

## CHAPTER .IV.

### "DIALECTICS AND INTERPRETATION."

#### (I).

##### Introductory.

Writers on Śāstras in Sanskrit have adopted a style, peculiarly their own. It can be called the discursive or dialectical style which presents the arguments and counter-arguments for and against a particular theory, advocated by the writer. Thus there is not much scope for the literary embellishments, which are thrown in the background by the tiresome frequency of 'nanu' and 'tu'. The best thing for a writer in this branch of literature is to be as simple as possible, so that he can be thoroughly understood. Even then there are some writers like Śaṅkara who can be called stylists, but that combination of literary merits in a Śāstric work is very rare and cannot be found in others. Rāmānuja writes in a style which is mature and dignified but which may appear rather difficult. Vallabha is too sparing, too laconic to the extent that the exact meaning which he intends to convey cannot often be understood without the help of explanation. Viṭṭhaleśa is surely clear in his writing, he can be easily understood but

he shows a tendency for ornamental style, as found in some of the long sentences and compounds in his works.

Puruṣottama, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, is primarily a commentator. In the independent works also, his mission is not just to refute, what others have said and thought, but also to explain clearly his own view point. He thus adopts the style suitable for his purpose. He is simple and clear. He never embarks upon long passages studded with long compounds and difficult words. His sentences are well-balanced. He never tries to be ornamental, though he has at his disposal the vast <sup>le</sup> which vocabulary of the Sanskrit language. He does not even appear to pause for a word, suitable words come to him and his pen goes on easily. He is a Śāstric writer and naturally we will find his language full of all the technical terms in Sanskrit literature. To one who is not conversant with the terminology, may find his works a hard nut to crack, but after the terms are understood, one will find the ease and even grace with which he writes. His explanations are often brimming with homely analogies like 'Sarvam Padam hastipade nimagnam' <sup>1</sup> and proverbs like

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1. A.B.P.p. 318.

'Gajā yatra na ganyante maśakānām tu ka kathā'.<sup>2</sup> The seriousness of the subject naturally requires some amount of dignity and maturity of style. Puruṣottama has the depth and profundity, dignity and maturity, combined with the ease and grace in the language. Puruṣottama however does not attempt to be a stylist, he is an interpreter and argumentator. He should thus be studied from that point of view.

(II).

Method and approach.

The tradition of the Śuddhādvaita thinkers recognises two methods of exposition, the pramāṇa method and the prameya method. Puruṣottama is said to have followed the former, while Harirāya and others the latter method. What exactly is meant by this? The words pramāṇabala and prameyabala are used by Vallabha himself, when he says in his Prakāśa on the Tattva-dīpanibandha at the end of the first chapter that he has expounded the meaning of the Śāstras by taking recourse to the pramāṇabala, while he will speak out the decision on all the topics by resorting to the prameyabala.<sup>3</sup> The distinction

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2. A.B.P.p.415.

3. Pramāṇabalam āśritya śāstrārtho vinirūpitaḥ,  
Prameyabalam āśritya sarvanirṇaya ucyate. T.S.P.p.168.

between the pramāṇa and the prameya methods seems to have started on the basis of this reference. The distinction however does not appear to be a very well-known one, and both the terms pramāṇapaddhati and prameyapaddhati appear to have been very vaguely used. Puruṣottama explains the term pramāṇabala as the decided implication of the pramāṇas, i.e. the prasthānas, following their mutual reconciliation and harmonisation.<sup>4</sup> Puruṣottama gives two explanations for the prameyabala. Firstly prameya is the Highest Lord, who is known by all the Vedas and the like. He is omnipotent, even then He is capable of particular actions in particular forms, which He assumes. This is the prameyabala.<sup>5</sup> Secondly prameya may be understood in the plural referring to the objects of our knowledge, obtained by means of our eyes etc. Their bala means their capacity to produce the particular effects.<sup>6</sup> What should be understood by the term pramāṇa?

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4. Pramāṇānām vedādinām śrībhāgavatāntānām balam parasparā-virodhena niścitam tātparityam ity arthah. T.S.Ab.p.168.

5. Prameyasya sakalevedādivedyasya bhagavato balam sarva-samarthatve'pi tattadrūpema pratiniyata-tattakārya-kartrtvādirūpam. T.S.Ab.p.168.

6. Prameyānām śāstrānugrhitacakṣurādijanyapremāviśayanām arthānām vā balam tattatkāryajananasamarthyam.

T.S.Ab.p.168.



In this particular<sup>4</sup> context it is to be restricted to denote only the verbal testimony. This would lead to the consideration of the svataḥpramāṇyavāda and the śabdabalaavicāra as against the parataḥpramāṇyavāda and the arthabalaavicāra respectively. On the basis of these two distinctions, Puruṣottama says that for those who accept<sup>5</sup> that the means of proof are self-valid and who understand the Śāstrārtha on the strength of the word, and who do not entertain any doubt regarding the theories taught in the Śāstras, the first chapter of the Nibandha is written. Those who follow the parataḥpramāṇyavāda or who do not accept the pramāṇas to be self-proved, and who approach the Śāstras on the ground of the Arthabala, may doubt the theories, that have been propounded, or they may accept wrong theories; for them the second chapter is written by the Ācārya.<sup>7</sup> It will thus be seen that the pramāṇabala is for those who follow the svataḥpramāṇyavāda and the śabdabala, while the prameyabala is for others who adhere to the parataḥ-pramāṇyavāda and the arthabala. When one proceeds on the strength of the pramāṇa, one would just make the statements regarding what is taught in the scriptures. When on the other hand, one takes recourse to the prameyabala, one would discuss the whole point from the point of view of the prameya or

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7. Cf. T. S. Ab. p. 168.

prameyas which are accepted to have certain characteristics; whereas one is srutitantra, the other is vastu-tantra. This difference can be seen clearly from Vallabha's own treatment as found in the two chapters.

The difference between the two methods can thus be explained. The *pramāṇa* refers to the authoritative scriptural texts. One who follows the texts, the injunctions, prohibitions, meditation, knowledge and even devotion, according to the texts, is called a *pramāṇamārgī* or a *maryādābhakta*. But one who, irrespective of Vedic rules, approaches the Lord in the manner of the Gopīs, depending solely upon the Lord (Prameya), is called a *prameyamārgī bhakta*. In other words *pramāṇamārga* is the *maryādāmārga*, and the *prameyamārga* is the *puṣṭimārga*. The former completely follows the constitutional rules, while the latter solely relies upon the will of the Lord, irrespective of the constitution. We can thus say that Puruṣottama is out and out a *pramāṇamārgī*, while Harirāya is a *prameyamārgī*. Harirāya and others who have followed the *prameyamārga*, have something of mysticism in them; this is not found in Puruṣottama.

There are however certain distinguishing characteristics which are found in Puruṣottama's method of presentation and

discussion of various views. Puruṣottama comes very late in the philosophical field in India. As we have seen in chapter II, he had many well known contemporary scholars, who contributed some view or other, while commenting upon the works of others or by means of independent compositions. Apart from that he had before him the works of scores of illustrious predecessors, whose views were considered authoritative. The Śuddhādvaita again was a comparatively modern system. Puruṣottama therefore adopted a comparative method. When any particular point comes up for discussion, Puruṣottama is never contented by giving his own point of view regarding it. He refers to almost all the scholars, who have expressed their views on that particular topic; he refutes them if he thinks it proper or otherwise he just keeps quiet after giving their opinions and stating his own. Thus for instance, in the very beginning of his *Prasthānakara-ratnākara*, Puruṣottama deals with the determinate and indeterminate knowledge. He refers to the Bhāṭṭas, the Bāhyas, the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, the Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaras and gives the view according to the Śuddhādvaita after that. Again after stating the view of the Bhāṭṭas, he also shows how the nirvikalpa jñāna as understood in the

Bhāṭṭa school can be explained from the point of view of the 'Suddhādvaita'.<sup>8</sup> He refers to the Nihilists and shows how they should be refuted.<sup>9</sup> While dealing with the savikalpaka he refers to the Sāmpradāyika Naiyāyikas and Rāmanātha, whom he refutes.<sup>10</sup> In the Khyātivāda he enumerates and explains all the theories of erroneous perception and shows how they are acceptable or unacceptable. Puruṣottama keeps in his mind not only the different views expressed by the scholars, but also the refutations that they have given of the rival systems. Thus for instance in his Prakāśa on the Anubhāṣya. I.i.2. Puruṣottama gives the arguments of those who think that Brahman can be inferred. He then refers to Bhāskara, who refutes this position. The arguments that have been advanced could not satisfy Rāmānuja, who gives his own refutation. The statement of all this is followed by a reference to Udayanācārya, who has given independent arguments to prove that Brahman or Īśvara can be established on the ground of reasoning.

Puruṣottama then refers to the Sāmpradāyikamata, the Abhinavamata and to Viṣṇuabhikṣu and finally refutes them.<sup>11</sup>

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8.Pr.pp.8-10.

9.Pr.p.10.

10.Pr.pp.13-14.

11.A.B.P. pp. 70-81.

Similarly under the next Sūtra, he explains the Bhedābheda-  
-vāda of Bhāskara, states its refutation as given by Vācaspati  
Miśra and attacks Vācaspati himself for this refutation.<sup>12</sup>

This is the position not only in discussing a particular  
theory, but even in commenting upon the Anubhāṣya and other  
works. In the Prakāśa on the Anubhāṣya at the end of almost  
every Sūtra or Adhikaraṇa, we find a statement of the inter-  
-pretations of that Sūtra or set of Sūtras as given by  
other commentators. While so stating the different inter-  
-pretations, he shows how and why Vallabha differs from them  
and how they are faulty. Sometimes he just gives these inter-  
-pretations and does not make any comments. Thus for instance  
under sūtra. II. ii. 18. Puruṣottama gives the interpretations  
of Rāmānuja and Bhāskara. The letter is similar to that of  
Saṃkara. The same thing has been said with some minor  
difference by others also, says Puruṣottama.<sup>13</sup> It should be  
noted that Puruṣottama here makes no comments of his own.  
Similarly at the end of the Tarkapāda, Puruṣottama refers to  
Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Sūtras. II. ii. 42-45. , in  
which Rāmānuja defends the Bhāgavata system. He also refers

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12. A. B. P. pp. 92-95.

13. Etad eva kiñcid vailakṣaṇyenānye' py āhuh. A. B. P. p. 635.

to Madhva who interpretes the Sūtras so as to repudiate the Śākta system. But he does not say anything for or against them. That is what we want to point out when we say that Puruṣottama adopts a comparative method. He compares the interpretations, theories and statements made by the scholars of his own school with those of others, and this he does, not just for the sake of refuting the other systems, which he very often does not refute. What he puts before us is a thorough comparison of these views and interpretations with or without his comments. This is very helpful for a clear understanding of the Śuddhādvaita, when compared with other systems.

Secondly we should ~~be~~ note that Puruṣottama's approach to the problems, he would like to discuss, is analytic. Whenever a certain point comes up for discussion, he does not skip over it by saying that this has been so ordered by the Ācārya or that this does or does not appear to be so. He would like to go to the root of the problem and with a thorough presentation of the original texts, he would proceed analysing the whole topic. An interesting illustration of the same can be found in a very scholarly and very

difficult discussion of whether the affix, 'mayat' means 'vikāra' or 'prācurya'. Under Sūtra I.i.12, Puruṣottama refers to many grammatical works, right from Pāṇini's Astādhyāyī upto the Siddhānteratnākara of Rāmakaṣṇa. Similar is his discussion of almost all the topics. Whenever a certain word is used, he explains the exact implication of the term, if it is very important for the theory, that is propounded. He wants to give us a clear picture of what is implied by the particular term; he is never confused or confusing. We shall here take certain examples to illustrate this point.

Individual souls are said to be anśas of Brahman. In the Bhāṣyaprakāśa at the end of the third pāda of the second Adhyāya, Puruṣottama discusses the exact implication of this term. He says that the term anśa is used in the Smṛtis and the Sūtras, while the term pāda is found in the Śrutis. Both are homonyms and are therefore vague. The word anśa may be used for a limb, a son, a piece, a part of something specific, and a constituent part in a bundle. As the Śruti passage 'Ardho vā eṣa ātmaḥ yat patnīḥ' shows, even a wife can be called an anśa. Similarly the term pāda also means a part or

a limb. Even though any of these meanings can be used without being afraid of the contingency of resorting to *lakṣaṇā*, the relation of the *anśa* and the *anśin* should be understood so as to be in accord with the analogies of the spider and his web and the fire and sparks. This being the case, the *anśa* must be something like a part or a piece, the nature of which is not modified; it is therefore not completely or eternally separate from the *anśin*, nor is it just an attribute of the same.<sup>14</sup>

The term *māyā* is also similarly discussed and explained. Bhāskara says that *māyā* is a revelation devoid of its object. According to Rāmānuja it implies surprise and wonderment. In the Śuddhādvaita however *māyā* is a special power of the Lord. The proof for this is found in the Bhāgavata passages like, 'Naṭaven mūdha māyābhir māyeṣān no jigīṣasi!'<sup>15</sup> *Māyā* thus means the deluding capacity of the Highest Lord.<sup>16</sup>

The term *Bhakti* in the Śuddhādvaita means service and love to the Lord i.e. Premasevā. Taking his clue from the cryptic statement of Vallabha-'*Bhaktiśabdasya pratyayārthah*

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14. A.B.P. pp. 766-767.

15. Bhāgavata. VIII. *xi*. 4.

16. A.B.P. p. 876.



prema, dhātvarthaḥ sevā'<sup>17</sup>, Puruṣottama develops the idea thus: The meaning is expressed by the affix and the base together and primarily by the affix. So the affix 'Ktin' which is capable of expressing the ordinary meaning of a root, is here combined with the root 'Bhaj' and so primarily expresses the act of worshipping. This is of the nature of service. The word sevā has the conventional sense of physical activity, preceded by constancy or frequency, as can be seen from the usages like strīsevā, auśadhasevā etc. From the passages like 'Matsevayā pratītem ca' the said activity can be stated to be of the nature of service. Again these passages inform us of the pūrnatva on account of the sevā. It is possible only when service is mixed with love, otherwise the trouble that it would give would prevent it from being called a puruṣārtha. This being the case, love is the motive and as such the dominant factor in the sevā. Thus it is the meaning of the affix, while the bodily service, which is subordinate to love, is the meaning of the base.<sup>18</sup>

While explaining that the Highest Lord is 'Rasarūpa',

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17. T. Sn. P. p. 75.

18. T. Sn. Ab. p. 75.

Puruṣottama enters into a discussion of the term Rasa. The term Rasa, he says, is used for the taste, ~~that~~ viz. the quality which is grasped by the tongue, the mobile substance, the quintessence and that which produces happiness which can be enjoyed. The scriptural passages, 'Rasam hy evāyam labdhvā-nandī bhavati',<sup>19</sup> 'Ko hy evānyāt kaḥ prānyād yady eṣa ākāśa ānando na syāt,'<sup>20</sup> 'Eṣa hy eva ānandayāti'<sup>21</sup> and others show that Rasa is the bliss, has the purpose of keeping the life-breath, has its place in the cavity of the heart and produces joy. Thus Rasa is 'Hṛdayasthaprāṇitānandajanaka ānanda.' The joy which is produced of this, can be enjoyed in all the limbs and so it can be said to pervade the whole body, even then passages like 'sa mānasīna ātmā janānam' show its place to be the mind. Thus the sentiment which <sup>is</sup> produced in accordance with the theories of the Rasaśāstra, is also an effect of the same Rasa.<sup>21</sup>

An analysis, though short, of the concept of sneha or love is also similarly found. Puruṣottama says that sneha is an attribute of the mind or the soul, it is not desire.

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19. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. II. 7/1

20. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. II. 7.

21. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. II. 7.

22. S. S. pp. 252-253.

'I like it,I have love for it,I am glad at it,but I do not want it',such sentences are used.Similarly,it is not just knowledge,because ,knowledge may be also of our enemies,for whom we have definitely no sneha.Thus sneha is a dharma-  
 22  
 -viśeṣa.

Important concepts of other systems have also been discussed by our author in the same way.One such concept is saṅgati.Puruṣottama explains saṅgati as:'Anantarābhidhāna-  
 -prayojākāṅkṣājānanakajñānaviśayo'nthah'.This means the desire to know why a certain statement is made after that which has already been made.That which is the object of knowledge , required to satisfy that desire,is called saṅgati.It is sixfold,as stated in the work:

Saprasaṅga upodghāto hetutāvasaras tathā,  
 Nirvāhaikaikakāryatve śoḍhā saṅgatir iṣyate.

Prasaṅga is that which can not be avoided,when remembered.

Upodghāta establishes the topic in hand.Hetutā is the relation between the dependent and that upon which it depends.

Avasara is something,which must be stated to satisfy the desire,which does not hinder the progress of the work.

Nirvāḥakatva serves the purpose of advancing the topic.

Ekakāryatva produces an allied effect. This is the explanation of the nature of saṅgati, and not its definition. Puruṣottama himself would like to explain saṅgati as the upekṣānarhatva, (not proper to be neglected) of that which is remembered, while the discussion is being carried on by an intelligent man.<sup>23</sup>

Hetutā and others are the attributes of the upekṣānarhatva and are included in the saṅgati because they are related to the same. Again there is no limitation that saṅgati is only sixfold; other divisions can also be accommodated.<sup>24</sup>

These and many other instances can be adduced to illustrate the analytical approach of Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama's style and method would show that there is something of a modern scholar in him. He has some sense of history, which is said to be so very rare in the works of Indian thinkers. A pointed instance of this is found in the famous Bhāgavata-svarūpaviśayakāśaṅkānirāsevāda, where in Puruṣottama discusses

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23. Sāvadhānapuruṣaprayujyamāṇavākya-prayojakatvena

smṛtasyopekṣānarhatvam eva saṅgatiḥ. A.B.P. pp. 130-131.

24. A.B.P. pp. 130-131.

whether the Bhāgavata Purāṇa is an old ~~work~~. Puruṣottama says that if the Bhāgavata was a modern work, many authoritative writers would not have referred to it in their works. He then proceeds with a list of those authors and works,<sup>25</sup> beginning with Śaṅkara who in his Caturdaśametaviveka refers to the Bhāgavata. He also refers to the commentaries on the Pāṇinīyasaṃskṛtānāmā and Upadeśasāhasrī, Samvatsarapradīpa of Prācīna Gauda (Gaudapāda?), Hemādri-vratadānakhanda, Prakriyā-kaumudī of Rāmacandra, Kālanirṇayadīpikāvivaraṇa of Nṛsiṃhācārya, Saccaritraṇṇāṇṇa of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya, Bhakti-rasāyana of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Bhaktiratnāvalī of Viṣṇu-puri, Kṣemendraprakāśa of Kṣemendra, Śivatatvaviveka of Appayya Dīkṣita, Nirṇayasindhu, Bhagavadbhāskara, Dīnākarodyota, and Caturvīṃśativyākhyā of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. The list found here shows that Puruṣottama has in him something of a modern scholar, who <sup>would</sup> find out such references to prove the antiquity or otherwise of a particular work. Puruṣottama thus can be compared with a modern research scholar.

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25. Bhāgavatasvarūpaviṣayakaśaṅkenirāsavāda.

(III).

Dialectics.

The term dialectics has been used by most of the modern scholars for describing the philosophical method, as found in the Bhāṣyas, their commentaries, and other works of philosophy. Baldwin's Dictionary explains the term thus:

Dialectic:....In ancient philosophy and logic: pertaining to reasoning and argument, and (as a noun) a system or course of reasoning or argument....

Dialectics: (In education): The Art of teaching by means of discussion as seen in Plato's Dialogues and involving as with Socrates inductive appeals to special instances.<sup>26</sup>

Dr. P. D. Chandratre in his thesis on Methodology points out certain important distinctions between Platonic dialectic and Vāda-paddhati, as followed by Sanskrit writers.<sup>27</sup> While we may not here enter into a discussion regarding this point, it will be sufficient to say that the term dialectic has been loosely used for the Vāda method.

Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama informs us

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26-Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Vol. I. p. 278.

27. Chandratre. Methodology. p. 238 ff.

that there are three types of Kathā or debate, Vāda, Jalpa, and Vitandā.<sup>28</sup> Vāda proceeds with the sole purpose of arriving at the ascertained truth.<sup>29</sup> Gautama calls it a discussion with students, teachers, co-students and persons, who are interested in reaching at right conclusions.<sup>30</sup> Vātsyāyana describes it as a collection of statements made by various speakers for arguing out various views leading ultimately to the acceptance of one of these views as the demonstrated truth.<sup>31</sup> Gautama defines Vāda as 'Pramānatarkasāadhanopālambhaḥ siddhānta-viruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣepratipakṣaparigrahaḥ Vādaḥ.'<sup>32</sup> Chendratre translates it as: 'Vāda consists in putting forward (by two persons) of a conception and counter-conception, in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings-neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine (or thesis) and both of

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28. Tisraḥ kathā bhavanti, vādo, jalpo vitandā ceti.

Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya. p. 70.

29. Tattvanirṇayaphalaḥ kathāviśeṣo vādaḥ. Servadarśanaśaṅgraha. p. 239.

30. Tam śiṣyagurusabrahmacāriviśiṣṭaśreyorthibhir anasūyibhir abhūpeyāt. Nyāyasūtras. IV. ii. 48.

31. Vādaḥ khalu nānāpravakṛtkaḥ pratyadhikarāṇasādhano'nyatarādhikarāṇanirṇayēvasāno vākyasamūhaḥ.

Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya. p. 6.

32. Nyāyasūtras. I. ii. 1.

which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through five factors.<sup>33</sup>

Gautama defines jalpa as : 'Yathoktopapannaś chala-jātinigrahassthānasāadhanopālambho jalpah.'<sup>34</sup> He explains vitandā as : 'Sa pratipakṣasthāpanahīno vitandā.'<sup>35</sup> In jalpa the disputant tries to overthrow the opponent and repudiate him in any way right or wrong. The vitandā is purely destructive, wherein the opponent is just refuted, while no alternative thesis is offered. Thus the Vāda is healthier than the other two.

The Platonic dialectic, as explained by Hocking, comes very near to this. "Socrates and Plato developed a method of mental experimentation, which Plato called the 'Dialectic'-a method well-fitted for use in conversation or dialogue. It consisted in taking up any belief, one of the speakers chose to present; treating it as an hypothesis, and following it ruthlessly to its extreme conclusions.

If for one reason the consequences of the hypothesis were

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33. Chandratre. Methodology. p. 31.

34. Nyāyasūtras. I. ii. 2.

35. Nyāyasūtras. I. ii. 3.



unacceptable, a new <sup>h</sup> Hypothesis must be tried; and the process may be continued until one is found which leads to no error. Thus the dialectic is a progressive thinking process... The true hypothesis would be the dialectical survivor.'<sup>36</sup> "

Coming to the Indian Vāda, we can say, following Dr. Chandratre, that according to the definition of Gautama, quoted above there are three features that constitute a Vāda. Firstly the contrary view points should be supported and condemned by means of proofs and reasonings. Secondly none of the view points, accepted or repudiated must be entirely against the main thesis. Vātsyāyana explains the significance of this condition when he says that the fallacy of contradiction (Hetvābhāsa) of Siddhāntavirodha, can be used in the Vāda, but the proper place for the clinchers or nigrahasthanas is the jalpa or vitandā, and not Vāda.<sup>37</sup> Third condition of the Vāda is that both the supporting and condemning must be in accordance with the

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36. W. E. Hocking: Types of Philosophy. p. 489. Quoted by Chandratre: Methodology. pp. 29-30.

37. Siddhāntam abhyupetye tadvirodhi viruddhaḥ iti hetvābhāsaḥ nigrahasthānasyānujñā vāde. Vātsyāyanabhāṣya. p. 70. Also see. Jalpe nigrahasthānaviniyogād vāde tatpratishedhaḥ. Vātsyāyanabhāṣya. p. 70.

reasoning of five-membered syllogism. It should be however noted that mostly all the writers on the Vedānta carry on with the three-membered syllogism consisting of *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *udāharana*.

In the light of what has been stated above, we would like to examine the Vādagranthas of Puruṣottama. The Vādagranthas would in themselves provide for a very important study of Puruṣottama's dialectics, because they are independent, compact and to the point. A glance at these Vādagranthas will show that Puruṣottama begins many of his Vādas with a verse, in which he makes a certain statement, according to the accepted hypothesis of his view. The said statement is challenged by the Opponent, who does not subscribe to the view and thus argues against it. Thus the discussion starts. An analysis of some of his Vādas is given below; so that we may be able to find out the salient features of his Vādagranthas.

