CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace-keeping and peace-building operations of the United Nations after the Cold War have been undertaken in a substantially different strategic environment, especially in the early 1990s when the Russian federation (after the dissolution of the Soviet Union) was reduced from a Super-Power (during the Cold War) to a major power. In the UN Security Council, the dominant position of the United States was apparent. The international political system after the Cold War was no longer bi-polar, thus creating space for the US and its allies to deal with armed conflicts under the auspicies of the UN Security Council, with greater willingness on the part of the US to get involved in the armed conflict through the UN.

As the most dominant liberal democracy in the post-cold war world, the United States preferred to make use of the UN Security Council to get involved in intra-state conflict (relating to ethnic groups and other identity-related groups) and ensure that humanitarian intervention is effected through the use of force, as legitimised under the UN Security Council. The role and effectiveness of the UN peace-keeping and peace-building operations, however, depended upon the capability and willingness of the major powers working in the UN Security

Council, to face challenges thrown up by the changing role and dynamics of the UN peace operations amidst the changing strategic environment and policies of the permanent five of the UN. We shall also dwell upon the prospects of the UN peace-operations in early 21st Century.

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The UN does not have its own military force; it depends on contributions from member-states. In addition to maintaining peace and security, peace-keepers are increasingly charged with assisting in political processes; reforming judicial systems; training law enforcement and police forces; disarming and reintegrating former combatants; supporting the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

Given these new tasks (e.g.: overseeing of elections, ensuring no human rights violations, etc.) necessary to conflict resolution in UN operations, the peacekeeping component cannot be separated from other sections of the operations, and its effectiveness goes hand-in-hand with the effectiveness of the larger mission. As these missions become more multi-dimensional, they will require more time to complete, and will no doubt

encounter controversy as they become entangled in more areas of the society in which they have been deployed. It is evident however, that the blue berets will remain a significant aspect of any force deployed to a conflict zone, if only for the moral assurance they provide; that an impartial party is looking out for the interests of the innocent, and working toward securing a lasting peace in the region. This is evident from the fact that UN peacekeeping operations have continued over six decades which suggests that there is something worthwhile in such forces. As a result, they will no doubt continue to be an important facet of larger intervention operations sponsored by the UN. Peacekeepers working singlehandedly however, are not quite effective in a post-Cold War international political system at respecting the same principles of impartiality, consent, and the non-use of force which were the basis of the inception of peacekeeping[1]. They can however, still positively influence the pursuit of peace in any conflict zone if they work to support the adversaries and do not themselves become a direct party to the conflict. In conclusion, peacekeeping operations resemble nothing of their

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[1] The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from UNOSOM, para.10;http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/UNOSOM.pdf (*visited 6 April2015)*

classic operations, and yet they remain an integral part of any intervention in conflict regions; if merely for the reassurance to civilians of the presence of the blue beret.

The very effectiveness of the UN depends largely on the support of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The geopolitical interests of these powers still remain in one way or the other. As such any peacekeeping venture will certainly depend on the attitude and willingness of the superpowers. However, the post-cold war UN has become more pro-active. In view of above the UN Peace-Keeping operations and the role of the forces deployed for that purpose will largely depend on the collective willingness and commitment of member-states.

In the past few decades, the UN has undergone some profound changes aimed at improving its ability to meet the new peace-keeping challenges of the 21st century. However, if peacekeeping is to continue serving as an instrument for maintaining international peace and security, member-states will need to ensure that missions are given clear mandates and the necessary human and financial resources to implement them. In

order to deal effectively with the lingering forces of war and conflict; the UN, member-states and other key stakeholders must continue working together to develop the right tools to make peace-keeping work.

New economic realities, like depleting natural resources, unemployment, terrorism (specially Islamic Jihadi), emergence of China as a big economy, the movements for democracy in different states, failed states and problems generated thereby ---- these factors will demand major role of IPKF in future, for maintaining inter-state and intra-state peace.

