

# **CHAPTER 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **I. THE PREAMBLE**

It is important to study the subject of the United States-NATO Relations in terms of changing U.S. Security perceptions in Post-Cold War era mainly for three reasons. Firstly, after the Cold War, most of the Cold War institutions disappeared but not NATO and its functions in the context of changing U.S. Security interests. Secondly, it is important to study the relation of the NATO with the U.S., as it may have a bearing on the changing roles of NATO - whether the NATO is in cooperation with the United Nations or in competition with it. Finally, not much research work has been done from the developing countries on the changing U.S.-NATO relations in a historical perspective. After the Second World War, it became clear that the two superpowers had different goals on the basis of their spheres of influence. Due to the differences between the superpowers, many countries had to choose ideological sides: capitalist liberal democracy or communism. Many of the events that one will examine in the rest of the chapters are a direct result of the competing ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, an Alliance of 15 countries from North American and Europe, was committed to fulfilling the goals of the treaty signed in 1949. In accordance with the treaty, the fundamental role of NATO was to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. It safeguarded the Allies' common values of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes and promoted these values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.<sup>1</sup>

The treaty, a model of brevity and clarity, paved the way for the Alliance's adaptation to the constantly changing dynamic of international security. It provides built-in flexibility and scope for tackling new problems and applying solutions to them that reflect the changing environment.<sup>2</sup> In Article 9, the drafters provided for a flexible organisational structure for the Alliance based on a single, authoritative institutional body in the form of a Council responsible for the implementation of the treaty and for the creation of such subsidiary bodies as might be necessary. This foresight has enabled the Alliance to evolve and to adapt itself to new circumstances throughout its history.<sup>3</sup>

The North Atlantic Alliance was founded on free consent of member states after public debate. The treaty upholds their individual rights as well as international

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1 NATO Handbook, Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, NATO, 2006, p.15.

2 Ibid, p.9.

3 Ibid.

obligations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>4</sup> The fundamental principle of the treaty, which remains to this day, is Article 5, which states: **“An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or in America shall be considered an attack against them all”**.<sup>5</sup> Through the treaty, member countries have committed themselves to sharing the risks and responsibilities of collective security and undertaken not to enter into any other international commitments, which might conflict with the treaty.

After the Second World War, many Western leaders saw the policies of the U.S.S.R as a continuing threat to democracy and international peace and stability. The forcible installation of Communist governments throughout the Eastern Europe demonstrating Soviet expansionism in Europe appeared to many as the first step towards a Third World War. These events prompted the signing of the Dunkirk Treaty in 1947 between Britain and France pledging a common defence against aggression by a third power.<sup>6</sup> Subsequent events including the rejection by the Eastern European nations of the European Recovery Programme (commonly known as the Marshall Plan) and the creation of the Cominform, a common European Communist platform in 1947 were responded to by most Western European nations by signing the Brussels Treaty in 1948.<sup>7</sup> Among the goals of that treaty was the collective defence of its members.

The American reaction on the signing of Brussels Pact was positive. On the same day the Pact was signed, President Truman delivered a speech suggesting an Atlantic alliance: “I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them”.<sup>8</sup> Already in March the secret Pentagon Talks on the safety in Europe between the USA, UK and Canada were launched. As Ottavio Barie observes, “this was a virtually emblematic confirmation of the tendency of Great Britain and the USA to base the system of Atlantic security on their special relationship consolidated even further in this case by the intentional exclusion of France and by the presence of Canada”.<sup>9</sup>

While the United States shunned most foreign interaction in its first century, its foreign policy was more one of neutrality than isolationism. George Washington began the policy of neutrality during his presidency in the 1790s. His decision made good sense. The United States was too young, too weak, and too short of money to engage

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4 Ibid, p.17.

5 “NATO’s Cold War Roots”, *BBC News*, 3<sup>rd</sup> August, 1999.

6 Baylis, John, “Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 5, Issue 2, 1982, pp.236-247.

7, Antonio, “The First Stage of Negotiations”, in Di Nolfo, Ennio (ed), *The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later: A Historical Reappraisal*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1991, p.21.