The Prastāvāda, as we have already said, is a composite work of three actions or avāntaravādas. It begins with the verse:-

Śrutisīrasi yasya mahimā nirupadhir

Īso'pi yasya khalu mahimā,

Tem Kṛṣṇam ādimūrtim namāmi

Niravadyasadgunam brahma.

38.

The first quarter leads to the discussion on the meaning of the Vedāntas. The opponent asks as to how the first quarter can be explained. Puruṣottama replies that all the Vedāntas teach Brahman i.e. they are Brahma-para. The followers of Śaṅkara points out here the 'A-vāstāvika-brahma-paratva', to which the author says that this is a śrauta system and only the Śrutis should be accepted as the valid Pramāṇa and the thoughts, which go against them, should be countered on the strength of reasoning, which does not go against the Śrutis. The author then goes on to show how the belief in the Sopādhika-brahma-paratva of the Śrutis is untenable, as it is not vouched for by the scriptural evidence. That Brahman has attributes is made out in the Śrutis and only the material attributes are rejected. Thus Brahman is an abode of contradictory attributes. So far, Puruṣottama bases all his observations on the scriptural

passages, hundreds of which are quoted and interpreted.

Puruṣottama now attacks the theory of Avidyā on logical grounds. He asks whether Avidyā is with or without beginning, whether it is related to the jīva or Brahman, and whether it is sat, asat, both sat and asat ~~and~~ or neither sat nor asat. Puruṣottama points out that none of these alternatives is acceptable.<sup>39</sup> Puruṣottama again comes back to the scriptural passages which he explains in extenso to show how they can not be called upon to prove the theory of meya. Puruṣottama at the end proves the avikṛtaparināma-vāda on the scriptural authority and finally comes again to his point, 'Tasmāc chrutiśirahi nirupadhir eva brahmano mahimā pratipādyata iti sūpapañnam.'<sup>40</sup>

The second part of the Brahastavāda is said to be based on the second quarter of the verse quoted above. Puruṣottama begins with a question. Accepting that Brahman has endless forms, should all the forms be accepted as equal or should we think that one of them is principal and the others are subordinate? Something that it is in fact

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39. Prh. pp. 21-22.

40. Prh. p. 34.

formless but assumes forms owing to māyā and so, whether they are equal or subordinate in relation to one another, does not make any difference. Others say that all the forms are māyika, of them that of Viṣṇu is the highest. Still others opine for Śiva. The followers of Bhedavāda make out that only one is Brahman, while the other is jīva. The author then says that in fact Brahman is beyond the three qualities, regulates the māyā, is an abode of contradictory qualities and is thus endowed with all the forms. It is and is not an agent, it is thus not an object of any dispute, it is faultless and on the analogy of blind men and an elephant, it assumes various forms to give the reward to various worshippers. The theory of māyā has already been refuted. The Bhedavāda is not taught by the Śrutis. Thus the difference of the forms should be discussed. Out of these the Highest is transcendental and another is of the nature of Vibhūti, the others are still inferior to it. Which of them is Mahāmahimayukta? <sup>41</sup> This is a sort of introduction to what Puruṣottama really wants to write. He then states the views of Appayya Dīkṣita as found in

Sivataddvaviveka, and refutes him thoroughly with a Vaisnavaite interpretation of the Śrutis, Smṛtis, Purāṇas, and all that. At the end he says that Bhagavat is the principal form of Brahman, and Śiva is the main Vibhūti. Thus the proposition in the second quarter of the verse is established. <sup>42</sup>

The third part deals with the third quarter of the said verse. Puruṣottama here says that Kṛṣṇa is the Ādi-mūrti and discusses it on the basis of the Purāṇas and minor Upaniṣads, and refutes the contention that Kṛṣṇatva is māyika.

Panditakarabhindipāla is something like an extension of the second part of the Prahasta. It begins with:

Vividheṣu Vividhaphaladeḥ śivādirupaḥ sadā svayam  
tv agunaḥ,  
Bhakteṣu nirgunatvam kurvan harir uttamo jayati.<sup>43</sup>

The whole discussion is based on the first quarter and is directed against Saivism. The basis here is of the

42. Prh. p. 233.

43. Panditkerabhindipāla. Avatāravādavalī. p. 247.

Purāṇas and minor scriptural texts.

Bhedābhedasvarūpanirṇaya begins with:

Brahmābhedopāsāṇāj jñānato vā  
 Brahmātmaikyē'py anśatām atyajantah,  
 Yasyaiśveryād āsate yanniyamyās  
 Tam Śrīkṛṣṇam devadevam namāmi.<sup>44</sup>

The verse thus states, the oneness of Brahman and ātman, the anśatva of the individual soul in spite of the said oneness and that everything is controlled and regulated by the Highest Lord. Thus it is necessary to discuss whether the abheda tolerates the bheda or not. The opponent argues that it does not, and makes out a case for absolute Monism. Puruṣottama replies that the theory of Satkāryavāda, which is based on the Śrutis, shows that everything existed even prior to the creation. So the attributes like ākāra and kāryatva should be accepted as existing in Brahman. If they are different from Brahman, it would go against the Advaitaśrutis. Hence we should accept that Brahman is endowed with the required attributes and is the cause.

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44. Bhedābhedasvarūpanirṇaya. Vādāvalī. p. 16.

The effects are one with the cause, though they are mutually different from one another. Similar is the case with the relation of Brahman and Jagat. The relationship between Brahman and the jīvas is like that of gold and a lump of gold. This is also abheda, which tolerates bheda. As here the whole argument proceeds on the bases of Satkāryavāda, Puruṣottama has to refute the Asatkāryavāda, and the belief in the Prāgabhāva. This is based on reasoning and not verbal testimony. Puruṣottama again comes back to his point and shows how the Bhedasehiṣṇu-abheda is to be accepted in the states of deluge and liberation.

Sṛṣṭibhedavāda is a very important work of Puruṣottama. It begins with:

Yo līlayā kila gavāṃ avanāya gotraṃ  
 Haste' tikomaletame kṛpayā dadhāra,  
 Yadrūpaṃ etad akhilaṃ yata āsa yasmāt  
 Sadvad vibhāti tam ajaṃ śaraṇaṃ prapadye.<sup>45</sup>

The statement of the third quarter is called in to question by those, who believe in the Paramānuvāda.

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45. Sṛṣṭibhedavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 82.



Puruṣottama refutes them by strongly attacking the very thesis that the paramāṇus can be the cause. The definition of the atom, as given by the Vaiśeṣikas, is criticised by him vehemently. He says that it is not from the subtle that the gross is produced, on the other hand the gross cause gives rise to subtle effects, as can be surmised from various instances. Puruṣottama also takes the opportunity to refute the concept of Abhāva. After thus repudiating the ārambhavāda, Puruṣottama refers to the Anīśvara sāṅkhyas and their theories. They are answered mainly on the scriptural grounds, though the non-sentiency of the Prakṛti is also pointed out. Thus Puruṣottama says that the sentient Brahman should be accepted as the material and the efficient cause as also the agent of the world on the authority of the Śrutis.<sup>46</sup> Now Puruṣottama here refers to the Ekadeśin who does not agree to the theory of Parināma and who therefore advances the Vivartavāda. The author here details the arguments of the māyāvādin, for rejecting the Sāṅkhyan parināmavāda and accepting the māyāvāda. Puruṣottama refutes the māyāvāda also

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46. Tasmād brahma cetanam jagata upādānam nimittam kartr  
ceti śrutibhya eva mantavyam. Vādavalī. p. 96.

on scriptural authority, though he uses logic also.<sup>47</sup> At the end the Śuddhādvaita views of Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva and Avikrtaparināma are fully explained.

In the beginning of the Khyātivāda we have the following verse:

Yanmāyā bahihkṣiptā khyāyate buddhir arthavat,  
Nivartate ca yadbodhāt tam namāmi janārdaṇam.<sup>48</sup>

The objector can not agree to the first line, but Puruṣottama answers his objections and says that he is in favour of the Anyakhyāti. Puruṣottama refers to the Naiyāyikas, who believe in the Anyathākhyāti. This is refuted on purely logical grounds. Similarly the Bhāttas, the Prābhākaras, the Māyāvādins, the Sāṅkhya and Rāmānuja are referred to. All are refuted except the last, whose view is also not accepted in toto. The difference in the views held by the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Śuddhādvaita is described and explained by the author. Puruṣottama shows how both Akhyāti and Anyakhyāti are accepted in his system.

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47. Srṣṭibhedavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 104.

48. Khyātivāda. Vādāvalī. p. 119.

Andhakāravāda is introduced with the verse:

Darśaya nātha guhāyām tamovṛtāyām svataḥ samāgatya,  
Mucukunda iva śayāne mayi kṛpayānehasāpi vapuh.<sup>49</sup>

The opponent does not agree to the term tamovṛtāyām because the tamas which is just absence of light, can not envelope anything. Puruṣottama refers to the view that the tamas is the separate substance. According to the followers of Kanāda darkness is not a substance. Similar is the view of the author of Pratyaktattvadīpikā. Puruṣottama says that Tamas is a substance, which is capable of enveloping and which is an effect of māyā, which is the mūla-śakti. In proving this he refutes both the Vaiśeṣikas and the author of Pratyak-tattvadīpikā.

Pratibimbavāda similarly is intended to prove that the image is a separate object altogether. The discussion is introduced with the verse:

Jyotis tamālenīlam karuṇāśīlam mudā staumi,  
Harati tamonikurembam yatpratibimbam svakīyānām.<sup>50</sup>

The second line is objected to by the disputant who says that the Pratibimba is not an existing entity at all.

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49. Andhakāravāda. Vādāvalī. p. 131.

50. Pratibimbavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 193.

Puruṣottama refutes the arguments and says that it is an entity on the ground of verbal testimony and also on account of perception. It is different from other objects because of its māyikatva. He refers to other views also, though he does not name any of the theorists.

Jīvapratibimbatvakhaṇḍanavāda begins with,

Yac cidanāṣeṣu jīveṣu pratibimbādirūpetam,

Vadanti matabhedais tam śrīkṛṣṇam sarvadaśraye.<sup>51</sup>

The Opponent does not agree with the theory of Anśatva and says that jīva is a Pratibimba or an ābhāsa. Puruṣottama here enumerates six views, held by the followers of Śaṅkara. Puruṣottama refutes those views on the basis of reasoning and scriptures both and establishes the theory of Anśatva.

Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda is a very important work in as much as it deals with the theory of manifestation and non-manifestation, which constitutes the basic plank of the Śuddhādvaita. The first verse runs:

Yadāvirbhāve ānande āvirbhavati sarvataḥ,

Tirobhavanti santāpās tam śraye gokuleśvaram.<sup>52</sup>

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51. Jīvapratibimbatvakhaṇḍanavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 170.

52. Āvirbhāvatirobhāvavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 182.

The opponent says that one who does not agree to the production and destruction of the effects can not also explain the manifestation and non-manifestation. Puruṣottama makes out a very strong case for his view. He discusses the Satkāryavāda, utpatti, prāgabhāva and all the theories connected with the Abhāvas, vehemently refutes them and finally explains the Śuddhādvaita concept of manifestation and non-manifestation and how it is to be applied to the creation of the world and the jīvas.

Lastly we shall refer to the Khalālapana vidhvamsavāda, which is metrical and thus unique in certain respects. It does not begin with a verse to which the opponent objects. Puruṣottama here straightly plunges into discussion, when he says that certain followers of the Śākta system doubt the Śaktitva of the Highest Lord, looking to the ornaments worn by him. Puruṣottama gives the authority of scriptures to prove the masculine character of God. He also refers to the Svāminyaṣṭaka and the Sarasvatīsthāpana.

We will not give an analysis of other Vādas like the Ūrdhvapundradhāraṇavāda or the Tulasīmālādharāṇavāda, firstly

because many of them are important only for the Śuddhādvaita practices and secondly because the Vādas which we have referred to will be sufficient for studying the vāda-paddhati of Puruṣottama. A study of the above Vādas will make clear the following points.

Most of the Vādas of Puruṣottama follow a definite fixed pattern. The first verse in almost each of these tracts is written in the form of a benediction, but besides, it also suggests the hypothesis, which is immediately tried. Sometimes we find, as in the first part of the Prahasa, that logic is subordinated to scriptures, but that is quite in keeping with the accepted view that the śabda is the highest authority in the Suprasensuous realms of metaphysics. It must however be stated to the credit of Puruṣottama, that whenever he is against a certain theory, he uses logic if that particular theory is advanced on the ground of reasoning and only when the opponent adduces scriptures in his support, Puruṣottama meets on that ground. The ~~first~~ part and even the whole of the Prahasa-vāda is directly concerned with the scriptures. When however the occasion arises the discourse is carried on

with reasoning. Other hypotheses are also put forward, as in *Sr̥stibhedavāda* and *Khy̥tīvāda*. They are however refuted by our author, who gives various arguments, logical and scriptural to support his own view and to refute the views of others. We may say that this comes very near to the Platonic Dialectic, as explained by Hocking. There is however one very important point of difference. In Platonic Dialectic the first hypothesis which has been put forward need not be necessarily accepted and other views are tried when the first is found unacceptable. In the *Vādagranthas*, as we have seen, the hypothesis suggested by the benedictory verse is the author's own view about the point. Thus the same is finally accepted after other rival theories are rejected. It can be pointed out, though it is very rare, that the rival theory is not entirely repudiated, while it is neither accepted fully. Thus Rāmānuja's view about erroneous perception is not completely refuted in the *Khy̥tīvāda*.

We can as well say that these tracts satisfy the requirements of the Indian Vāda. The contrary view points are supported and refuted on the basis of proofs and reasoning. We have noted above that proofs for a Vedāntin

includes scriptures as the final authority. They are to be supported by tarka or reasoning. The ancient logicians classify tarka into 11 but the modern school accepts only 5: Ātmēśraya (Ignoratio elenchi), anyonyāśraya (Petitio principii), cakraka (circle), anavesthā (regressus ad infinitum), and pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum). The other six are: vyāghāta, lāghava, gaurava, utsarga, apavāda, and vaijātya.<sup>53</sup> Many of these tarkas are very often found in the Vādas of Puruṣottama. We may here take some illustrations.

The Pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga is found in the Bheda-bhedasvarūpenirṇaya, when our author says that if the attributes like ākāra, kāryatva, and the like are not accepted as existing in Brahman before creation, the scriptural passages teaching of the satkāryavāda would be rendered meaningless. If the effects are said to exist separately from Brahman, it would go against the passages teaching oneness. Hence for reconciling these two, we shall have to accept Brahman, which is endowed with these attributes, as the cause.<sup>54</sup> This is Pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga.

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53. Cf. Sarvadarśanasamgraha. pp. 238-239.

54. Vādāvalī. p. 18.



The fault of anyonyāśraya has been pointed out by Puruṣottama in the views of those who believe that Īśvara is the sentiency reflected in the impressions of the creatures, remaining under the influences of māyā, which has its abode in Brahman; and jīva is the sentiency reflected in the internal organ imagined by māyā. To this Puruṣottama says that the reflection must be accepted only of that which is not defiled by upādhis on the ground of the illustrations of ghaṭāśkāśa etc. This being the case, Īśvara cannot possibly be accepted as existing, because the māyātamas has its own solid constituents and the like and thus they would obstruct the impressions. (Dhīvāsanās) If the constituents are not many, then the hetu cannot be explained and if one believes in the nature as such, it would lead to the contingency of svabhāvavāda. Besides there will be pātītiā principii in so far as the svabhāva can be explained, only when reflection is established and the reflection can be accepted, only when the svabhāva is established. Thus there is anyonyāśraya between svabhāva and pratibimba.<sup>55</sup>

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55. Vādāvalī. p. 173.

Ātmāśraya and anavasthā are found together when Puruṣottama is refuting the concept of production in the asatkāryavāda. As it is with number, so with production also we should believe that production is produced. This is not only without any proof, but it leads to the fallacy of regressus because utpatti requires another utpatti, this again the third and so on. It should not be stated that utpatti is produced from it self, on the basis of the usages like 'Utpattir jāta', because that would be ātmāśraya.<sup>56</sup>

Besides these which have been illustrated here, there are many other reasons found in Puruṣottama's argumentation. Thus for instance we find mānābhāva,<sup>57</sup> drṣṭāntābhāva,<sup>58</sup> prasiddhatva,<sup>59</sup> kalpanāgaaurava,<sup>60</sup> ativyāpti,<sup>61</sup> etc.

-----The second requirement of a Vāda is that both the view points should not be completely against the main thesis. The idea behind this requirement is, as we have seen

56. Vādāvalī. p. 189.

57. Ibid. p. 86.

58. Ibid. p. 189.

59. Ibid. p. 187.

60. Ibid. p. 189.

61. Ibid. p. 201.

above, that the clinchers should not be used in a Vāda, the proper place for them being Jālpa or vitandā. In the Vādas of our author the contingency of Siddhāntabhāṅga is very often found used against the adversary. We shall see one illustration of this.

The atom is defined in the Vaiśeṣika system as :  
 ' Bhautikatve sati nityo gatinān paramāṇuh. ' What is the bhautikatva here? Is it bhūta-sambandhitva? In that case all the primordial elements like earth do not exist in the beginning of creation; there can be no question of the bhūta-sambandhitva. If the opponent takes into account the existence of space, it would also include the mind, and thus the definition will be too wide. If for averting this contingency he refuses to accept the creation as such, the atoms themselves can not exist and this would be tantamount to Siddhāntabhāṅga. 62

The third requirement of a Vāda is regarding the five-membered syllogism. The writers on the Vedānta, however, do not generally give all the five but they give only the first three members viz. Pratijñā, Hetu, and Udaहरण. Puraṣottama's Vādas afford us with many

sylllogisms.

One important point which we should not note is that the Vādas of Puruṣottama never assume the form of jalpa or vitandā. Most of his Vādagranthas are intended to prove something and not to disprove something. The Prāhastā and the Khaḍḍālāpanavidhvansa Vādas are specially directed against the Śaivas and the Śāktas respectively,, but there is not just an attitude of putting down an adversary. In the Prāhastā Puruṣottama proves that Brahman is the teaching of the Vedāntas, that Śiva is the principal Vibhūti and that Kṛṣṇa is the mūlarūpa. In the Khaḍḍālāpanavidhvansavāda we find that Puruṣottama tries to emphasise the personal aspect of God. One may perhaps point out that the Jīvapratibimbatvaḥḍāṇavāda, as its name indicates, is meant to refute the theory of the followers of Śāṅkara. The last verse of the Vāda also lends support to this.<sup>63</sup> But we should bear in mind that after refuting the theory of Pratibimba, Puruṣottama shows how the theory of anśatva is faultless. The Prasāṅga dialectics is often found in these works, when

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63. Iti 'śrīvallabhācāryavācūm āśayagocaram,

Pratibimbādirūpatvaḥḍāṇanam viśadikṛtam.

Vādāvalī, p. 182.

Puruṣottama- offers different alternatives for understanding the opponent's theory and rejects all of them. But the trend of arguments is never destructive for the sake of being simply destructive. The alternatives are on the other hand offered to show the inherent inconsistencies in the theory, which is attacked. Thus when he says that the māyā is neither sat, nor asat, nor again both sat and asat and not even different from both sat and asat, he points out how the theory of māyā cannot be logically explained and accepted.

The observations, which we have made regarding the Vādegranthas, are equally applicable to the discussions, that are found in other works of our author.

As regards the fallacies of reasons (hetvābhāsas) the author himself discusses the topic in his Prasthāna-ratnākara. We would like to give here his own explanations and illustrations. The Naiyāyikas classify fallacious reasons into five, savyābhicāra, viruddha, sat-pratipakṣa, asiddha and bādhitā.

Savyābhicāra is the straying reason which is explained as: Sēdhyatadabhāvasādhakatayā pratīyamānaḥ. It is twofold,

common (Sādhārāṇa) and uncommon (asādhārāṇa). The former is that which proves both the sādhyā and its absence by positive concomitance, e.g. Dhūmavān Vahneḥ. The latter does the same by negative concomitance, e.g. Śabdah anityah. Śabdatvāt. The logicians give a third variety also called non-conclusive (anupasanbhārin), which is explained as, Avṛttisādhyaakatva, e.g. Ākāśavān. Diśah. Sometimes it is understood as kevalānvayidharmāvacchinnapakṣaka, e.g. Sarvaṃ anityam. Prameyatvāt. The fault here lies with the obstruction in understanding the negative concomitance.

Adverse reason or viruddha hetu is explained as, sādhyā-asamānādhikarāṇo hetuḥ. The hetu is not coeval with the sādhyā but is entirely different from it, e.g. Gauḥ. Āśvatvāt. This, says Puruṣottama, is not different from the sverūpāsiddhi.

Sat-protipakṣa or opposable reason is that which obstructs the understanding of the sādhyā, e.g. Jalam uṣṇam. Sparśavattvāt. Noṣṇam. Atejastvāt.

Unestablished reason or asiddha is explained as: 'Vyabhicārādyenyaपरामर्शप्रतिबंधकतāvacchedakadharmatvam asiddhiḥ.' It has three varieties. (1) Svarūpāsiddhi,

e.g. Ghaṭeḥ prthīvi. Paṭatvāt. (2) Āśrayāsiddhi, e.g. Gaganakamalam surabhikamalam. Surabhikamalatvāt. (3) Vyāpyatvāsiddhi, e.g. the Dhūmanisthavyāpti is absent in a cloud of dust. It can also be said to exist when the Sādhya or the hetu is unknown.

Bādha or stultified reason is explained as: 'Pakṣe sādhyā-sūnyatvam!' Thus for instance fire does not exist in water.

Besides the five, which have been enumerated above, Puruṣottama says that upādhi is also a fallacy. It is defined as: 'Sādhyaavyāpakatve seti sādhanavyāpakatvam upādhiḥ.' Thus for instance the syllogism like, 'Yūgiyā hinsā adharmaśādhanam hinsātvāt.' has this fault because it does not take into account the niśedha of hinsā when enjoined in the scriptures.<sup>64</sup>

One important point, which we may here note with regard to the dialectical method of Puruṣottama, is that as an honest debater, he does not resort to the unfair means of argumentation as employed in the jalpa or vitaṇḍā. Dialectic quibbling or chala is one such way which means a wilful misrepresentation of the views of the opponent.<sup>65</sup> It is classified into three, vāk-chala, sāmānyā-chala and upacāra-chala. In the first, the meaning, which is not intended to be conveyed, is assumed, when

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64. Pr. pp. 144-146.

65. Vacanāvaghāto'rthavikalpopapattyā chalam. Nyāyesūtras. I. ii. 10.

the statement of the opponent is vague. In the second an absurd signification is urged by using too generic a term. The third is based on the secondary meaning of the words. It is necessary that the views of the opponent should be correctly presented before they are attacked, and we find this particular virtue in the discussions of Puruṣottama, who has never taken recourse to any of the chalas, mentioned above. Not only so, but at many places we shall find the quotations of the view-points of others. Thus for instance the catuṣkoṭīka dialectics of the Bauddhas,<sup>66</sup> the theory of Syādvāda, as explained by Anantavīrya,<sup>67</sup> the views of logicians, Mīmāṃsakas and others given in the ~~works~~ of Puruṣottama would show that Puruṣottama is always careful in the presentations of the opinions of others. Not only so but at some places he would also show the contents of certain books. Thus for instance he says that the Sāṅkhya, well-known by the name of Kapilasūtras, has two versions. One has 28 Sūtras and is commented upon by Pañcāśikha, the other is Sāṅkhyaprameśanasūtra in 6 Adhyāyas. While the first version

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66. A.B.P.p.658.

67. A.B.P.p.664.



just mentions the topics taught in the system, it is the second which explains them fully.<sup>68</sup>

We have noted above that Puruṣottama has the dignity and elegance of style. As a result of this he does not often jeer at his opponents. The accusations against Śaṅkara found in the works of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa are almost totally absent. He treats Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, all the Ācāryas with equal respect, as can be seen from the fact that he never uses singular number for them. Singular is used by him only for Śrīkaṇṭha and Bhikṣu, for neither of whom he seems to have much regard. For Śrīkaṇṭha of course the sectarian spirit might have invited criticism and lowered the position of his school. Puruṣottama also has adopted a critical and liberal attitude. There is however sometimes some caustic criticism from his pen,<sup>69</sup> but they

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68. A.B.P. p. 154.