UN peacekeeping activity has increased significantly and its nature has changed since the first UN peace-keeping operation, established in 1956 due to the Suez Crisis. At Suez, the blue berets had a traditional mission to perform: to ensure and monitor cessation of hostilities between the parties and supervise the maintenance of ceasefire. Today, peace-keeping operations are more multi-faceted and challenging than before. The operations also often play a central role in the political efforts to solve crises and the promotion of development. Peace-keeping activity has

undergone some significant changes. The first UN operation was established when Egypt strived to nationalise the internationally important trade route, the Suez Canal. At that time, peacekeepers monitored, patrolled and safeguarded demilitarised zones and their integrity. The operations have changed and they are facing new challenges. Force has been used in UN operations, and the role of the use of force is central, but it can never replace the political process. For example, the Mali mission (MINUSMA) has raised the issue of the stance of peacekeeping activity in relation to prevention of terrorism. In Mali, the mandate for anti-terrorist operations has been granted only to the AFISMA mission, commanded by France. Similarly, the exceptionally extensive authorisation to use force given to the "intervention brigade" in the MONUSCO mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has given rise to debate. This mission also uses unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), about which many member-states have reservations.

Notwithstanding the above, the key principles of peacekeeping have remained unchanged: neutrality, approval of the receiving state, rules of engagement. When engaged in peacekeeping, one must take advantage of training and use the

right tools – military measures alone do not suffice. Force has been used in UN operations, and the role of the use of force is central, but it can never substitute the political process.

From Various Tasks to Various Challenges

Reconciling the peace-keeping operations to new challenges is a demanding task for the UN and its member states. The intergovernmental and even internal threats concern several states at a time, so addressing them requires simultaneous efforts taken by several nations. Sometimes the affected states are not willing to accept international forces from the UN.

Reluctance to intervene in internal state affairs is also emphasised in the policies practiced by certain states with permanent seats in the UN Security Council. In case of Syria, Russia in particular has been reluctant to intervene in the situation. According to the then Foreign Minister Tuomioja, if ever implemented, the potential peacekeeping mission in Syria would be one of the most challenging and difficult operations in the UN

history. In spite of this, the UN member states would be obliged to support implementation of the operation.

Financing and finding of resources are also challenges that concern peacekeeping. Lisa Buttenheim pointed out that there is a discrepancy between the donors and troop contributing countries. The biggest donors are western countries, and the largest financial contributions are made by industrial countries (the US, Japan, the UK, Germany and France), and the largest numbers of troops are contributed by emerging countries with large populations (Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia and Nigeria).The emerging states are demanding more influence on peacekeeping issues, but they have been reluctant to increase their shares in the financing of operations. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) hopes that the EU would make a stronger commitment to supporting operations and contributing forces. The UN needs the support of all of its member-states also in peacekeeping activities. As regards troop contribution, improved regional balance is needed. In addition, there is demand for various capabilities. The UN forces no longer enjoy similar respect as earlier and, for this reason, it is more difficult to win the trust of

local population, and, therefore, peacekeepers become targets of hostile outbursts easier than before. Sometimes, the troops are forced to operate in a very hostile environment. In many conflicts, civilian population has become a target of armed operations to an increasing extent. The methods of war have become crueler than they used to be.

The nature of peace-keeping operations changed and the frequency of operation increased significantly in the 1990s, partly due to the dissolution of the Cold War world order. Currently, the mandates for operations take better account of the interconnection between development, peace and security, and human rights. In spite of these changes, the goals of the UN ---- securing of peace, protection of civilian population, and restoration of normal conditions – have remained the same.

Turns and Twists in the Evolution of UN Peacekeeping

The founders of the UN made no explicit provisions for peacekeeping in the 111 article-long Charter. Chapter VI covered the voluntary settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII dealt with enforcement action. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld quipped that peacekeeping forces might be placed in their own chapter, numbered "six and a half." Lacking specific legal provisions, peacekeeping has emerged largely through precedent. The principles and customs of peacekeeping have been moulded by the various missions. Therefore, any discussion of UN peacekeeping must start by highlighting some of the major points in its evolution, from the Cold War to the present. Anthony McDermott states that there has never been a 'golden age' of peacekeeping operations[2]. During the Cold War, peacekeeping had a relatively minor role that was largely confined to the Middle East and regional conflicts associated with de-colonisation. Peacekeeping forces thus helped to contain those crises in which

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[2]Anthony McDermott, 'The UN and the NGOs: Humanitarian Interventions in Future Conflicts', inAnthony McDermott (ed.), Humanitarian Force, PRIO Report, 4/97, p. 75.

neither superpower had a major interest, forestalling their involvement and subsequent escalation.