8 Speech by Paul Henri Spaak on “To The Imperial Defence College” at Imperial Defence College, November 1957.

9 Barie, Ottavio, “The Final Stage of Negotiations”, In Di Nolfo, Ennio (ed), *The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later: A Historical Reappraisal*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1991, p.46.

in another country's war. With the notable exceptions of the War of 1812 (1812-1815), and the Mexican War (1846-1848), the United States tended to its own internal problems until 1890. By then the Civil War was long over, slavery abolished, Reconstruction ended, and the Indian Wars finished. The United States was prepared to look beyond its borders and construct a new foreign policy.<sup>10</sup>

The Berlin blockade that began in March 1948 led to negotiations between Western Europe, Canada, and the United States that resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty. As a next logical step, negotiations between West European nations and the United States resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4<sup>th</sup> April, 1949 in Washington D.C. Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation emerged as a trans-Atlantic regional defence alliance as a vanguard against the Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe.

Until 1950, NATO consisted primarily of a pledge by the United States to aid its members under the terms of Article 5 of the treaty. There was no effective machinery, however, for implementation of this pledge. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 convinced the allies that the Soviets might act against a divided Germany. The result was not only the creation of a military command system, but also the expansion of the organization.<sup>11</sup> In its first decade, NATO was mainly a military organization dependent on U.S. power for security and for the revival of Europe's economy and polity.

The decision of the United States after the Second World War to participate in a regional wartime defensive alliance represented a fundamental change in American foreign policy, namely the death of isolationism. The United States recognised that its interests no longer could be confined to the limits of the Western Hemisphere: U.S. security was linked inextricably with the future of the West European democracies. Concepts of individual liberty and rule of law, coupled with those of a common heritage and shared values, provided the foundation for the NATO Alliance.<sup>12</sup> These ideals, as well as the ongoing goal of every member country to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, continue to link the fate of America to that of its NATO Allies.

The NATO was established to safeguard the 'freedom, peace, common heritage and civilisation' of the North Atlantic region following the Second World War, professedly adjunct to the Charter of the United Nations. After the fall of the Nazi Germany and with the Iron Curtain rising in East Europe, there was an urgent need for restructuring the

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10 Jones, Steve, "A Brief History of the Pre-WWII American Idea", in Rodney P. Carlisle, *Handbook to Life in America*, Volume 7, Infobase publishing, New York, 1<sup>st</sup> January, 2009, pp.203-210; Levin, Geoffrey, *From Isolationism to Internationalism: The Foreign Policy Shift in Republican Presidential Politics, 1940-1968*, Johns Hopkins University, 2011, 46.

11 Samkharadze, Nikoloz, *The European Security and Defence Policy and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - Partnership Or Rivalry?*, Issue 5 of Working Papers European Studies Hannover, 2004, p.11.

12 Johnson, Paul, "The Myth of American Isolationism – Reinterpreting the Past", *Foreign Affairs*, 74, May/June 1995, pp.159-64.

Western (i.e. US) military security landscape.<sup>13</sup> This was also necessary in order to foreclose any resurgence of a United Germany as a threat to international peace and stability, even if the union of the two Germanies was a very distant possibility then. It also reflected a West European desire to lure the United States into playing an active part in guaranteeing European security on a permanent basis, this time codified and sanctified by a treaty. After the Second World War, however, the United States decided that it should not withdraw to its shell again, as it did after the First World War. Certainly, not at the teeth of the Soviet threat looming large in Europe. This, it was hoped, would ensure that the experience of the post-First World War Europe was not repeated. That alone would provide a guarantee against another war on account of Europe.

## II. THE PROBLEM

Though NATO was created through the signing of the Washington Treaty, the Treaty paved the way for the Alliance's adaptation to the constantly changing dynamic of international security. It provided built-in flexibility and scope for tackling new problems and applying solutions to them that reflect the changing environment.<sup>14</sup>

After the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-European Alliance has become the object of intense review. The disappearance of the Soviet threat appears to have diminished the need for security cooperation. European resentment of the American domination seems increasingly dominant, and calls for European autonomy and American disengagement can be heard on both sides of the Atlantic. When NATO was founded in 1949 - parallel to the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany - it was, in the words of Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, to serve three functions: "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down".<sup>15</sup> During the 40 years (1949-89) of the East-West conflict, the Atlantic Alliance served these three functions extremely well.<sup>16</sup> Besides providing for deterrence and defence against the Soviet threat, it largely put Germany under leash and coupled the United States with the defence of Western Europe. NATO's integrated military force structure as well as the U.S. military presence in Europe were the physical guarantees that joined America with the fate of Europe.<sup>17</sup>