69. Cf. (1) Ata evam satyapi yat tadevicāreṇānandamaye duḥkhā-  
-stitvakatham tad grāṇthakṛto mahāduḥkhasamskārasya  
prāblyam eva gamayati iti dik. A.B.P. p. 199. This is against  
Śaṅkara. (2) Ata idam bhikṣāvaiyagryadaśayām evāvādīd iti  
dik. A.B.P. p. 237. This is against Vijñānabhikṣu. (3) Vaiśeṣi-  
-kadarśanasya ulūkarūpiṇā kṛtātvaṭ... Vādāvalī.  
p. 140. This is against the Vaiśeṣikas in the Andhakāravāda,  
etc.

are very rare. Barring some stray passages we can say that Puruṣottama maintains a high standard, below which he does not go.

The last point, which we should take in to account in relation to Puruṣottama's argumentation is whether he is himself open to the charge of punarukta, which is a clincher. In many of his works the same arguments are repeated. The theory that darkness is an object is found discussed in the Prasthānakatnākara,<sup>70</sup> Andhakāravāda,<sup>71</sup> and in the Āvaranabhāṅga.<sup>72</sup> Similarly the theory of jīva-pratibimbatva is refuted strongly in the Prasthānakatnākara,<sup>73</sup> the Vāda bearing the same name,<sup>74</sup> and the Āvaranabhāṅga.<sup>75</sup> That an individual soul is atomic is proved in the Āvaranabhāṅga,<sup>76</sup> and Anubhāsyaprekāśa.<sup>77</sup> The way in which God can be realised is explained in the Anubhāsyaprekāśa,<sup>78</sup> and

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70. Pr. p. 111. ff.

71. Andhakāravāda. Vādāvalī. p. 13. ff.

72. T. S. Ab. p. 125. ff.

73. Pr. p. 129. ff.

74. Jīva-pratibimbatvatthandānavāda. Vādāvalī. p. 170. ff.

75. T. Sn. Ab. p. 102. ff.

76. T. S. Ab. p. 92. ff.

77. A. B. P. p. 798 ff.

78. A. B. P. p. 803. ff.

Prasthānaratnākera,<sup>79</sup> The passages being completely similar.

The Sṛṣṭiprakriyā in the Anubhāsyaprakāśa<sup>80</sup> should be compared with that in the Prasthānaratnākera.<sup>81</sup> The refutation of the concept of Abhāva is found at many places.<sup>82</sup> All these passages have a close affinity not only from the point of view of arguments but even expressions, to the extent that one appears to have been almost quoted from another. It is quite likely that Puruṣottama might have quoted in his works from other works of his own. But does this constitute the fault of repetition? Repetition would be a fault only when it occurs in the same work and not in different works. On the other hand Puruṣottama's intention seems to be that even if one of his works is read, the reader can understand the arguments which lead to the position accepted by the Śuddhādvaita. The repetition may strike one, who reads many of his works.

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79.Pr.p.137.

80.A.B.P.p.810.ff.

81.Pr.p.160.ff.

82.Pr.p.111.ff, T.Sn.Ab.p.89.ff, Sṛṣṭibhedavāda, Āvirbhāva-tirobhāvavāda, etc.

(IV).

'Important refutations'.

Turussottama has refuted almost all other systems in one way or another. It is difficult to show here how he has refuted all these theories, because it will make a Volume in itself if we take down all his arguments, advanced by him against others. It will however be useful to see some<sup>of</sup> his important refutations.

While the Buddhistic theories are rejected by him, when commenting upon Anubhāṣya, he has independently repudiated the Buddhistic theory of Śūnyavāda. He asks whether the proof by which the nihilist establishes the void, exists or does not exist. If it does exist the existence of the pramāṇa would go against the accepted principle of void. If it does not exist, how can the principle of void be established with the help of a Pramāṇa, which does not exist at all?

The Buddhists advance their famous four-cornered dialectics for establishing the theory of void. They give four alternatives, sat, asat, sadasat, and sadasadvilaksana, and reject them all. That, which does not exist at all, can not be produced by the usage of words. Thus for instance

the horn of a hare does not exist at all. That which exists can not be produced either from that which exists or from that which does not exist. The pot or a sprout is produced only by the destruction of a lump of clay or a seed respectively, and so it is not produced from bhāva. It can neither be produced from abhāva, because otherwise the essence of non-existence must inhere in the effect, but it is not seen inherent. It can not be produced from itself, because that would be tantamount to the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, and also that of absence of purpose. It cannot further be produced from anything else because in that case everything will be produced from everything, in as much as the other thing, which is the cause, is not definite and thus may be anything. Thus when the concept of production is rejected, that of destruction is also similarly refuted. We can not again accept both sat and asat, because as sat and asat are mutually different from each other, one thing cannot be both. The last alternative is also not possible because one thing cannot be different from both sat and asat, and nothing is seen corresponding to it in the world. Hence the void or Śūnyatā, which is kept out of the four alternatives, is the only principle and the attainment of void is

salvation according to them.

Puruṣottama gives a spirited reply to this. Is the principle of void arrived at by the nihilist on the basis of any proof or just on the strength of the *vaśtu* without taking the help of any proof? It can not be latter, because then it would be well known to all like the space and there would be no dispute regarding the same. Again does that strength exist or not? If it does, then the *śūnya* which is the abode of this strength must also exist and hence it cannot be kept out of the four alternatives. Similar is the case if it does not exist. Coming to the first alternative, even the *pramāṇa* must be either existent ~~or~~ or non-existent and this would again bring the whole thing in the four alternatives. What again is the proof, by which the void is established? Is it perception or inference? The former is not possible, because the object of perception is not well known to all. Inference is also not helpful. The syllogism, whatever is inexplicable is *śūnya*, is not proper, because of the want of illustration. For the Buddhists, everything is included in the *pakṣa*. If another syllogism is tried, 'Ghaṭaḥ śūnyaḥ. Uktarītyā vicārāśahatvāt. Paṭaḥvat,' then

there is the fallacy of straying reason because in the case of the piece of cloth or the golden ornaments, the theory of the production of an effect after the destruction of a cause (Upamrdya prādurbhāvaḥ) is not accepted by all. Hence we must accept the theory of 'Bhāvādā bhāvotpattiḥ', and that would go against the vicārāśeḥatva, which has been made out. The nihilists are thus refuted by their own arguments.<sup>83</sup>

After refuting the Jain theory of Syādvāda following Vallabha, Puruṣottama refers to one Anantavīrya, who says that the seven statements are based upon the vivakṣā or the desire to express a particular thing. Thus when we want to posit a thing, we would say 'Syād asti', and if we desire to negate, it the statement would be 'Syān nāsti'. If both positing and negating are desired in a certain order, we have 'Syād asti ca nāsti ca'. If on the other hand both are desired to be stated simultaneously then the sentence is 'Syād avācyaṃ'. If the positive is to be stated as indescribable, we have 'Syād asti ca avācyaṃ ca', and if that is a case with the negative, then 'Syān nāsti ca avācyaṃ ca' would be the sentence. If all the three are

desired to be expressed, we have the last statement, 'Syād  
asti ca nāsti ca avācyaṃ ca'.

Puruṣottama asks whether the seven statements which are explained on the ground of Vivakṣā, are the natural attributes of the objects or they are adventitious or super-imposed or they have that particular thing as their object. If they are natural attributes, they definitely exist and the question of any desire to express does not arise. They cannot be adventitious, because in the absence of definite natural attributes, the adventitious ones cannot be stated, as it would go against perception. Nor they can be super-imposed, because the attributes, which are superimposed, can not make the existing ones indefinite. The last alternative is equally wrong, because just by imagining any such bhaṅga, the natural attributes can not be made indefinite. The ancient scholars have already shown how they are mutually inconsistent and contradictory.<sup>84</sup>

Puruṣottama is very critical of the Vaiśeṣika concept of paramāṇus. He has refuted the vaiśeṣika theories of



paramānus as the cause, while commenting upon Anubhāṣya.<sup>85</sup>

In the Sṛṣṭibhedavāda, however, he attacks the very definition of paramānus, as given by them. The paramānus is defined by them as : 'Bhautikatve sati nityo gatiṁ paramānuh.' What is meant by bhautikatva here? It can not be the quality of being related to the primordial elements, because in the beginning of creation, we can not imagine the existence of elements like the earth, other than those, which are to be created. If the Vaiśeṣikas point to the existence of space, the definition would as well apply to the mind also. If they do not accept the state in the beginning of creation, the paramānus themselves cannot be accepted and this would amount to Siddhāntabhanga. Bhautikatva again cannot be bhūtasamavāyitva, the quality of being inherent in the elements, because the primordial elements themselves do not exist as shown above. If the definition is some how understood because of yogyatā, even then it is too wide and would include the mind also on the strength of the description of the mānasa-sṛṣṭi in the Purāṇas and the Yogasāstra. If that is accepted as istāpatti, just as

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85. A.B.P.p.620. ff.

the Paramāṇus would be fivefold, the mind also would be partite and this would go against the eternal nature of the mind. If that is also an iṣṭāpatti, then the Śabdaprāmāṇya is left off by the Opponent and the accepted principle is nullified. The opponent is thus on the horns of a dilemma.

The Vaiśeṣikas argue that the whole world is produced from substances having less and less of sphericity. This is the case of everything upto the trasareṇu. The dṛyaṇukas are also produced from still smaller substances because they are capable of producing the mahat and the dīrgha.<sup>86</sup> This would lead to the paramāṇus, which have infinitesimal sphericity and they are not produced from anything else.

Puruṣottama says that apart from the question of definition, the argument given above<sup>ve</sup> can be advanced further and we can say that as the paramāṇus are capable of producing the objects of medium sphericity viz. the dṛyaṇukas, they must also be~~be~~ understood as produced and this would go against their eternity. It should not be argued that the point, where we stop, while going to the cause from the effect, is the paramāṇu, because this would

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86. Vadavali. p. 83.

run counter to the accepted principle. If that is done, so as to avert the contingency of regressus, it is better to leave aside the whole theory of ārambhavāda.

Again the body is made of five elements in which the elements like water are mixed with each other. At the time of separation they would be relegated to the position of atoms and so the clay and the like would not be visible at all. Thus the theory is against perception also.

Again the substances are said to be produced not from the point of view of having a particular form (Rūpavattva), because this would include the atoms of air also. They can not again be from the point of view of mūrtatva, because that would include the mind also, but here the Vaiśeṣikas accept the sparśavattva. Even here it includes the mind, because the concept of conjunction has been accepted with regard to the mind and conjunction is not different from touch. Hence the theory is fallacious from this point of view also.<sup>87</sup>

Puruṣottama has very vehemently rejected the concept

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87. Vādāvalī, pp. 85-86.

of Prāgabhāva and other abhāvas, as advocated by the Vaiśeṣi-  
 -kas, at many places.<sup>88</sup> Abhāva, says, Puruṣottama, need not  
 be understood as an independent category but it should be  
 included in the Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva. The Prāgabhāva  
 is the state of the inhering cause, favourable to the  
 manifestation of the effect and co-existing with the non-  
 -manifestation. Dhvansābhāva is that state, which is not  
 favourable to the existence of the effect. There is no other  
 proof for establishing the independent existence of the  
 abhāvas. It may be argued that the very absence of a pot  
 in a potsherd is a proof for the Prāgabhāva. Puruṣottama  
 says that such an understanding, as understood by the  
 opponent, has for its object the Abhāva, which has its  
 counter-part in the existence of a particular pot. Now  
 the absence of any sense contact with a pot is general  
 and thus can not lead to the particular, which is required  
 by the Prāgabhāva in question. The cognition of the

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88. T. Sn. Ab. pp. 88-90, Pr. pp. 111-123, Sṛṣṭibhedavāda, Āvirbhāva-  
 -tirobhāvavāda, etc. Puruṣottama has also written one  
 Abhāvavāda, which is unfortunately not extant.

Prāgabhāva of a pot in the said potsherd is not capable of being proved because no such appearance is possible. Even though the opponent may admit it, it is not accepted by all. Puruṣottama further asks as to whether the negation prior to production, as envisaged by the said cognition, is only one for all the pots or is different with different pots. The first alternative can not be accepted, because the production of any pot would destroy the prāgabhāva altogether and there can be no particular Prāgabhāva for a particular pot. It cannot be said that it is destroyed by the production of all the pots, because in that case the production of one pot will not destroy the Prāgabhāva and the potsherds, which are the parts of the said pot, will have to be understood as showing the Prāgabhāva of the pot and not the pot itself. It can not be argued that this is not a contingency, because the existence of the pot obstructs such an understanding. If this is the position, the co-existence of the pot and the Prāgabhāva at the same place should be admitted and the contention of the destruction of the Prāgabhāva by the production of all the pots would be futile. Further as

the counter-parts are transitory, we can not reasonably speak of all the pots. Thus when that which destroys can not be explained, the definition of the Prāgabhāva as the negation which can be destroyed is also wrong. The Opponent<sup>s</sup> points out that there can be a definition like, 'Candhādhyānādhikarānakālavṛttyabhāvatva', or 'Adṛṣṭa-tvāvacchinnānādhikarānakālavṛttyabhāvatva'. To this Puruṣottama says that as there is no knower of the produce<sup>d</sup> knowledge before creation, there can be no such abhāvatva. The opponent says that God is there to see it all. Well, then we shall accept what is said by God and not what is said by the Opponent.

The second alternative is equally unreasonable. The knowledge of the abhāva is dependent upon that of the counterpart and so in the absence of the latter, the former cannot be known. If the knowledge of the counter-part is accepted in the form of a pot, then the Prāgabhāva will be common to all the counterparts and this would lead to all the contingencies urged above. It should not be argued that the contingency can be averted by accepting the understanding, on account of the subliminal

impressions of the supraworldly knowledge, which has for its object a thing of future, due to the common characteristics of the Ghaṭatva. No such understanding is possible because the subliminal impressions for a future object do not exist, when such an experience does not exist. As for the supraworldly knowledge, Puruṣottama says that it will have to be understood in a limited sense, as the said knowledge has, at first, for its object all the pots and this<sup>is</sup> followed by the Pratiyogināśyatva of the Prāgabdhāva. Or it should be accepted that the latter comes in the beginning and so the supraworldly knowledge is limited from the first instant. After that one should explain the knowledge of the Prāgabdhāva for a future pot. This is ignoratio elenchi, because the futurity is here made up by the Prāgabdhāva. If futurity~~ty~~ is explained as the abode of production, which occurs after the present, then there can be no cognition of the Prāgabdhāva. When we see that a pot will be produced from this, there can be no cognition of the Prāgabdhāva of that pot. The future existence of the pot does not require the understanding of the Prāgabdhāva.

The cognition of the Prāgabdhāva can not again be inferred. The syllogism that can be formed is: 'Kapālam ghaṭapṛāgabdhāvavat. Ghaṭīyacaramasāmegrimattvāt. Yo yacaramasāmegrimān sa tatpṛāgabdhāvavān. Paṭīyacaramasāmagriviśiṣṭatantuvāt. 'Puruṣottama objects to this syllogism by saying, 'Prāgabdhāverūpasādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnaśādhyāprasiddhyā anumānāsambhavāt. 'He says that there is no proof for comprehending the Prāgabdhāva and as the cognition can also be explained on the ground of the sāmāyika-atyantābhāva, the Prāgabdhāva can not be established on the ground of cognition and the like.

The opponent changes his stand and says that he may agree that the Prāgabdhāva is not established by apprehension. In the relation of the cause and the effect, subsisting in the potsherds and the pot, there must be some regulation for the production of a particular pot from particular potsherds. The regulation can not be possible in the potsherds themselves. There is again the fault of Gaurava in explaining the pot as produced from many potsherds. Hence something, that can regulate the



place of production, is required. This necessity can be fulfilled by the concept of Prāgabhāva.

Puruṣottama replies to this that in the Satkāryavāda, it is the sat, which is manifested, hence the desanīyama is possible by the cause itself. Thus the establishment of the Prāgabhāva, on this ground, is just 'abhyupagamaika-sareṇatva' (taking recourse to one's own doctrines.) The question of Gaurava does not arise, since many causes lead to one effect. The pot which is to exist to-morrow, is absent today; this involves the time factor, which is also explained in the same way by the satkāryavāda. It should not again be made out that if we do not admit the Prāgabhāva, there will be the contingency of the reproduction of that, which has already been produced. The factor of time involves a certain order. Hence the diffusion of the sāmāgrī on account of the Tirobhāva, will account for its destruction and this bars the contention of the reproduction of what is already produced. Therefore the Prāgabhāva cannot be established in this way also.

The opponent then argues that in a pot which is prepared on hearth, the touch, form, taste and smell are

produced. Here the cause and the time factor are common. So we should admit the Prāgabhāva of touch etc. Puruṣottama says that such an acceptance is not necessary, because the transformation of touch etc. follows from the nature of touch and the like helped by the phenomenon of pāka. As svabhāva is an attribute, there is lāghava in its acceptance.

The opponent points out that the pre-existence which is found in the cause, can be explained only on the ground of our admitting the Prāgabhāva, because the said Pūrva-vartitva is the same as existing at the time, which is covered by the Prāgabhāva. Puruṣottama says that the pūrva-vartitva need not be necessarily explained, because a cause is just the abode of the manifesting capacity. If at all required, it can easily be understood by the knowledge of the effect, which is produced later. Again the Prāgabhāva being the cause, what about the pūrva-vartitva existing in it? For this we have only the prāgabhāva as an explanation and this would result in the fallacy of ātmāśraya. Thus the Prāgabhāva, which is suggested by the special condition of the cause, which is in the process of being known, is known on the basis of the knowledge of Prāgabhāva.

This is the fallacy of circular reasoning or cakraka. It can not be doubted that the Prāgabhāva is not implied by the condition of the cause. One does not think that a pot will be produced here and just now and there is the Prāgabhāva of a pot, when one does not see the condition of the cause, favourable to the production of a pot. It should not be contended that such an understanding arises only by practice, for then it would arise even when the cause is not seen. Thus the Prāgabhāva is not different from the cause.

Similar is the case of Dhvamsa, says Puruṣottama. One who sees the condition of the cause, detrimental to the existence of the effect, thinks that the pot is destroyed. This does not go against the terminology Dhvamsa and Prāgabhāva. Both the terms can easily be used in relation to the cause, bearing in mind that they are relative terms like cause and effect. Similarly the terms Bhāvi and Dhvasta also can be used. It should not be made out that as the effect exists in the conditions of Prāgabhāva and Dhvamsa, it must be seen; because the existence of the effect is subtle and subtlety here means that the form is not manifest.

The reciprocal non-existence (Anyonyābhāva) and absolute non-existence (Atyantābhāva) are like-wise not different.

concepts.<sup>89</sup>

While explaining the Anutva of the individual soul, Puruṣottama enters into a scholarly refutation of those, who think otherwise.

The Jains believe that the soul<sup>89</sup> has middle measure or deha-parimāṇa, on the ground that, otherwise, the sentiency, which pervades the whole body, can not be explained. Puruṣottama says that the pervasion of the sentiency can be understood on the analogy of smell, which can spread to other places also. If we accept the Jain theory, the -- individual soul would be liable to transiency. The eternity of the individual soul is proved by Puruṣottama on the strength of curious and interesting arguments. A child, which is just born, sucks the breasts of its mother, due to hunger. This activity, on the part of a child, can be explained only on the ground of the memory of the experience of averting hunger, that has been experienced before. This means that the soul<sup>89</sup> of the child is the same as that which was present in some other body previously. This leads to its beginninglessness and indestructibility and hence eternity. Another argument given is that of the ghosts, who speak of

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89. Pr. pp. 111-116.

the previous life.

The soul again can not be said to have the measure, capable of accretion and depletion. As the bodies are different and many and the soul enters them, here also the same problem of anityatva would arise. The jīva cannot have many parimāṇas, for no such thing can be seen in the world. If it is accepted as having a body, it will be partite and hence transitory.

The logicians and others have used the same arguments to refute other theories and have proved the pervasive measure of the souls on the following grounds. Things, which are produced at various places for our enjoyment, should have our own adṛṣṭa as the cause. So the cause, at the place of production, is the conjunction of the jīva joined with the adṛṣṭa. This would lead to the Vibhūṭva of the soul. If the soul is atomic, its attributes like desire and knowledge would be suprasensuous, as the attributes of an atom are. And as an atom is imperceptible, the term 'I' would be countered by perception. The mind again is atomic and the conjunction of the mind and the soul would produce a third substance, as the conjunction of two atoms results in the production of something else. The conjunction of the mind with the sense-organs would require the disjunction of the soul and the

mind and thus there can be no production of knowledge. This being the case, the individual soul must be all-pervasive.

To this Puruṣottama replies that it has many weak points. If all the individual souls are all-pervading, they would have connection with all the form-ed objects, all the sense organs, minds and bodies. This will result in the enjoyment of all by all and there will be no regulation of a particular enjoyment for a particular soul. The opponent may here point out that there is a fixed place for the non-inherent cause regarding the distinctive qualities of the all-pervading jīvas and so the enjoyment can be limited to a place, where the jīva and the mind are joined. Puruṣottama says that no such limitation is useful. When one eats a mango, it is limited in being eaten by the mouth, even then one may say, 'I eat a mango'. Even so here one may say, 'I am enjoying in the body of Devadatta'. Further just as one may say 'There is nothing in my legs but I have headache', one would also experience 'I am happy in the body of Devadatta, but unhappy in the body of Yajñadatta.' As one jīva is present everywhere, the experiences, produced at the places of conjunction with the respective minds, will be inherent. There would be nothing to bar the after-cognition

(anuvyavasāya) regarding the different minds; then all would be omniscient. This does not become an iṣṭāpatti, because the opponent does not believe in only one soul but accepts many jīvas. If for establishing the limited enjoyment, some limiting adṛsta is admitted, it would result in the middle measure of the jīva and this would controvert the accepted vyāpakatva and nityatva, for which it is necessary to admit the enjoyment, limited by other bodies also. This goes against perception. Again all the souls would be omniscient and there will be an unwarranted blending in all the three worlds. (Pratyaksavirodha, Sarvajñatāpatti and Trailokyasaṅkarāpatti). This, says Puruṣottama, is 'Ubhayataḥ pāśa rajjuh'.

Experience and remembrance have not necessarily the same field of operation. In fact remembrance does not require the consideration of the place of action, as we often see the usages like, 'Netrābhyām adrākṣam karābhyām asprśam', or 'Yam aham adrākṣam tam antaḥ sparśmi.' The logicians would have thus to face the ridiculous position of remembering the taste of a mango in the body of Yajñadatta, while it has actually been eaten by Devadatta's body. There is again nothing to prove that experience and remembrance would be limited to one body only,

for the remembrance of the previous birth can be explained only by admitting only one soul, not concerned with a change of bodies. This can not be accounted for by the existence of an Ātivāhika. If one is dead in Prayāga and born in Indraprastha, one may well remember one's jāti; or one staying as a spirit in Srughna but dead elsewhere may remember one's friends and relatives; but the Ātmapradeśa limited by the Ātivāhika may not include Srughna, Prayāga or Indraprastha. If for averting this the Ātmapradeśa is not considered but any place related to the Ātivāhika is taken into consideration, then memory would come to the Ātivāhika and not the jīva. Further the Adṛṣṭa would have to be inseparably connected with the Ātivāhika, otherwise the sacrifices etc., performed on the earth, would lead to the production of Adṛṣṭa in all the souls. Thus even those, who are alive, will be able to enjoy heaven by means of another Ātivāhika. Many Ātivāhikas of liberated souls exist and thus they are by no means rare. The rarity of the Ātivāhikas need not be substantiated by pointing out their transiency, for one may be able to enjoy by means of the Ātivāhika even of a deity, or that has been attracted by the Adṛṣṭa.

It is again impossible to accept the regulating power of the Adṛṣṭa. The Adṛṣṭa is due to the actions; efforts are made by



the conjunction of the mind and the soul. The conjunction thus will be of all the minds with all the souls. Thus we will have all the *Adṛṣṭas* for all. There can be no differentiation in the conjunction of the mind and the soul, for that stands in need of a separate cause. If no other cause is possible, one may believe in the desire of God for the regulation, as to which soul would enjoy what and whose *Adṛṣṭa* would be produced by which action. Similar is the case in the *Anvātmavāda*. Why then go a long way to establish the *Vyāpakatva* by accepting the *Adṛṣṭavādātmasamyoga*?

If the *jīvas* are all-pervasive, they would not be ruled by God. They would be egotistic on account of their greatness and eternal nature. They are also sentient equally. How then is God superior? So the atomic measure of the *jīvas* is necessary for establishing the superiority of God. Even though the *jīva* is atomic, sentiency can pervade the whole body, because it has the quality of gliding as is the case with smell. It should not be made out, says *Puruṣottama*, that in case of atomic souls, happiness and the like will not be perceived, as the perception of qualities requires a larger measure. He says that what is required for perception is the fitness or *yogyatā*. Even in the

theory of all-pervasive souls on the other hand, the perception even of the Adṛṣṭa would be irrefutable on account of the sāmānādhikarāṇya of <sup>the</sup> large measure. The question of the perception of the Paramāṇu will not arise at all, because there is no fitness in the atoms, which are not manifested. Again the pleasure and the like are not the attributes of the soul.