In 1956, the General Assembly created the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) for the Suez Crisis. The responsibility and authority for creating mandates has since fallen to the Security Council. UNEF I was charged with separating the sides, supervising the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli units, and patrolling the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. Another important operation was the UN Operation in Congo from 1960 to 1964. Both of these experiences have shown that peacekeeping was not a simple procedure to activate and carry out.[3]

In 1973, another force was created to monitor the ceasefire and provide a buffer zone in the Arab-Israeli (Yom Kippur) War. Many of the principles that have since guided UN peacekeeping operations were crafted during this mission. According to the UN Under-secretary General for Political Affairs, Sir Brian Urquhart, certain political requirements became necessary to justify

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[3] McDermott, pp. 75-76.

deployment: the consent of the parties involved to the mandate, the continued support of the Security Council, the use of force only in self-defence, the willingness of individual member states to supply personnel, and, of course, the member states and Security Council's willingness to fund the operation.[4] In March 1964, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was introduced to provide a buffer zone between the Greek and Turkish populations on the island. Other forces in the Middle East during that period included a mission to supervise the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights, a force that in 1978 was charged with monitoring the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon. The common characteristic of these operations is their longevity. Their presence in relatively populated areas for more than a decade made peacekeeping forces a local party directly involved in politics on the ground. In addition, these forces became a long-term contributor to the civilian economy and provider of such services as medical treatment, housing, distribution of food and services, and family contacts.[5]

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[4]Brian Urquhart, 'The UN and International Security after the Cold War', in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations, Divided World: the UN's Roles in International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, revised edition, 1993, pp. 81-103.
[5] McDermott, p. 77.

So far, we have discussed the first generation of peacekeeping operations. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali described the thirteen pre-1988 Cold War peace-keeping operations as "largely military in composition and their tasks were to monitor cease-fires, control buffer zones, investigate alleged arms flows, and prevent a resumption of hostilities and so on." In other words, they were to maintain calm on the front lines and give time for the peace-makers to negotiate a settlement of the dispute that had led to the conflict in the first place.[6] Many of those political negotiations have failed, but, nonetheless, the UN peace-keeping forces prevented the expansion of many conflicts. An important characteristic of the first generation, or classic peacekeeping operations, is that they involved the post-truce interposition of a peacekeeping force with the consent of the parties to the conflict.

After 1988, however, UN peace-keeping went through something of a transition. With glasnost and perestroika came an unprecedented co-operation among the five permanent members of the Security Council. The subsiding of Cold War tensions

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[6] Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns (eds.), The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995, p. 80.

lessened East-West rivalry and there was an unprecedented era of expansion and optimism, not only in terms of the number of missions undertaken, but also in the scope of activity.[7] More peacekeeping operations have been established since 1989 than in the previous 45 years of the UN's history. In 1988, the UN operated just five peacekeeping missions, but at its peak in 1993, it had 18. More peacekeeping personnel were deployed abroad than at any other time in history. In 1989, the UN had only 9,950 troops in the field. By 1993, it had a record 80,000. At the end of July, approximately 65,000 personnel were deployed in 16 UN peace-keeping operations.[8]

Peace-keeping operations during this era are often described as second-generation peace-keeping. Many of the operations lacked the explicit consent of classical operations and many operations had a new level of involvement. In second-generation operations, such as the UN Transition Assistance Group in

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[7] Beginning with the deployment of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibiabetween April 1989 and March 1990, there has been an enormous increase in the number of statesinvolved in peacekeeping. In 1988, before UNTAG, only 26 countries were involved. By November1994, there were 76.