The demise of the Soviet Union led to the end of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and to the disappearance of the potential threat to NATO, thereby diffusing the very basis of the Atlantic Alliance. The reunification of Germany was another factor that decreased the

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13 Delbrueck, Jost, "A European Peace Order and German Question: Legal And Political Aspects", *Michigan Journal Of International Law*, Vol. 11, No.3, Spring 1990, pp.897-888.

14 Future Security Environment, Intelligence Sub-Division, Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Transformation, 13<sup>th</sup> June, 2007, p.6.

15 Reynolds, David, *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*, Yale University Press, 1994, p.13.

16 Haftendorn, Helga, *The Post-Cold War Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance*, The Madeleine Feher European Scholar Lecture, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 1<sup>st</sup> May 1997.

17 Ibid.

relevance of NATO, as it had existed.<sup>18</sup> During 1948-49, NATO was more relevant to Germany than to any other European state. With the reunification of Germany, with Eastern Germany also coming under NATO protection, this threat of the rise of Nazism and Communism vanished.<sup>19</sup>

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in the post-Cold War period, it was widely felt that NATO had lost its *raison d'être*.<sup>20</sup> The demise of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War and brought the world face to face with an 'uncertain' future. For a good part of the last century, the Cold War provided the framework for the conduct of international affairs. The two opposing blocs - the United States providing leadership to the Western World and the Soviet Union leading the club of nations under Communist rule started constructing and amassing nuclear weapons to defend themselves against a possible attack by the opponent. Both parties established their respective partner military organisations - NATO and Warsaw Pact - to demonstrate their allied solidarity and deter potential aggressors. Neither party could seriously consider openly challenging the other, without running the risk of being dragged into a nuclear war. A balance of terror it was indeed. But after the collapse of Communism, all that was gone. And now what?<sup>21</sup> The validity of NATO became more questionable with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup> But the U.S. leadership was not interested in dissolving NATO, because it believed that NATO would not only guarantee European security against any military threat but also provide international political, social and economic stability and prosperity to its members as well as to those who were eager to strengthening European security under NATO.<sup>23</sup>

### III. WHY NATO?

NATO was needed as insurance to maintain the freedom and security of Europe. This is vitally important to the freedom and security of the United States.<sup>24</sup> A Europe dominated by any power hostile to America, its interests, and values would be a direct

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18 Moens, Alexander, "American Diplomacy and German Unification", *Survival*, Vol 33, November-December 1991, p.531; Bournazel, Renata-Fritsch, *Europe and German Reunification*, St. Martins, New York, 1992, p.5.

19 Ibid.

20 Moore, Rebecca R., *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, Praeger Publisher, Westport, 28<sup>th</sup> February, 2007, p.9.

21 Ibid.

22 Mehrotra, O.N., "NATO eastward expansion and Russian security", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol 22, No.8., 1998, pp.1225-1235.

23 Ibid.

24 NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "Future of NATO – Secretary General's Perspective" in Robert Czulda and Robert Łoś, *NATO Towards the Challenges of A Contemporary World*, International Relations Research Institute, Department of Theory of Foreign and Security Policy, University of Lodz, Warsaw, 2013, pp.20-21.

threat to the security, stability, and prosperity of the United States itself. America fought two world wars and sustained over 40 years (1949-89) of a Cold War military commitment to prevent Europe's domination. Thus during the two Cold Wars, NATO proved to be a shield to ward off the Soviet onslaughts, and also a springboard of challenges thrown at the Soviets. Could this be in response to the demands of the US Security interests?

Throughout its history, America had been inextricably linked to Europe. Despite its frequent pronouncements of isolationism, it has influenced the balance of power and the struggle among competing ideas in Europe. In this century, America's essential role has been underscored in one World War against expansionist ultra-Nationalism, a second against Fascism and a Cold War against Communism.<sup>25</sup> With the end of the Cold War, the struggle over power and ideas in Europe had ended with the victory of Democracy over Communism, and that an American presence would no longer be necessary. But after only a few years, it is clear that American involvement clears essential for European stability.<sup>26</sup> The building of tolerant democratic societies, and the balance of power that allowed them to take root and flourish, are still at risk.