As regards the contention, 'Aham iti pratyakṣānupapattiḥ', Puruṣottama says that it is not valid. The perception is of the jīva covered with the body. As this entails co-extension with the grossness and the like, such a perception is only of the nature of illusion.

The argument, that the conjunction of the mind and soul, which are of different nature, produces something else, is based upon the theory of the production of a thing from the conglomeration of two atoms. The theory is however wholly discarded by the Vedāntin, who follows the Śrūtis. Similar is the case regarding the argument of the non-production of knowledge, as it is based on the same theory.

The jīva, according to the followers of the Śuddhādvaita, may become all-pervasive, if God so wishes, when the aspect of

bliss is manifested.<sup>90</sup>

Puruṣottama has refuted almost all other Vedāntic theories also in <sup>one</sup> way or other. For them, however, the emphasis is more on the interpretation of the scriptures, rather than reasoning alone. Even then there are passages in his works, where reason finds its way and we may note some of them here.

Puruṣottama after Vallabha refutes the system of dualism as advocated by Madhva, Mīmāṃsakas and others. He asks as to how dualism can be understood. It may either be on the basis of the difference of Upādāna, or that of the natural attributes or of the Pramāṇas. The first alternative is not possible, because the scriptures tell of Brahman as the only material cause. Even in the world, if one wants gold, one does not take into consideration the effects of the lump of gold as earrings and the like. The contention that oneness can not exist between a pot and a piece of cloth is answered by saying that the distinction of the material cause in this respect is mundane. The second alternative is equally meaningless, for once the unity of essence is conceded the distinction of the attributes is immaterial. Otherwise a man on his seat will be different

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90. T.S.Ab. pp. 92-95. Puruṣottama has also written a Vēda on

the subject, as we have seen above.

from the same man on his feet, or a piece of cloth, when spread out, will be different from the same, which is rolled. Even the attributes, which do not exist at the same time, do not differentiate the substantive; the attributes that can exist need not surely differentiate the substantive. Thus a pot is not differentiated by taste and form. Even those, that do not exist simultaneously e.g. entrance and exit, may have the difference in their counter parts and not the substantive. Brahman is One and Great and thus is not differentiated by attributes. In fact even the attributes also have no essential difference. The entrance and exit having different counter parts may appear as different but are really not different, for there is no proof for this. Even so at other places also the difference is due to egoism and is not real. The third alternative is also wrong. Perception is deluding and so is the case with other means of proof, which are based upon it. Thus we must accept what is established by the Śrutis.<sup>91</sup>

As regards the other Ācāryas, Rāmānuja has been criticised often by Puruṣottama. The criticism however is mainly based on the interpretations and the spirit or burden of the attack is that we can not accept the Brahman, which <sup>is</sup> qualified by the cit

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91. T.S. Ab. pp. 158-159.

and acit in the beginning of creation. It should be noted that the followers of the Śuddhādvaita have <sup>9</sup>soft corner for Rāmānuja. Puruṣottama himself is not so vehement in his criticism of Rāmānuja, because he generally uses, 'Tad cintyam' etc. instead of 'Tad asangatam' etc, which he uses for others.<sup>92</sup>

The theories of Śrīkantha are almost similar to those of Rāmānuja. He is however ~~criticised~~ criticised for his belief in Siva as the Highest God. Nimbārka is never mentioned by him.

The Bhedābheda of Bhāskara is criticised by him on interpretative grounds. The reasoning here is as follows:

The Śrutis say that if the cause is known, all the effects are known. If we believe in the Bhedābheda, the point of view, by which the bheda is accepted, can not be known by the knowledge of the cause, because the effect is different from the cause. If it is known, then the effect is not different and we must accept the abheda completely. Hence we should accept only the Avasthābheda between the cause and the effect and not the Svarūpabheda.<sup>93</sup>

Puruṣottama at one place <sup>94</sup> defends Bhāskara against Vācaspati. As the whole discussion is very interesting we have put it here

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92. Cf. A. B. P. p. 97. etc.

93. A. B. P. p. 534.

94. A. B. P. pp. 93-95.

in extenso.

Bhāskara's theory is contained in the well known verse, which is as follows:

Kāryarūpeṇa nānatvam abhedah kārṇātmanā ,

Hemātmanē yathā bhedaḥ kuṇḍalēdyāt<sup>Y</sup>manā bhidā.

Vācaspati asks as to what is this abhedā, which exists simultaneously with the bheda. Is it mutual absence? If it is, does it subsist between the effect and the cause like a bracelet and gold? If it does not subsist, then there is oneness and no difference. If it does, there is difference and no oneness. The bhāva and abhāva are not non-contradictory, because they do not exist simultaneously. If they do, the kaṭaka and <sup>Y</sup>ardhamānaka also would be essentially identical, because in that case difference is not against identity. Again, if the bracelet is one with gold, just as bracelets, crowns and earrings are not different from the point of view of their essence, which is gold, even so they<sup>Y</sup> should not be different from the point of view of their essence of bracelets. Hence only gold is the substance and not the bracelets and the like, which are not found to be identical. If it is said that the abhedā is only from the point of view of gold and not bracelets, then there surely is bheda from the earrings etc. If bracelets are non-

different from gold, why should they not follow in the earrings and the like? If they do <sup>not</sup> follow, how is it that they are non-different? That one, which is removed when the other follows, is different from the other, just as the string follows, while the flowers do not and are thus different. The earrings and the like do not follow even though gold does. Thus they are also different from gold. If everything is expected to follow together, the distinctions like 'this is not this' etc. can not be maintained, as there can be no discriminating factor. Again when we know from a distance that there is gold, we will not wish ~~to~~ know whether they are earrings or something else, because there is identity between gold and its viśeṣas and gold is known. If there is difference between them, they will not be known, when the gold is known. Well, says the argumentator, they are identical also, why are they not known? On the contrary it is quite proper that they should be known. As a rule, when the cause is absent, the effect is also absent. The absence of the effect is removed by the presence of the cause. So far as identity is concerned, ~~when it is accepted~~, the cause exists.

Vācaspati says that if the earrings and the like are known by the knowledge of gold, the attempts for knowing them are

meaningless. When one thing is not known, while the other is known these two are different. When a cub of an elephant is seen and an ass is not, the former is different from the latter. When gold is seen from a distance, its distinctions like earrings are not known and are thus different from gold as such. What then about the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* as found in 'Hema-kundalam'? It can not be explained on the ground of the relationship between the substratum and the dependent or between the two having a common resort. If the reference here is to the presence (*Anuvṛtti*) and exclusion (*Vyāvṛtti*), why should one wish to know the earrings, when gold is known? Abhedā again is not *akāntika* or *śaṅkāntika*, from which both are possible. Therefore when one of the two can be repudiated, it is proper that the *bhedakalpanā* has abhedā as its *upādāna* and not vice versa, because the *bhedā* depends upon those, which are differentiated. If there is not oneness, the difference subsisting on many can not be possible. The one again does not depend upon difference. When we say that 'A is not B', the comprehension of difference rests upon that of the counter part, while that of oneness does not depend upon anything else. Thus the *anirvacanīya-kalpanā* is *abhedopādānā*. This is also corroborated by scriptural passages. Therefore the *kūṭastha-nityatā* is real and not *pariṇāminītyatā*.



To this Puruṣottama says that it is all wrong. In the theory of Bhāskara, that is refuted, the bheda is not accepted as of the nature of reciprocal negation (anyonyābhāva) and hence to refute him on this ground is like imagining the smell of a sky-flower. Even if it is accepted, the pot and its absence, as also the pot and things which are different from it, are seen as existing simultaneously on earth and there is no contradiction, as it has been alleged. The total non-existence (Atyantābhāva) which is constant and pervading, exists everywhere, hence when the counter-part is brought, it is only an obstruction of the abhāva-buddhi. Thus abheda can exist, even when there is bheda and thus there can be no contradiction if both co-exist. The contingency again of the oneness of kataka and vardha<sup>m</sup>kataka is not so sound because non-contradiction is never seen as leading to oneness. Vācaspati's attempts to differentiate the bracelets from gold are also futile. Bracelets are just states of gold and are therefore one with and also different from gold. Even Śaṅkara has said the same thing regarding the ocean and its waves. As for the refutation regarding the pratītivirodha, Puruṣottama says that there is no such contradiction, because even though difference is understood from the point of view of kuṇḍalas,

oneness can equally be understood from the point of view of Gold. This is corroborated by evidence. When that is conceded, whatever Vācaspati has said regarding the bheda and abheda, when gold is seen from a distance, is of no significance. Both the bheda and abheda are comprehended, and that is what the quoted kārīkā means. As the effects like the crown and bracelets are only states of gold, the sāmānādhikārya with the gold is plausible, so also the vyāvṛtti-vyavasthā and jijñāsājanakatva. So the difference is adventitious and not inexplicable. This does not go against the Śrutis which do not teach mithyātva. Puruṣottama concludes by saying that the theory of Bhāskara is not faulty in this respect.

Śaṅkara's theory of absolute monism has been the subject of the most severe criticism of Vallabha and his followers. Vallabha thought Śaṅkara to be his chief adversary and attacked him very vehemently. The same is the case with Viṭṭhaleśa and the array of writers, who followed him. Puruṣottama however shows a balance of judgement. His references to Śaṅkara are as respectful as those to other Ācāryas and what is more <sup>he</sup> is never discourteous. Even then, he never simply depends upon the interpretations of the Śrutis but supports his statements with sound reasoning.

Whatever may be the greatness of Vallabha as a writer and founder of a system, Vallabha's refutations of Śaṅkara, many and frequent that they are, are more theological than logical. Some of the very important refutations of Śaṅkara's theories, as given by Puruṣottama, are noted below:

In the Prahastavāda Puruṣottama rejects the theory of Avidyā. Avidyā is said to be an upādhi of Brahman. Is it with or without a beginning? It can not be the former. The opponent believes that Brahman, which is endowed with the upadhis, is the Īśvara. If avidyā has beginning, Īśvara would also have it; this would be similar to the theory of Īśvara as an effect, as believed by the Sāṅkhya, and it would go against the Vedāntic theories. The later alternative is equally unacceptable, because that which has no beginning has no end also. Thus there arises the contingency of non-liberation and Īśvara would then be inferior even to the individual soul. As Īśvara is bound equally as the individual soul, nobody would worship him. If it is said that the avidyā is without beginning but has an end, even then Īśvara must be accepted as omniscient. He knows all the Vedas; and there is nobody else higher than he as an Adhikārin. Those, who believe in the direct realization, should admit that such a realization

of Brahman is required even for Īśvara. When this Īśvara is liberated, this would result in the negation of the world. If Īśvara does not obtain liberation, others, who are inferior to him, can also not obtain it and this would go against the theory of direct realization. If we believe in the liberation of others, while Īśvara is not liberated, then Īśvara will be inferior to those, who are capable of self-realization.

As for the avidyā, which leads to the imagination of distinctions, is it connected with jīva or Brahman? It can not be the former, because then it can not imagine the attributes in Brahman. As Brahman is not an object of the mind or speech, and as jīva has no knowledge of the adhiṣṭhāna, the jīva cannot be related to it, and when there is no possibility of reflection, there can be no imagination either. The opponent may say that the souls, endowed with knowledge, see Brahman and thus a connection can be established. Puruṣottama says that this is wrong. As avidyā is guṇātmikā and as those, who have the required knowledge, see Brahman only after the eradication of the guṇas, there can be no such possibility. Further the advent of knowledge leads to eternity or non-destruction, while this leads to destruction. Should we accept destruction for those who have

already reached the state of non-destruction? If the avidyā in the jīvas is to imagine the distinctions in Brahman, the latter must be seen. But Brahman can be an object of visualization only after the distinctions are imagined. This is *petitio principii*. If we agree to the visualization of the qualITLESS Brahman, how can Brahman be qualITLESS? The second alternative would lead to all the contingencies, stated above regarding the Īśvara.

Again is the said advidyā existent, non-existent, both or neither? The first is not possible, because if it exists, as much as Brahman, this would result in dualism. It can not be the second, because then like the sky-flower it can not imagine anything. It is not again the third, because it is imagined itself, in that case like the conch-shell-silver. It can not be imagined by anybody at first, since as the Brahman is qualITLESS, even the jīvas do not exist. If it has no beginning, all the fallacies stated above would arise. If we believe that it has not a beginning but an end, then also the contingencies have been stated above. The <sup>u</sup>fourth alternative is equally unacceptable, because in that case, avidyā will not be different from Brahman which is neither sat, nor asat. Thus the belief in the upādhis

is not plausible.<sup>95</sup>

The Pratibimbavāda, as advocated by the followers of Śaṅkara, has been the object of a very severe criticism in the works of Puruṣottama.<sup>96</sup> Six different view points are advanced by the followers of Śaṅkara with regard to the theory of Pratibimba. They are as follows:

1. Māyā is beginningless and inexplicable, is connected with the cit and is the prakṛti of the bhūtas. The image of the cit in it is Īśvara. This māyā has innumerable pradesas called avidyā, having the capacity of concealing and projection. The image of cit in them is the jīva.

2. The mūla - prakṛti, which is triguṇātmikā, has two forms, māyā and avidyā. The māyā has mainly in it the pure sattva unsoiled by rajas or tamas. The image of cit in it is Īśvara. Avidyā has the sattva, defiled by rajas and tamas. The image of cit in it is jīva.

3. The image of cit in the same viz. avidyā, called māyā on account of its power of projection is the jīva.

4. The image of cit in the avidyā is Īśvara and the same in

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95. Prh. pp. 21-23.

96. T.S. Ab. pp. 102-103. See also Jīvapratibimbatvakhaṇḍanavāda,

Vādāvalī. p. 170 ff.

the internal organ is the jīva.

5. Some believe in the four-fold sentiency of the kūṭastha, jīva, Brahman and Īśvara corresponding to the Ghāṭākāśa, jalākāśa, mahākāśa and meghākāśa. Īśvara is the image of the cit in the dhīvēśanās of all the living beings remaining in the māyētamas resting in the Brahman. The image of sentiency in the internal organ, imagined by māyē and remaining in the caityanya, which is delimited by the subtle and gross bodies, is the jīva.

6. The caitanya, which is delimited by the upādhis of the jīva like the internal organ is the Īśvara who is the bimbs. His image (Pratibimba) in the nescience is the jīva. Even there the jīva has its specific place of manifestation in the internal organ, which is the pariṇāma of ne<sup>5</sup>science.

Puruṣottama says that for those, who think that Īśvara is an image in that, which is without the capacity of concealment and projection, the Īśvara can not be established. There can be no image in what is very pure, as it is seen in case of marble-stones. It is not possible to say that the substratum might have some connection with impurity from a distance, because even space was not existing before creation, and we can not thus talk of

distance. If we accept the external space, the *Īśvara* and the cit would be limited to a particular place; then they cannot be all-pervading and the *ākāśa* also cannot be accepted as being created. That *jīva* is an image in the *pradeśas* of the *Māyā*, those which are capable of projection etc., is also untenable. In that case the enveloping capacity would pose an obstruction for the image. If it does not come in between the two, how can the *jīva* be ignorant? There are further fallacies like the absence of space. Thus the view that the *bhūtaprakṛti* and its *pradeśas* are *upādhis* is not plausible. The same argument counters the second view point also.

Again as both the *māyā* and *avidyā* are all-pervading, the *rajas* and *tamas* do and do not defile the *sattva* everywhere. Thus there can be no discrimination between the *māyā* and the *avidyā* and consequently between the *jīva* and *Īśvara*. If the *māyā* and the *avidyā* are not all-pervading, the *jīva* and *Īśvara* would similarly not be all-pervading and this goes against the accepted theory. If it be argued that the *māyā* is all pervading and clear and pure from all sides and that the *avidyā*, which rests in it, is not so clear and pure, even then *Īśvara* can not be accepted, because no image can be seen in that which is all pervading. The same is



the case with the jīva, because māyā has three guṇas and there may be an obstruction between the outer cit and the inner <sup>avidyā</sup> ~~avidyā~~ by virtue of the rajas and tamas. If the cit is very near so as to avert all obstructions, that which is very near can not be reflected. If some distance is admitted, then the fallacies in such an admission have already been pointed out. The third viewpoint has the same faults, as stated before. Coming to the fifth, which takes its stand on the illustration of the ghaṭākāśa etc., Puruṣottama says that the reflection can be accepted only of that, which is unmixed with the upādhis, on the basis of the given illustration. This being the case the intervening tamas of the māyā, the tamas having many parts thickly closeted, would obstruct the dhīvāsanās. And there can be no Īśvara. If the parts are not accepted as thickly closeted, the purpose can not be explained. If it is said to be the very nature of the thing, then we have the svabhāva-vāda. The svabhāva can be established if and when the pratibimba is accepted and vice versa. This is petitio principii. There are similar fallacies in saying that the internal organ does not subsist without the māyā.

As against those, who believe that the reflection of the cit in the māyā is Īśvara and that of the jīva is the image of

Īśvara in the avidyā or the internal organ, Puruṣottama says that the māyā will block the reflection of the image and thus the reflection will not be explicable. Even though the māyā may be clear externally on all sides, even then that aspect, which is not clear, is internal and will pervade the avidyā and the internal organ; thus the fallacy remains as such. If it is believed that the avidyā with the pure sattva is inside the māyā endowed with the same and that the rajas and tamas are still inside it, then there can be no reflection in that which is very clear and pure. Coming to the sixth view point Puruṣottama says that as Īśvara is also mixed with the upādhis, as he is delimited by the upādhis of the jīva, there can be no reflection, because of the absence of any go-between. Īśvara thus can not be a bimba. If we accept something in between, then this would run counter to the accepted theory of omnipresence. The fourth view point is also refuted by the arguments, that have already been stated.

Further the reflection can be possible only of that which is an object of our eyes; and as the cit can not be seen, it can not be a bimba at all. Puruṣottama here discusses whether the echo of a sound is also a reflection. The opponent has made out the same to prove that even though the sound is not seen by our

eyes, it is reflected in an echo. Puruṣottama is however not prepared to agree that echo is a reflection.

All these view points can not be admitted from the point of view of the nature of vṛtti. If something exists, enveloping a certain place, it can not be reflected there. The cit, māyā and avidyā are all-pervading. Thus there can be no question of reflection or the reflected. Thus there can be no Īśvara, no jīva. If we believe in the reflection in the dhīvāsanās, there will be multiplicity of Īśvaras, because the abode being not one the images/ also must be many. The Pratibimba again is not co-eval with the bimba and has its existence, corresponding to that of its counter part. Here we will have to accept the sāmānādhikaranyā and bimbasthitivijṣṭīyasthitikatva, both of which can not be maintained. Puruṣottama then discusses the scriptural passages.<sup>97</sup>

In the Prasthānaratnākara, while discussing the anumāna, Puruṣottama refutes Dharmarāja Dīkṣita, a follower of Śaṅkara. Dharmarāja Dīkṣita gives the following syllogism: 'Brahmabhinnam sarvaṃ mithyā. Brahmabhinnatvāt. Yad evaṃ tad evaṃ. Śūktikārejeta-  
vat,' for illustrating the use of the anumāna in philosophical

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97. Vādavalī. pp. 170-176.

thinking. Puruṣottama says that, as in the Prasthānas, the silver which is anirvacanīya can not be established, the illustration given here is not proper. Even if we may agree to the illustration, the falsity can be explained on the ground of the buddhyākāratva, and thus it is not proper to adduce the distinction from Brahman for the same. The hetu again is implausible, because of the sentences like, 'Idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā.'<sup>98</sup> Puruṣottama says that if the hetu is established on the basis of appearance, then nothing is required to be said. The appearance depends upon the buddhi and we have no objection in accepting it as false. The syllogism would thus be "Brahmānyatvena pratiyamānam avastu. Ādyantavattvāt. Svāpnikavat". The hetu need not be called common on the ground of counter-syllogism, because the dream experiences are proved to be false. If a man dreams of connections with a woman or of going out to some other country, when he is awake, he does not find a woman or another country; thus the reality of the dream experiences is sublated. This however does not lead to the falsity of the whole world. Puruṣottama gives a syllogism for this. 'Vimataḥ prapañcaḥ svotkrāntasattākasaḍrśe-  
-srstipūrvakāḥ. Mithyāsrstītvāt. Svāpnikavat.' Scriptural passages can be cited to show that the world, which has

98.Nrsinhettaratāpinī Upaniṣad.V.

Brahman as its essence is not unreal. What is mithyātvā?

It is that which though unreal, appears to be and is said to be real. The definition of mithyātvā given as 'Svāśrayatve-nābhimatayāvanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratīyogitvam' does not corroborate the advaitic theory of the māyāvēdin. It rather goes against him, as it will establish the world as a counter part of the absolute negation of the world, in connection with Brahman. The opponent has given a syllogism 'Pataḥ etattantu-niṣṭhātyantābhāvapratīyogi. Patatvāt. Patāntarevat.' Puruṣottama objects to this by saying that the hetu is contradicted by perception. The opponent challenges this by saying that there is no fallacy in the hetu, because the object here is the existence of Brahman, which is the substratum. Puruṣottama asks as to what is meant by the compound Brahmasattā? Does it mean the existence of Brahman or Brahman which is existence? The first is wrong, because Brahman is not possessed of any attribute. The second goes against the Śrutis saying that it can not be experienced by our senses. Puruṣottama then shows how the scriptural passages do not go against the 'Suddhādvaita'.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Pr. pp. 246-148.

The most important criticism of Śaṅkara is however given in the beginning of the Anubhāṣyaprakāśa. Here perhaps Puruṣottama is following in the footsteps of Rāmānuja, who has given a critical and exhaustive refutation of Śaṅkara under the first Sūtra in his Śrībhāṣya. Puruṣottama is however more careful and does not indulge in the repudiation of Śaṅkara on a large scale. Puruṣottama ~~however~~ thinks it fit to concentrate on the Adhyāsa-bhāṣya viz. The introductory part of Śaṅkara's commentary. We need not here give the Pūrvapakṣa, which is well known. Apart from the references to the Śrutis, Puruṣottama's arguments are as follows:

Śaṅkara has tried to make out the concomitance, that whatever is an object is non-sentient. This vyāpti, says Puruṣottama, is sublated by perception. The sentiency of the soul is accepted by both the parties, it can be grasped by the pratyagvitti (Inner knowledge). The soul is thus an object of the Pratyagvitti and is thus all-pervading. Hence only the vyāpti viz. whatever is non-sentient is an object, can be established by perception. The opponent need not point out that as the pratyagvitti does not apprehend the ātman, which is cit-ekarasa, it is not an object. Even if we agree to

this, the atman will have to be accepted as an object in some form or another. Otherwise, if there is no object, how can there be any vitti? It should not be said that it is the ego, which is the object and not the soul. According to the Nyāya system, it is the soul which is the object and not the ego. According to the Sāṅkhya, as the ego is non-sentient, if this is the case, the ahaṁtva and the caitanya would appear to be co-equal. In that case, when the ego as an object is removed in the pratyagvitti, only the ātman~~as~~ remains as the object. It should not be said that, when the ego is removed, the ātman is known as the very nature of the pratyagvitti. This can not be accepted in the absence of any other means of realization. That is what happens in the world at the time of testing a gem. Otherwise the nityā-nitya-vastuviveka is possible even from the systems like the Sāṅkhya; and thus it will not lead to the vicāra-adhikāra, as made out by the opponent. Hence even though the opponent does not wish, he will have to accept reluctantly that ātman is known by pratyagvitti. This will not lead to the non-sentiency of the atman on account of its being illuminated by an external agency, because one can fall back upon the Śruti passages like 'Atrāyam puruṣaḥ/ svayam

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jyotir bhavati'. Thus the ātman should be understood as the  
 abode of sentiency and yet having the nature of sentiency;  
 and the contrast between the subject and object can be  
 explained away by virtue of our experience. Thus when the  
 relationship of the āśraya and the āśrayin is established,  
 the <sup>āt</sup>ātman and samvid will have to be admitted as different  
 and thus the substance as an object should also be accepted  
 as distinct. It should not be doubted that as the sattva is  
 inexplicable, those which are connected with it are also  
 equally inexplicable. It is necessary, even for the opponent,  
 to explain the sattva, because otherwise even the samvid will  
 be confounded with asattva. If existence is to be of the  
 nature of luminosity, then the ātman, which is connected with  
 it, surely has the sattva. It is not wise to say that the  
 ātman is of the nature of luminosity and is not connected  
 with it, as there is no pratyaktva there. 'I know' or 'I am  
 endowed with knowledge', sentences like these show that  
 knowledge is an attribute of the soul. Thus when the  
 existence of the soul different from the luminosity is



conceded, the existences of the *śārtha* as an object in the form of not being superimposed, is also established, because that which does not exist can not be an object. There is no such cognition as 'I see or experience a sky-flower'. As regards the phantom or mirage it is seen in a superimposed form. It should not be said that there is the straying of existence in the *abhāva*, because it also has the *bhāvatva*. The *abhāva* is stated to be there, only in the form of the counter part which is not being experienced. Otherwise even with a counter part, it will be cognised. It should not be contended that since the *saṃvit* is inseparably connected with an object and as it does not shine forth without the object, it can not be called self-luminous. That as the lamp has its nature of light, the *saṃvit* is of the nature of luminosity and this itself is the *svataḥprakāśa padārtha*. Similar is the case of the soul. The opponent may here point out that the *ātman*, which is all-pervading, exists every where. Just as water is superimposed on sand resulting in mirage even so the bodies etc. are superimposed on the *ātman*. If we believe in the *sattva*, it is impossible to explain the limitation at a particular place. Thus we accept the *saḍ-asat-vilaksanatva* on the basis of its being seen, taking into account its *asattva*. This, says

Puruṣottama, is improper. For those who believe in the vastu-pariccheda, the samavāyin and the like of the substance exist and thus the deśa is easily established. Those, who do not accept it, believe that everything is the effect of Brahman and thus the deśa would be included in it. Thus when the deśa is established as also the bodies etc, it is easy to understand their superimposition on the soul. Otherwise it is difficult to explain it like the sky-flower. The illustration given by the followers of 'Sāṅkara viz. 'Apratyakṣa ākāśe mālīnyādhyāśavaḥ apratyakṣa ātmani śarīrādhyāśaḥ' is not correct. Ākāśa is perceptible to the non-intelligent as space, and to the intelligent on account of the nature of the thing itself. Thus the illustration does not lead to the desired conclusion. At the end of the discussion Puruṣottama discusses some scriptural passages.<sup>101</sup>.

