदुपचारः । Nys II.2.63.
21. Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇinisūtra V.1.48.
22. KAS, IV.3.8.
23. AP., ch. 344, Verse 11.
24. व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः । Nys. II.2.67.
25. लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्धस्तान्पर्यानुपपत्तिः । NSM. P. 319.
26. शक्यसम्बन्धो लक्षणा । RG. 185; लक्षणा
शक्यसम्बन्धः । Alaṅkāraśekhara, P. 11.

27. स त्रिविधः - संयोगः, समवायौ, विशिष्टबुद्धियोग्यश्चेति ।
Trivenikā, P. 17.

28. नत्र द्रव्ययोरैव संयुक्तबुद्धिहेतुः संयोगो
 गुणविशेषः । Trivenikā, P. 17;

29. संयोगः संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः, TB. P. 79; संयुक्त-
 व्यवहारहेतुः संयोगः । TS. P. 16.

30. TS. P. 4.

31. नित्यसम्बन्धः समवायः । स पञ्चविधः -
 अवयवावयविभावो, गुणगुणिभावः, क्रियाक्रियावद्भावो,
 जातिव्यक्तिभावो, विशेषनित्यद्रव्यभावश्चेति ।

Trivenikā, p. 18.

32. यथा अवयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रिया-
 वन्नौ जातिव्यक्तौ विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चेति । TB. 16

33. वक्तुरिच्छा तु तात्पर्यं परिकीर्तितम् । NSM, P. 421.

34. Nyāyakośa, P. 327.

35. प्रयोक्ता चाभिसंधोषयितृमात्रम् न तु वक्तव्यम् ।
 NM. P. 24.

36. Nyāyakośa, P. 327.

37. तात्पर्यगर्भा चासत्तिः । NSM. P. 303.

38. Ibid. P. 315.

39. शाब्दबोधे चैकपदार्थेऽपरपदार्थसंसर्गः संसर्गमयोदया
 भासते । Śabdādhara, Vyutpattivāda P. 1.

40. त्रयो ह्यत्र व्यापाराः संवेद्यन्ते - पदार्थेषु सामान्यात्म
स्वभिधाव्यापारः, समयापेक्षार्थावगमनशक्तिः, अभिधा-
समयश्च । तावन्मैव न विशेषांशौ । आनन्त्याद्व्यभिचाराच्च ।
एकस्य ततो विशेषरूपे वाक्यार्थे तात्पर्यशक्तिः
परस्परान्वितौ । Locana, P. 19.
41. D. A. I. 10.
42. V. Raghavan, II Edn. P. 193.
43. Ibid, P. 21.
44. Ibid
45. NM. P. 371 f.
46. Dhanika, Avaloka on the Dasarūpaka P. 156.
47. SD. II. 20.
48. NM. P. 371
49. Sastri, S. Kuppuswami, A Primer of Indian Logic,
P. 258.
50. NM., P. 333.
51. Kunjuni Raja, K., Indian Theories of Meaning, P. 222.
52. Ibid. P. 218.