CHAPTER 2

ORIGIN OF NATO

I. INTRODUCTION

Modern military alliances are the subject of a rich body of theoretical literature that contends that two main factors urge the formation of alliances. One is idealistic: nations commit themselves to fight alongside each other because of shared values and ideas. The other is realistic and rests on an analysis of costs and benefits: alliances can save costs and multiply benefits through the division of responsibilities, sharing of the common assets, or simply the protection provided by having a stronger country as an ally. Indeed, because the United States has long been one of the world's main military powers, its alliances have often taken the shape of a positive security guarantee and are thus unequal: one side (in this case the United States) protects the other. Such alliances nevertheless have been of great benefit to the United States because they have helped ensure that the allied party will not employ an independent defence policy and will be less tempted to become a nuclear power. Alliances have further ensured influence in the respective foreign policies of allied countries and have provided bases for power projection.

The traditional international law as obtained in Europe recognized the concepts of sovereignty of states and sovereign equality, principally to protect and preserve the then prevalent absolute monarchies and other similar forms of dictatorships. Sovereignty resided in and emanated from the ruler, which he exercised over his 'subjects' usually within his territory. The subjects had no rights, and it was for each ruler to decide how to rule within his realm. Other rulers had no right to interfere in his realm, nor did he have such a right in respect of them. A system of balance of power, represented by the Concert of Europe and founded on the Metternich principle of 'legitimacy', validated and buttressed this live-and-let-live concept of sovereignty and sovereign equality between monarchs and despots.

The groundwork for an Alliance system was laid out in 1815, when Holy Alliance (loose organisation of European sovereigns) was proclaimed at the Congress of Vienna. The importance of the Alliance lay in its becoming a symbol of absolutist policies. Autocratic and repressive rulers used the Alliance as an instrument to maintain the status quo in Europe.

The Triple Alliance of 1882, the most famous of the triple alliances, was concluded by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. The Alliance served double purpose: It strengthened Germany in its relations with France, which had reached a new peak of animosity because of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, and it gave Austria-Hungary a powerful ally in its resistance to the developing expansionism of Russia. During the ensuing decades, Europe was the scene of a steady heightening of tensions between the nations of the Triple Alliance and the other major European powers. France, Great Britain, and Russia, alarmed by the threat to their security posed by the powerful

combination of the Triple Alliance, concluded a rival pact known as the Triple Entente. The resulting division of Europe into two armed camps led eventually to the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

After the World War I, League of Nations, international alliance was formed in 1920 for the preservation of peace. The league was based on a new concept: collective security against the “criminal” threat of war. Never truly effective as a peacekeeping organization, the lasting importance of the League of Nations lies in the fact that it provided the groundwork for the UN. This international alliance, formed after World War II, not only profited by the mistakes of the League of Nations, but also borrowed much of the organizational machinery of the league.

In its early days, the United States adopted an isolationist policy for a variety of reasons. The fledgling nation wanted to develop without becoming entangled in the conflicts that had overtaken Europe and without being influenced by European values. Early leaders feared that too much involvement in the affairs of other nations would endanger the values of freedom and equality that had fueled the founding of America. The United States wanted to serve as a model for other countries and recognized that it must first perfect its own development.

Early leaders of the United States endorsed commercial treaties and expansion of trade with other nations, but discouraged political or military alliances. President George Washington in his Farewell Address of 1796, just before leaving office called upon the United States to foster good relations with all nations and encouraged the country to develop economic ties abroad. But he warned against becoming involved in the affairs of Europe. In his 1801 inaugural address, President Thomas Jefferson repeated Washington’s warning, encouraging friendly relations with all nations but “entangling alliances with none.” In 1823 President James Monroe also reiterated Washington’s directive in a message sent to Congress. The message, which became known as the Monroe Doctrine, called on the United States to stay out of European affairs and also warned the Europeans not to meddle in the affairs of the western hemisphere. Monroe said any such action would impinge upon the “rights and interests” of the United States.

The U.S. Congress was reluctant to engage the U.S. in either World War. In each conflict, strong presidential advocacy and growing threats to broader U.S. interests led to eventual involvement. After the First World War, the U.S. Senate voted down the Versailles Treaty and with it, involvement in the League of Nations because of opposition, remained strong to “entangling alliances”. The protection offered by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans contributed to the view that the United States still enjoyed a relatively unbridgeable barrier against attack.

The league of embodied the idea of “collective security”, under which an international organisation might seek to settle disputes among its members. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who urged military force against Germany from the early 1930s, taunted supporters of collective security and the League as guilty of “long-suffering and

inexhaustible gullibility". U.S. absence from the League left the institution without the strongest economic and military power after the First World War, and therefore, without effective leadership.[1]

The global depression of the 1930s and the Second World War made clear that events in Europe greatly affected U.S. economic and political interests. From a desire to bring global security, there was considerable support in the U.S. Congress for the creation of the United Nations in 1945. Article 1 of the U.N. Charter outlined a resolve "to maintain international peace and security, and …take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression".

In addition to this, after World War II (1939-1945), many Western leaders saw the policies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as threatening to stability and peace. The forcible installation of Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe, territorial demands by the Soviets, and their support of guerrilla war in Greece appeared to many as the first steps of World War III. Hence, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), regional defense alliance, was created by the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington D.C.

Military Alliances that include a security guarantee in case of aggression can be formal (written agreement) or informal. Formal alliances exist in two varieties: bilateral ones (such as those existing between the United States and its Asian allies and between France and some African countries) and multilateral ones (such as NATO or the alliance among Russia and some of the former Soviet states). Informal alliances do not take the shape of a treaty or accord but nevertheless imply a security guarantee – such as the relationship between the United States ad Taiwan; the United States and Saudi Arabia; and arguably, the United States and Israel.

The United States maintains formal defence commitments to nearly 50 states, including most Latin American countries (Rio Treaty, 1947); most European countries and Canada (Washington Treaty, 1949); and South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and Liberia. These alliances were forged in the second part of the last century to fight communism.

This chapter portrays NATO in a historical perspective by highlighting important developments towards the end of the Second World War as well as at the dawns of the post-war world. Towards the end of the chapter, it also presents salient features of the NATO Charter.

II. BEGINNINGS OF COLD WAR: RISE OF THE IRON CURTAIN

After a century of friendship, Americans and Russians quarrelled over Asian questions in the 1890s and became enemies in 1917, when the communists seized power, established the Soviet Union and declared ideological war on the capitalist

[1] Carr, E.H., *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, Palgrave McMillan, New York, 2001, pp.1-4.

nations of the West. The United States intervened in the Soviet Union and refused to recognize the new state until 1933. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1940 and Japanese bombardment of Pearl Harbour (Hawaii, US) in 1941, the U.S. and U.S.S.R came closer together to defeat the Nazi-Fascist Axis. However, the friendship developed strains, even during the war, as Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader, seeking Soviet security, used the Red Army to control much of Eastern Europe.

Horrified by the devastation of the war, countries were inspired to come together and work toward peace. They formed a new organization, the League of Nations, to achieve that goal. The League would last from 1920 to 1946 and have a total of 63 member nations through its history, including some of the world's greatest powers: France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Germany, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But the League had two major flaws. First, several of the world's most powerful countries were not members, most notably, the United States. Second, League members proved unwilling to oppose aggression by Japan, Italy, and Germany in the 1930s. This aggression ultimately led to the Second World War (1939-1945). In the end, the League failed in its most basic mission, to prevent another world war. Despite this failure, the idea of a league did not die. The first commitment to create a new organization came in 1941, when U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed a declaration, in which they pledged to work towards a more effective system to keep world peace and promote cooperation.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, the U.S. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull had been looking for ways of checking the drift towards war. They saw the futility of appeasement, but since their hands were tied by the neutrality legislation and the isolationism of the American opinion, they could do little to stiffen the British attitude. Even though, the U.S. President Roosevelt had promised the American public that he would keep American out of war during the presidential campaign in 1940, as soon as he won the election, Roosevelt went back to work doing everything he could to push America into the war. Roosevelt was secretly allowing tons of war material to be shipped to the English from the very start of the war in Europe (in September 1939). Roosevelt completely shredded the Neutrality Act when he gave the British 50 destroyers in September 1940, when it was obvious that England was losing control of the seas to the German U-Boats. He passed the Land Lease Act in March 1941, in which England effectively received unlimited military aid from the United States. Shortly, after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Roosevelt began sending military aid to the Communists, sending two billion dollars in war material before Pearl Harbor. Most Americans viewed Communism as an evil force yet Roosevelt sent Stalin two billion in weapons to keep Communism alive.

When the war came, American sentiment immediately began to change. To a much greater extent than in the First World War, it was preponderantly pro-Ally from the beginning, since Hitlerism was obviously a menace to everything that Americans believed in. The U.S. Congress passed a new Neutrality Act, allowing the sale of munitions to belligerents under cash-and-carry rules, while at the same time, American merchant ships were forbidden to enter the combat zone.

The fall of France precipitated one of the great debates in American history, a debate conducted not only in the U.S. Congress and in the press but among private citizens all over the country. Of the various organisations, two were outstanding: the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, headed by a veteran Kansas newspaper editor, William Allen White of the Emporia Gazette and the isolationist America First Committee. While few of the interventionists advocated full entry into the war, they argued that the security of the American people required the defeat of Hitler, for which reason they should give Britain all possible aid short of war.

It was argued that if Hitler conquered Britain, he would control all the eastern Atlantic and could out-build the United States in any race for military and naval supremacy. He could also take possession of West Africa whence he could move easily into South America. America, south of the bulge Brazil was a military liability and the United States could not possibly defend it. Meanwhile, Japan was showing an obvious interest in the French, Dutch and British possessions in Asia and Indonesia, with their invaluable rubber, oil, tin and other natural resources and threatened to take control of the Western Pacific. Hence, the United States might be hemmed in by two aggressive and dictatorial powers, and could hold only North America and the Caribbean.

The isolationists maintained, in reply, that Hitler could never consolidate his conquests, that even if he were victorious, it would be possible to come to terms with him, and that under no conceivable circumstances, would the United States be in danger of attack.

As opinion crystallized, the policy of the Roosevelt administration became firmer. The United States adopted military conscription for the first time in peacetime. After the fall of France, the U.S. War Department released “surplus” guns and planes for sale to Britain. And the United States leased bases on British territory in Newfoundland and the West Indies, and gave the British fifty destroyers in return.

Plans were made for taking over any European colonies in the American hemisphere, which might be in danger of German occupation, the assent of the Latin Americans being secured at a conference at Havana. This Havana Conference also produced the strongest statement so far of hemisphere unity, with the passage of a resolution stating that an attack on any one of the American states from outside the hemisphere should be considered as an attack on all. Thus, the administration had definitely abandoned neutrality.[2]

In order to solve the financial problem of the European allies, Roosevelt devised a lend-lease programme. Anxious to avoid any repetition of the war loans of the First World War, he proposed that goods rather than money to be lent to Britain, with the understanding that repayment be made in kind after the war. This momentous and imaginative proposition was approved by Congress in March 1941, the Lend Lease Act

[2] Parkes, Henry Bamford, *A History of the United States Of America*, Knopf, New York, 1957, p.652.