We have seen above some important refutations of the theories of others, as given by Puruṣottama. It may not be possible to examine all of them here because it would add much more to the bulk of this thesis, but we may say that there is nothing wrong in stating that many of his arguments are fairly reasonable. The repudiation of the Buddhistic

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101. A.B.P. pp. 13-16.

Catuskotika is really a very good specimen of Puruṣottama's scholarship and capacity as an argumentator. Similar is his rejection of the concept of abhāva, the theory of the pervasion of the soul, and that of the reflection of the soul and Brahman. The question however remains only with the last discussion, in which Puruṣottama attacks Śaṅkara and his thesis that the subject can never be an object. Puruṣottama's refutation as detailed above reminds one of the similar but more violent refutation given by Rāmānuja. There are flaws in Śaṅkara's theory, but it should be remembered that it is futile to accept everything reasonable and logical in those realms, <sup>where</sup> ~~where~~ logic has no say of its own. It is rather difficult to agree that the ātman is the object of Pratyagvitti, when there is absolute oneness and there can be no subject-object-relationship or duality. Śaṅkara could have very easily pointed out to Rāmānuja and Puruṣottama, what Puruṣottama has himself said to Vācaspati while defending Bhāskara. The whole theory of oneness, adhyāsa, inability to explain the subject-object-relationship and all that pertain to the esoteric level and not to the exoteric realm of thinking. It is useless therefore to argue that 'Ahaṁ jñāmi' and similar sentences show that

knowledge is an attribute of the 'I' ,when Śaṅkara is thinking from the point of view of 'Kena kam vijānīyāt'.<sup>102</sup>

It is again curious to note that all the thinkers would like to conceal their weak points by falling back upon the Śrutis, while the same is denied by them to their opponents. Vallabha and after him Puruṣottama have to take recourse to the Śrutis very often. For Śaṅkara it has been stated that he first frames his system on the strength of pure reason and then tries to support it by scriptures. In so doing he is sometimes compelled quite naturally, to distort the scriptural passages-a process, theologians can never tolerate.

(V).

#### Interpretation of the Śrutis.

The Śrutis have always been the fountain source of Indian philosophical systems. All the systems, especially the Vedāntic ones, are said to be dependent mainly on the Śrutis and every Ācārya wishes to show that his theories are not new or invented but are the same as taught in the Śrutis, which were not properly understood by others. The Bhagavad-

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102. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. IV. v. 15.

Gītā and the Brahmasūtras also enjoy the same position of the Prasthānas or starting points of those systems. For Vallabha however the Bhāgavata is added to make up the Prasthānacatus-taya.

Vallabha says that out of these four Prasthānas, the Śrutis, the Gītā, the Brahmasūtras and the Bhāgavata, each former can be properly understood with the help of the succeeding one. This has been illustrated by Puruṣottama thus.<sup>103</sup> The Śruti says, 'Apāṇipādo Javano grahītā'.<sup>104</sup> Does this mean that Brahman is devoid of worldly hands and feet or that it is without hands and feet altogether? The Gītā passage 'Sarvataḥ pāṇipādam tad'<sup>105</sup> would help us in this respect and so the alaukikaśāmarthyā of God is upheld by accepting the former alternative. Similarly the Gītā says 'Nityaḥ sarvaśataḥ sthānūr acalo'yaṁ sanātanah',<sup>106</sup> and 'Mameivamśo jīvaloke'.<sup>107</sup> For understanding this the Brahmasūtras 'Utkrāntigatyāgatinām'<sup>108</sup> etc. would help<sup>109</sup> in deciding the aṁśatva. The Sūtras again say 'Janmādyasya yataḥ'

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103. T. S. Ab. pp. 38-40.

104. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. III. 19.

105. Bhagavad Gītā. XIII. 13.

106. Bhagavad Gītā. II. 24.

107. Bhagavad Gītā. XV. 7.

108. Brahmasūtras. II. iii. 25.

109. Brahmasūtras. I. i. 2.

This can be understood with the help of the Bhāgavata passages like 'Jenmādyasya yato'nvayād...' <sup>110</sup>

The basic view point regarding the Vedas is almost the same in all the orthodox systems of India. The Vedānta believe -s in the Svataḥprāmāṇyavāda of the Śrutis. As Puruṣottama says the Vedas are an independent Pramāṇa for the meta-physical knowledge, on account of three reasons. Firstly it is Sattvaśodhaka. The Sattva which helps in the right knowledge can be purified only by the means stated in the scriptures, and thus they are an independent proof. Secondly they are the sentences of the Lord Himself. The Vedas are regarded in India as Apauruṣeya. Thirdly they are of the nature of the external breath of the Highest Lord. <sup>111</sup> The Vedas are thus eternal. The speciality of the Suddhādvaita is that they believe in a different nāma-prapañca altogether. We shall however discuss that point in the next chapter.

The Vedāntic writers have throughout tried to find out their own theories from the scriptures. The scriptures are the works of different sages composed at different times and

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110. Bhāgavata. I. i. 1.

11. Sarvanirapekṣāḥ svataḥprāmāṇa<sup>amāna</sup> bhūtā vedā eva. Sattvaśodhakatvāt bhagavadvākyatvāt tanniśvasātarūpatvācca.

different places. Naturally therefore the scriptures may not appear to present a coherent system and the need for evolving such a system was felt from very early times. Even Bēdarāyana has said 'Tat tu samāyayāt'.<sup>112</sup> Everyone has tried to find-out a consistent system from a bundle of conflicting passages.

Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa have not commented upon the Upaniṣads and though Puruṣottama is said to have written many Dīpikās, most of them are unfortunately not found. We have thus to depend upon the interpretations of the Śrutis found in the Anubhāṣya and its Prakāśa and other works.

Puruṣottama discusses how the conflicting Śruti passages should be reconciled and interpreted. If we accept one position and reject the other, then naturally the passage which is rejected would lose the Prāmānya, though it may form an integral part of the Śrutis. This is undesirable because how can we declare that one passage is right, while the other is wrong? As a consequence, the whole of the Śrutis would be Aprāmānika.<sup>113</sup>

How then should the contradictions be reconciled?

Puruṣottama says that it can be done by accepting both as

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112. Brahmasūtras. I. i. 3. Vallabha's interpretation of this

Sūtra is not taken into account here.

113. A.B.P.p.47.

equally correct and the contradiction is to be explained on the ground of the superior powers of the Highest Lord. This can be corroborated by the Śrutis themselves, e.g. 'Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate'<sup>114</sup> etc. Such passages show the capacity of the Highest Lord.<sup>115</sup> Thus even if the śrutis may say that the fire is not hot, we should accept it because the Lord has the form of fire as also of being not hot. That is how the ~~Parā~~ Brahman can be both sākāra and nirākāra, i.e. with and without forms.<sup>116</sup> It is thus the expressed sense in the Vedas, which is to be accepted and not gaunī or lakṣaṇā i.e. secondary. The gaunī vṛtti whenever accepted, is only for the ordinary persons.<sup>117</sup> It is on the basis of this that Brahman is accepted in the Śuddhādvaita as an abode of contradictory attributes.

There are however three different approaches in connection with the relationship of Brahman and its attributes. Firstly if we take into account the strength of the word,

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114. Śvetāśvatera Upaniṣad .VI.8.

115. A.B.P.p.47.

116. Tathā ca bhagavataḥ sarvarūpatvena vahnirūpatvād anuṣṇa-rūpatvād cānuṣṇatvavahnitveyor aikādhikaranyāc chivatvādīnām apy aikādhikaranyāt vahnir anuṣṇaḥ param brahma brahmāviṣṇuśivākāram anākāram ity aviruddh-am ity arthaḥ. S.S.pp.124-125.

117. Nanv evam sati gaunī sarvata evocchidyeteti tatsiddhy-ādisūtrāṇi virudhyerann iti cet, na , teṣāṃ mandamadhya-mārthatvāt. T.S.Abb.p.37.



then Brahman is an abode of all the contradictory attributes. We may however think it out in another way also. Whenever Brahman is described there are many attributes, negative as well as positive. The negative attributes reject the mundane ones, while the positive descriptions enumerate those, which are supramundane. Thirdly if we go by implication, Brahman has the nature of all the contradictory<sup>118</sup>es. We can easily understand the distinction between the first two approaches. To say that Brahman contains all the attributes, even contradictory ones, can not be reconciled with another statement, made in the same breath, that it has all the supramundane attributes and the negative descriptions pertain only to those attributes, which are mundane. If everything in the Vedas is alaukika, everything must be alaukika and we can not explain one word from the point of view of the laukika and the other from that of the alaukika. This is what Puruṣottama knows perfectly well and that is why he distinguishes between the two approaches.

On the whole the approach of the Śuddhādvaita authors

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118. *Evamāca śabdabalavicāreṇa viruddhasarvadharmāśreyam*

*brahmeti nirṇayeh. Śrutatyuktayuktyā vicāre tu laukikadharmā-  
-śūnyam alaukikasarvadharmayuktam iti nirṇayeh. Arthabala-  
-vicāre tu viruddhasarvarūpam iti nirṇayeh. A.B.P. p. 933.*

towards the Śrutis is that of the acceptance of a devotee of everything that is stated, whether it may or may not appeal to reason. In fact there should be no appeal to reason, because it is all beyond the world. Hundred of passages are interpreted in this way in the works of Vallabha and Puruṣottama.

While the way, in which the passages are interpreted, follows generally the pattern of the rules of interpretation, generally accepted by all, it is necessary to note one important point. Very often the Śuddhādvaita takes recourse to the Purāṇas for understanding the purport of the Śrutis. This has already been noted above, while showing the inter relation of the four Prasthānas, in the Śuddhādvaita. In the Anubhāsyaprakāśa Puruṣottama quotes a verse for this:

Anantaśākhāsāpekṣe vaidikārthasya nirṇaye,  
Svabuddhikalpitād arthād baliyān upabrūhitah. <sup>119.</sup>

It is interesting to note here that the Purāṇas may be understood as an aid to the interpretation of the Vedas, especially for understanding the development of mythology. Dr. M. Winternitz at one place refers to the efforts of scholars to bring the <sup>verses</sup> ~~verses~~ of the Rgveda in to unison with the later narratives and to utilize

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119. A. B. P. p. 353. Similar case on p. 1068 also.

the later in the elucidation of the Rgvedic poem.<sup>120</sup> So far as progressive mythology is concerned, Vedic legends can be examined in the light of the Purāṇic tales. Can the same thing be done for the interpretation of the Upaniṣadic teaching also?

The most important point that requires to be considered here is the relationship of the Pūrva and the Uttara Kāṇḍas of the Vedic literature. Puruṣottama gives the different views held by various writers and gives the necessary refutations. Śaṅkara says that the Pūrva and the Uttara Kāṇḍas of the Śrutis should not be taken together but they are rather against each other, because there is a difference in the subject and the purpose of teaching. Puruṣottama says that in that case, the Uttara Kāṇḍa can not be called the Vedānta at all. If there is no mutual relationship between the two, there is definitely no ekavākyatā between them. The Uttara Kāṇḍa is not necessary for explaining the nature of a doer in the actions, for it expounds the nature of the individual soul which is neither a doer nor an enjoyer. It again does not lend strength to the

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Cf. Dr. M. Winternitz. History of Indian Literature .Vol. I. p. 105.

In the footnote, he refers to Geldner in the 'Vedische Studien! I. 243-295, and Oldenberg, ZDMG 39, 72ff and 'Die Literatur des alten Indien 'pp, 53ff.

actions on the basis of the passage: 'Yad eva vidyayā karoti...!',<sup>121</sup> since only the Udgīthavidyā leads to the Karmapauskalya and this is not the case with the whole of the Uttara Kāṇḍa. The ekavākyatā can not be established on the ground of accentuation and grammatical rules, because it is not the proper basis and goes against the well known Mīmāṃsa rule 'Arthaikatvād ekam vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣam ced vibhāge syāt.' The relation between the two can again not be established by arguing that sacrifices create a desire to know. Mere desire of knowledge is of no use. The 'Śruti' Vedam anūcyācāryo 'ntevāsinam anuśāsti',<sup>122</sup> and similar passages differentiate between the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. The term Vedānta can again not be defended on the ground of conventional usage, because it is not included in the Svādhyāya. (The view point here is of the convention and not the compound 'Vedesya antah'.) In that case its ~~is~~ ~~the~~ study and thought about it (Adhyayana and vicāra) would not be enjoined, i.e. would be avaidha. Its study can not again be included in the vicāra as found in the passages like 'Tad vijijñāsasva tad brahma',<sup>123</sup> because mere jijñāsā can not restrict it to the three upper classes. According to Śaṅkara therefore the Upaniṣads can not be called Vedānta at all.

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121. Chāndogya Upaniṣad. I. i. 10.

122. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. I. xi. 1.

123. Taittirīya Upaniṣad. III. i.

Bhāskara says that the Pūrva and the Uttara Kāṇḍas have different subjects but have the same purpose. This, says Puruṣottama, goes against the Śrutis and Smṛtis teaching Brahman as the meaning of all the Vedas (Sarvavedārtha.)

Vijñānabhikṣu believes that the Uttara Kāṇḍa is subordinate to the Pūrva Kāṇḍa, as Brahman is the Dharma and all the Vedas teach of the Dharma. The Dharmavicāra is thus not useless, but is for the purpose of a complete study of the Dharma and would thus be on a par with the Kalpasūtras. Puruṣottama argues that this would go against the scriptural passages, which show that Brahman is the meaning of all the Vedas. This would again run counter to the view of the sages like Jaimini, who did not complete the Dharmavicāra and Vyāsa, who did not begin with the Dharmavicāra. The analogy of the Kalpasūtras is not proper, because of the difference in the topic of discussion (Pratī-pādyabheda) in the Uttara Kāṇḍa. The opinion of Śrīkaṇṭha is also refuted.

How are the two parts related in the Śuddhādvaita? According to the passages like 'Mām vidhatte' bhidhatte mām. ...,'<sup>124</sup>

The term Upaniṣad can be understood to mean the knowledge of Brahman and Ātman according to the Brahmanavāda. The term vidyā means the negation of any understanding of distinctions as

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124. Bhāgavata Purāṇa. XI. xxi. 43.

per the passage, 'Vidyātmani bhidābādhaḥ.'<sup>125</sup> So when the sacrifices are performed with knowledge, they lead to the Karma-  
-pauṣkalya. The Vedāntas are thus required for the Pūrva Kāṇḍa. Knowledge again can be obtained by one, who has a pure mind and the sacrifices and the like are instrumental in the purification of the mind. Thus the Pūrva Kāṇḍa is helpful to the Vedānta. Though in both of them Karma and Jñāna are known to be respectively principal, the subject matter of both is one and the same, in as much as actions and knowledge are different attributes of the same object i.e. the Highest Lord. When they are combined, the result is the Brahmabhāva and the attainment of the highest position. Thus both of them have the same purpose. This being the case, it is meaningless to point out any contradiction between the two.<sup>126</sup>

According to the Śuddhādvaita all the words express God. Puruṣottama says that those, who take the scriptures as having the purport of action only, are completely ignorant of the fact that the scriptures teach of the Highest Lord. This is very nicely brought out by Puruṣottama, whom we may fully quote here. "Atraivam bhāti. Vedasyopekremo hi mantra-  
-devatāstutyādāv upayukteh. Prakaraṇam ca yēgasya. Sa ca 'yajño

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125. Bhāgavata Purāṇa. XI. 19. 40.

126. A.B.P. pp. 46-49, 69-70.

vai viṣṇur'iti śruter bhagavadrūpaḥ. Devatāś pañnyādayo yāga-  
 -śeṣā bhagavadamśabhūtaḥ. Kartāḥ puruṣo'pi yāgaśeṣo bhagavadamśaḥ.  
 Puruṣaśeṣabhūtam phalam apy'etasyaivaivānandasyānyāni'ty ādiśruter-  
 -bhagavadamśabhūtam. Tathāivopakaraṇānya pi. Evam sarvaṁ sākṣāt-  
 -paramparayā ca bhagavadrūpaṁ iti bhagavaty eva śrutes  
 tātpariyam".<sup>127</sup>

Additional arguments are also given by our author to show that the sacrifices are of the nature of the Highest Lord. Vedas have various branches and each sacrifice e.g. Jyotiṣṭoma is described in them in various ways. What is the use of the different descriptions of one and the same sacrifice, when one such a description would have been enough? If different descriptions are for those who are not intelligent, then one simple explanation for them would have worked even for those, who are intelligent. Nor are they for propounding the better results, since in that case, it is useless to describe the same fruit everywhere. The variety of descriptions is thus for establishing the similar variety of the forms of the Lord. In the Śākhāntarādhikaraṇa of the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras, there are 24 aphorisms to discuss and refute the contention that there is difference of action, corresponding to the difference of Śākhās and it has been established that only one karma is taught in various branches. We should therefore concede that

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127. T. Sn. Ab. p. 21.

karma has many forms. This can be explained only on the ground of passages like, 'Vedaś ca sarvair aham eva vedyaḥ',<sup>128</sup> Showing that the Highest Lord is the teaching of the Vedas. The Śruti further asserts 'Yad ekam avyaktam anāntarūpanam'<sup>129</sup> i.e. the God has many or endless forms. Puruṣottama therefore concludes:  
'Bhagavato'nekarūpatvād yajñarūpasya bahuprakārair nirūpanam.'<sup>130</sup>

The Śuddhādvaita thinkers do not agree that the Upāśanās, which form part of the Uttara Kāṇḍa, are for the purification of the mind, as has been made out by the Māyāvādins. Meditations actually teach of the greatness of God.<sup>131</sup>

It will of course be a very useful study to see how the Upaniṣads are interpreted in the Śuddhādvaita. Thousands of passages are interpreted by Vallabha and Puruṣottama, though the former did not comment upon them regularly, while for the later, even though he is said to have done so, most of his commentaries are not extant. It is possible to show these

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128. Bhagavad Gītā .XV.15.

129. Mahānārāyaṇīya Upaniṣad .I.15.

130. T.Sn.Ab.pp.24-26.

131. Udgīthādisūryādyupāśanāyā tattatprakāraṇoktam phalam tena tenopāśyena dīyate. Teṣāṃ ca pratīkatvena tatkr̥taphala-  
-dānaṁ mūlarūpamāhātmyaṁ, eva pratipāditam bhavati. Jñāte  
ca mahātmye tatra bhaktis teyā jñānam. T.S.Ab.p.45.



interpretations after collecting the vast number of passages found explained by them, especially by Puruṣottama in his voluminous works. This however requires a special study from that particular point of view. For the present however I have just given the fundamental approach to the Śrutis, as clearly explained by Puruṣottama. Even then I would like to examine here the interpretation of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, together with that of the Gauḍapāda kārīkās, as given by Puruṣottama. Puruṣottama's commentaries on the Nṛsiṃhotteratāpinī, Kaivalya, and Brahma Upaniṣads are also available, but the purpose of these commentaries appears to be to show that the said works can not be explained so as to teach the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara. Even in the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya the purpose is definitely the same. It is however an important Upaniṣad and Puruṣottama has commented upon the first two chapters of the Gauḍapāda's Kārīkās also. We will therefore study the Dīpikā of Puruṣottama on this Upaniṣad from three points of view; the interpretation of the Upaniṣad, the explanation of the kārīkās and the relationship of the Upaniṣad with the Kārīkās in the light of Puruṣottama's remarks.

The Upaniṣad begins with the syllable Om. Puruṣottama says that the Śruti wants to teach the seed of the expression of

Brahman in the whole of the Vedas. This is taught by stating the meaning of the syllable Om. The Om is of the nature of Akṣara Brahman. (Om ity etad akṣaram.) Everything that can be measured by time, past, present and future, and whatever is beyond the Time e.g. jīva etc., all this is Om. The speech which expresses, what is expressed by Om, is an explanation of it.<sup>132</sup> Everything, that which is an effect and that which is not, is Brahman. Nothing is different from Brahman. That which we express by the term Om and the term Brahman, having all the forms, that soul is Brahman i.e. it is to be expressed by the term Brahman; it is not the Prakṛti.<sup>133</sup> As the term ātman is known to be used for the puruṣa and the individual souls the Upaniṣad says: 'So'yaṁ ātmā catuspāt.' This is for averting any understanding of the Puruṣa or the jīva here. The passages from 'so'yaṁ ātmā...' upto 'Sa ātmā sa vijñeyah.'<sup>134</sup>

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132/ Idam sarvaṁ tasyopavyākhyānam: Idam/sarvaṁ Omkārayoni-  
-kaṁ vēṅmayam...Upavyākhyānam nikatātayā vīveraṇam  
ity arthaḥ. Māṇḍūkya dīpikā. p. 4.

133. Ayam ātmā brahma. Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad. 2. This is understood by Puruṣottama as against any doubt regarding the teaching of Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya.

134. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. 7. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā p. 20.

is something like an explanation of what has already been stated before. As Puruṣottama says 'Idam sarvaṃ vakṣyaṃāṇaṃ ca sūtrārūpeṇa pūrvam uktasya vṛttirūpaṃ jñeyam'.<sup>135</sup> As the Upaniṣad is aware of the difficulty in understanding it, the ātman is divided into four pādas.

What is the meaning of the pāda here? It does not mean 'Legs' as in the case of a cow, it means 'parts' as in the case of coins.<sup>136</sup> Further it is instrumental everywhere, in so far as it signifies Brahman. It is not instrumental in the first three and objective in the last, for otherwise the formlessness would lead to its inexplicability.<sup>137</sup>

The first pāda is said to be jāgaritasthāna i.e. having as its resort the sātत्वika antahkaranavṛttiviśeṣa. It is described as bahir-prajñā, because, on account of it, the individual souls have the comprehension of the external objects.<sup>138</sup> It has

135. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā.p.5.

136. Kārṣṇapāṇāder ivāṃśavacanāḥ pādaśabdeḥ na tu gavāder iva caranavacanāḥ. Ibid.p.5.

137. Tatrāpi brahmagemakatvāt kareṇasādhanaḥ sarvatra, na tu viśvādiṣu kareṇasādhenaḥ turīye karmasādhanaḥ. Vairūpyād brahmano nirvācyatāpatteḥ ca .Ibid.p.5.