[8] United Nations, 'Report to the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation',UNDoc.A/50/1, 22 August 1995, p. 81; and 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace'.

Namibia in 1989-90, the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador in 1991-95 and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992-93, there was consent of the parties involved. But, the peace agreements were complex and multidimensional. These operations were deployed as part of negotiated political solutions. Peacekeepers were also given new tasks such as electoral assistance, human rights monitoring, resettlement of refugees, police training, protection of humanitarian relief efforts, and disarmament and demobilisation of armed forces. An increasing regard for humanitarian intervention further widened the scope of peacekeeping mandates.

Between 1988 and 1991, the forces met successes in Africa and Central America, encouraging "the view that further development of the principles and practices would allow the UN to serve as an effective instrument to reduce violent conflict within the international system."[9] In 1988, the Nobel Peace Prize was

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[9] Mats R. Berdal, 'Whither UN Peacekeeping', Adelphi Papers 281, London: October 1993, p. 3

awarded to UN peace-keepers for their "decisive contribution toward the initiation of actual peace negotiations."

The New Generation of Peace-keeping

In the wake of such optimism, came a new wave of efforts. Along with the new tasks of early 1990s came third-generation missions that were largely enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the Charter. They primarily involved internal conflicts and they often lacked the consent of the parties to the conflict, as in Somalia and Bosnia.

The operations of the early 1990s were overly ambitious, given the considerable financial and political constraints placed on the UN by member states. To a large degree, the UN overextended its management capabilities, its resources and its political backing. These new endeavours were mostly incorporated into existing administrative and management structures, often lacking success. In fact, the problems of third generation operations in Somalia and Bosnia, and the "disastrous" mission in Rwanda

"prompted a period of retrenchment."[10] The Security Council - particularly the United States - was reluctant to authorise, implement or finance new peace-keeping operations. Rather than setting up more missions, the UN turned to improving its infrastructure and its operational efficiency. The total deployment of UN military and civilian personnel fell from its 1993 peak of more than 80,000 to approximately 14,000 in 1998.[11] Along with this retrenchment also came a general consensus that much needed to be done to approach conflict management more inclusively with other fields. Many saw a need to better co-ordinate humanitarian concerns, human rights, social development and traditional military approaches.

Given the financial, logistical and political constraints, the UN also turned to a policy of delegation - some would say devolution. While affirming its three basic principles, consent, impartiality, and use of force only for self-defence, the UN delegated the enforcement of mandates to coalitions of willing member-states and regional organisations more equipped to deal

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[10] Michele Griffin, 'Retrenchment, Reform and Regionalisation: Trends in UN Peace SupportOperations', International Peacekeeping 6, No. 1 (spring 1999), pp. 2-3.

[11] Griffin, p. 3.

with the actual activities.[12] This new approach continues to be followed and was affirmed in the 16 July 1997 Programme for Reform announced by then Secretary General, Kofi Annan.[13]

Challenges to Peace-keeping

Some of the challenges to effective peacekeeping are considered largely conceptual. In the past, peacekeepers were merely expected to separate hostile forces and observe ceasefires or truces. For the operation to be successful, it was essential that the parties to the conflict offered their collaboration and support. However, in recent conflicts, involving ethnicity-based disputes, internal political struggle or the collapse of state institutions, the UN has been acting without the clear consent of the parties to the conflict. The result is that the environment for peacekeeping is no

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[12] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Position Paper of the SecretaryGeneral on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations', UN Doc.,A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, paras. 33, 80, 85-87.

[13] He stated, "The United Nations does not have, at this point in history, the institutional capacity toconduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Under present conditions, ad hocmember states' coalitions of the willing offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to theescalation or spread of an ongoing conflict. As in the past, a mandate from the Security Councilauthorising such a course of action is essential if the enforcement operation is to have broadinternational support and legitimacy". 'Renewing the United Nations: a Programme for Reform:Secretary-General's Report', UN Doc., A/51/950, 14 July 1997, para. 107.