1941, with substantial majorities in both Houses. Goods might be lent to any country "whose defence the President deems vital to the defence of the United States".[3]

A joint declaration by the U.S. and Great Britain, issued during the Second World War, expressing certain common principles in their national policies to be followed in the post-war period. The declaration was signed on 14th August, 1941, by President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill after a series of conferences abroad a warship in the North Atlantic off the coast of Newfoundland. The two leaders declared that the U.S. and Great Britain sought no territorial, or any other, aggrandizement from the war. They proclaimed the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government and not to have boundary changes imposed on them. The right of all nations – victors and vanquished – to have access to the earth's natural resources was also recognised – as was the desirability of economic cooperation among nations and improved living conditions for working people. The Charter expressed the hope that, after the defeat of the Nazis, all countries would be able to feel secure from aggression, and that the people of the world would be free from fear and want. It recognised the principle of freedom of the seas, expressed the conviction that humanity must renounce the use of force in international relations, and affirmed the need for disarmament after the expressed Allied victory.[4]

The U.S. President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill agreed on three things:[5]

1 They worked out the aims for a democratic alliance.
2 They agreed on eight principles and four freedoms – freedom of speech, freedom of faith, freedom from fear and freedom from poverty. This was directed against U.S.S.R and Germany who did not provide these rights.
3 They also agreed to establish a new permanent system of international security.

The date of the Atlantic Charter was significant because in August 1941, the United States was not fighting the Second World War, yet the U.S.S.R was fighting on Britain's side. Yet in the Charter, the U.S.S.R was the enemy. "There was a great community on this earth", wrote Walter Lippmann, "from which no member can be excluded and none can resign. This community had its geographical center in the great basin of the Atlantic. The security of this community turns upon the relations of the two great powers – Britain and the United States. In this area and at this phase of historic time, they had the arsenals and the military formations necessary by to the waging of the war. And therefore their alliance was the nucleus of the whole region must necessarily be organised, to which, when their alliances was firm, the other members of the community will in their own interest freely adhere". Lippmann canvassed the likelihood that potential antagonism with the Soviet Union would ensure that an Alliance would be a more practical arrangement than any global New Deal. The Soviet Union, single-mindedly devoting its diplomatic efforts of a cordon of friendly states against any repetition of the German invasion, proved unwilling to subordinate its interests to the

[3] Ibid, p.653.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.

American Open Door Scheme, but spheres-of-interest also were re-emphasised between the Atlantic Allies. To the extent that the British could recover any economic or potential room to manoeuvre, they distanced themselves from forced enthusiasms for an American Open World. At Yalta, the Atlantic Charter was reaffirmed in the Declaration of Liberated Europe, but it no longer reflected the thrust of events.

At a conference held in Washington D.C., on 1st January, 1942, the 26 governments then at war with the Axis powers declared that they "subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the joint declaration…known as the Atlantic Charter".

The U.S.-Soviet relations had soured significantly following Stalin's decision to sign a non-aggression pact with the Nazi Germany in August of 1939. The Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in September 1939 and the "Winter War" against Finland in December 1939 led the U.S. President Roosevelt to condemn the Soviet Union publicly as a "dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship in the world", and to impose a "moral embargo" on the export of certain products to the Soviets. Nevertheless, in spite of intense pressure to sever relations with the Soviet Union, Roosevelt never lost sight of the fact that the Nazi Germany, not the Soviet Union, posed the greatest threat to world peace at that time.

At no period in the war, was there much evidence of Soviet co-operation. The Russians refused to share military information, did not acknowledge the $11,000,000,000 worth of the lend-lease aid given by the United States and recognised the Communist groups instead of the official governments-in-exile of Poland and Yugoslavia. It became obvious that Soviet policy was determined by the expansionist ambitions of the Stalinist dictatorship and by its conviction that Communism was intrinsically opposed to capitalism and must in the end become world-wide.[6]

Despite deep-seated mistrust and hostility between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 created an instant alliance between the Soviets and the two greatest powers in what the Soviet leaders had long called the "imperialist camp": Britain and the United States. The United States extended assistance to the Soviet Union through its Lend-Lease Act of March 1941. Lend-Lease material was welcomed by the Soviet Union and the U.S. President Roosevelt attached the highest priority to using it to keep the Soviet Union in the war against Germany. Nevertheless, the programme did not prevent friction between the Soviet Union and the other members of the anti-Hitler Alliance.

Following the Nazi defeat of France in June 1940, Roosevelt, U.S. President Roosevelt grew wary of the increasing aggression of the Germans and made some diplomatic moves to improve relations with the Soviets. Beginning in July of 1940, a series of negotiations took place in Washington between U.S. Under-Secretary of State Summer Welles and Soviet Ambassador Constantine Oumansky. Welles refused to accede to Soviet demands that the United States recognise the changed borders of the

[6] Ibid, p.670.

Soviet Union after the Soviet seizure of the territory in Finland, Poland and Romania and the re-incorporation of the Baltic Republics in August 1940, but the U.S. government did lift the embargo in January 1941. Finally, during the Congressional debate concerning the passage of the Lend-Lease bill in early 1941, Roosevelt blocked attempts to exclude the Soviet Union from receiving U.S. assistance.

Top-level peace planning began in October 1943, when U.S. Secretary of State Hull met the British and Russian Foreign Ministers, Anthony Eden and Yacheslav Molotov, in a conference in Moscow. They signed a declaration promoting permanent co-operation and the establishment of a "general international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states". This was followed by meetings of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. In November 1943, U.S. President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill met Stalin, the Russian leader, in Tehran to plan a cross-channel attack against the Axis Powers, under the code name 'Overlord'. At Tehran, Churchill argued for giving priority to Italy and possible new offensives in the Balkans or southern France, but Roosevelt and Stalin outvoted him. It was agreed that Russia should retain some, at least, of the territories she had appropriated in 1939 and 1940. The Tehran conference marked the high point of the East-West wartime alliance. Stalin came to the meeting as a victorious war leader; large quantities of U.S. lend-lease aid were flowing into the Soviet Union through Murmansk (North-western city in Russia) and the Persian Gulf; and the decision on Operation Overlord satisfied the long-standing Soviet demand for a second front.

During 1944, the cooperation promised at the Moscow Conference was absent. As the Russians drove the German armies out of Poland and the Balkan countries, they proceeded to install Communist-controlled governments, without consulting Britain and the United States. Meanwhile, the British stepped into Greece and set up a conservative regime. These evidences of conflict led Roosevelt to make his last and most vigorously criticized attempt to reach an understanding with Russia at the Yalta Conference of February 1945.

The three leaders met in a conference held in the vicinity of Yalta, Crimea, in Ukraine. It marked the high point of Allied unity and followed a similar meeting held in Tehran, Iran; it was devoted to the formulation of Allied military strategy and to negotiations on a variety of political problems. A communiqué, known as the Yalta Declaration, was issued at the end of the conference. It declared the Allied intention to "destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world"; to "bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment"; and to "exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans." Reference was made to a decision to divide Germany into four zones of occupation. Poland was to be compensated for the loss of her eastern territories by receiving a slice of eastern Germany for Russia.[7]

The Soviet Union was annoyed at what seemed to it to be a long delay by the Allies in opening a "second front" of the Allied offensive against Germany. Stalin's

[7] Ibid, p.671.

troops struggled to hold the Eastern front against the Nazi forces, and the Soviets began pleading for a British invasion of France immediately after the Nazi invasion in 1941. In 1942, Roosevelt promised the Soviets that the Allies would open the second front. Although Stalin only grumbled when the invasion was postponed until 1943, he exploded the following year when the invasion was postponed again until May of 1944. In retaliation, Stalin re-called his ambassadors from London and Washington and fears soon arose that the Soviets might seek a separate peace with Germany. As the war in the east turned in favour of the Soviet Union, and despite the successful Allied landings in Normandy in 1944, the earlier friction intensified over the irreconcilable differences about post-war aims within the anti-Axis coalition. Lend-Lease helped the Soviet Union push the Germans out of its territory and Eastern Europe, thus accelerating the end of the Second World War. At the end of the Second World War, Europe lay in ruins. The Soviet forces occupied most of Eastern and Central Europe and the eastern portion of Germany. American, British and French forces occupied West Germany. The allies partitioned (divided) Germany into East and West Germany.

The last of the wartime agreements took place at Potsdam in July 1945 with President Harry Truman representing the United States. This was mainly concerned with filling in the details of decisions made at Yalta. The agreements about the Polish border were clear violations of the Atlantic Charter, which had promised that there should not be territorial changes except by the wishes of the people concerned. The promises of democracy and free elections in Poland and the Balkans were never honored, nor was there ever any coordination of occupation policies in Germany from the beginning. The Russians set out to establish Communism in the zone assigned to them. There can be little doubt that the Yalta and Potsdam agreements weakened the moral position of the United States. Russian armies were already in control of Eastern Europe and it is not apparent that Roosevelt gave them anything, which they would not have taken in any case.[8]

The Russians established Communism in their zone, made it politically and economically subsidiary to the Soviet Union and sealed it off from the Western zones. As the American and British authorities came to the realisation that they might need German help against the Soviet aggression, they gradually adopted less stringent policies and began to forget about the crimes committed by the Nazis.[9]

With World War Two at an end by the end of the summer of 1945, the United States knew that the Soviet economy was in a state of near-collapse. The Soviet Union had lost at least 20 million souls during the war alone and perhaps another 20-30 million from Stalin's decade of purge trials. Thirty thousand factories and forty thousand miles of railroad tracks had been destroyed. All the industrialization that Stalin had promised and delivered to his people with the Five Year Plans had been lost. Truman realized this and remained confident that the United States was in the stronger bargaining position. He surmised that the Soviets had to come to the United States for much-needed economic aid. As early as January 1945, Franklin D.Roosevelt had already denied the

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid, p.682.

Soviet request for a six billion dollar loan. Lend-Lease proved no more effective. In the Spring of 1945, Congress agreed that they would not allow Lend-Lease for any post-war reconstruction in Russia. This was obviously a major shift in policy for under the Lend-Lease Act of 1941; the United States had shipped enormous quantities of war materiel to the Soviets, including almost 15,000 planes, 7000 tanks, 52,000 jeeps and almost 400,000 trucks.

After the close of the Second World War, the strange allies of the war became the leaders of the bipolar world. The cooperation and understanding that had existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Second World War began to fade gradually after the war and mutual distrust and suspicion began to appear. The strained relations that steadily developed between the US and the USSR after the Second World War and made them stand forth as each other's rivals, came in the form of a 'Cold War'.