138. Jāgaritam sātत्वiko'ntahkaranavṛttiviśeṣaḥ sthānam yasya sa jāgaritasthānaḥ. Bahir laukike bāhye viśaye prajñā avabhāso yena jīvanām sa bahir prajñā. Ibid.p.6.

seven limbs and nineteen faces. The limbs are the worlds and the faces are , ten organs (Of sensation and action), five life-breaths and four internal organs. They are doors of approaching it.<sup>139</sup> It is described as 'Sthūlabhuk', because it enjoys the gross body of the Brahmāṇḍa or the gross objects of enjoyment by means of these doors. It is Vaiśvānara, since it leads all the individual souls to their proper worlds and enjoyments in various ways.<sup>140</sup> Puruṣottama says that his interpretation is in conformity with the Śruti, 'pādo'sya viśvā bhūtāni.'<sup>141</sup> Here Puruṣottama gives a very important explanation of the term pāda, when he says , 'padyate jñāyate param Brahmāneneti pādah.'<sup>142</sup> The term pāda thus means that by which Brahman can be known.

The second is svapnasthāna i.e. having the dream as its abode , the rājasa antahkaraṇavṛttiviśeṣa. It is antahprajñā, because on account of it, one experiences the internal objects in a dream. It is praviviktabhuk because of the enjoyment of

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139. Mukhāny upalabdhidvārāṇi. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p.6.

140. Viśvān sarvāntarān jīvaṇ anekadhā tattaducitalokeṣu bhogeṣu ca nayatīti viśvānarah. Sa eva vaiśvānarah sarva-piṇḍātma. Ibid. p.7.

141. Rg-veda. X.90.3.

142. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p.7.

the internal with respect to the sense-organs.<sup>143</sup> It is taijasa, because it helps in the enlightening of the *indriyas*. This is the second *pāda*. Here also Purusottama explains *pāda* as 'Jñāpakomśah.'<sup>144</sup>

The *susuptasthāna*, the *tāmāsa antahkaraneṣṭtiviśeṣa* is the third. It is described as '*ekībhūtaḥ*', because of its in-separable connection with the *jīva* and it is called '*Prajñānaghana*', since it is the mass of *prajñānas*. Purusottama explains *prajñāna* in two ways, (1) *Prajñānāni tattadindriyājanyāni jñānāni*, (2) *Prakṛst-am jñānam yais tēnīndriyāni*.<sup>145</sup> The term '*eva*' in the *Upaniṣad*<sup>146</sup> is for averting the knowledge of everything as different from the very nature. The third *pāda* is called '*Ānandabhuk*', because as compared with the previous two, it is full of bliss. It has the essence of the attributes of Brahman, and it is also the *Brahmaloka*. It is not however the Highest Bliss, because the bliss here is measured. This however should not lead us to admit the existence of even the slightest misery, because

143. *Previviktaṃ indriyapekṣayā āntaram bhunkte iti.*

*Māndūkya Dīpikā*.p.9.

144. *Ibid*.p.9.

145. *Ibid*.p.10.

146. *Prajñānaghana evānandamayah. Māndūkya Upaniṣad*.5.

misery is the result of dualistic experience, which is absent here. Because it is ānandamaya, it is said to be ānandabhuk. The door of enjoyment is the cetāś. As Puruṣottama puts it 'Kevala-  
-bodha<sup>ā</sup>līkṣaṇam svasmin<sup>ā</sup>grāhaka<sup>ā</sup>kārenāparinatam cetāś citta<sup>m</sup>  
mukham ānandopelabdhidvāram asyeti cetomukhaḥ.'<sup>147</sup> The viśva  
and the taijasa though knowing the past and the like, show  
dualism, but in the third pāda, there is no dualism and thus it  
is called prajñā. The Upaniṣad, after teaching of the nature,  
describes His greatness. As he inspires all the different things  
he is the controller of all, like the fourth. He knows everything  
as non-different from himself. He is thus Sarveśvara and Servaj-  
-ña. He again enters and regulates and thus is called the  
Antaryāmin. He is the Yoni, the place of origin of everything.  
From him are born all the beings and they merge in him finally.

The fourth pāda is described by the Śruti at first with  
negative attributes, so as to differentiate it from the first  
three. He is neither antahprajñā, nor bahihprajñā, because he  
does not create anything endowed with vikalpabuddhi, either  
externally or internally. He is again not ubhayatahprajñā i.e.  
he is omniscient and his prajñā does not depend upon the

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147. Māndūkya Dīpikā, p. 11.

object or the Pramāṇas.<sup>148</sup> It is neither prajñā, nor aprajñā, nor even prajñānaghana. It is not an object of our eyes or any other sense organs. (Adṛṣṭ<sup>a</sup>, avyavahārya) He can not again be an object of any organ of action (agrāhya). He is beyond all inferences (alaksya), comparisons (ālīṅga), thoughts (acintya) and expressions (avyapadeśya). After thus distinguishing him from everything else by means of negative attributes, positive description is given for explaining his greatness. He is to be approached by those, who have knowledge of the soul.<sup>149</sup> The expanse of the world is quietened in him. As he is beyond all limitations, there can be no expanse of the world different from him. He is quiet, benign and devoid of duality. That is how people believe him to be. He is not 'such and such' alone.<sup>150</sup> He is the ātman, he should be known. Thus even though beyond mind and speech, the description of him is not futile because he is the self. This also makes clear the doctrine of grace.<sup>151</sup>

After this the Upaniṣad with a view to show the affinity

148. Māṇḍūkya Śūpikā. pp. 20-21.

149. Ekātmapratyeyasāram ekātmapratyayair jñānibhiḥ saro' nusanam yasya. Ibid. p. 21.

150. Etādṛśam caturthem manyante, na tv etādṛśa eva saḥ. Ibid. p. 22

151. Sa pūrvoktarītika ātmā vijñeyah, ātmatvato na vaiyarthya ity arthah. Tāveta śrutyāntaroktam varanaikalabhyatvam eva sphuṭibhavati. Ibid. p. 22.

between the syllable Om and the Brahman, compares the first three pādas with the three morae, A, U, and M and the last pāda with the moraeless nāda. Puruṣottama says after explaining these comparisons: 'Evam nādasya turīyadharmavattvena mātṛāntarāṇām pādānterasādharmyenādhiṣṭheyaśtvasāmye<sup>152</sup> ca Omkāro mukhyagaunavṛttibhyām ātmābhinnas ity arthaḥ. Ātmābhinnatvād evākṣarābhinnas jñeyaḥ.'<sup>152</sup> The Upaniṣad concludes by giving the phalaśruti., 'Samviśaty ātmanātmānam ya evam veda.' Puruṣottama explains samviśati as 'Upabhunkte' and cites the śruti, 'so'śnute sarvān kāmān saha brahmānā vipāścitā.'<sup>153</sup>

While commenting upon the first nine verses of Gauḍapāda-Kārikās, Puruṣottama makes an important statement: 'Tathā cedam siddhyati. Sarvapindātma viśvaḥ, sarvendriyātma taijasaḥ sarvamaṇa-ātmā sarvapraṇātma vā prajāñāḥ. Evambhāvaś cānabhimānena ity evamrūpaḥ paramātmāiva jñeyo na tu śarīraḥ.'<sup>154</sup>

From the analysis of the interpretation of the Upaniṣad as given by Puruṣottama, it is clear that Puruṣottama and for that matter the Śuddhādvaita teachers do not believe that

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152. Māṇḍūkya Līpikā .pp. 31-32.

153. Ibid. p. 32.

154. Ibid. p. 16.



The four quarters as described in the Upaniṣad, refer to the four states of consciousness. They are on the other hand various forms of God, who is capable of assuming endless forms. This is perhaps the reason why at many places in the dissolution of the compounds the instrumental and not the genitive is accepted. e.g. Bahihprajñāḥ: Bāhye viṣaye prajñā avabhāso jīvanām yena sah.<sup>155</sup> etc. Is this a correct reading of the meaning of the Upaniṣad? It appears that the Upaniṣad teaches about the states of consciousness, rather than what is explain<sup>ed</sup> by Puruṣottama, and the interpretation according to that ~~seems~~<sup>seems</sup> more natural. One will also perhaps find that Puruṣottama is unnecessarily bringing in the doctrines of the Śuddhādvaita at places. Thus for instance what is the ground for telling about the 'Ganitānandatva' in connection with the prajñā and its (his) attribute 'Anandamaya'? The explanation of 'Samviśati' as 'Upabhunkte', while interpreting the phalaśruti, appears to be far-fetched. It is no use finding fault with Puruṣottama here and there, because many such weak points can be found out. It must be said however that just as the absolutism of Śaṅkara can not be found out in the Upaniṣad in toto, similarly the Śuddhādvaita also can not be

accepted as taught here completely.

Coming to the Kārikās of Gaudapāda, we have already seen in the preceding chapter that though Puruṣottama has commented upon all the chapters, his commentary only on the first two is extant. Any way the commentary on the first two chapters, especially the second, is enough to show how Puruṣottama has interpreted the Kārikās in keeping with his own theories. We may note here some interpretations which are interesting for our purpose.

The Kārikā 'Devasyaiṣa svabhāvo'yam; āptakāmasya kāsprhā'<sup>156</sup> is taken by Puruṣottama to prove the theory of Līlā. He says 'Tena krīḍāto'yam svabhāvo na tu sprhaya karanam'.<sup>157</sup>

One may note here that the term 'Krīḍātaḥ' is added by Puruṣottama here. The immediately preceding Kārikā 'Krīḍārtham iti cāpare' need not warrent such a conclusion, because it is again preceded by 'Bhogārtham sṛṣṭir ity anye.' Is it that the author of the Kārikā really accepted the theory of Krīḍā? Perhaps he did not, for how to explain the 'Apare' otherwise? In the three Kārikās I. 7-9, the author gives

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156. Gaudapāda Kārikā. I. 9.

157. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p. 19.

various opinions regarding creation but it may not mean that the last opinion is of the author himself. Perhaps Gaudapāda does not prefer the one to the other.

How are the Kārikās, I.16, 17, 18 explained by Puruṣottama? The verse 16 says that when the individual soul, sleeping on account of the beginningless māyā, is awake, then the unborn sleepless dreamless non-dualism is known. Puruṣottama says that Anādimāyayā etc. means that, when one gets the Adhikāra for the realization of the fourth, he knows it, which has been described before. The term 'yadā' in the verse shows some effort for obtaining, but on the basis of the passage 'Vedāntaviṣṇūnasuniścātārthā...etc.'<sup>158</sup> it is suggested that the realization occurs at the time of the end. Puruṣottama argues for this: 'Anyathā pūrvaslokena gatārthatvād etam na vadet.'<sup>159</sup> Kārikā 17 runs 'If the world exists it will no doubt be removed. This dualism is just māyā, there is advaita from the highest point of view.' Puruṣottama says that this verse is intended to teach that dualism is of the nature of interim creation. This is for removing the

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158. Muṇḍake Upaniṣad. III.ii.6.

159. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p.26.

dualistic ideas in the minds of those, who have the different Adhikāra and who are thus incapable of tolerating the delay. Kārikā 19 means that the distinctions, if at all imagined by anyone, will be removed. This Vāda (discussion?) is because of preaching. When truth is known there is no dualism. Puruṣottama however explains it in a different way. He says that this verse also corroborates what has been stated in the previous verse. His explanation is : "Kalpito-  
vikalpo mānaso yadi kenacit upāśanena yogādisāadhanena vā  
viśeṣato nivarteta. Tada śuddhe cetasi upadeśād jñāte turiye  
ayam vādeḥ bhedāpādakatvāt dvaitarūpo na vidyate." "

Puruṣottama then adds "Sarvasya tadabhinnatve jñāte  
bhedasyāpi tadanatirekāt so'pi pūrvabuddharūpādvaito brahma-  
-iva bhavati."<sup>160</sup> The verse is really a difficult one for interpretation. Puruṣottama's explanation of 'Kenacit' and the way in which he construes the second line do not appear to be convincing.

Puruṣottama's interpretation of the Kārikās of the second chapter is worth considering. Puruṣottama says in the beginning of the chapter: "Upadekṣyamāṇajñānaviśayasya-  
-tñānaḥ sarvātmakatvalakṣaṇe sverūpe bodhanīye

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160. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā. p. 26.

tadvirodhinah pratīyamanasya kālpanikasya bhedasya niśāsya  
 bhedavādyabhimataprapañcasya mithyātvam pratipādayiṣya  
 ...etc."<sup>161</sup> Under the first three verses Puruṣottama gives

two syllogisms to prove the unreality of the dream  
 experiences, following the Kārikās. They are 'Svāpnikāḥ  
 sarvabhāvabhedāḥ śarīrāntahsthāḥ. Śarīrasamvṛtatvāt. Yād  
 yat samvṛtam tat tad antahstham. Grhākumbhavat. Yād vā śarīra-  
 -samvṛtam tac cārīrāntahstham. Śīrāntrādivat.' and 'Tathā  
 ce yadi gatvā paśyet tam deśam prapaśyaṇ pratibuddhas  
 tatraiva tiṣṭhet. Yato naivam ato naivam. Yato na gatvā  
 paśyati tato'ntareva paśyati.'<sup>162</sup> The second line of the

third verse according to Puruṣottama, counters those, who  
 believe in the reality of the dream creation on the  
 analogy of the creation of the Cintāmaṇi and the like.  
 The fourth verse extends the unreality to the internal  
 waking world. The internal waking creation is here of course  
 the object, visualized by the mind, which is different from  
 an external object. Thus the svapna and the jāgarāta sthānas  
 are of the same type (Verse 5) One may point out that while

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161. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā, p. 33.

162. Ibid. pp. 33-34.

in the dream everything is created, in the waking state it is the external object that is thought of. How can it be unreal? Kārikā 6 replies to this that the object of mental deliberation<sup>e</sup> does not exist before and after that deliberation and is thus on a par with the object, experienced in a dream. Puruṣottama says 'na hi māṇavakah sinhatvena dhyāteḥ sinho bhavati.'<sup>163</sup> It need not be said that the objects of our ideas should not be called unreal, because they very often produce real results. The Kārikā 7 is a reply~~ed~~ to this. This happens even in dreams. Puruṣottama gives the illustration for this, 'Svāpnikapramadāḥ sparsādīnā pāramārthikaskhalanadarśanāt'.<sup>164</sup> It should be noted here that 'Saprayojanatā vipratipadyate' is explained by Puruṣottama as 'Saprayojanatā svapnā<sup>e</sup> pi vipratipannāto kiñcitkarā sati sattvasādhikā.'

If ādyantavattva is the criterion of unreality, the scriptures enjoining svarga would be futile. Svarga is produced of the apūrva. The apūrva is produced of our own

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163. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā.p.37.

164. Ibid.p.37.

actions and is thus liable to destruction by worship etc.

Kārikā 8 is a reply to this. Puruṣottama's explanation of the verse is that the apūrva (apūrvam ~~śmat~~kriyābhivṛkṣam karma) is an attribute of the Lord. (Sthānidharmah: Sthāninaḥ jāgrādēdisthānavato dharmah) as is the case with those, who live in the heaven. (Svargasthā hi devās tanniyā<sup>m</sup>ākātvena bhagavatā parameśvareṇa sthāpitāḥ sarvadā tatra nivasanti)

For them heaven is not established by the apūrva, but is of the nature of the avayavas of the Lord. Similarly the apūrva is also not obtained by action but is eternal. The same is the case with heaven. It is only the connection between the two, that is produced and therefore the Karma-śruti is not futile. Tān is the second line of Kārikā 8 is understood by Puruṣottama as 'Svargavāsinaḥ svargam vā svābhiṣajeis tān dharmān vā' and 'prekṣate' as-'divyacakṣuṣi labdhe sākṣāt karoti.' The last quarter specifies the prekṣana. 'Yathaiveha suśikṣitaḥ': 'Yena prakāreṇa bhagavad rūpateyā apūrvateyā vā tatsvarūpajñāne upādhyāyena suterām dattaśikṣas tathā! Thus he sees the heavens, as he has been taught here about them. 165.

If everything is unreal, even the seer would be unreal. This would lead to the śūnyavāda. (V.10) Kārikā 11 is for giving the Siddhānta. The term 'Devah' in the verse according to Puruṣottama, has its connection with the krīḍā. Thus the imagination of God is of the nature of sport. The three cases used in 'Ātmanā', 'Ātmēnam' and 'Ātmā' show that the Lord is the essence of all the Kārākas. Puruṣottama says 'Tatropalakṣaṇavidhayā sarvātmatvam sarvakāratvam ca sādhitam. Ākārabhede kārakabheda bhāvāt.'<sup>166</sup> The nature of the imagination is the regulation of particular names in the particular forms of his own. The term 'sva' in 'svamāyayā' is for showing that this power is non-different and dependent. He knows the distinctions as of his own nature. Puruṣottama gives an illustration for this. 'Yathā puruṣaḥ śankhasura bhimatsyādimudrāḥ svāṅgulibhir vidhāya tāsu tattedrūpatām anusandhatte tadvat.'<sup>167</sup>

The Siddhānta would thus show that nothing is unreal. What then about the arguments, advanced for proving the unreality of everything? The Kārīkās, that follow, are for

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166. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā, p. 41.

167. Ibid. p. 41.



dispelling the doubts regarding this. The Kārikā 12 asserts that God imagines the substances thus. He transforms (Vikaroti vikṛtān karoti) the illusory substances, which are separate from his essential nature (aparān : Svātmarūpe<sup>6</sup>ṭhyo' tiriktān). The objects are irregularly (avyavasthitān) imagined in the mind, while those of external experience are regular (Niyatān). Even in this false imagination, God does it. The following two verses 13 & 14 are for making clear the unreality of the objects, so imagined.

Verses 15 and 16 show respectively the manner of imagination, corresponding to the two verses 11<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> and 12. Kārikā 15 says that the Lord first imagines (creates?) the jiva who essays to hold the life-breaths or the Hirenayagarbha. After this comes the turn of the external objects of enjoyment and the internal instruments of enjoyment. The word 'Prthag-vidhān' is for showing that the distinction in these objects is not that of the essence. Kārikā 16 gives the well known illustration of the rope and the snake. The following Kārikās 18 and 19 show how the ignorance as stated in the previous Kārikā, can be destroyed by knowledge. While explaining Kārikā 18 Puruṣottama says that just as

darkness is the cause of indiscrimination in the rope-snake example, here also the cause is the māyā of the sporting God.

It is described in the last quarter of the Kārikā 19. Puruṣottama explains 'Yayā'yam jīvo mohito bhavati tādrakprakārah svayam paramātmāiva māyetyarthah.'<sup>168</sup> Thus the māyā is the svarūpa of the Lord and it deludes the jīva.

The following nine verses are for explaining the Darśan-tika-anśa in the preceding verse 18. These verses show that the Highest Lord is the essence of everything. Verses 29 and 30 are for those, who know only one aspect. It is the desire of God, which regulates the knowledge of all these aspects. He protects him, who sees Him in various ways after becoming that which the worshipper sees Him to be! 'Tadgrhaḥ samupeiti tam' is explained as 'Tadgrhas tadekanīṣṭho vā tattadbhāvātmakam ātmānam samupaiti, prāpuoti, tasminllinas tadātmako bhavatītyarthah.'<sup>169</sup> Puruṣottama gives another interpretation also, which we have not noted above. 'Avati' is understood as 'Svāntah|rakṣati' or 'Sādā anusandhatte'. This will be connected with the worshipper. 'Sa bhūtvā' is explained on the basis of 'Devo bhūtvā devān apyoti.'<sup>30</sup> The Kārikā ~~30~~ is also understood in the same way.

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168. Māndūkya Dīpikā .p.47.

169. Ibid.p.50.

Those, who know only one aspect of God, have taken Him to be different from the Prāṇas etc., which are non-different.

(Apārthābhāvaiḥ abhinnaśattākaiḥ) <sup>one</sup> who knows this, properly can advance the scriptural views without ~~entertaining~~ <sup>entertaining</sup> any doubt. <sup>170</sup>

The Kārikās 31 to 33 which identify the world with the māyā, gandharvanagara etc. are stated by Puruṣottama as directed against those, who believe in dualism. The world, as understood by them, is really a phantom of imagination. But even the mithyāvādin are wrong. Kārikā 34 is a reply to them. This soul is just imagined even by those, who advocate the Mithyāvāda. Puruṣottama says 'ayam ātmā esadbhir mithyābhūta-ir bhāvaiḥ prāṇādibhiḥ sādhitam yad advaitam tenāpi kalpitāḥ, arthan mithyāvādinibhiḥ. Bhāvā api advayena anyathā bhavanti tathā kalpitāḥ, arthād ekaikāśavādinibhiḥ.' <sup>171</sup> Thus the monism, which accepted by both, is proper. Kārikās 35, 36 show how the advaita is to be understood. The world is not pluralistic but is non-different from Brahman. Verses 37, 38 show the means for obtaining the knowledge of the soul. And the last Kārikā states the phala. At the end Puruṣottama gives a very interesting

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170. Māndūkya Dīpikā. p. 50.

171. Ibid. p. 52.

summary of the contents of the second chapter.<sup>172</sup>

The interpretation of the second chapter, as given by Puruṣottama, will make the following points quite clear. In his attempt to find out the 'Suddhādvaita from the Kārikās, Puruṣottama has to explain them in such a way that all the verses, which directly teach the theory of illusion, describe the world as such for those, who are dualists. Kārikā 11 is said to give the Siddhānta but the way, in which the following verses 12, 13 are explained in relation to it, is really more ingenious than natural. Even the explanation of the Kārikās 11 and 34 appear to be far-fetched. The explanation of the Kārikā 8 is a good piece of imagination, as also that of the last quarter of the Kārikā 19. The inclusion of the term *krīḍā* now and then may be wholly unwarranted. The editor Bhaṭṭa Ramanath Shastri says in his introduction "Sṛīmatpuruṣottamacārṇavair api, bhavan-matamūlaguroḥ Kārikāsv api māyāvādo na labhyate, labhyate tu Brahmanvādaḥ iti darśayadbhiḥ svapāṇḍityena vivṛtaḥ."<sup>173</sup> Scholarship is surely there.

The relationship of the Kārikās with the Upaniṣad has

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172. Māṇḍūkya Dīpikā, pp. 54-55.

173. Ibid. Introduction.

posed a problem for modern scholars.<sup>174</sup> Some of them think that the Kārikās also form part of the Upaniṣad, while others do not agree to that view. Puruṣottama consistently calls it Gauda-  
-vārtika, as we have seen in the previous chapter. In the commentary itself Puruṣottama does not give any clue regarding his own opinion. At one place in the Āvaranabhāṅga Puruṣottama says that the verses in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the three chapters are read among the Śruti ~~and~~ by the moderns.<sup>175</sup> Any way the tradition of regarding the Kārikās as part of the Upaniṣad seems to have been current in the mediaeval times, though the Śuddhādvaita school does not appear to have accepted it.

(VI).

Interpretation of the Sūtras.

Whereas the scriptures form the first starting point of the Śuddhādvaita, as also in all the systems of the Vedānta,

174. For a discussion see. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. Āgama-  
-śāstra of Gauḍapāda. Intro. p. xxxviii. ff., T.M.P. Mahadeven  
Gauḍapāda, a study in the early Advaita. p. 31. ff. Cf. also  
'The problem of the Upaniṣadic theory of the Āgamaśāstra/  
Prakaraṇa of Gauḍapāda' by B.N.K. Sharma. Bheratīya Vidyā.

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175. Vaitathyādvaitātātaśāntyākhyam prakaraṇatrayam Māṇḍūkya-  
-sthāh ślokaś ca Gauḍapādīyaṇy etānīdanīntenair Upaniṣat-  
-su paṭhyante. T. Sn. Ab. p. 63.

the Brahmasūtras form the third. Vallabha began to comment upon them and his son completed his work. Puruṣottama has written a voluminous sub-commentary on it called Prakāśa. At many places Vallabha disagrees from his predecessors and Puruṣottama has tried to uphold his teacher's views with admirable erudition and labour. It will be an interesting study to see how the interpretations of Vallabha differ from those of others. It is easy to say whether this or that interpretation of a particular Sūtra appears to be correct, but it is surely difficult, perhaps impossible, to say whether any particular system can be evolved out of the whole work. The Brahmasūtras, as we have them today, do not appear to be the work of a single author or the work even of a particular period and it is very difficult to find out any coherent system of set theologico-philosophical ideas in them. I have tried to examine some of the interpretations of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa, taking into account Puruṣottama's remarks upon them.