longer benign.[14] Peacekeepers increasingly work in a climate of continuing armed conflict, sometimes in places where there are poorly defined borders or ceasefire lines and no guarantees of respect for their safety or role. Petru Dimitriu argues that this new and complex environment, together with the ambitious objectives of the United Nations and ever-growing pressure on scarce resources, has made it more imperative than ever to think clearly about when and how the UN should become involved in peacekeeping operations.[15]

Mats Berdal argues that "the fundamental distinction between enforcement and peacekeeping should be maintained … combining peacekeeping with enforcement action in one operation, as is effectively the case with the United Nations's Operation in Somalia, carries with it considerable military and political risks."[16] Indeed, the cases of Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia and Somalia bring new challenges to the task of peace-keeping. Elevating peace-keeping to peace enforcement raises several issues. Chief among

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[14] Dimitriu, pp. 224-5.

[15] Dimitriu, p. 225.

[16] Berdal, 'Whither UN Peacekeeping', p. 6.

them is whether the UN is endowed with adequate resources to undertake certain enforcement mandates. Another issue is whether the UN can develop a competent structure to undertake enforcement, including cases where the military risks are very high. Another problem is that of legitimacy, and whether the impartiality that is the key to UN peace-keeping operations can be maintained.

The international community is unable and unwilling to provide the UN with resources to undertake enforcement tasks. Without the political support of the five permanent members of the security council and, in particular, the logistical, financial and political support of the United States, no operation has ever been completed successfully.[17] Passing resolutions under UN Chapter VII without providing the organisation with adequate resources for the mandate undermines its credibility. A force equipped for peace enforcement would not enjoy the same acceptance as a friendly and impartial force. A peace enforcement force must be prepared to operate in a hostile atmosphere. So, one of the basic principles

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[17] The US Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) of 3 May 1994 outlined new, very restrictiveguidelines for US support and participation in UN operations. This has contributed significantly tothe diminished credibility of the UN, especially in Rwanda.

of peacekeeping-the use of force in self-defence-has to be considered. Mandates should suit the prevailing situation on the ground. For example, in July 1995, Serb forces overrun the UN-declared 'safe area' of Srebrenica and thousands of Muslim civilians were slaughtered in full view of the lightly armed UNPROFOR contingent whose mandate did not extend to the use of force to protect civilians. The force's mandate should have been better suited to the situation in which they were placed.

Peace-keeping and peace enforcement are visible tools, well suited for particular conflicts, but they should not overlap in one poorly defined mission. The mandate needs to be clear, whether it is peacekeeping or enforcement. Thus, a mission's success will be judged by its original intent. In fact, many peace enforcement missions have been publicly judged as failures, largely because they were judged through peace-keeping criteria. In view of increasing criticism, not only from the United States, but also from the rest of the world, and the changing nature of operational environment, the UN has begun to address shortcomings in its efficiency and operational capacity. In July 1997, Kofi Annan proposed reform measures to confront the challenges of the

coming decades. Emphasising that reform is an evolving process, Annan initiated many structural reforms. For instance, he set up a senior management group to eliminate overlap and better co-ordinate the various UN branches. He also tried to create mechanisms to more closely monitor staff performance. Till date, there have been few changes to the budgetary process. The UN has largely argued that reform would be easier if the United States were to pay its delinquent dues. The United States has retorted that it wants to see the reforms first.

In terms of peace operations, the organisation hopes to streamline its often slow and cumbersome responses to emerging crises. In many cases, precious opportunities have been lost by the lapse of time between the decision of the Security Council to mandate an operation and the moment when the peacekeeping forces arrive in the area.[18] Earlier deployment of peace-keeping

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[18] Usually, it takes six weeks from the idea for a peace operation to the actual Security Council vote.After the adoption of a Security Council decision on a peacekeeping operation, the United Nationshas to request member states make the necessary troops available. Subsequently, nationalgovernments and, in many countries, parliaments, have to decide on these requests and to approvetroop contributions.

forces might prove to be more efficient in stabilising a critical situation before it erupts into widespread violence.[19]

Other structural limitations have hampered the effectiveness of certain missions. A lack of pre-deployment planning, mobility limitations, restrictions on the use of force, the sparse availability of military intelligence from member-states, and, of course, a lack of funding, have all bridled the capability of forces to carry out their mandates. Several corrective measures have been suggested: improve communication between operations in the field and the New York headquarters, establish a central planning agency at the Secretariat, assign support regiments for UN duty, pre-stock general supplies at regional depots, arrange faster airlifts, improve early-warning capabilities and secure better military intelligence from member-states.[20]

The planning task under the UN requires not only co-ordination within a department but also cohesion with various

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[19] Dimitriu, p. 228.