Europe represented the world's greatest contribution of nations and peoples, which share Alliance commitments to democracy and market economies. America's cultural heritage and institutions largely spring from European roots. The most important multilateral alliance - the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - is centered there. The continent is also one of the world's greatest centers of economic power and represents a massive export market for the U.S. products. Thus, the continued political, cultural and economic well-being of the United States is inextricably tied to Europe.

Local conflicts, internal politics and economic instability, and the re-emergence of historic grievances had replaced Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe. The United States and its transatlantic allies jointly ensured that tolerant democracies became rooted throughout all of the Europe and that the unresolved legacies of past conflicts are contained and resolved. In this context, building new security architecture for Europe meant providing a framework to build stable democracies, market economies and ultimately a stable and just peace across the continent.

NATO has travelled far from its original mission of deterring a Soviet attack on Western Europe. It stands to reason that it should do so, NATO planners maintain, because the original *raison d'être* of the alliance – the Soviet threat – has disappeared. What is needed, they argue, is to make NATO more up-to-date and more relevant to solving messy conflicts like Bosnia. Put in the parlance of the strategist, NATO's core mission is to prevent the domination of Europe by a hostile power or bloc of powers, which strive to deny the continent of its overall freedom and security.

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25 Perry, William J., *U.S. Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, Department of Defence, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995.

26 Ibid.

That mission – preserving the basic security condition of Europe – is as relevant today as it was during the Cold War. Moreover, it is especially important in defining the America's role in European security and NATO. The U.S. has a vital interest in the freedom and security of Europe regardless of whether a hostile attack is imminent. Who can predict whether Russia or some other country may or may not be a threat to Europe ten or twenty years from now? It is not the immediacy of the threat that counts, but the depth of America's vital interests in the basic security condition of Europe. If even a potential threat to that interest exists, the U.S. is prepared to deter major power aggression and defend European security and freedom. It makes no sense for America to leave Europe and return, as it did in the last two world wars, only when Europe is in flames and the threat reaches practically America's doorstep.

Since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO has faced unanticipated new threats and responded by moving beyond its traditional Cold War role. Instead of defending Western Europe against Soviet tanks, it deployed “out-of-area” for the first time and used military power to force cessation of conflict and then provided stability for the long process of reconciliation and reconstruction.

NATO serves a vital role in the post-Cold War Europe. NATO provides much of the stability framework for realizing at last George Marshall's vision of a Europe united in freedom, peace and prosperity. NATO anchors the United States in Europe to the benefit of the both Europe and the United States. It constitutes the world's only standing, readily usable coalition of military capability, which is critical to defeating Saddam Hussein in Desert Storm (1991) and bringing peacekeeping to the Balkans. Secondly, it exercises a stabilizing influence on current and future members as their militaries learn to plan together rather than against one another, thereby avoiding the nationalisation of defence across Europe. NATO is the expression of the shared values and interests of a community of member nations. Third, is NATO's historic role of drawing members together, encouraging them to resolve disputes peacefully, causing them to plan and work with rather against one another, and fostering respect for democratic values and institutions.

In fact, NATO does not serve a single purpose. It serves three purposes - the first two being military and the third politico-military. First and originally paramount, is territorial defence, enshrined in the pledge that an attack on any member “shall be considered as an attack against them all”(Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington). Second, deriving from Article 4 as well as Article 5 of the treaty is NATO's provision of a standing mechanism for command and control and for a habit of working together. These forces can be mobilized to protect common interests either in Europe, as in the Bosnian peacekeeping force, or outside Europe, as when the U.S.-led coalition that defeated Iraq in 1991 drew upon forces and habits of encouraging them to resolve disputes peacefully, causing them to plan and work with rather than against one another, and fostering respect for democratic values and institutions.

The relative emphasis given to the first two military roles for NATO is changing in response to the changing security environment of Europe and the needs of its members for combined military capabilities. This evolution results because the requirement for the first role - territorial defence - has decreased, while the requirement for the second role - coalition operations in pursuit of common interests - has increased.