Vallabha reads the two Sūtras I.i.2 and 3 as one. He refers to others, who separate those Sūtras. He does not give any particular reason for a combination of the Sūtras. He just says:

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'Naitat sūtrakārasammatam iti pertibhāti'. It is therefore left for Puruṣottama to point out why Vallabha has differed from all others. Puruṣottama says that in the Brahmasūtras, we find that the Adhikaraṇas are formed after stating that which is to be established and the proof for the same, so it is proper that both the Sādhya and the Hetu should be expressed here. The term Brahman is understood by the followers of the Sāṅkhya to mean the Prakṛti and so to avert this it is necessary to show that the causality of Brahman is stated in the scriptures. One may point out that even if two Sūtras may be read separately, we may have the Adhikaraṇa of the first three Sūtras. In the first Sūtra in the term 'Atha', which stands for the prerequisite of the Dharmavicāra, the Brahmevicāra is also implied and thus even though the Pramāṇa has not been expressly stated, Brahman can be taken to be known only from the Upaniṣads. The combination of the Sūtras is thus not necessary. Puruṣottama says that 'Atha' has many meanings and even if it means 'Ānantarya', it may not be taken to imply the Dharmavicāra. Hence it is better to have

only one Sūtra. If we agree with those, who accept two different Adhikaranas of the two Sūtras, the first has no hetu while the second lacks the Sādhya. Thus both are wanting and therefore cannot establish the desired Prameya.<sup>177</sup> Though Vallabha here differs from that which has been accepted by all the other commentators, the arguments of Puruṣottama appear to be plausible.

The third Sūtra 'Tat tu samanvayāt' is also interpreted by Vallabha in a different way. Samanvaya is understood by him to mean 'Sanyas anvaya'. God permeates all in the form of existence, sentience and bliss. Vallabha gives three reasons for such an interpretation. He says that the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta-pakṣa, as understood by others, are both wrong. Secondly the reconciliation of the conflicting passages is the very purpose of the Śāstra. How can it be the reason for establishing a certain proposition, when the reconciliation is yet to be explained? Thirdly the reconciliation, as understood by others, is not vouched for by the following Sūtras. The first and the third of these arguments are, in fact, matters of opinion, and of course each of the commentators will try to show that he alone is correct. To say that the Pūrvapakṣa is wrong is not a very happy



argument in any case, because the pūrvapakṣa is always proved to be wrong. The second argument of course has its value. Dr. V.S. Chate however points out: 'The same charge, however, may be brought against Vallabha himself; for Sūtra I.iv.23 also makes out the same point. i.e. that Brahman is also the material cause of the universe.'<sup>178</sup>

The Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa has been understood by all, except Madhva and Vallabha, as directed against the Sāṅkhya view of non-intelligent Pradhāna. Madhva however interpretes it in a different way. Brahman which is described as the object of knowledge (Īkṣāṇīya), can not be understood as inexpressible. Vallabha's interpretation of the Sūtras is some-what similar. We shall note his interpretation of all the Sūtras here. Brahman is not aśabda (na vidyate śabdaḥ yatra, sarvavedāntādīyapratipādyam) because of Īkṣāti. Even though Brahman is beyond all the dealings, he becomes an object of vyavahāra of his own desire. (I.i.4). The Highest Lord endowed with the attributes of Īkṣāti and the like, can not be Gaṇa (: Prakṛtiguṇasattvasambandhavan), because of the term ātman used for him. The term ātman stands for the Highest Brahman, which is Nirguṇa. (I.i.5). The term

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178. V.S. Chate. Vedānta. p. 59.

ātman again can not be Gauna, because liberation or mokṣa is taught of those, who meditate upon him. (I.i.6) The creator of the world is again not saguna, because he is not censured as heya, as would have been the case with one, endowed with worldly attributes. (I.i.7) Brahman is again not beyond all the dealings, because the individual soul merges in him everyday in deep sleep. (I.i.8) Again at the time of liberation everyone becomes similar to God. (Gati: Mokṣa, sāmānya: samānesya bhavaḥ. I.i.9)<sup>179</sup> That everything is an effect of Brahman is clearly established by the Śrutis. (I.i.10) Puruṣottama at the end of the last Sūtra refers to the interpretations of other commentators. He gives the interpretation of Śaṅkara and its refutation given by Jayatīrtha. He gives his own refutation also. Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Śaiva and Madhva are just referred to. After this Puruṣottama refers to the twofold Sāṅkhya and says that the Sāṅkhya theoreticians do cite the Śruti passages in support of their own views, but such citations do not show that the scriptures form the main source of their doctrines. That is why Vyāsa has refuted them in the Ānumānika-adhikaraṇa, because as they accept the Prakṛti as the main principle, and as it is not known through the

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179. Mokṣe sarvasyāpi bhagavatē tulyatvāt. A.B.p.146.

scriptures, it is definitely asebda.<sup>180</sup> Though Puruṣottama is not specific, he seems to imply that the attack on the Sāṅkhya finds its place in the Ānumānika-adhikaraṇa and need not thus be the subject matter of this adhikaraṇa. Puruṣottama is however not so clear here as he is elsewhere. His comments are half-hearted and his treatment is such that he is just perhaps trying to follow the work, he is commenting upon, so as not to be open to the charge of Vyākhyeya-grantha-virodha. We may here note some difficulties in the said interpretation. Vallabha begins the Adhikaraṇa with the statement 'Evaṁ Brahmajijñāsām pratijñāya kimlakṣaṇakam brahmety ākāṅkṣayām jannādisūtradya-<sup>2</sup>-yena Vedapramāṇakam jagatkartṛ<sup>2</sup> samavāyī cety uktam. Evaṁ trisūtrya jijñāsālakṣaṇavicāra kartavyatā siddhā.<sup>181</sup> If now Brahman is Vedapramāṇaka, why should there be any doubt regarding its being sarva-pramāṇa-viśaya? Puruṣottama has again criticised Śaṅkara for accepting the indicated sense in the term 'Īkṣati' by believing in the Dhātvarthanirdeśa. Puruṣottama himself however takes 'Īkṣati' as Īkṣābodhaka. Is it not Dhātvarthanirdeśa? Or is it just Dhātunirdeśa? While the Sūtras 4 and 5 have something to do with Īkṣaṇa, the Sūtra 6 shows

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180. A.B.P. p. 154.

181. A.B.P. p. 128.

that the creator of the world is not Gaṇa. (Gaṇa has its connection with the word Guṇa according to Vallabha) The question of Brahman being the creator has already been settled in the second sūtra, while the discussion that Brahman is devoid of Mundane attributes will find its place in ~~III~~ III.ii. What is the use of the same here? Similar is the difficulty with the seventh Sūtra. Vallabha seems to be aware of this difficulty when he says, 'Evam sūtracetuṣṭayena īkṣatīhetunā jagatkartṛtvopapattyaḥ sṛṣṭi-<sup>182</sup> vākyaṇām Brahmaparatvam upapāditam.' This itself may appear rather strained. The remaining three Sūtras have nothing to do with kartṛtvā at all. Puruṣottama however tries to connect the Sūtras 8,9 with the question of vyavahāryatva. He says, 'Evam cātra brahma na sarvavyavahārātītam. Suṣuptipralayaḥ jīvā-dhāratvena śrī<sup>183</sup> tatvāt. Yed yadē yedādhāratvena śrutam tat tadā tatprayuktavyavahāre viṣayam ity evam anumānam bodhyam.' <sup>183</sup> Puruṣottama also says 'Evam ca brahma na sarvadā sarvavyavahārā-tītam. Mokṣe tathātvā śrāvītatvāt. Yed evam tad evam. Maitreyī-brāhmaṇaśrāvī<sup>184</sup> tasarvevad ity evam anumānasiddher asya hetutvam bodhyam.' <sup>184</sup> We may say that the explanations are not very convincing. Similar explanation is not given of the Sūtra 10.

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182. A.B.p. 143

183. A.B.P.p. 146.

184. A.B.P.p. 148.

At the end however Puruṣottama says, 'Evaṃ atra trisūtryāṃ  
 susuptivicāreṇa dainanādinapralaya~~apralaya~~kartr̥tvam, dvitīye  
 mokṣavicāreṇātyantikatatkartr̥tvam tṛtīye kāryakartr̥tvaprati-  
 -pādenena naimittikāditatkartr̥tvam bodhitam iti pratibhāti.'<sup>185</sup>

The word 'Pratibhāti' should be noted here. In spite of all the  
 attempts of Puruṣottama, the last three Sūtras do not seem to  
 have any definite connection with the first four. What again is  
 the theory, that is established here? Is it that Brahman, though  
 beyond all the dealings, is the object of the Vedic teaching  
 or rather becomes so by His own desire? Is it that Brahman is  
 en<sup>d</sup>owed with supramundane attributes only and devoid of the  
 mundane ones? Is it, finally, that Brahman is the creator of all?  
 None of these is the purport of all the Sūtras. If there is no  
 one viśaya, how can there be one adhikaraṇa?

Vallabha directs the whole Adhikaraṇa I.iii.14-21 against  
 Śaṅkara. Puruṣottama says 'Asminn adhikaraṇe jīva<sup>h</sup>brahmaikyakṛta-  
 -sarvasaṅkaravādasya māyāvādasya ca nirākṛtir eva mukhyā.'<sup>186</sup>  
 Vallabha and Puruṣottama appear to have realized the sheer  
 anachrosism of directing the set of Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa against  
 Śaṅkara, who is just a commentator of the Sūtras. Vallabha says

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185. A.B.P. pp. 150-151.

186. A.B.P. p. 394.

that as Vedavyāsa is omniscient, he knows that one māyāvāda will be taught in future and thus refutes it in anticipation. Puruṣottama shows how such things are possible. In the Purāṇ<sup>as</sup> also Sūta has told of future events.<sup>187</sup>

The difficulty in the interpretation of the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa comes to the fore in the beginning of the forth quarter of the first Adhyāya. Vallabha says, "Tatra 'Īksater nāśabdā' iti sāṅkhyamataṁ śābdatvād iti nivāritam". Puruṣottama explains, 'Naṁ adṛśyatvādyadhikaraṇa etadṛśam api vākyaṁ vicāritam eveti kim anena vicārena... Tathā ca yady api tadvākyaṁ vicāritam tathāpi tanmatssya sarvathā śārautātvaṁ eveti nopapēditam ato vicāra ity arthah.'<sup>188</sup> Really speaking both Vallabha and Puruṣottama appear to be in difficulty. There is nothing in the interpretation of I.i.4-10., which has any connection with the Sāṅkhya. Again Vallabha definitely refers to the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa, while Puruṣottama refers to the Adṛśyatvādyadhikaraṇa. Is it that Puruṣottama knows the difficulty in the works of Vallabha and tries to defend him by going out of the way?

Sāṅkara has often been attacked by scholars, not only

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187. A.B.P. pp. 401-402.

188. A.B.P. p. 475.

ancient but even modern, that his views are not corroborated by the Sūtras. It has been pointed out that the Sūtrakāra did not agree to the falsity of the world, for otherwise he would not have refuted the Buddhistic theories in the Sūtra 'Vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat',<sup>189</sup> It should be borne in mind that this is the position of almost all the Ācāryas. Vallabha is also open to the same charge. The Sūtrakāra, who says 'Naikasmīn asambhavāt', can not be stated to teach Brahman, endowed with contradictory attributes. While Vallabha does not keep this in mind, Puruṣottama does not miss the point. He realizes the difficulty and tries to make amends by saying that, in fact only Brahman and nothing else is possessed of contradictory attributes. He says 'Vestutas/tu viruddhadharmāntaratvam brahmany eva pramāṇasiddham nānyatreṭi khyāpayitum taddūṣaṇam',<sup>190</sup>

The Sūtra II.iii.18. 'jñāta eva' is a very important Sūtra for all. Whereas Śaṅkara takes 'jñāta' to mean jñāna, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka understand it as jñāta. I may quote here the remarks of Dr. Ghate about Vallabha. He says, "Vallabha, who also holds with Rāmānuja and Nimbārka that 'knowledge' or 'intelligence' is an attribute (...) of the jīva, interpretes the Sūtra as

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189. Brahmasūtra. II. ii. 29.

190. A. B. P. 660.

stating the prima facie view, according to which jīva is knowledge and therefore Brahman itself, and all distinctions are due to the principle of māyā; though really the jīva is a part (Anśa) of Brahman and is related to it just as sparks are related to fire. And, while refuting this view, Vallabha makes very interesting remarks: 'Tasmāt tadamśasya tadvyapadeśavākya-mātram svīkṛtya śiṣṭaparigrhāṛtham mādhyamikasya eva aparāvataṛo nitarāṃ sadbhir upekṣyah'... Of course this interpretation of the Sūtra is far fetched, though it makes no material difference as ultimately he means that the soul is a knower."<sup>191</sup> Dr. Ghate's reading of Vallabha's interpretation ~~is~~<sup>does</sup> not seem to be correct. This is not a Sūtra, presenting the prima facie view. Vallabha begins to Sūtra with 'Guṇān nirūpayan prathamataṛ caitanya-guṇam āha,' and then explains the Sūtra as 'Jñāś caitanyasvarūpaḥ Aṭa eva śrutibhyo vijñānamaya ityādibhyah.' Puruṣottama explains it as 'Jñānadharmakatve'pi jñānasvarūpa ity arthah.'<sup>192</sup>

According to Vallabha, thus the individual soul is both the knower and the knowledge. The tirade against ~~to~~ Śaṅkara is a usual feature of Vallabha's works and need not been understood in the way, in which Dr. Ghate has understood it. Vallabha thus

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191. Dr. Ghate. Vedānta. p. 92.

192. A. B. P. p. 706.



combines the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and of course his explanation is not so far fetched, as said by Dr. Ghate.

The Sūtra, which should be considered in connection with the different interpretations is II.iii.50. Though there are many Sūtras in this pada, that afford an interesting study, I have not here embarked upon a detailed study of Vallabha's interpretations and therefore I will just refer to this Sūtra only. It reads 'Ābhāsa eva ca.' Śaṅkara takes the word ābhāsa to mean just appearance. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka understand the term as 'Hetvābhāsa'. The later interpretation is clearly far fetched. Vallabha here agrees with Śaṅkara in the literal sense of the word. But whereas 'Ābhāsa' according to Śaṅkara means Pratibimbatva and consequently mithyātva, this is not what Vallabha means. Jīva is an ābhāsa, because the quality of bliss is not manifested in him. As Puruṣottama says, 'Tathā ca yathā'nācāri brāhmaṇe brāhmaṇābhāsaḥ, sūtradhāra katve' pi brāhmaṇyākhyadevatāyās tatas tirohātātāt, tathā jīvo' pi.'<sup>193</sup> If we think that the Sūtrakāra does not teach the māyāvāda of Śaṅkara, perhaps the interpretation of Vallabha is the best.

The first Adhikaraṇa of III.ii. deals with the dream world. It has been variously interpreted by the Ācāryas. We shall here

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give the interpretation of Vallabha. The first two Sūtras present the prima facie view. The opponent says that there is creation in the dream state, and this has been stated by the Śrutis. In some texts the creator is also told as also the sons and the like. Thus the dream creation, created by Brahman, does exist. From the third Sūtra begins the reply. The exponent says that dream creation is māyā only, because it is not fully manifested. What is meant by Māyā and 'Kārtsnye'? Puruṣottama here says 'Siddhānte tu sām<sup>a</sup>rthyaviśeṣo māyā. ... Ata Īśvareṣya yā vyāmoḥikā śaktiḥ sā māyā prakṛte jñeyā. ... Deśaḥ kālo viśayasannidhir indriyavyāpāro bādhābhāvaś ceti kārtsnyam.'<sup>194</sup> Thus the dream creation is not real. As

Puruṣottama explains further, 'Tathā caindrajaḷikena natena yathā sāmājika vyāmoḥane keutukārthan māyāmātrasrṣṭiḥ kriyate, tatheśvareṇa jīvavyāmoḥanādyarthan svapnasrṣṭiḥ kriyate iti na tasyaḥ satyatvam.'<sup>195</sup> Why then should God create it at all?

The fourth Sūtra replies to this that the dream is indicative of good and evil, as it has been said in the Śrutis and again those who are experts in reading the dreams also say so. Thus the dream is shown to the jīva for indication. Puruṣottama says

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194. A.B.P. p. 876.

195. A.B.P. p. 876.

that the dream is not as negligible as the sky-flower, because in that case it can not be suggestive of anything. The fifth Sūtra says that it is on account of the desire of the Highest Lord (Parābhidyānāt) that the attributes of God are concealed from the individual soul, who suffers, as a consequence, the bondage. Or the non-manifestation of the attributes (Sah: Tirobhāvaḥ Viparyayo vā) may be due to the connection with the body.

Dr. Ghate has fully discussed the Adhikarana with reference to the interpretations of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara, giving three different views, idealistic, realistic and idealistico-realistic respectively. As for Vallabha, he says that the Ācārya 'practically follows the third view and interpretes just in the same way as Bhāskara does with the difference that he interpretes Sutra 5 just as Rāmānuja does it...' <sup>196</sup> Dr. Ghate is correct when he implies that Vallabha follows the idealistico-realistic view by disagreeing with Śaṅkara, who takes the waking state also to be illusory and with the view of Rāmānuja, that the dream is also real. But there is a fine distinction between his view and that of Bhāskara, in as much as for him the dream creation is a creation of Brahman and not of the individual soul, as understood by Bhāskara. The problem for Vallabha however is that of

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196. V. S. Ghate. Vedanta. p. 121.

the connection of the first four Sūtras with the rest. The viṣaya in this Sūtra according to Vallabha is, 'Kiñcid āśankya periharati. Nenu jīvāya bhagavān srṣṭim karoti pradarśayati ca svasya sarvalīlām. Anśaś cāyam. Katham asya duḥkhitvam ity āśankya periharati tuśabdah.'<sup>197</sup> Why should this question be raised here and not in II.iii? Even though the Sūtra contains the word 'Tirohitam', which Vallabha and his followers understand as a sure indication of the Sūtrakāra's belief in the theory of Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva, the Sūtra, as explained by Vallabha, appears to be entirely out of context as it has nothing to <sup>do</sup> with the dream creation. The Sūtra 6 again gives an alternative. Vallabha says 'Īśvaracchayā aiśvaryāditirobhāvam svamate nirūpya matāntarenāpi niyatadharmevādena nirūpayati.... Asmin pakṣe dehaviyoge eva punar aiśvaryādi-prāptih. Pūrvasmin kalpe vidyamāne' piti śeṣah.'<sup>198</sup> What is the ground for 'Svamate' here? If the term 'Tirohite' should indicate the Sūtrakāra's belief in the theory of Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva, can we say that the term 'māyāmātram' in Sūtra 3 shows that the Sūtrakāra accepts the theory of māyā? At the end Vallabha refutes the interpretations, given by others and

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197. A.B.p.883.

198. A.B.p.884.

says 'Nidrāyā vivekajñānābhāvāvasaratvād yathāvyākhyāta evārthah'.Puruṣottama says 'Idam hi nidrāprakaraṇam.Nidrā ca tadeivāvasaram prāpnoti yadā vivekajñānam na bhavati.Ato jñānatirobhāvasyaivātra vaktavyatvāt tasya cōkterītyaiva bodhāt yathokta evārtha ity arthah.'<sup>199</sup> It is difficult to understand how Vallabha and Puruṣottama call this a nidrā-prakaraṇa.Should we think that the last two Sūtras deal with nidrā,while the first four with svapna? In that case why should there be one Adhikaraṇa only?

The set of Sūtras and Adhikaraṇas,beginning with III.ii.11 is very important for our purpose,in as much as they deal with the nature of Brahman in relation to the attributes. Dr.Chate says that according to Vallabha,Sūtras 11- 21 form only one Adhikaraṇa.<sup>200</sup> This is not correct,if we follow Puruṣottama.The question here according to Vallabha relates to the attributes of the individual soul and the inert matter as sometimes taught as belonging to Brahman,while at times, they are denied to it.Some believe that the reconciliation can be brought about by admitting the sthāne,i.e.

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199.A.B.P.p.886.

200.V.S.Chate.Vedānta.pp.126-127.

the abode; thus Brahman is endowed with smell in the earth and devoid of it in water. As Vallabha explains 'Evam sthāna-tah parasyobhayakīṅgam upapadyate'<sup>201</sup> The term 'api' gives an alternative explanation, 'athavā kāraṇa eva rūpam arūpam cāvacchedabhedena acāntāya- sāmartyād vā.'<sup>202</sup> Both these alternatives are wrong(na), because Brahman is taught in this way everywhere. (Sarvatra hi). Puruṣottama explains that Brahman has no svagatabheda and is of one and the same nature everywhere.<sup>203</sup> In the next Sūtra the opponent says that the explanation of the Siddhāntim is not correct, because of the distinction in the cause and the effect. Thus Brahman, different from the world, is distinct from Brahman endowed with the attributes of the world. (Na bhedaḥ iti cet). The exponent replies that this is wrong(na), because Brahman is said to be one everywhere. (Pratyekam atadvacanāt) Some Śrutis actually deny the bheda. (Sūtra 13) Here ends one Adhikaraṇa.

The second adhikaraṇa, beginning from Sūtra 14 gives the

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201. A.B.p.900.

202. A.B.p.900.

203. A.B.P.p.902.

reconciliation in the opinion of the ekadeśin. Who is this ekadeśin? Puruṣottama says 'Ayaṁ hy ekadeśi brāhmaṇa ekadeśena jagatsamavāyaitvaṁ tadatiriktasya jagadvāilakṣaṇyaṁ svarūpataḥ sādharmaikatvaṁ svecchayā vyavahāryatvaṁ jñānātmakam brāhmaṇa ākāraṁ manvāno jñānākāraṇasya brāhmaṇaḥ prapeñcapretibimbena laukikadharmavattvādikam manute.'<sup>204</sup> Brahman is different from (a) the world (rūpevat: rūpyate nirūpyate vyavahriyate iti rūpaṁ sarvavyavahāre viśayatvaṁ tadyuktam rūpavad viśvam.)<sup>205</sup>, because Brahman is mainly taught (Pradhānatvāt) wherever it is described. Vallabha adds that the discussion here is regarding the attributes, which are different from Brahman and not those of Brahman. He concludes 'Tasmāt kāryavat taddharmēnām api kāryatvāt bhagavattvaṁ na bhagavaddharmatvaṁ iti siddhāṁ.'<sup>206</sup> The next Sūtra says that just as the light of the sun is and is not an object of our senses in the absence or presence of the clouds and the like, even so Brahman can not be approached by our mundane speech and mind, but it can be approached in the absence of obstructions. Otherwise, the <sup>āsto</sup> Sūtra will have no meaning (Avaiyarthyaṭ). The Sūtra thus wants to prove that even though Brahman is not an

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204. A. B. P. p. 905.

205. A. B. pp. 906-907.

206. A. B. p. 908.

object of worldly dealings, the scriptures are not futile.<sup>207</sup>

Well, why then not imagine the supramundane sense organs also?

To this the reply is given in the Sūtra 16 that the Śruti

teaches of Brahman as just a mass of knowledge. (Tanmātram:

Prajñānaghanamētram.) The scriptures and the smrtis themselves

show the absence of the attributes of the jada and the jīva

in Brahman. (Sūtra 17) Vallabha says 'Prapañcadharmā bhagavaty

ucyante vedātau na tu taddharmā bhagavā<sup>2</sup> itī jñāpayati.'<sup>208</sup>

The Śrutis also give the simile of sūryaka (Sūryeṇa sahitaṁ

jalam sūryakam. Sūtra 18) Vallabha says at the end 'Tasmāj

jadajīvadharmāṇām bhagavaty upacāro niśedhas tu mukhyaḥ.'<sup>209</sup>

Puruṣottama at the end give the resume of which we have

quoted in extenso because of its importance. "Brahmaṇaḥ

prapañcavilakṣaṇatvena kāryasādharaṇadharmāṇām kāraṇe brahmaṇy

abhāvena brahmaṇas tatsvarūpadharmāṇām ca laukikamanovāg-

-agocaratvena kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghana itī śrutyō akārasya

jñānātmatvatvā<sup>2</sup> tattatkriyādīnām dharmāṇām ca naisargika-

-tvena teṣāṁ ca bhagavat-prakāṣye eva darśanādivyavahāra viṣaya

-tvena laukikavāṇmanobhiḥ pratīyamāṇānām sthānadharmatvāt ta-

thety ekadeśimatena siddham ity arthaḥ. Tena brahmaṇaḥ sthānato

207. A. B. p. 909.

208. A. B. p. 913.

209. A. B. p. 914.



jadajīvadharṁetvam svatas tu tadrahitatvam ity ekadeśimatenā-  
 sidḍham. Etenāsyādhikarṇasya prāsāṅgikatvam maksyamānopā-  
 -dghātātvaṁ veti sūcitan."<sup>210</sup>

Sūtra 19 begins the next adhikarṇa. It contains the  
 siddhānta against the view of the ekadeśin. The view of the  
 ekadeśin (Tathātvam) is in-correct(na). Water can reflect a  
 substance but the attributes can not so contain any reflection.  
 (Ambuvad-agrahaṇāt) Thus the sarvakāma etc. are the attributes  
 of Brahman and are not aupacārika, on account of the connect-  
 -ion with the upādhis.<sup>211</sup> How then to reconcile the conflict-  
 -ing passages according to the <sup>Siddhānta?</sup> Sūtra 20 gives a  
 reply to this. Just as space may be big or small in accordance  
 with its limiting adjuncts, even so here also Brahman is  
 endowed with all the attributes. This there is ubhaya-sāmañja-  
 -sya. Sūtra 21 says that all the attributes, even the contrad-  
 -ictory ones, are seen in God. Sūtra 22 gives the way of  
 reconciliation from the point of view of reason. The denial  
 of the attributes in the <sup>2</sup>Sūtra relates to only those which  
 are mundane (Prakṛtāitāvattva), and then speaks of many other  
 attributes, which are supramundane.