The term Cold War was for the first time used by an American Diplomat Bernard Baruch. Baruch, in course of a speech, said, "*Let us not be deceived today, we are in the midst of a Cold War.* Since then the term Cold War was used in describing the post-Second World War relations between the Soviet Union and the Western States. In 1946, he was appointed the United States representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) by the President Harry S. Truman. As a member of the newly created UNAEC, Baruch suggested the elimination of nuclear weapons after the implementation of a system of international controls, inspects and punishments for violations.[10]

On June 14th, 1946, Baruch – widely seen by many scientists and some members of the Truman administration as unqualified for the task – presented his Baruch Plan, a modified version of the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, to the UNAEC, which proposed international control of then-new atomic energy. The Soviet Union rejected Baruch's proposal as unfair given the fact that the United States eliminate its nuclear weapons before a system of controls and inspections was implemented. A stalemate ensued.[11]

The Second World War changed the balance of power much more drastically than the First World War. Of the eight great powers existing in 1914 (Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, the United States and Japan), only one - Austria-Hungary - had been eliminated by 1919. But the Second World War ended, at least for the time being, the great-power status of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and gravely weakened Britain and France. Only the United States and Soviet Union were still indubitably first-class powers. All of Europe was exhausted, while countries on the periphery of Western Civilisation, such as Argentina were rapidly rising in the power scale. The most important result was that the Soviet Union was left as the main center

[10] Schwartz, Jordan A., "The Spectacular: Bernard M. Baruch in Washington, 1917-1965", *The American Historical Review*, Volume 87, no.5, American Historical Association, December 1982, pp.5-7.
[11] Ibid.

of power in the while Eurasian continent. Would the Soviet government be willing to join the United States in maintaining peace?

Cold War is not a state of armed struggle but a state where the rivals while maintaining their peacetime diplomatic relations, continue their hostility. Both rivals use all means other than war to weaken each other. It became an ideological war. It was fought by means of political propaganda. In the words of Max Paul Friedmann, "*A world divided into two camps is still a world living under the shadow of war. Cold War may, at any time, turn into a hot war. Both the superpowers want to avoid any direct conflict because of fear of co-destruction*."[12]

Louis Halle stated, "*The Cold War was a situation of high tension between two blocs, it was even more dangerous than an armed conflict; the parties to the Cold War tried to complicate the issues rather than attempt to resolve them and all disputes and conflicts were used as pawns in the Cold War*."[13]

The Cold War was an uneasy peace after the Second World War, marked by a fierce rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. One might call the Cold War as a war of words between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lasted from the end of the Second World War until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Cold War was in many ways a war of ideology. While there was not always direct military conflict during the Cold War, there certainly was the constant presence of ideological differences. The two opposing systems of democracy (along with capitalism) and communism provide a framework against which the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union can be examined.

The origins of the Cold War are not really that difficult to uncover. When Russia overthrew its czar, made a revolution, became the Soviet Union, unified itself under Lenin and created an ideological structure – communism, the United States could only react with fear and trepidation. The ideology of Marxism-Leninism was the cornerstone of the whole Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R symbolized Communism, involving a political system of the one-party state and an economic system of state-ownership. The U.S. government could not accept the simple fact that a country could exist with economic and political principles so critically opposed to democracy and industrial capitalism.

The United States tried to project the Soviet Union as the enemy of world peace and Communism as destroyer of individual freedom. The US propagated that the Soviet Union was an expansionist state, an imperial power, which had installed Communist regimes by force in Eastern Europe. The U.S. believed that the U.S.S.R was determined to encourage communist revolutions in other countries and was worried about communism spreading across the world. This was seen as a dangerous threat to the governments and economies in the West. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership

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[12] Friedmann, Max Paul, *Nazis and Good Neighbours*, Cambridge University Press, New York, August 4, 2003, pp. 137-139.

[13] Halle, Louis, *The Cold War As History*, Harper and Row Ltd, New York, 1967, pp.2-3.

described the Americans as colonialists, imperialists and capitalist exploiters. Stalin believed that Britain and the United States delayed opening a second front in the Second World War so that the Soviets would suffer greater casualties, and be left too weak to threaten the West after the war.

Such was the situation at the time of the Nineteenth Party Congress - a stalemated Communist offensive in Europe and Asia and an increasingly powerful alliance system led by the Western powers. Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism and published before the Congress and Malenkov's foreign policy address at the Congress outlined Soviet views of developments in foreign affairs and the needs for the future.[14] The United States was described as leading a capitalist-imperialist alliance aimed at attacking the Soviet Bloc, meanwhile, destroying the economic and political independence of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan, not to mention their colonies. All this was explained as a result of a contracting capitalist markets that brought economic decay and inevitable wars against capitalist states. The United States had initiated the war in Korea, turned the United Nations into an "agency of the U.S. dictatorial policy" and systematically thwarted all Soviet efforts at disarmament and reunification of Germany.

The clues concerning the Soviet policy were several. The main propaganda attack would be directed against the United States as a Hitlerite fascist state. An appeal would be made to "progressive groups" in the West European states in the West European states and Japan to break from their American alliance and join the "peace camp" with special attention given to the appeal to Germany, Italy and Japan for whom much sympathy was expressed because they had "lost their interdependence". The idea of inevitable conflict propagated during the Zhdanov era was now replaced by the theme of "peaceful co-existence of capitalism and communism". It was inevitable that the capitalist states fight one another, but possible to coexist peacefully with the Communist states. There was also a hint of the post-Stalin trade offers in Malenkov's concluding outline of "tasks in the sphere of foreign policy" in which he spoke of "the promotion of business relations with all countries". Thus, did the Nineteenth Congress show promise of a new tactical line in the Soviet foreign policy.

George Kennan described the Soviet Union as committed "fanatically" to the belief that there could be "no permanent modus vivendi" between East and West. In Kennan's view, the Kremlin's perspective resulted from a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideology and a traditional and instinctive insecurity. Marxist-Leninist ideology and the closed society that limited contact with the outside world had a hypnotic effect on Soviet officials, leaving them unlikely and unable to question their assumptions about the West. Kennan argued that Soviet policy could not be changed by talk; it was "highly sensitive to the logic of force". He warned that much depended upon the "health and vigour" of American society and urged his colleagues in Washington to have the

[14] Gruliow, Leo, *Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record Of The Nineteenth Communist Congress and the Reorganisation After The Stalin's Death*, Frederick Praeger, New York, 1953, pp.6-7, 99-106.

"courage and self-confidence to protect American traditions. "World Communism is like a malignant parasite…This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet".[15]

The Soviet Union represented a clear threat to American values and to freedom at home and abroad. The Kremlin sought to expand Communist influence throughout the world, and it would not be deterred by negotiation. The American way of life increasingly appeared under siege to the American government. Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, particularly in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland seemed only to confirm these fears. So too did the emergence of strong Communist parties in France and Italy.

Kennan argued that Soviet ideology taught that the outside world was hostile and not to be trusted. Capitalism and Socialism could not long co-exist. Moreover, in Kennan's interpretation, the Soviet Union pictured itself as a center of socialist enlightenment adrift in a dark and misguided world. The logic of history was on its side and in the long run, revolution was inevitable. To Kennan, the challenge that Soviet Communism posed to the United States offered a test of faith and an opportunity for re-affirmation. In the closing paragraph of the article, he wrote that the Soviet challenge offered "a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations". The American virtue and strength at home translated into power to meet the Soviet threat abroad. He wrote that the United States should "offer gratitude to providence", which had chosen the United States for the great task of resisting the spread of Soviet communist oppression and protecting freedom at home and abroad.[16]

By 1919, the Red Scare had become an American reality. Through the manipulation of public opinion and repression and even physical force, anarchists, socialists and communists were clearly forced into retreat. Socialism or communism in the United States is simply impossibility – it is too European for American tastes. It always has been and perhaps always will be. True, there have been socialists and communists in this country well before 1917. The American government fear revolution. They fear change – real, fundamental social, economic and political change. In 1848, most European governments were under assault from the left. And when many of these individuals came to this country to escape political repression, they brought their ideas of revolution – red ideas – with them.

Given the experience of the Second World War itself, this division of Europe was perhaps inevitable. Both sides wanted their values and economic and political systems to prevail in areas, which their soldiers had helped to liberate. If both sides had accepted these new spheres of influence, a Cold War might never have occurred. But the nations of Western Europe and the United States still had Hitler on their minds and they soon began to see Stalin as a similar threat.

With the Second World War at the end of the summer of 1945, the United States knew that the Soviet economy was in a state of near-collapse. The Soviet Union had lost at least 20 million souls during the war alone and perhaps another 20-30 million

[15] Kennan, George, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *Foreign Affairs*, XXV, July 1947, pp.548-550.
[16] Ibid.

from Stalin's decade of purge trials. Thirty thousand factories and forty thousand miles of railroad tracks had been destroyed. All the industrialization that Stalin had promised and delivered to his people with the Five Year Plans had been lost. US Vice-President Truman realized this and remained confident that the United States was in the stronger bargaining position. He predicted that the Soviets had to come to the United States for much-needed economic aid. As early as January 1945, the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had already denied the Soviet request for a six billion dollar loan. Lend-Lease proved no effective. In the spring of 1945, the U.S. Congress agreed that they would not allow Lend-Lease for any post-war reconstruction in Russia. This was obviously a major shift in policy for under the Lend-Lease Act of 1941; the United States had shipped enormous quantities of war material to the Soviets, including almost 15,000 planes, 7000 tanks, 52,000 jeeps and almost 400,000 trucks.[17]

Even before the war ended, it was becoming apparent that Roosevelt's attempt to win Soviet cooperation in building a new world order had failed. The old Russian imperialism and the new Communist programme of world revolution had become fused into a single dynamic and expansionist force. The Soviet government sought to control as much as possible of the Eurasian continent, while its Communist supporters throughout the world stopped calling for democratic collaboration against fascism and were soon denouncing "Yankee Imperialism". But the American people were slow to recognise that one world conflict had been succeeded by another. As a result of the rapid demobilisation of the American armed forces, the free world was left with no check on the Communist advance in Eastern Europe and the Far East, except the American monopoly of the atomic bomb. It was not until the spring of 1947 that the United States undertook a positive programme of resistance to Communist pressure.

Overshadowing all these initial Cold War issues of 1945 was the atomic bomb. The weapon used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August presented a whole new category of problems. During the Second World War, the U.S. President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill followed a policy that would ensure a nuclear arms race at war's end. Still, Staling found out about the Manhattan Project and by 1943, had already begun the development of a Soviet bomb. After the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the subsequent surrender of Japan, the United States developed a disarmament plan based on turning over all fissionable materials, plants and bombs to an international regulatory agency. The Soviets responded quickly with their own plan, which stipulated nothing less than a total ban on the production of all fissionable material. They further added that all existing bombs would be destroyed. Wishing to preserve its monopoly on nuclear weapons, the United States continued to stress regulation and inspection by an independent agency. But the Soviets, in the hopes of neutralizing any United States advantage, insisted on immediate disarmament.