[20] Chapter VIII of the UN Charter established a constitutional link between the UN and otherorganisations. In fact, Article 52 encourages regional organisations to act in the spirit of the UN and"make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes … before referring them to theSecurity Council."

departments, offices, divisions and units involved in all the aspects of UN peacekeeping. Appropriate co-ordination is essential between the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Administration and Management, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The reforms introduced in March 1992 do not seem to have resolved this essential structural problem of peacekeeping operations.

At the heart of UN peace-keeping reform, though, lies the Security Council. Griffin argues "the single greatest stumbling block in efforts to improve responses by the UN to crisis situations is the impasse over the reform of composition and procedures of the Security Council." But, this issue has proved to be the "thorniest item on the current agenda".[21] Many have suggested that the Security Council should be more geographically representative. Some have suggested that the Council be enlarged and that the veto power of the permanent members be somehow amended. Japan, for instance, now contributes nearly 13 per cent of the general budget, but has little say in security issues. Unless reforms to the decision-making process of the Council are realised,

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[21] Griffin, p. 13.

the Council's legitimacy as a global decision making body will be hampered. Much of the strength of the UN is its universality, but a peacekeeping process comprising that universality could jeopardise not only the individual mission, but also the legitimacy of the UN in general. For example, the UN's involvement in the Gulf crisis was widely considered to have boosted the organisation's power and profile. However, the US's disproportional say in the decision-making procedures and the lack of influence of such countries as Japan and Germany (both of whom contributed vast amounts to the operation), led many to question the process. The very reason the US went to the UN was to gain legitimacy, but such a use of the Security Council erodes the legitimacy of the entire process. Other member-states in the UN had little or no say in operational decisions either. It would seem that a further regionalisation of UN peacekeeping operations would exacerbate this problem. In the near future, however, any change to the composition and power of the permanent five Security Council members-the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain - do not seem likely to change.[22]

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[22] Griffin, p. 13.

Another constraint to operations has been the issue of sovereignty. Globalisation and the rise of intra-state wars have diminished the power of states as players in conflicts, and the UN needs to adapt to this changing political landscape. The UN Charter certainly upholds sovereignty in principle. But, the UN was set up, not to protect governments and states, but to 'save next generations from the horrors of war.' Under chapter VII, "Threats to peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression" could merit intervention.

A convergence of political will against Saddam Hussein in 1991 produced Security Council Resolution 687 which envisaged comprehensive and somewhat intrusive interference in Iraqi sovereignty: regulating weapon types, designating borders, creating an observer force, enforcing reparations and controlling oil exports. Resolution 688 offered specific UN protection to the Kurdish minority in Iraq, indicating that the flow of refugees might constitute a threat to international peace.

In the words of Christopher Greenwood, "It is no longer tenable to assert that whenever a government massacres its own

people or a state collapses into anarchy, international law forbids military intervention altogether."[23] Similarly, Kosovo Resolution 1160 passed in 1998 elevated the Province's status to "a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration."

Then, Resolution 1199 asked the Yugoslav government to withdraw its security forces from a part of its national territory. Clearly, there is a growing consensus that human rights abuses merit interventions into conflicts previously closed behind the doors of sovereignty.[24]

As mentioned earlier, there has been an increasing willingness to delegate missions to international or regional organisations with the funding and political will to carry them out. Though this often overcomes financial and political constraints, this solution could prove counterproductive. In his 16 July 1997 Programme for Reform, the Secretary General, Kofi Annan,

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[23] Christopher Greenwood, 'Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?', The World Today 49, No. 2 (February 1993), p. 40.