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210. A. B. P. p. 914.

211. A. B. p. 919.

Sūtra 23 starts the next adhikaraṇa. Vallabha says that the contradiction has been resolved earlier on the basis of sabdabala and now the Sūtrakāra does the same from the point of view of the arthabala. Puruṣottama says that the ~~arthabala~~-vicāra is not necessary but as other sages have taken their stand on the ~~arthabala~~ also, it is necessary to consider from that point of view also.<sup>212</sup> Sūtra 23 states the prima facie view that Brahman is avyakta. The next Sūtra is a reply to it. Vallabha understands the word 'Api' as a jeer against the opponent, who is a fool. The Highest Lord is seen in the course of intense devotion (Sāmrādhana), when God shows favour. The devotee perceives him, or people like Dhruva infer him. The 'Pratyakṣānumānābhyām' may be understood as 'Śrutismṛti-bhyām' also.

Another Adhikaraṇa begins with the Sūtra 25. This and the next Sūtra form the Pūrvapakṣa. The reconciliation of conflicting passages is not proper on the strength of the perception of a devotee, because that can be no specification. (Avaśesyāt) The illustration given here is that of light. In the light of the sun, the moon, the jewels etc, one experiences heat or cold but the light as such is not taken

to be manifold. The prakāśa of the Lord depends upon the actions like penance etc. (Prakāśaś ca karmāṇi). This is not uniform but is various (abhāyāsāt) corresponding to different actions and different devotees. The Sūtra 26 takes the argument further. Because of this variation (atah) the Lord is manifested in endless ways (ananta). But then we should accept some frame (līṅga) of the Lord. This can be decided on the basis of the scriptures or the perception of a devotee. The Sūtra 27 gives a reply to this by saying that Brahman is both without attributes and is endowed with them, because both are taught (Ubhayavyapadeśāt). This can be illustrated by taking the instance of a snake, which may be both straight or coiled. At the end Puruṣottama says 'evam ca śeḍḍabalavicāreṇa viruddhasarvadharmāśrayam brahmeti nirṇayaḥ. Śrutyukta yuktyā vicāre tu laukikadharmaśūnyam alaukikasarvadharmayuktam iti nirṇayaḥ. Arthabalavicāre tu viruddhasarvarūpam iti nirṇaya iti bodhenā-rtham atra tredhā vicāritam.'<sup>213</sup>

Sūtra 28 begins a new adhikaraṇa. The question discussed here is regarding the relationship of Brahman and His Dharmas. The Sūtra says that the abodes of light like the sun are non-

-different from light as also different from the same; both being called tejas. Similarly the attributes are both different and not-different from Brahman. We should note here that Vallabha takes 'Vā' in the sense of 'tu'. Sūtra 29 however says that Brahman should be understood as before. This, says Vallabha, is the way of reconciliation from the point of view of the ekadeśin. This is further corroborated by the next Sūtra, which says that the attributes are also denied to Brahman, as is inferred from 'eva' in the passage 'Ekam evādvitīyam.'<sup>214</sup>

Different interpretations have been given by different Ācāryas and it is very difficult to say which of them is correct. The Sūtrakāra himself does not appear to be very clear, as can be judged from the repeated use of the term 'vā'. It may be noted that Vallabha's interpretation of 'va' in the 28th Sūtra as 'tu' is not so very happy. Similarly one may feel that the explanations of 'Arūpaved' in Sūtra 14 and 'api' and 'sāmādhane' in Sūtra 24 do not seem to be satisfactory. Vallabha's explanation of 'arūpaved' as 'jagad-vilakṣaṇa' reminds one of II.i.4, where the question has already been discussed, though ~~maxxxxx~~ in a different context. The

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214. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad. VI.ii.1.

problem before the Sūtrakāra is as to whether Brahman is possessed of the Dharmas and not whether Brahman has the attributes of the jada and the jīva. The greatest problem for Vallabha however lies in his bringing in the ekadeśin. Who is this ekadeśin? Why should there be a complete adhikarane for him? Again the difficulty becomes more acute, when the last two Sūtras 29, 30 are said to belong to him. Vallabha has to say 'Ubhayam api sūtrakārasammataṃ'.<sup>215</sup> Puruṣottama takes special pains to distinguish between the two positions.<sup>216</sup> Again how is <sup>it</sup> that Vyāsa's own opinion is given in the Sūtra 28, and that of the ekadeśin in the sūtras 29 and 30? Puruṣottama spares no pains to defend his teacher. He says that as the view of the ekadeśin is corroborated by another Sūtra 30, we should not think that the Sūtrakāra considers the view as equally correct. 'Ekam evādvitīyam!',<sup>217</sup> need not deny the attributes also. When we say that Devadatta is at home and nobody else, it goes without saying that Devadatta endowed with hands and feet is at home. The argument is given

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215. A.B.p. 940.

216. See. A.B.P.p. 941.

217. Chāndogya Upaniṣad. VI. ii. 1.

only to show that there is nothing different from Brahman.<sup>218</sup>

But it may appear that in his zest to defend Vallabha, perhaps Puruṣottama himself is facing difficulties.

The Opponent of Puruṣottama is again very searching. It is wrong, he says, to understand the ekadeśin as that of Vyāsa. In other words the opponent asks; what is the ground for believing that the Sūtra 28 gives the Sva-siddhānta? Puruṣottama replies: 'Ekadeśipade atra vyāsasyaiva ekadeśi grāhyah. Anyathā ambuvatsūtreṇa ata eveti sūtrasiddham dr̥ṣṭāntam na dūṣayet. Vṛddhihrāsādisūtradvaye yuktyanteram ca na vadet.'<sup>219</sup> The ekadeśin is not mentioned by name, because he may not be so well known as Jaimini. The opponent's name is equally not given in the Sūtra 'jīvamukhyaprāpa-liṅgād iti cet tad vyākhyātam'.<sup>220</sup> Or it may be that this view is intended for the lower adhikārins. It can also be possibly stated that the ekadeśin may be one Kāśakṛtsna, who is mentioned before in 'Avasthiter iti Kāśakṛtsnah'.<sup>221</sup>

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218. A.B.P. p. 942.

219. A.B.P. p. 942.

220. Bṛhmasūtra. I. iv. 17.

221. Bṛhmasūtra. I. iv. 22.

It should not again be said that as the Sūtras 29 and 30 come after Sutra 28, they teach the main principle. Puruṣottama says "Dvitiyaśkaṇḍhe 'ittham bhāvena kathito bhagavān bhagavattamāḥ ,anetthambhāvena hi param dṛṣṭum arhanti sūrayaḥ' ity ādibhir etadāmukhyatāyāḥ śukavākye vyāsecaranair evokta-tvāt." The view is admitted only for the lower adhikārins, who may be enlightened by it. Puruṣottama refers here to the Nāsadiyasūkt<sup>222</sup> and says that Vyāsa thinks from the point of view of the līlāsrsti, while others do not understand it.<sup>223</sup> Puruṣottama then goes on to denounce strongly the interpretations of others.

From all that is given above, it appears that Vallabha is at times obscure, and Puruṣottama is also not satisfactory in~~def~~ defending him. At the end of the Ānandamāya-adhikaraṇe Puruṣottama takes Vācaspati to task and quotes a verse:

Yuktibhir atisithilābhiḥ samādadhāno dṛḍhān doṣān,  
Vācaspatir api bhāṣye vyākhyāvyājena dūṣaṇam brūte.<sup>224</sup>

Can the same thing be said of Puruṣottama here?

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222. Rg-vede. X. 129.

223. A. B. P. pp. 942-943.

224. A. B. P. p. 220.

After III.ii.34. we have a different author for the Anubhāṣya. Viṭṭhaleśa's interpretations of the Sūtras are not a very creditable performance, when compared with those of Vāllabha. He distinguishes through out between Puṣṭi and Maryādā, often refers to Gokula, discusses the incarnations of Viṣṇu, and all that. With all his fantastic interpretations, he gives so many things with a sectarian bias and so many things, which the Sūtrakāra might have never intended. Puruṣottama as a faithful commentator has to explain all these things, and what is more he tries to defend Viṭṭhaleśa. We may note only three instances here.

At the end of III.iii.2. Viṭṭhaleśa says 'Iyam tūpāśanā-mārgīyā vyavasthoktā. Bhaktimārgīyā tv etadvilakṣṇā.'<sup>225</sup> Puruṣottama in his explanation says about Nanda etc. but his opponent asks 'Nanu sūtrakāreṇ edam kutroktam yenaivam ucyate?' Puruṣottama replies 'Agrimeṣūtre dhikārasya nūpasam-hārahetutākathānenātrā yathādhikāranirṇayasūcanāt sūcitam iti jānīhi.'<sup>226</sup>

Under Sūtra III.iii.28 Puruṣottama's opponent asks as

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225. A. B. p. 983.

226. A. B. P. p. 984.



to the use of referring to the Purāṇas and Itihāsa, when all others refer to the maxims of the Pūrvatantra. Puruṣottama of course gives the stock reply 'Itihāsapurāṇayor vedopabrūhenatvāt.'<sup>227</sup>

Under IV.iv.7. however Puruṣottama has to say something which, if accepted by an opponent, Puruṣottama would never tolerate. He says 'Nāyam niyamo yad viṣayavākyaṃ sautrapadānurūpam eva grāhyam iti.'<sup>228</sup>

Dr. Ghate is frank in his assessment of the Anubhāṣya. He says, "It is very difficult to assert dogmatically whether Vallabha's doctrine receives or does not receive any support from the Sūtras; but so much may be said that his commentary strikes us many times not as a very creditable performance, being in places very sectarian or unsatisfactory, although one can point out instances where he offers very interesting criticisms of others. It is to be observed however that his special references to Gokula, the Puṣṭimārga and the Māyādāmārga, and his manner of reconciling the mutually contradictory passages in the Upaniṣads by postulating the miraculous and incomprehensible

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227. A. B. P. p. 1061.

228. A. B. P. p. 1396.

greatness(Aiśvarya) of the Brahman and his assertion of pure monism without any reference to plurality make it far from possible that his doctrine could have been the one propounded by the Sūtrakāra."<sup>229</sup> One may not agree with the assessment of Dr.Ghate in toto.The sectarian interpretations are mainly found in the later part of the Bhāṣya, and Vallabha need not be blamed for the weaknesses of his son.Again Vallabha's criticisms of others are more caustic than brilliant.As regards the miraculous power of God,it is indeed a moot point. The point however is that all these Ācāryas try to evolve their own systems from the Sūtras,which in their turn have tried to evolve something like an Upaniṣadic system.But on account of the enigmatic style of the Sūtras,it is very difficult to get a clear idea of the system of the Sūtrakāra.

(VI).

Interpretation of the Gītā and Bhāgavata Purāṇa.

While the Bhagavad Gītā is regarded by all as one of the Prasthānas,Vallabha includes the Bhāgavata Purāṇa also

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229.V.S.Ghate.Vedānta .p.177.

in the list. Vallabha himself as not commented upon the Gītā, as others have done; and though he has very often referred to it in the course of his commentaries and works, it is very difficult to piece them together and make out a full-fledged commentary. In the first chapter of the Tattvadīpanibandha Vallabha understands the term 'Śāstrārtha' as 'Gītārtha'.

The point has been discussed by me at some length in the chapter BII. Any way Puruṣottama, curiously, keeps quiet in his commentary at that place.<sup>230</sup> The Amṛtaraṅginī commentary is said to have been written by Puruṣottama but it is not correct. It is written by Vrajarāya. Only the introductory portion is from the pen of Puruṣottama. This is however sufficient to show the purport of the Gītā according to the Śuddhādvaita.

Puruṣottama, in the beginning, refers to the purport of the Gītā, as explained by Śaṅkara and Madhusūdana, and criticises them. He refers to Śrīdhara and offers no comments. At the end he states the views of Rāmānuja and says 'Idam Siddhāntasyānugunam.'<sup>231</sup> After this he gives the explanation according to the Śuddhādvaita.

The Lord Śrīkrṣṇa who came to the world for the liberation

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230. T.S.Ab.p.30.

231. Bhagavad Gītā with seven commentaries.p.11.

of all, uplifted the devotees by explaining to them the concept of devotion. He could see the dark Kali age, which was devoid of all Dharma. Hence for creating devotion in the future generation, he preached his own essential nature to Arjuna, when an occasion for the same arose. Of the fourfold devotees, *ārta*, *jijñāsu*, *arthārthin* and *jñānin*, Arjuna had the first two *Adhikāras*. That teaching has been compiled by Vyāsa, who was an incarnation of the knowledge of God, in seven hundred verses. It has been explained by Viṭṭhaleśa in his *Gītātātperya* thus:

Pravṛttidherman bhagavān rsiadvārā nirūpyatu ,  
 Nivṛttim iṣṭām sudṛḍhām nihsandigdham harir jagau.  
 Sāṅkhyam yogo rahasyam ca rahasyatanam eva ca,  
 Anyonyādhikyanirdhāro jñānavijñānāyor api.  
 Svesvarūpavinirdhāro bhajanetaranirṇayah,  
 Taddhetur guṇavāṣāṇyam sarvaśāstravinirṇayah.  
 Iti gītārthanirdhāro yathābhāgo vitanyate,  
 Sāṅkhyeyogau nirūpyēdau moham utsārya phalgunam.  
 Bhaktipūyūṣapātāram kṛtavān iti saṅgrahah. <sup>232</sup>

Viṭṭhaleśa has also discussed, says Puruṣottama, as to why should the first *Adhyāya* begin with the speech of

Dhṛtarāṣṭra. Dhṛtarāṣṭra is surely not a devotee and his son Duryodhana is an incarnation of a demon. Again as the Brahma-vidyā is being taught here, it requires a calm adhikārin, whose resignation is for getting the knowledge of the self. Here the spirit of resignation in Arjuna is for fear of sin. Again if Kṛṣṇa would teach the Brahma-vidyā to Arjuna, then Arjuna would also retire from the kingdom and the Samsāra. This is not the position. Hence the teaching is not quite up to the mark here. To this the reply is that the sons of Prthā are admitted to the path of devotion by the Highest Lord as his own. The Lord with a desire to lighten the burden on the earth made Yudhiṣṭhira perform the Rājasūya, after which the great war was fought. Again Kṛṣṇa through Yudhiṣṭhira desired to establish the realm of religion and kill the demons. This can be possible only in the reign of Yudhiṣṭhira. If however the foes are killed by them, just as brothers kill brothers, and the Pāṇḍavas begin to rule, then the kingdom will have no element of virtue. It is because of this that Kṛṣṇa made Arjuna grieve in the stated way. Hence the withdrawal from war has been described of

Arjuna himself; otherwise a warrior would have experienced the feeling of heroism and not of resignation. Hence only the Bhagavadīyatva is the cause of this feeling in Arjuna. To such a man only the Bhaktimārga should be taught and as the teaching is not of the common standard, Dhṛtarāṣṭra and his son are brought in the beginning. Again when a Bhagavadīya thinks of doing something according to the desire of God, it is a good thought, not otherwise. Thus it should not be understood that the grief of Arjuna is for showing that those who are full of grief are entitled to know Brahman, because it is not the primary purpose. The purpose in the Bhagavad-Gītā is to teach the limits of the path of devotion, the limits that are beyond the world and the Vedas. Puruṣottama thus concludes 'Ato'tra mukhyatayā bhakter evopadeśaḥ yat-punar anyat tat sarvam tasyaiva śeṣabhūtam iti dik.'<sup>233</sup>

As is the case with the Śrūtis and the Sūtras, the Bhagavad Gītā has also been interpreted very often and by many. It is difficult to say dogmatically as to whether the 'Suddhādvaita is or is not taught in the Gītā. It will be a

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233. Bhagavad Gītā with seven commentaries. p. 12.

study in itself to see whether the 'Suddhādvaitic interpretation of the Gītā is correct.

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa is held in very high esteem in the Suddhādvaita system. Vallabha's Subodhinī on the same is not complete. He has also given a chapter-wise summary of the Purāṇa in the third chapter of his Tattvadīpenibandha. Puruṣottama has written his sub commentary on the Subodhinī and on the said chapter. Puruṣottama has also independently written one tract Bhāgavatasvarūpaviśayakaśaṅkānirāsavāda.

The 'Suddhādvaita system considers the Purāṇas as one of the Prasthānas. Bhāgavata is surely immensely popular among the Vaiṣṇavas in India and it really deserves that popularity. The date of the Purāṇa has baffled the scholars and various views are advanced for the same.<sup>234</sup> It is interesting to note here that Puruṣottama has also tried to show that the Bhāgavata is not only a Mahāpurāṇa but is also very old.<sup>235</sup> It is difficult to say anything about it.

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234. Cf. D. K. Shastri. Aitihasika saṁśodhana. p. 187 ff, M. Winternitz History of Indian literature. Vol. I. pp. 554-557, R. C.

Hezra. Purāṇic records on Hindu rites and customs (Studies in) pp. 52-57, the Purāṇa index. Vol. I. V. R. R. Dikshitar. Intro. pp. xxviii-xxx.

235. Bhāgavatasvarūpaviśayakaśaṅkānirāsavāda. Appendix to T. Sn.

It is equally difficult to say anything about the philosophical teaching of the Purāṇa. Prince S.N. Dasgupta has written on the philosophy of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.<sup>236</sup> Apart from the question of date, the philosophical teaching of the Purāṇa also requires a separate study.

(VIII).

Puruṣottama as an interpreter.

We have discussed above the interpretations of the Śrutis, Sūtras and Gītā according to the Śuddhādvaita, in the light of Puruṣottama's remarks. We may here add a few lines regarding Puruṣottama's own interpretations of his predecessors, whose works he has commented upon. It should be said at the very out-set that Puruṣottama remains completely faithful to Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa, whose works he mainly explains. But the problem before Puruṣottama was not just to explain the words of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa but to restate with his scholarship and skill the teachings of Vallabha among the scholars of the day. He has thus to write much more than

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236. S.N. Dasgupta. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. IV.  
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mere explanations. Vallabha's laconic style makes his works so obscure that they can not be understood without the help of a commentary. Puruṣottama's commentaries however supply much more than what is needed. Puruṣottama not only tries to explain the concepts of the Śuddhādvaita with clarity and exactitude, but compares them with other systems, defends Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa and refutes others. All this he does by way of commentaries, Prakāśa on the Anubhāṣya, Āvaranabhaṅga, on the Tattvadīpanibandha etc. Only rarely we find in the Anubhāṣya-Prakāśa that Puruṣottama indulges in discussions, which are not exactly called for in the Anubhāṣya. After II.iv.16 Puruṣottama discusses the jñānakriyā,<sup>237</sup> and at the end of the same pāda there is a long discussion on the Sr̥ṣṭiprakriyā.<sup>238</sup> Similarly at the end of I.iii.38 Puruṣottama raises the question whether the Śūdras are also entitled to learn the whole of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas and comes to the conclusion that only those portions which do not teach of Brahman should be read or heard by them.<sup>239</sup>

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237. A.B.P. pp. 772-804.

238. A.B.P. pp. 810-813.

239. A.B.P. pp. 442-444.

Whenever he explains, he explains fully. Thus when an Upaniṣadic passage is just referred to in the Bhāṣya by a word or two, Puruṣottama would give the whole passage, interpret it and reject the interpretations given by others. He would not leave aside anything that he knows, and of course he knows everything that is required for him to know. Even the traditional story of the Vivāda between the Brahmvēdin and the Mīmāṃsāvēdin connected with the verse 'Ekam śāstram devakī-putragītā etc' does not move away from his mind.<sup>240</sup>

When Puruṣottama is defending the interpretations of Vallabha and Viṭṭhaleśa, he is surely brilliant though at times he seems to be facing difficulties in doing so. The most glaring example of this is found in the Suvarṇasūtra, when Puruṣottama has to perform the duty of defending the fantastic interpretations/ given by Viṭṭhaleśa of the Vedic verse 'Tā vā vāstunyo aśmasi gamadhyaḥ...etc.'<sup>241</sup> Viṭṭhaleśa talks about Gokula and all that and Puruṣottama is of course not so enthusiastic about it in his commentary.

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240. Cf. T.S. Ab. pp. 26-27.

241. Rg Veda I.154.6.

Puruṣottama however can not let it go easily. His opponent immediately asks why should there be such an explanation, when even in the Nirukta the verse is said to have the sun as its deity. Puruṣottama can of course give the answer.

"Prakaranānurodhāt. 'Vedaiś ca sarvair aham eva vedyaḥ,'

'Sarve vedā yat padam āmananti' iti śrutismṛtibhyā ca. 'Ado yaḥ dāru plovate' Ity elakṣmīprakāśakamentresya puruṣottama-kṣetramēhātmye vyāsepādair vedabhāṣya vidyāranyena ca Śrījāgannāthapareṭayā vyākhyānāt, etasyaḥ saraṇer darśitatvā ca "242

Again while explaining his master, Puruṣottama does not miss the textual problems also. Thus for instance, while commenting upon the statement of Vallabha 'Agnisūryasomavidyud-rūpā brahmaṇo haṁsoktacaranarūpā,' Puruṣottama says 'Rūpād iti pāṭhe bhāvepradhānānirdēśaḥ. Rūpeti pāṭhaḥ śrīhastākṣaresu sandigdhatvād bodhyaḥ.'<sup>243</sup> After III.iv.21. Puruṣottama says that another Sūtra 'Bhāveśabāḥ ca 'is read by others. He then explains why it has not been included here. "Tac ca vidhir vādhārenaved ity atra itesyaiva syāt padvid iti śrutivyākhyānena iva vyutpāditam atāḥ prayojanābhāvād upekṣitam iti pratibhāti.

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242. S.S.p.295.

243. A.B.P.p.494.

Lekhakadoṣāt tr̥titaṃ veti jñeyam." <sup>244</sup>

Sometimes Puruṣottama finds that the interpretations of the Sūtras as given by Viṭṭhaleśa are different from those given by Vallabha. Puruṣottama notes the difference carefully in his Anubhāsyaprakāśa. Thus for instance at the end of Sūtra II.iii.42 Puruṣottama notes that while the term 'Prayatna' in the Sūtra is understood as an effort of the individual soul by Vallabha, Viṭṭhaleśa explains it as the effort of the Highest Lord for the purpose of sport. <sup>245</sup> Similarly at the end of III.ii.18 Puruṣottama shows how the interpretation of this set of Sūtras given by Viṭṭhaleśa is different from that given by Vallabha. <sup>246</sup>

We have stated above that Puruṣottama is on the whole very faithful to the Ācārya and his son, whose works he explains. A very careful perusal of his commentary on the Anubhāsyā will however show that there are cases, of course rare, when Puruṣottama in his zest to give a scholarly explanation slightly goes off the track. In the very first Sūtra for

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244. A.B.P. p. 1212.

245. A.B.P. p. 750.

246. A.B.P. pp. 914-916.

instance, Vallabha discusses the illustration 'Daśamas tvam asi' and points out that a man knows himself to be the tenth not only because he hears that, but also because he sees himself to be the tenth. The perception here is thus stronger than the Āptavākya. Puruṣottama however indulges in a scholastic discussion and gives three alternatives, one who sees, one who is blind and one who knows that the soul is different from the body. For all the three the knowledge is only of the body and not the soul, resulting from the Āpta-vākya. Vallabha's explanation is certainly better.<sup>247</sup> Such instances are very rare and again the difference wherever found does not make any substantial change in the teaching of the authors. We can say at the end that Puruṣottama, who is a very capable argumentator, is also a very faithful and brilliant interpreter.

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247. A.B.P.p.30.