The consequent American victory over Japan deprived the Soviet Union of 'all but a token share in the post-war settlement in the Far East'. The Soviet Union did not possess a nuclear device until 1949. This created a strange situation, as Peter Calvocoressi said, "*The Soviet Union, no less than the trivial state, was at the mercy of*

[17] Schlesinger, Arthur, *Origins of Cold War*, 1st edition, Praegers, New York, 1992, p.6.

the American, if they should be willing to do to Moscow and Leningrad what they had to done to Hiroshima and Nagasaki."[18]

As the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union grew in the late 1940s and into the 1950s, both the countries began to rebuild their military forces. Following the Second World War, the United States was intent on reforming the military forces. There were two goals: (i). In the aftermath of Pearl Harbour, the armed forces had to be unified into an integrated system. Such a policy of unification was required by the Cold War itself and (ii). There was also a need for entirely new institutions to coordinate all military strategy. In 1947, the U.S. Congress solved both issues by creating the National Security Act. The act created the Department of Defence, which would serve as an organising principle over army, navy, and air force. Second, the Act created the National Security Council, a special advisory board to the executive office. And lastly, the Act created the Central Intelligence Agency or the CIA, which was in charge of all intelligence.

(a). The Iron Curtain

The defeat of Germany was one of the major changes that occurred after the Second World War. The vacuum created by the defeat of Germany had to be necessarily filled. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were capable of filling the vacuums in Europe. The Soviet Union was determined to establish its domination over the East European countries, which she hoped to (and did) liberate from the Nazi Germany. The Soviet leadership argued that all invaders of Russia in the past had come from East Europe and wanted friendly governments in the countries bordering her territory. The West did not realize that by friendly governments, the Soviets meant communist governments. The Western leaders were aware of like hood of USSR emerging as a very powerful state once Germany was defeated. The United States and Britain were keen on holding free elections in the liberated countries and setting up of democratic governments.

The US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister of Britain Winston Churchill insisted at Yalta Conference held in February 1945 that free elections must be held to which Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader agreed. But Stalin did not keep the promise as the Soviets liberated East European countries and installed Communist regimes without holding the promised elections.

On July 25, 1945, after Germany had surrendered, the Big Three-British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and US President Harry S Truman met at Potsdam in order to discuss the fate of Germany. The crucial issue at Potsdam, as it had been at Versailles in 1918 and 1919, was reparations. The Soviet Union, as to be expected, wanted to rebuild their near-destroyed economy using German industry. The United States feared it would have to pay the whole cost of rebuilding Germany, which in turn would help rebuild the Soviet Union. So, after all the discussions had ended, a compromise was reached and Germany was to be partitioned

[18] Calvocoressi, Peter, *World Politics, 1945-2000,* Longman Ltd, New York, 8th edition, 2000, p.33.

into four occupied zones. Britain, France and the United States occupied the western Germany while the Soviet Union occupied East Germany.

The main issue at Potsdam and for the next two years was who would control Europe. Britain had its chance, so too did France and Germany. Was it now Russia's turn? Or perhaps the United States? Few people ever questioned why Europe needed to be controlled in the first place but in the end, everyone wanted to avoid yet another war. Russia wanted Poland. Everyone wanted Poland. But especially Russia. Historically, Poland had always been the key state needed from which to launch an attack against Russia.

The Soviets viewed this demand as unacceptable for it indicated that the United States was really taking too heavy a hand in determining what nations ought to adopt what specific form of government. In response Stalin went to create what Winston Churchill, never at a loss of words dubbed the "IRON CURTAIN" in 1946. For Churchill:

> "From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and eastern Europe-Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war I am convinced that there is nothing they desire so much as strength and nothing for which they have less respect than military weakness."[19]

Churchill's Fulton speech stating that the Soviet Union had erected an "Iron Curtain" at the dividing line between the West and the East added fuel to Cold War and described Soviet actions threat to democracy and freedom.

The term 'Iron Curtain' was coined by German politician Lutz Fraf Schwerin von Krosigk and made popular by Churchill, who used it in a public speech in Fulton. The term was first used to refer to the actual metal barrier that cut the continent in half, but it soon became a reference to the ideological barrier also. In a telegram to US President Truman, Churchill spoke about European situation and said, "An iron curtain is drawn upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind."[20] This became the first official mention if the term Iron Curtain.

The Soviet Union motivated by both traditional Russian imperialism and Marxist ideology and the expansionist nature, posed a threat to the United States and its allies. While the United States accused the USSR of seeking to expand Communism in Europe and Asia, the USSR vied itself as the leader of history's progressive forces and charged the US with attempting to stamp out revolutionary activity wherever it arose. Stalin's foreign policy was couched in ideological terms and although his successors Malenkov and Khrushchev may have moved away from Stalinism, they were both committed Communists. Peaceful Co-existence like Stalin's more hard line approach

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[19] Churchill, Winston, *The Second World War, Triumph and Tragedy*, Bantam, 1967, p. 489 and 514.

[20] Ibid.

was justified in relation to Marxist notions regarding the inevitability of the downfall of capitalism.[21]

On the U.S. side, there was no doubt that Truman and all the Presidents that had followed him were convinced of the superiority of capitalism and the benefits to be gained by its adoption in other parts of the world. The United States stood for liberal democracy, freedom of political expression, and capitalism with its emphasis on private ownership of the economy. Presidents like Eisenhower and later Reagan seemed to embody U.S. values; for others like Truman and Kennedy, the American way of life provided a powerful inspiration.

Any common ground between the two ideologies was merely superficial. Although both the Soviet Union and the West claimed to be upholding democracy and freedom, their views on what these concepts meant in practice illustrated that there were irreconcilable differences of ideology. To the West, democracy and freedom could be guaranteed only by constitutional rules within which the political parties could compete for power; to the U.S.S.R, democracy as a expression of the people's will and freedom could be gained only by preserving socialism from 'corrupting influences'.

By 1946, the United States and Britain were making every effort to unify all of Germany under Western Rule. The Soviet Union responded by consolidating its grip in Europe by creating satellites states in 1946 and 1947. One by one, communist governments, loyal to Moscow, were set up in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Stalin used Soviet Communism to dominate half of Europe. Why Stalin did this might not be clear. Was he trying to build an international communist movement beginning with Eastern Europe? Or, was he simply trying to protect his borders from any intervention on the part of the United States or the allies? The climax came in 1948, when a communist coup in Czechoslovakia overthrew a democratic government and the Soviet Union gained foothold in Central Europe.

(b). The Long Telegram

At the beginning of 1946, Truman decided that he was "tired of babysitting the Soviets who understand only an iron fist and strong language." Stalin responded with a speech stressing the basic compatibility between Soviet Communism and Western democracy, thus inaugurating a new hard line policy. Frustrated, Washington found meaning in crucial document known as the "**Long Telegram"**. On 22 February 1946, the expert on Sovietlogy, George Kennan sent an 8000-word telegram to Washington from Moscow that was to have an unprecedented impact on the entire structure of the U.S. foreign policy. In the telegram, Kennan argued that the key explanation for Soviet hostility towards the West lay less in the actions, or inactions, of the West than in Stalin's domestic policies of intimidation and repression. "A hostile international environment", wrote Kennan, "is the breath of life for [the] prevailing internal system in this country". Foreign policy analysts in the U.S. were quickly persuaded and U.S. policy shifted from quid quo stance towards one combining "patience with firmness". In

[21] Phillips, Steven, *The Cold War: Conflict in Europe and Asia*, Heinemann, Portsmouth, 2001, pp.159-160.

positing thus, Kennan's strategy recognized the realistic limits of American diplomacy: his "was a view conscious of the fact that because capabilities are finite, interests must be also; distinctions had to be made between what was vital and what was not...it insisted on using [a] perception of interests as a standard against which to evaluate threats, not the other way around: threats had no meaning, Kennan insisted, except with reference to and in terms of one's concept of interests."[22]

Kennan was a Foreign Service officer who knew Russia well. He explained the communist mentality in the following words: "The Soviet's hostility to the West is rooted in the need to legitimize their bloody dictatorship - they must therefore believe in the inevitable triumph of communism over the beast capitalism."[23]

The Soviets, Kennan continued, would exploit every opportunity to extend their system and therefore could not and would not be converted to a policy of harmony and cooperation. According to Kennan, Russia's policy was:

> "To undermine the general and strategic potential of major western powers by a host of subversive measures to destroy individual governments that might stand in the Soviet path, to do everything possible to set the major Western powers against each other."[24]

But since the Soviets believed that they had history on their side - history as understood by Marx's materialist conception of history-the communists were in no hurry and would not risk major war. Published as *'The Sources of Soviet Conduct'*, in Journal Foreign Affairs and signed by "X", Kennan's observations quickly gave Washington its own hard line and for the next three decades or so American Foreign Policy could be expressed by one word: containment. In order to quiet Soviet ambitions, the United States now had to embark on a path of intervention, under the guise of containment.[25]

There were two other administrative policies that also helped to shape the future of US-Soviet relations during the early stages of the Cold War. Most Western European Communist Parties were at a peak in the years immediately following the Second World War. The French Communist Party, for instance, won almost 30 percent of the vote in November 1946 elections. In Greece, Communist led guerrillas supplied from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, posed a threat to the uninspired government of Greece. Civil war broke out in Greece amid economic crisis. By January 1947, the British informed the United States that they could no longer supply economic aid to

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[22] Gaddis, John Lewis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, pp.30-33.

[23] Kennan, George, 'The Long Telegram', February 22, 1946. Classified in Etzold, Thomas and Gaddis, John Lewis, *Containment Doctrine on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950,* Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1978, pp.50-63.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Kennan, George, "X", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 5, no.4, July 1947, and "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *Foreign Affairs*, XXV, July 1947, pp.575-576.

Greece or Turkey. Believing that the Soviet Union was responsible for Britain's pullout, the United States decided that they had to assume the role of supplying aid.[26]

Dean Acheson played a central role in defining American foreign policy during the Cold War. As under Secretary of State to Harry Truman, Acheson devised the policy and wrote Truman's 1947 request to Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey and, a speech, which stressed the dangers of totalitarianism rather than Soviet aggression and marked the fundamental change in American foreign policy that became known as the Truman Doctrine. Acheson designed the economic-aid programme to Europe under Marshall Plan, which he believed that the best way to contain Stalin's Communism and prevent future European conflict was to restore economic prosperity to Western Europe, to encourage interstate cooperation, and help the American economy by making it trading partners richer.