The United States continue to have a great stake in maintaining influence in the decisions and policies of Europe's governments and multinational organisations. NATO in particular, the institutional embodiment of the Trans-Atlantic partnership, has been the key element in maintaining general peace in Europe for more than 45 years, an achievement unparalleled by any other international organisation. Critical to America's interests in the region is maintaining the viability and vitality of NATO as an institution, which is able to deter and defend any attacks on its members. At the core of NATO's success is the integrated military command structure, through which the forces of the Alliance cooperate, train and plan together for the common defence.

With the changing perceptions of the Alliance, the European partners are faced with certain difficulties in following the U.S. global strategy. According to it, the Alliance re-affirmed that its military posture would not be directed against any particular enemy. Instead, the NATO members presently emphasis a commitment to common security with allies, which now include former foes as well. An important development that took place was the integration of fifteen European nations under the flag of European Union, not only economically but politically as well. The top priority for NATO remains the creation/maintenance of a stable European security environment, based on democratic institutions and the peaceful solutions of conflicts, whether domestic or international. New threats dominate the Alliance agenda today - such as those arising from the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, 'Islamic' fundamentalism and the breaking up of the old states and the surfacing of new ones along ethnic and religious lines.

The evolving emphasis in NATO's mission from homeland defence to coalition operations has two important consequences for relations with Russia. First, because territorial defence is not currently at issue, it should be clear that NATO is not drawing new lines across Europe nor is it directed at Russia. Second, because "coalitions of the willing" organised by NATO will include some-but not necessarily all-NATO members, and will generally include non-members drawn from the Partnership for Peace (like Bosnia's peacekeeping force), the distinction between full membership and partnership will be less important in the new NATO. In particular, Russia can and should be anticipated partner in future coalition operations.

The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States placed the fight against terrorism at the top of international agenda, including that of NATO. As a result, the transformation process that characterised the first ten years (1990-2000) after the end of the Cold War era took on a more expansive dimension and with greater urgency. Did the changed U.S. interests demand this?



Since its creation in 1949, NATO has served the primary institutional link between the United States and Europe on matters affecting the security of Europe. During the Cold War, the Alliance was focused exclusively in the defence of Western Europe against a single threat - attack by the Soviet Union. The Alliance tied together the fate of the United States and Western Europe in the face of a massive Soviet military build-up and ideological challenge of Communism.

In practice, NATO also provided a mechanism for ensuring that the United States and European militaries were capable of fighting together. Its integrated military structures prepared war plans and carried out joint exercises. NATO also maintained an elaborate committee structure responsible for Alliance decision-making and providing guidance to military commanders. Headed by North Atlantic Council, that structure also provided opportunities for political consultations on range of security issues.

During this period, NATO's European members believed that a close alliance with the United States was essential for their territorial security. For the most part, they regarded the U.S nuclear capabilities and world-wide military deployments as necessary to contain the Soviet Union. With this security arrangement in place, the Europeans could focus on re-building their economies destroyed during the Second World War and begin building an integrated European intended to end military rivalries permanently and ensure economic prosperity.

NATO is needed to adapt its military strategy to today's reality: the primary danger to the security of NATO's members in this historical era is not potential aggression to their collective territory, but threats to their collective interests beyond NATO territory. These threats require attention to preventing deadly conflict, restoring and preserving peace, preventing regional conflict, stemming proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ensuring supplies of key resources such as oil, and responding effectively to transnational dangers such as terrorism. NATO's principal strategic and military purpose in the post-Cold War era is to provide a mechanism for the rapid formation of militarily potent "coalitions of the willing" that are able to project power beyond NATO territory. In NATO parlance, such a power projection force for "out-of-area" operations is called a Combined Joint Task Force. Shifting NATO's emphasis in a evolutionary manner from defence of member territory to defence of common interests beyond NATO territory is the strategic imperative for NATO in the post-Cold War era.