[24] The consequence of this trend, are, as of yet, unclear. The concept is still vague. Some states fearthe consequences of this growing concept being carried to extremes.

recommended that regional organisations and coalitions take a more active role in peace-keeping: The UN Charter does make mention of co-operation with regional organisations. But, this trend of regionalisation seems to have arisen largely out of necessity and its ultimate effects could prove counterproductive. In the long term, it marginalises the UN, and, then, seen only as an outside player in world conflicts, the organisation might have an even harder time commanding funds and political support. Moreover, as Griffin argues, although this organisation represents an innovative solution to the crisis at the UN, regionalisation "entails a growing tolerance for external interventions, the motivations for which may be less altruistic and the conduct of which is not subject to rigorous multilateral supervision".[25]

Peace-keepers of the Future

The recent relationship between the United Nations and NATO's war in Kosovo has taught some important lessons: it is both an affirmation that the UN is still important and a wake-up call that reform is urgently needed. The UN was largely excluded

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[25]Michele Griffin, 'Retrenchment, Reform and Regionalisation: Trends in UN Peace SupportOperations', International Peacekeeping 6, No. 1 (spring 1999), pp. 2-3.

from the initial stages of war. This was mostly a tactical move on the part of the United States in anticipation of a Chinese or Russian veto in the Security Council. In the end, though, the UN was invoked largely for the sake of legitimacy. If the UN wants to be involved earlier in the process next time, it needs the budget and the infrastructure to command operations like that of Kosovo. The UN needs the capacity for both humanitarian and military operations more than ever since they are inseparably linked. Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999, which provided measures for rebuilding Kosovo, proved that the UN is still relevant and needed. But, if the UN wants to remain relevant to live up to its Charter and "save next generations from the horrors of war," it needs to amend its peacekeeping agenda. It needs the funding, the strength and the capacity to mount and support a new generation of peacekeeping operations. The nature of war has changed and peacekeeping must keep pace.

Challenges to Successful Peace-keeping

In 1999, the UN was tasked with setting up an interim administration in East Timor and assumed the transitional

administration of Kosovo in the same year. In 1999 and 2000, the Council authorised the establishment of new operations in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Eritrea / Ethiopia. The latest surge in demand for complex peacekeeping operations has placed new strains on an already overstretched system. In the past few years, the Security Council has authorized four new missions in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi and Haiti, while mission in Sudan is reestablished, and the operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been significantly expanded.

A robust military presence is considered essential during the initial stages of a peacekeeping operation in order to deter potential spoilers and establish the mission's credibility. Finding troops with the necessary training, equipment and logistical support to effectively undertake the complex and often dangerous tasks required of UN peacekeepers remains a key determinant of an operation's success. However, this is easier said than done, since the member-states who possess such troops have often proven unwilling or unable to make them available for UN peace-keeping operations. Threats to the safety and security of UN field personnel has also become an issue of great concern, particularly after the

2003 terrorist attack on UN headquarters in Baghdad, prompting the Secretary-General to order a review of the entire United Nations security system. Improvements are ongoing in this area and require further support by member-states.

Restoring some semblance of a functioning state is an increasingly important aspect of complex peacekeeping operations. There is a growing consensus on the need to shore up basic state services, including the judiciary, civil administration and public utilities, in order for post-conflict societies to return to normalcy as quickly as possible. In this regard, the rule of law component has become a critical part of mission planning and considerable progress has been made in establishing capacity to support police, judicial and corrections activities in post-conflict societies. Additionally, in recent years it has become increasingly apparent that elections, which are often identified as the end point of post-conflict transitions, are not a quick fix and can only serve as an exit strategy for the UN if other conditions have been fulfilled.

Budgetary Requirements for Peace-keeping Operations

UN peace-keeping is far cheaper than the alternative, which is war. In 2003, UN peacekeeping cost about US$2.6 billion, while, in the same year, governments worldwide spent more than US$794 billion on arms. The approved peacekeeping budget for the year 2004-2005 is US$2.8 billion. However, with the additional requirements of the new and recently expanded missions, as well as the possibility of a new mission in Sudan, that amount could grow by a further US$2.38 billion. All member-states are legally obliged to pay their share of peacekeeping costs under a complex formula that they themselves have established. Despite this legal obligation, member-states owed approximately US$1.2 billion in current and back peacekeeping dues as of June 2004.