(c). The Truman Doctrine

Where the United States might have tried to conceal disagreements with its former Soviet allies, the U.S. government agreed to air these openly but non-provocatively. There would also be no more concessions made towards Soviet expansionism, though no challenge would be made against Soviet control of territories already held. Moreover, U.S. military strength would have to be reconstituted, with economic and military aid to U.S. allies a key part of the new global strategy. The United States also agreed to continue its negotiations with the Soviets but only in order to register Soviet acceptance of U.S. positions or to publicise Soviet intransigence. In this way, the United States hoped to stake its claim to the new international power structure, while wooing allies at home and abroad, the U.S. government hoped the Soviets would exercise restraint in the face of American firmness, finding as well the possibility of a settlement in America's patience. The United States had induced the Soviets to withdraw troops from Iran and to give up its demands for boundary concessions and base rights from Turkey. The United States also intervened in Greece to support the U.S. allied government there from a communist insurgency, while installing the Sixth Fleet of the U.S. Navy in local waters. In Asia, the U.S. government kept the Soviets from playing any substantial role in the reconstruction of Japan, while displaying as well U.S. determination to prevent the Soviets from extending southward from their occupied zone north of the 38th parallel in Korea. Though the new foreign policy had been evolving, it coalesced after Truman's March 12, 1947, proclamation that: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.[27]

The Truman administration believed that if the United States "contained" the Soviet Union by checking any aggression, wherever it occurred, and in the meantime built up her own strength and that of the free world, it might eventually be possible to negotiate

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[26] Kennan, George, *The Soviet Union and The Atlantic Pact*, Foreign Service Dispatch 116 of September 8 from the American Embassy to Department of State, Washington D.C., 1952.

[27] Gaddis, John Lewis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, pp.89-91.

a general settlement by which the Third World War could be prevented. Every major move was made only after a long and often bitter debates. While the Truman administration regarded Europe as the most vital area, many Republicans wanted more emphasis placed on the Far East. And while most Democrats and most Republicans (needed until his death in 1951 by Senator Vandenberg) favored generous appropriations for aid to other countries, a large body of Congressmen insisted that the United States was in danger of over-taxing her resources and that other countries could not be trusted. This attitude reflected the old isolationist suspicion of the rest of the world. There was a marked revival of the old ultra-nationalist lunatic fringe; men who in 1940 and 1941, had insisted that Roosevelt was a war-monger and that it would be easy to do business with a victorious Hitler, now declared that both the Truman administration and most of America's foreign allies were tainted with Communism and apparently wanted the United States to fight a crusade with the Soviet Union almost single-handed.[28]

Britain abruptly announced plans to cease financial and military abroad to fight Communism. The U.S. President Harry S. Truman issued the **Truman Doctrine**, which authorized U.S. aid to anti-Communist forces in Greece and Turkey. The Truman administration sought Congressional approval of aid to replace British supplies. In the post-war fatigue prevailing in the United States, however, military expenditures were politically untenable, even more so with the 1946 election to the U.S. Congress of an economy-minded Republican majority.[29] The Truman Doctrine marked the formal declaration of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union-it also solidified the United States' position regarding containment. Later this policy was expanded to justify support for any nation that the US government considered to be threatened by Soviet expansionism. Known as the **Doctrine of Containment**, this policy aimed at containing the spread of Communism around the world, was outlined in a famous 1947 Foreign Affairs article by American diplomat George F Kennan. Containment soon became the official U.S. policy with regard to the USSR.[30]

Obviously, the United States could not allow the rest of the world to be dominated by Stalin, any more than by Hitler. But Communism presented more complex problems that Nazism. Hitler had relied mainly on force, but Stalin's most dangerous weapon was the belief of exploited groups that the triumph of Communism would mean the establishment of a utopian commonwealth. While the Soviet advance had to be checked by force, it was equally important to check the spread of Communism in the minds of men by offering them a better alternative. Freedom could be safeguarded only by showing that it meant justice, progress and prosperity.

Under the direction of George C. Marshall, the newly appointed Secretary of State, a Policy Planning Staff was organised with Kennan its first director. Having defined the Soviet problem, Kennan set to work to find its solution and this he proffered in his

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[28] Parkes, Henry Bamford, *A History of the United States Of America*, Knopf, New York, 1957, pp.684-685.

[29] Combs, Jerald A., *History of American Foreign Policy: From 1895*, M.E.Sharp, New York, June 2008, pp.316-346.

[30] Kennan, George, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *Foreign Affairs*, XXV, July 1947, pp.575-576.

famous essay, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, published in the Summer 1947 edition of Foreign Affairs, under the James Bond-like pseudonym of “Mr. X”. Here, Kennan introduced the term “containment” to post-war foreign policy. Kennan’s article outlined the core objectives of U.S. foreign policy – to protect the security of the nation from the interference or threat of interference, from foreign powers and to advance the welfare of Americans by promoting a world order favourable to the U.S. interests. Given limited capabilities, however, Kennan saw that priorities would have to be set. Thus, to achieve the core objectives of the U.S. foreign policy, Kennan argued that the United States should not try to restructure the international system but should simply try to maintain an equilibrium or balance of power within it such that no one country or group of countries could emerge pre-dominant. In essence, the United States would have to define its core interests and sources of power in order to allocate scarce resources efficiently.[31]

What remained as yet unresolved was the extent to which the United States would intervene in the domestic politics of other states in order to protect its own interests. While Kennan argued in 1948 that the United States should refrain from interfering the domestic affairs of other countries, he added that intervention might be justifiable given a sufficiently powerful national interest as well as the means to carry it out successfully. That same year, the U.S. State Department predicted that Mao’s Red Army would defeat Chiang Kai Shek’s Kuomintang in China and abroad.[32]

In fact, the rush towards military demobilization reduced U.S. forces from 12 million at the end of the war to 3 million by July 1946, reaching just 1.6 million by July 1947. Meanwhile defence expenditures fell from $ 81.6 billion, or 85.7 percent of total expenditures, in 1945 to $ 44.7 billion or 72.4 percent of total expenditures in 1946, down to just $ 13.1 billion or 35.5 percent of total expenditures, by 1947.[33] The Truman Doctrine, however, required the United States to focus on core U.S. economic, political, strategic and territorial interests, forcing the U.S. government to device new strategies for projecting American power given the apparently global nature of the Soviet challenge.

The Soviets accepted the Truman Doctrine’s “two rival worlds” idea. It went along the Marxist-Leninist notion of a world divided into two hostile camps - one capitalist and the other communist. For Stalin, a final class struggle, determined by the laws of historical development, would mean certain Soviet victory.

Truman declared that it is the policy of the United States “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.” In 1948, neither side believed any longer in the possibility of preserving some level of partnership amidst the growing tension and competition. During this new and more intense phase of the Cold War, developments in and around postwar Germany emerged as the core of the conflict. Following its defeat in World War II, Germany had

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[31] Kennan, George, ‘X’, ***Foreign Affairs***, Volume 5, no.4, July 1947, pp.566-582.

[32] Combs, Jerald A., *History of American Foreign Policy: From 1895*, M.E.Sharp, New York, June 2008, p.338.

[33] Military budgets cited are from Gaddis, John Lewis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982.

been divided into separate British, French, American and Soviet occupation zones. The city of Berlin, located in the Soviet zone, was also divided into four administrative sectors. The occupying governments could not reach agreement on what the political and economic structure of postwar Germany should be, and in mid-1947, the United States and Britain decided to merge their separate administrative zones. France joined them subsequently.[34]

The two Western governments were worried that to keep Germany fragmented indefinitely, when the Soviet and Western occupation regimes were growing so far apart ideologically, could have negative economic consequences for the Western sphere of responsibility. This concern echoed a greater fear that the economic problems of Western Europe - a result of the war's devastation - had left the region vulnerable to Soviet penetration through European Communist parties under Moscow's control. To head off this danger, in the summer of 1947, the United States committed itself to a massive economic aid program designed to rebuild Western European economies. The program was called the Marshall Plan, after the Secretary of State George C. Marshall.

(d). Marshall Plan

Secretary of State Marshall proposed a scheme of extensive aid to all-European nations if they could agree on how to revive a working economy, "so as to permit", he wrote, "the emergence of political and social conditions in which institutions can exist." There is no doubt which institutions Marshall had in mind-a free market economy directed by forces not in Europe but across the Atlantic. Marshall even included the Soviets in his plan. But at a meeting in Paris, the Soviets gave their response to the Marshall Plan by walking out. Neither Russia not its satellite states would take up the offer. Meanwhile, as the Marshall Plan pumped US Dollars into Europe, West German economic recovery began to trigger a general European recovery. The Soviets viewed this development as a little more than a capitalist plot to draw the nations of eastern European into the American sphere of influence.[35] Besides, the U.S pledged economic assistance aimed at re-building the Western political-economic system and countering perceived threats to Europe's balance of power under the Marshall Plan.

In his speech at Harvard, Marshall had spelled out that while the United States would give generous economic aid, the initiative for proposals on how best to make use of this aid for reconstruction and economic revival had to come from the Europeans themselves. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin realised this; he regarded Marshall's offer as "a life-line to sinking men" to avert "the looming shadow of catastrophe" over Western Europe. Together with his counterpart Georges Bidault, he organised an international conference in Paris in June and July 1947. The conference led to the formation of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation and to the acceptance of decisive American economic and political involvement in the international affairs of countries of Western Europe. Eventually, in April 1948, the European Recovery Program was set up and a new European Payments Union and the Organisation for

[34] Kennan, George, *Memoirs 1925-50,* Hutchinson, London, 1968, pp.433-462.

[35] Kennan, George, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *Foreign Affairs,* XXV, July 1947.

European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) were established. The latter was organ responsible for the distribution of the Marshall Plan to aid sixteen European nations and the Western zones of Germany. Due to European disagreements and contrary to its original intention, Washington decided to become a direct participant in the running of the OEEC.[36]

After the 1948, the European Recovery Program had created a momentum towards recovery in Western Europe. Still that program seemed incapable of surmounting the crippling effect of Europe's continuing insecurity. As Warren Austin explained, "Today, the greatest obstacle in the way of recovery is fear…. that pervades the daily lives of the people of the Western Europe…Their plans for the future are weighed against the fear that foreign armies will again sweep across their land… Their sense of insecurity robs them of a vital ingredient in the recipe for recovery-confidence in the future."[37] If those fears were often exaggerated, he continued, they were not groundless, for the Soviets had used the Red Army as the instrument for creating Moscow-directed regimes across Eastern Europe.

Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the new Secretary of State Dean G Acheson, elaborated on Europe's mood of insecurity, declaring in part:[38]

> "Western European countries have seen the basic purpose and principles of the [United Nations] Charter cynically violated by the conduct of the Soviet Union with the countries of Eastern Europe…the human freedoms as the rest of the world understands them have been extinguished throughout the whole area…. These same methods have been attempted in other areas-penetration by propaganda and the Communist Party, attempts to block cooperative international efforts in the economic field, wars of nerves and in some cases thinly veiled use of force itself. By the end of 1947, it became abundantly clear that this Soviet pressure and penetration was being exerted progressively further to the West."

The twin policies of Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan led to billions in economic and military aid to Western Europe. The United States consolidated its new role as the leader of the West.