Such a shift in military mission would not supplant territorial defence. Defence of member territories, according to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, would remain a solemn commitment of the Allies. But NATO territory - including the territory of its new members - is not threatened today. Nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future. Russia has neither the intention nor the prospective military and allies publics will not continue to support an Alliance - enlarged or unenlarged - that appears to focus on non-existent threats of aggression in Europe rather than on today's security problems. Neither will a shift in emphasis in NATO's military strategy from territorial defence to power projection supplant its important politico-military role. Indeed, this role deserves strong emphasis in the next phase of NATO's history.

Today, the Alliance's response to the new, post-September 11 security environment is based on a clear set of principles agreed upon by member governments. The Allies agree that they must be ready to help to deter, defend, disrupt and protect themselves collectively against terrorist attacks from abroad and that this may include taking action against terrorists and against those who harbour or protect them. They also agree that the Alliance should not be constrained by predetermined geographical limits: it must have the capacity to act as and where required. Similarly, it may need to provide its assets and capabilities, on a case-by-case basis, to assist with operations conducted by other international organisations or coalitions of countries involving NATO members.

These decisions make wide-reaching demands on the Alliance, not only in terms of acquiring the necessary capabilities, but also in terms of the sustained political will of the member countries to draw the consequences of the policies they have adopted and to provide the means to implement them. The need for reviewing and updating policies and structures will not end with the fulfillment of present commitments. Modernisation and rationalisation will remain factors to contend with on a permanent basis, if only because threats to security and stability themselves are not static.

How the Alliance has met the challenges of the past and how it has set about preparing itself to be able to fulfill equally challenging roles in the future is the subject of this new edition of the NATO thesis. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the Alliance up to 2008.

#### **IV. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY**

This study is an inquiry into the historical origins of NATO, the challenges that it faced during the Cold War until it ended, its search for identity at the end of the long haul of the Cold War, and its 'sudden' resurgence, and even 'legitimation' in the context of the United Nations. It seeks to inquire into the underlying motivational factors that have fashioned this 'chameleon-like' change of colour, tenor, and reorientation to be at once an organ of the US security interests and a foot soldier of the United Nations.

The principal hypotheses of this inquiry are as follows:

1. The United States seeks to utilise NATO whenever it finds it convenient in terms of its international security interests.
2. NATO's security interests therefore coincide with those of the United States.
3. Both predictably change in response to the changing international milieu.

The present study seeks to endeavour to test these hypotheses through the select international situations and the NATO's responses to them.

The study of the thesis is divided into 6 chapters. It gives a bird's eye view of the lay outs of the thesis besides highlighting the importance of the study and its objectives. **Chapter I** of the thesis offers an introduction to the Alliance and provides a basic explanation of its origins and fundamental tasks as well as the main spheres of its

development since its foundation. **Chapter II** deals with the historical strands on the formation of military alliances, situations created by the Soviet Union during the Second War and after the end of the war resulting in the formation of NATO and definite ending of the United States' policy of isolationism. **Chapter III** portrays the travails of NATO with initial nuclear weapons issues of 1950s-60s, as mainly a military organization dependent on U.S. power for security and for the revival of Europe's economy and polity in its first decade. The 1960s were characterized by two consequent developments in NATO: the withdrawal of military participation by France, under President Charles de Gaulle, from the organization but not from the alliance in 1966; and the emergence of situations influencing of deterrence or alternatively instrument of detente as well as defense.

**Chapter IV** is divided into three parts, namely, (i). Disappearance of the Soviet Union, (ii). New Challenges and (iii). Evolution of New Framework. It deals with the post-Cold War NATO in search of a new identity. The operational roles of the Alliance in relation to peace-keeping and peace-support are the subject of **Chapter IV Part II 'New Challenges'**, which examines the implementation of Alliance decisions with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, and the mission in Darfur, Sudan. **Part III 'Evolution of New Framework'** includes a summary account of the policy directions taken by NATO member countries with regard to multinational security, focusing on the more recent post-Cold War era, and examines the principal topics on the Alliance's agenda in the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It consisted of measures taken by the Alliance to combat the threat from terrorism and from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and describes the new capabilities that are under development.

**Chapter V** presents a perspective on how the U.S. security policy is reflected through NATO and wherever possible United Nations during the Cold War and post-Cold War era. It also bears upon the impact of 9/11 on it. **Chapter VI** embodies certain conclusion emerging from the study.