III. SOVIET EXPANSIONISM

The Soviet Union proceeded to bind East European countries more closely to itself through a number of trade treaties and warning them against the Marshall Plan. On October 5, 1947, Stalin brought the economies of the Eastern bloc in a Soviet-led

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[36] Laurent, Paul Henri, America's Ally Britain's Opponent: Belgium And The OEEC/EPU, 1947-1950, *Journal of International Studies*, Volume 16, no.3, 1987, pp.453-466.

[37] Warren R. Austin's address to the Vermont Historical Society, February 24, 1949, Department of State Bulletin 20, (March 6th, 1948), p.248.

[38] Dean Acheson's statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 27th, 1949, Department of State Bulletin 20 (May 8th, 1949), p.595.

version of the Marshall Plan, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and exploded the first Soviet atomic device in 1949.

The United States took the lead in re-establishing West Germany from the three Western zones of occupation in 1949. All the Western Powers merged their zones into one, to be later organized into one state, Federal Republic of Germany. The Western Powers implemented monetary reforms. It was realized that Europe could not be rebuilt economy until German economy was rehabilitated. The Soviet Union's response to these developments in the west was the Berlin Blockade. The monetary reforms introduced by the Western Powers did not receive Soviet approval. The Western Allies then introduced in West Berlin a currency called D-mark. The Soviet Union thought differently. It thought that if the currency reform in West Germany were successful, West Germany would become strong, threatening Russia's position in East Germany. When the currency was introduced to West Berlin, the Soviet Union retaliated by imposing total ban on all traffic between Berlin and the Western zones.

The Americans regarded the blockade as a Russian attempt to force the withdrawal of the western powers from West Berlin, to consolidate the Soviet control of central and Eastern Europe, to frustrate the Marshall Plan and to encourage the communist parties in Western Europe. In short, this was regarded as an overt sign of Communist aggression. General Clay, the Military Governor of the American Zone, said, "When Berlin falls, West Germany will be next."

The Berlin Blockade, according to **Arthur Schumann**, was "in fact a test to see whether the Western Powers could be pushed out of West Berlin or at least be coerced into abandoning their plans for a West German State." However, how long could the Soviet Union impose the blockade? It perhaps did not realize the determination of the West to defend their interests.[39]

As Louis Halle says, "…Although Moscow was overwhelmingly superior in local military strength in Berlin, in any ultimate test it would find itself effectively inhibited from the use of that superiority by the American possession of atomic bombs." The Soviet Union failed to get hold of Berlin and in May 1949, the Berlin Blockade was lifted.[40]

It was clear that the Western Powers would resist with determination any Russian attempt to dominate Central and Eastern Europe. They had held on to the Western sectors of Berlin by a vast and costly airlift. Though Stalin lifted the blockade, the Western Powers failed to obtain Russian recognition of their rights of a land route to West Berlin. This meant that even in moments of defeat Russia determined to show strength. A repetition of the Berlin crisis was to be expected in the future. The Berlin Crisis was over but the Russian influence over Eastern and Central Europe was not shaken. The suspicion of the western nations about the Russian aggressions remained.

IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALLIANCE

[39] Schumann, Arthur, *Berlin Blockade*, Random House, New York, 1989, p.5.

[40] Halle, Louis, *The Cold War As History*, Harper and Row Ltd, New York, 1967, pp.10-12.

Stalin could take no little satisfaction from the rapidity and thoroughness with which communist regimes were established in Europe and Asia after the Second World War. But there was a gloomier side to the picture in the form of the increasing unity and military preparedness of the Western powers. The Communisation of one European state one after the other, the Berlin Blockade, the endless obstruction of the efforts to achieve German, Austrian and Japanese peace treaties, the widespread Communist offensive in Asia and the Korean War created an atmosphere of alarm in the Western capitals that did much to end hesitation and hasten the formation of a closer alliance system.[41]

Throughout the period of overt Communist offensive, Russia of course sought to avoid the formation of opposition alliances, mobilizing its own vast propaganda resources as well as those of the Cominform and the foreign Communist parties for that purpose. In Europe, the Communists fought all measures for alliance with the United States and were the most vigorous opponents of the efforts to achieve European economic and political unity. In the Middle East and Asia, anti-American as well as more broadly anti-Western propaganda were widely employed, while local Communist parties sought to avert diplomatic alignment with the West and to win support for the Soviet bloc. This protective offensive, however, was weakened by the evidence of Soviet actions and Western unity moved ahead very rapidly.

The idea of establishing an anti-Soviet alliance grew from general European fears of Soviet aggression. Hitler was still on everybody's mind. Although Hitler was dead, was Stalin perhaps viewed as the next aggressor? Regardless of whether or not Stalin was hell-bent on world domination, the point here is that he was perceived to be an aggressor in the Hitler mold. Western Europe also needed some guarantees from the United States that they would be protected from any aggression while they began the slow process of economic recovery.

In Britain, the Economist took the lead in warning the West against any further trust of Stalin. "Quite apart from any question of ideological differences, or political or strategic interests," ran it conclusion, "it is well to go cautiously with a man who has shed so much blood. For better or worse, Stalin is not a Main Street politician; he belongs among great despots ad conquerors of history, and those who have to deal with such beings should study well the nature of their powers."[42] Stalin's decision to lift the Berlin Blockade was only a tactical move; the Kremlin remained as dedicated as ever to its policies of expansion in Europe.

On the 22nd January, 1948, the proposal for a form of Western Union, consisting of a network of bilateral agreements, was put forward by the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in the House of Commons. He quoted the Dunkirk Treaty of March 1947, which had laid a firm basis for collaboration between France and Britain, and spoke of the need to conclude similar agreements with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the

[41] Ellison, Herbert, *History of Russia*, Rinehart and Winston, Holt, New York, 1964, pp.518-520.

[42] "Britain, France and Germany", *Economist*, 15/01/1949, "Mr Truman's Stalin", *Economist*, 22/01/1949.

Netherlands; thus making 'an important nucleus in Western Europe'. He went to say: "We shall consider the question of associating other historic members of European civilisation, including the new Italy, in this great concept…We are thinking of Western Europe as a unit".[43]

Bevin had advised the U.S. Secretary of State Marshall of his desire to launch 'some form of union in Western Europe, backed by the Americans and the Dominions'. His idea was welcomed by Marshall. It was felt in Washington, however, that as the Dunkirk Treaty had been aimed expressly against a renewed German aggression, a more suitable model might be the Rio Treaty between the United States and the Latin American countries, a collective defence arrangement aimed against any aggression.[44]

France and Britain concluded the Dunkirk Treaty pledging a common defence against by a third power in March 1947. The Dunkirk Treaty was a joint Anglo-French pledge to give all possible help to each other in case of German attack upon any one of them. It was directed exclusively against Germany, though there was no question of immediate threat from a divided and occupied Germany. However, in view of known potential of Germany, it was a move in self-defence, which for the moment kept the Soviet Union totally out of the picture. The Treaty provided Western Europe with a bulwark against communist threat. It was also brought forth greater collective security, something that the U.N. failed to do.[45]

On 4th March, 1948, representatives of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom met in Brussels to discuss a treaty of mutual assistance. On the same day, the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault sent an eloquent message to the U.S. Secretary of State Marshall: "The moment had come to strengthen on the political level, and as soon as possible, on the military level, the collaboration of the old and the new world, both so closely united in their attachment to the only civilisation which counts'. He declared that France, with Great Britain, was determined to do everything in her power to organise the common defence of the democratic defence of Europe. He expressed great economic assistance given by the United States, but stressed that the resolve of the European countries to resist aggression could be effective only with American help.[46]

The Brussels Treaty was signed on 17 March 1948, by Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. The aim was collective military aid and social and economic cooperation. This treaty created the Brussels Treaty Organisation, which was joined in 1954 by Western Germany and Italy also.[47] The supreme body of the Brussels Treaty

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[43] Powaski, Ronald E., *Towards An Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism and Europe, 1901-1950*, Greenwood Publishing Groups, 1991, pp.198-200.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Kaplan, Lawrence and Honick, Morris, *NATO 1948: The Birth of The Transatlantic Alliance*, Rowman and Littlefield Company, New York, 2007, pp.12-13.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Isby, David, and Kamps Jr, Charles, *Armies of NATO's Central Front*, Jane's Publishing Company Ltd, New York, 1985, p.13.

Organisation was to be the Consultative Council, consisting of the five Foreign Ministers. Under it was the Western Defence Committee consisting of the Defence Ministers. Article IV of the Treaty stated that should any of the Parties be the object of an 'armed attack in Europe', the others would afford the attacked Party 'all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'.

However, any defense arrangement without the United States was inadequate to the power of the Soviet Union. The western leaders were aware of this fact. The Brussels Treaty thus was a framework for an institution with an American security guarantee[48], which at that time did not exist. The United States supported the pact, but, due to continuing strong isolationism at home, the administration did not associate publicly with its formation.[49] At first, Truman needed to gain both public and congressional support for his new policy towards the Soviet Union.

In that it was an effort towards European post-war security cooperation, the Brussels Pact was a precursor to NATO and similar to it in the sense that it promised European mutual defence. However, it greatly differed from NATO in that it envisaged a purely European mutual defence pact primarily against Germany, whereas NATO took shape the next year, on the recognition that Europe was unavoidably divided into two opposing blocks (western and communist), that the USSR was a much greater threat than the possibility of a resurgent Germany, and that western European mutual defence would have to be Atlantacist (i.e. including North America). In September 1948, the parties to the Treaty of Brussels decided to create a military agency under the name of the Western Union Defence Organization. It consisted of a WU Defence Committee at Prime Ministerial level, and a WU Combined Chiefs of Staff committee, including all the national chiefs of staff, which would direct the operative organization.[50]

On the day the Treaty was signed, American President Truman told the American Congress: "I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them". This was an important statement. The Brussels Powers certainly trusted that American planning would go beyond a promise of help after attack, and after Soviet occupation, which, in the words of the French Prime Minister, Henri Queuille, might amount to no more than attempting to 'liberate a corpse'.

During the months of negotiations between the Brussels Treaty Organisation and the United States and Canada, many other issues became controversial. For example, the question of whether the new organisation should be only a strategic or also a political alliance was contentious. In the end, and largely on the insistence of Canada, the envisaged organisation was also given a political and ideological role rather than a mere military function. Thus, Article 2 emphasised the necessity of economic and social cooperation between the member states, and Article 8 stated that no member state

[48] Kaplan, Lawrence S., *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance*, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1994, p.17.
[49] Ibid, p.20.
[50] Maloney, Sean, *To Secure The Command of the Sea*, University of New Brunswick, 1991, pp.95-97.

should enter into any obligations that conflicted with NATO – in other words, no member state was allowed to go Communist. Also, the role of Germany, and how to restrain and integrate Germany into the Western world, was extensively and successfully discussed. At the London Conference in the spring of 1948, the three Western Allies were therefore able to agree on the radical step of setting up a separate West German state.

Of particular importance were questions of NATO membership, coverage, and duration. Eventually, it was decided that there should be no different categories of membership; countries were either participants or not. For strategic and political reasons, it was decided to interpret the term “North Atlantic” loosely. For example, the Algerian departments of France were accepted as being covered by NATO and countries, such as Italy and Portugal (and later Greece and Turkey) were of such strategic importance that they needed to become involved. This meant for example that Antonio Salazar’s Portugal, which was hardly a democratic country, was allowed to join. For largely strategic reasons, Portugal (including the Portuguese Azores) and Italy as well as Norway, Denmark (including Danish Greenland), and Iceland were allowed to accede to NATO in April 1949. They had not participated in the negotiations between the Brussels Treaty Organisation, the United States and Canada.

By September-October 1948, it had become clear that a new unified alliance would be created rather than a defensive agreement between the Brussels Treaty Organisation and a North American organisation, as had been envisaged in the Pentagon talks. Most importantly, at around the same time, it became obvious that the United States would be a definite member of the new Atlantic Alliance. While the Europeans expected above all to benefit from NATO by means of American protection and military aid, Washington hoped that the existence of NATO would convince the Soviet Union to restrain its expansionist ambitions. Not least the United States expected that due to American participation, the North Atlantic Alliance would help to overcome the outdated balance-of-power concept that had dominated European politics for centuries. NATO was therefore meant to contribute decisively to the establishment of a peaceful, stable and prosperous continent.

V. WASHINGTON TREATY (1949)

The ink was scarcely dry on the signatures of the Brussels Treaty when the Soviet started their blockade of Western Berlin. It was against this background of defiance and tension that plans for the defence of the West and negotiations for a North Atlantic Treaty were pressed forward. On the 11th April 1948, U.S. Secretary of State Marshall, and Under-Secretary Robert M. Lovett began exploratory talks with Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally on the security problems of the North Atlantic Area. On the 28th April 1948, the idea of a single mutual defence system, including and superseding the Brussels Treaty system, was publicly put forward by St. Laurent in the Canadian house of Commons. This was welcomed in Westminister by British Foreign Secretary Bevin. At about the same time, Senator Vandenberg prepared, in consultation with the State Department, a resolution which recommended in part ‘the association of the United States by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective

arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security' and the United States…contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 (of the United Nations Charter) should any armed attack occur affecting its national security'. On the 11th June, 1948, Resolution 239 – better known as the Vandenberg Resolution – was passed by the United States Senate by 64 votes to 4.[51] This marked a striking evolution in the American foreign and defence policies in time of peace, and it made it possible for the United States to enter an Atlantic Alliance.

On 6th July, 1948, the preliminary talks, which led to the North Atlantic Treaty began in Washington between the State Department and the Ambassadors of Canada and of the Brussels Treaty Powers. It was agreed from the start that any treaty for common defence, linking countries from both sides of the Atlantic, should be within the framework of the United Nations' Charter. These talks ended on the 9th September 1948, with a report to governments recommending inter alia that the proposed treaty should:

1 Promote Peace and Security
2 Express determination of the Parties to resist aggression
3 Define the area in which it should be operative
4 Be based on self-help and mutual aid
5 Be more than military: that is, promote the stability and well being of the North Atlantic peoples
6 Provide machinery for implementation.

The report was duly considered by governments, and at the end of October 1948, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty was able to announce 'complete agreement on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic and on the next steps to be taken in this direction'. The next steps were the actual drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty, which started in Washington on the 10th December, 1948, between the representatives of the seven powers.

It had become clear that the original idea of an association between the United States and the Brussels Treaty Powers would be superseded by a larger grouping of countries. On 13th October, 1948, the Canadian government had announced their willingness to join such a group. There were also other countries which the negotiators wished to bring in, e.g. the Irish Republic and Sweden (neither of which joined), Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Italy – the inclusion of Italy being particularly being urged by France. At the same time, the French obtained agreement to the inclusion of the three Algerian Departments of France in the area to be covered by the Treaty.

The position of Denmark and Norway in relation to the Treaty had been uncertain. The separate Scandinavian Pact, which they had been engaged in negotiating, had fallen through because the Swedish policy of full neutrality could not be reconciled with Norway's insistence that any Scandinavian defence association would to have co-

[51] Kay, Sean, *NATO and the Future ofEuropean Security*, Rowman & Iittlefield Publishers, 1998, p. 22.

operated with the Western Powers. On 5th February, 1949, the Norwegian Foreign Minister Harvard Lange before leaving for Washington to enquire about the Atlantic treaty, rejected a Russian offer of concluding a non-aggression pact. On 3rd March, 1949, Norway joined the Atlantic Alliance, while making it clear that she would not allow any armed forces of foreign powers to be stationed on Norwegian territory, as long as the country had not been attacked, or threatened with attack. Portugal also decided to joint the other Atlantic Powers, once it was ascertained that her close cooperation with Spain would not be prejudiced by the treaty and that foreign troops would not be stationed in the Azores in peacetime.

On 15th March, 1949, the Brussels Treaty Powers, Canada and the United States, formally invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal to join to the Treaty.

Although the Brussels Treaty was positively regarded in the United States, it was not clear initially that the United States would be willing to give up George Washington's long-standing advice to avoid entangling alliances. In addition, the United States, located at a distance from Europe and populated by large number of German immigrants and their descendents, had fought "the Nazis" or "Nazi Germany" during the Second World War and had made a distinction between "Nazis" and "Germans" more than its allies had. Consequently, a treaty explicitly aimed at a resurgent Germany would be difficult to sell in the United States.[52]

Throughout these negotiations, the Soviet Union did their best to prevent the conclusion of the Treaty. On 29th January 1949, they inveighed against the Brussels Treaty and warned all Europeans that a North Atlantic Alliance was simply an instrument for furthering the imperialist aims of the Anglo-Saxon powers. On 31st March, 1949, they presented a memorandum to the twelve prospective signatories claiming that the Treaty was contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The twelve countries replied in a joint note delivered to Russia stating that the text of the treaty was the best answer to Soviet allegations, since it showed beyond the shadow of doubt that the Alliance was not aimed against any nation or group of nations, but only against armed aggression.

Hence, a treaty was signed on 4th April 1949 at Washington D.C by twelve countries: the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Iceland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway and Portugal, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, an alliance which brought together free and sovereign countries in order to create a collective security system. The treaty provided for mutual consultation in case political independence, territorial integrity or security of any of the signatories was threatened.

Within days of the signing of the treaty, requests from America's new NATO allies like Greece and Spain came for military and financial assistance. It was argued in their respective requests that they needed help so they could play a fair role in the new

[52] Collins, Brian J., *NATO: A Guide to the Issues*, Praegers Publishers, Wesport, USA, 01/02/2011, p.15.

security organisation.[53] The timings of these requests were not going to speed up the U.S. Senate's ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Senate had already involved itself in the details of the wording of the treaty before it had been signed in April. Now, the issues of the duration of the treaty, the direct costs of the U.S. participation, and burden sharing posed potential obstacles to the ratification process.

It took much personal persuasion from President Truman and members of his administration to win the support of individual senators for ratification. On July 21, 1949, after much debate, the Senate ratified the North Atlantic treaty by a vote of 82-13, which exceeded the two-thirds majority to pass.[54] The treaty represented a radical change in the American foreign policy, from one of limited engagement overseas to full international participation. The ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty did not mean that the Senate had lost its concerns about a European entanglement.

The establishment of NATO in April 1949 rested upon a European and in particular a British initiative. As John Lewis Gaddis had written, it was "as explicit an invitation as has ever been extended from smaller powers to a great power to construct an empire and to include them within it".[55] However, in the circumstances of the times, consideration about American empire building and American dominance played a rather minor role. The Europeans were looking for military protection and economic and military aid to ensure their survival as democratic states. The American political establishment of the time – both the Democratic administration and, until the election of 1948, the Republican leadership of the Congress – realised very well that putting a stop to the Soviet expansionist encroachments and maintaining democratic states with a liberal economic order on the European continent were very much in the national interest of the United States.

There was formidable opposition from isolationists who suspected that America was being asked to pull the European chestnuts out of the fire. These largely emotional and psychological pressures were difficult to satisfy. The administration, and in particular Secretary Acheson, embarked on a major effort of persuasion to win over as many isolationists in Congress, as possible by, for example, emphasizing the harmony of interests between the U.N. Charter and the NATO Treaty. But due to Congressional pressure, and much to the dislike of the Europeans, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Charter, in which an attack on one member was regarded as an attack on all and would lead to a joint war effort, had to be expressed much more vaguely than originally anticipated. Essentially, this was the result of the Vandenberg Resolution passed by the Senate in early June 1948.

The U.S. Senate was unlikely to agree to a treaty that potentially took away Congress' power to declare war. After all, the Brussels Treaty could be interpreted to

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[53] Douglas, Frank R., *The United States, NATO and A New Multilateral Relationship*, Greenwood Press, Westport, USA, 30/11/2007, pp. 12-14.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Gaddis, John Lewis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982.

require an automatic rendering of military assistance. But the continuing instability in Europe led the U.S. Congress and President Truman to move towards a clear engagement in European security. In 1948, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, previously an isolationist, sponsored a resolution stating that the United States should pursue the "progressive development of regional and other collective defence arrangements for individual and collective self-defence" in accordance with the U.N. Charter. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the resolution, which passed, and issued a report on the proposed North Atlantic Treaty that strongly endorsed collective defence. The Senate approved the treaty, which went into force on August 24, 1949.[56]

Is it possible for NATO to be redefined without the redefinition being subject to the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate? If a treaty, once it was enacted and ratified by the United States, could then be changed without the U.S. Senate again offering its advice and consent, the American government would never need but to enter into one or two treaties.

Military aid to Western Europe, in President Truman's opinion, would be necessary if there was to be any kind of build-up of military ground forces to counter the Soviet military forces without the need for more U.S. ground forces in Europe. U.S. Senators were assured that the U.S. membership in NATO did not mean more U.S. military forces in Europe. It was explained that the U.S. membership would create more confidence in Europe, so Europeans could secure themselves. The proof of a U.S. commitment to the defence of Western Europe would be the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, which meant that Western Europe would be protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This argument supported the reality of the day, as the American military power in Western Europe was centred on rotational B-29 aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons, and not any sizeable American ground force.[57]

When Acheson was made Secretary of State, he built a working framework for containment, first formulated by Kennan, who served as Head of Acheson's Policy Planning Staff. Acheson was the main designer of the military NATO and signed the pact for the United States. The formation of NATO was a dramatic departure from historic American foreign policy goals of avoiding any "entangling alliances".

Article 5 of the Treaty states: "An armed attack against one or more signatories in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." The signatories agreed to work for collective defence and to assist each other. This would include use of armed forces to restore and maintain security of the North Atlantic area.

Though the simple commitment of the US power to the defence of Europe, the Atlantic Alliance promised the treaty area both peace and security. As President

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[56] North Atlantic Treaty, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Washington D.C., June 6, 1949.

[57] Douglas, Frank R., *The United States, NATO and A New Multilateral Relationship*, Greenwood Press, Westport, USA, 30/11/2007, pp. 12-14.

Truman stated in his January 1949 inaugural, “if we can make it sufficiently clear, in advance, that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur.” In his letter of transmittal to the President on April 7, 1949, Acheson explained the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty in similar terms. “It was designed,” he wrote, “to contribute to the stability and well-being of the member nations by removing the haunting sense of insecurity and enabling them to plan and work with confidence in future.” Speaking over the combined Columbia and Mutual Broadcasting systems, Acheson further assured the American people that “if peace and security can be achieved in the North Atlantic area, we shall have gone a long way to assure peace and stability in other areas as well.”[58]

Arguing for the North Atlantic Treaty, Acheson assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the pact, supported by the United States military assistance, would achieve the security no longer promised by t he United Nations. The secretary pointed to the national affinity of purposed between the United States and Western Europe, one based on 300 years of history as well as on common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs. When committee members pressed Acheson as to the nature of the American commitment, he did not evade the question. “If you ratify this pact,” he told the senators, “it cannot be said that there is no obligations to help. There is a obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties.”[59] What mattered to Acheson was the success of the Western world in building a community of strength and unity against possible Soviet aggression. The alternative, he warned, was to allow the free nations to “succumb one by one to the erosive and encroaching processes of Soviet expansion.” The surest hope for peace lay in the West’s ability to make it absolutely plain to the USSR that aggression would not succeed.

Washington’s general satisfaction over the treaty scarcely exceeded that of London, for the treaty established above all the American interests in European security. President Truman’s assurance of solidarity between Europe and America, no less than his open appeal for public support behind policies of cooperation, were for Europe a matter of relief and encouragement. “Whatever causes might have led to war,” declared the Economist on March 19, “uncertainly about America’s interest in Western Europe can no longer be numbered among them.” Similarly, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin declared before Parliament: “This is the first time that the United States have ever felt able to contemplate entering into commitments in peace-time for joint defence with Europe, and it is a most famous historical undertaking into which they are now entering in common with the rest of us.”[60]

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[58] The North Atlantic Pact, Department of State Bulletin 20 (March 20th, 1949), 346; Acheson’s address over CBS, March 18th, 1949, Department of State Bulletin 20, (March 27th, 1949); Acheson’s Report on the North Atlantic Treaty, Department of State Bulletin, (April 24th, 1949), 532.

[59] Acheson’s Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 27th, 1949, Department of State 20 Bulletin, May 8th, 1949, 595.

[60] *Manchester Guardian*, March 24th, 1949, p.8.

Greece and Turkey in 1952 and West Germany in 1955 joined the NATO. It was seen as a warning to the Soviet Union on US preparedness to fight, if necessary, for the defence of 'free world' for the containment, and if possible, defeat of communism. It was strongly opposed by the Soviet bloc. Certainly, it further soured international relations and prompted the Soviet Union to set up its own alliance, Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed in 1955 by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact was created in response to the decision to allow Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Warsaw Pact allowed the Red Army to be stationed in member states. It also provided for a unified military command and a system of mutual assistance. This enabled the Soviet Union to launch a multinational invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

NATO, made up of ambassadors from the 15 countries, was created with the sole aim of protecting Europe from Soviet aggression, "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law." There are two main features of the Treaty. First, the United States made a firm commitment to protect and defend Europe. As states in the Treaty, "an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against all." Second, the United States would indeed honour its commitment to defend Europe. After the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the NATO powers devoted their efforts primarily to increasing their military strength in Europe where Russia had more than twice as many ground troops and an immense superiority in operational aircraft. Urged on by the Korean War, NATO powers made a number of important decisions during the closing months of 1950. They decided to create a unified NATO Command, the U.S. President Truman selecting Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander of NATO forces. They also decided to increase NATO forces substantially, to admit Greece and Turkey to NATO and to rearm West Germany. Simultaneously, the Western powers negotiated peace treaties with Japan (September 1951) and Germany (May 1952) bringing both states into the structure of their defensive alliance. Moreover, the success of the effort to get the United Nations sponsorship of the police action in Korea was a solid gain in the effort to stay the Communist offensive.[61]

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. military in general were more than doubtful whether the country had the resources to build up a Transatlantic Military Alliance. Indeed, the Joint Chiefs feared that the U.S. Congress would be able to make available to the American military services would be greatly reduced if Washington decided to rearm the Europeans. Whether or not European re-armament went ahead, in view of Stalin's conventional superiority, the West would be helpless if faced with a Soviet invasion of Europe. Eventually, however, the Joint Chiefs realised that the proposed Mutual defence Assistance Program would actually enable them to enlarge and modernize the equipment available to the army, navy and air force. Moreover, the administration's willingness to listen to the military and to agree to rule out the right of any of the future NATO members to automatic military assistance greatly pleased the

[61] Ellison, Herbert, *History of Russia*, Rinehart and Winston, Holt, New York, 1964, pp.518-520.

Joint Chiefs. Instead, bilateral agreements with each member were made the precondition for offering U.S. military aid to Western Europe. NATO's policy was based on two principles. The first was to maintain adequate military strength and political unity to deter aggression and other forms of military or political pressure. The second was to pursue a policy aimed at a relaxation of tensions between East and West – a policy based to a large extent on a general military strength.

Supporters of the United Nations and Roosevelt's "one world" concept feared that an "Entangling Alliance" would revive the despised and dangerous balance-of-power concept of pre-Second World War days. Although they recognised that the Soviet Union's veto in the Security Council made any use of the United Nations for Western defence purposes difficult, if not possible, the envisaged Alliance appeared to ignore the United Nations together altogether. This was a poor precedent that might well threaten to undermine the United Nations fatally. The Truman administration therefore invoked the U.N. Charter as much as possible in the Articles of the North Atlantic Treaty, although they realised, as Lawrence Kaplan writes, "that there was a basic incompatibility between the Treaty and the Charter".[62] During the strenuous efforts to sell the North Atlantic Treaty to the country, the administration pretended that NATO was a regional organisation of the United Nations (Chapter 8 Article 53). Wisely, however, no reference to this effect was included in the text of the treaty. After all, regional organisations were obliged to report to the U.N. Security Council, which would have given Moscow an unacceptable element of influence on NATO.

Why was the United States concerned in European affairs? The answer is simply that the U.S. forces are in Europe not to defend the Europeans, but to defend the United States. About 85 percent of American troops in Europe are stationed in Germany, leading member of the common market and a stronger supporter of European unity. Add to that the fact that the United States enjoys strong economic and social bonds with Western Europe. But to continue these bonds, and to retain its position as a world power, the United States must keep Western Europe free from Communist domination. The best way for the United States to keep Western Europe free and thereby to deter aggression against America was to join other nations with the same interests. This was the idea for the U.S.'s membership in NATO.

The American public embraced NATO because it offered a way of participating in world affairs and opposing Soviet power in a more indirect way. Americans no longer believed that world security would through the United Nations—itself a product of World War One—but they still held on to the ideas of some sort of collective security with an ideological base. The Atlantic nations were said to be held together by both common interests as well as common commitment to democracy and industrial capitalism. For Western Europe, NATO provided a much-needed shelter of security behind which economic recovering could take place. In a way, NATO was the political counterpart of the Marshall Plan. For the United States, NATO signified that the United States could no

[62] Kaplan, Lawrence, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of An Alliance*, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, 2004, pp.8-9.

longer remain isolated from European affairs. Indeed, NATO meant that European affairs were now American affairs as well.

The United States had committed herself to a military alliance in peacetime for the first time in her history. From 1949 onwards, a large number of American troops was stationed in Western Europe. For the coming years her allies could call for American military assistance anytime. This was a point of no return for the pre-war isolationist policy of the United States.

American isolationism was an ambiguous concept. The United States had never been isolationist with regard to commerce. Merchant vessels roamed the seven seas from the first days of independence. Nor has the United States been isolationist with regard to culture. But through most of its history, the republic had been isolationist with regard to foreign policy. From the start, Americans sought to safeguard their daring new adventure in government by shunning foreign entanglements and quarrels. George Washington admonished his country to “steer clear of permanent alliances,” and Thomas Jefferson warned them against “entangling alliances.” By the 1950s it seemed that at last America had made the great turning and would forever after accept collective responsibilities. The age of American isolationism, it was supposed, was finally over. It is surely clear that the upsurge American internationalism during the Cold War was a reaction to what was perceived as a direct threat to the security of the United States. It is to Joseph Stalin that Americans owe the forty-year suppression of the isolationist impulse. The collapse of the Soviet threat faces us today with the prospect that haunted Roosevelt half a century ago – the reversion to isolationism.[63]

Since its formation in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has achieved two fundamental results. First, it won the Cold War without firing a shot. It proved also to be the most important aspect of a Western policy of containment of Soviet expansion that culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the communist governments of Eastern Europe. Secondly, NATO provided the necessary security framework for the economic and political integration of Western Europe, which fostered European Union institutions strong enough to rule out among states that had been fighting one another for a millennium.[64]

The heart of the Treaty is Article 5 that provides, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the security guarantee to the members. It says that "(The Parties agree) ... an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them... will assist the Party or Parties attacked... including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Nevertheless, Article 5 does not commit the Parties to the automatic response. As Acheson has explained: ‘(Our promises) were to regard an attack on any of our allies as

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[63] Schlesinger, Arthur, “Back To The Womb? Isolationism’s Renewed Threat”, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 1995.

[64] Ireland, Timorthy, *Creating The Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1981, p.20 and Jordan, Robert S., and Bloome, Michael W., *Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1979, p.29.

an attack on ourselves and to assist the victim ourselves and with the others, with force if necessary, to restore peace and security.... This did not mean that we would be automatically at war if one of our allies were attacked. We should and would act as a nation in accordance with our promises - not in repudiation of them - and, as a nation, 'that decision will rest where the Constitution has placed it.'[65]

The Washington Treaty: An Outline

The Parties[66] to the Washington Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

The parties are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to the following provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty[67]: -

Article 1:
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain from in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2:
The parties will contribute towards the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3:
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

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[65] Acheson, Donald, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State* Department, Matthew B. Ridgway, Doubleday & Company, New York, 1969, p283.

[66] The original signatories were Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Lawson, Ruth, International Regional Organisations: Constitutional Foundations, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1962, p.5.

[67] See US Treaties and Other Agreements 1964, US Statutes at Large, 81st Congress, 1st Sess,, 1949, LXIII, Part II, 2242.

Article 4:
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6:
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

1. on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; or
2. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7:
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8:
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagements in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9:
The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a

defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10:
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic Area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11:
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their notifications.

Article 12:
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic Area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13:
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14:
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copes thereof will be transmitted by the Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

Thus began a group of Western nations on the north Atlantic basin led by the United States their journey through the currents and cross-currents of the murky waters of international politics.