Role of Inter-Parliamentary Union

The Inter-Parliamentary Union has a major role to play in ensuring that members of parliament around the world are aware of the importance of UN peace-keeping and the enormous, political, logistical and financial challenges associated with it. At a time when the UN is faced with acute shortages of personnel and equipment for ongoing and upcoming peace-keeping efforts,

parliamentarians can encourage member-state governments to assist the UN in filling the "troop commitment and equipment gaps". Furthermore, legislators can support UN efforts by urging their respective governments to honour current and past assessed contributions and respond to requests for troop and other personnel contributions to missions, particularly in critical specialties such as forensics and investigations.

Additionally, as a focal point for world -wide parliamentary dialogue, the IPU could use its influence to ensure that governments that have not yet done so, to ratify the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.

Finally, aside from encouraging member-states to continue providing the UN with the human and financial resources needed to conduct successful peace-keeping operations, the IPU can also assist the UN politically by supporting peace processes in countries where peace-keeping operations are deployed.

Demands for International Involvement in Peace Operations will Persist

Following the end of the bipolar, post-Cold War period, the world community will continue to encounter situations where conflicts and disasters arise that will create pressures for international intervention.

These situations will range in character. Some will be consensual in nature. In such cases, the parties to a dispute may look to other countries or to international organizations to provide: a) their good offices and influence to help resolve outstanding differences; and, b) the organizational and technical expertise and the technology and personnel required to monitor and otherwise carry out a peace agreement. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which operates in the Sinai in support of the Israel- Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979 is a current example.

In the near future, there may be demands for a similar mission in the Golan Heights, should the ongoing negotiations between Israel and Syria bear fruit. Some of these situations will be humanitarian in character. In the face of natural and, increasingly, manmade disasters, countries and international organizations will be compelled to respond to demands for outside

assistance. The man-made famine in Somalia and the epidemic that followed the genocide in Rwanda are two recent examples. With this era of instant global communications, the world's attention may increasingly be drawn to catastrophic situations by the news media. Outside parties may feel compelled by the outcry of domestic opinion to act, responding more to the horrors conveyed in television images than by pleas for help from the victims or their spokespersons.

Other cases will involve conflicts between and within states that require outside intervention to re-establish calm and create an environment for immediate conflict avoidance and eventual conflict resolution. Such intercessions may require both diplomacy and a force of well-equipped observers and peacekeepers. The long civil war in the former Yugoslavia may be a case in point.

Yet other cases will involve situations in which public safety and political legitimacy need to be restored, if peace is to be firmly implanted after a long period of conflict and insecurity. The conditions surrounding the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) may fall into this category. UNTAC was

intended to serve as a catalyst for national healing in Cambodia, under a political agreement, by underwriting stability and safety for a free and fair election and by providing technical expertise and resources to ease socioeconomic recovery.

Finally, other instances may involve proactive engagement in regions in conflict. The desire to defuse tensions and to prevent the spread of a conflict may lead to calls for intervention by outside parties. The intervention may include the insertion of observers, equipped with monitoring capabilities and, possibly, with weapons. The preventive deployment of United Nations military observers to Macedonia in 1993 is an example of this category of intervention. Macedonia contains many competing and, sometimes hostile, ethnic groups found in the Balkans. The unstable situation elsewhere in former Yugoslavia caused concern that, unless a protective buffer of peacekeepers were sent to Macedonia, the Bosnian conflict could spread there, or, worse, become the ignition point of a wider European war. Often, not one but a hybrid of several challenges will confront the international community in a given location. This could increase pressure on outside parties to intervene. In cases of extreme violence and

human suffering, pressures on individual governments and the United Nations to act could prove detrimental. As the above suggests, the news media are increasingly playing a significant role in giving immediacy to conflicts and tragedies occurring in remote regions.

In helping OTA assess the role of technology, addressing the requirements of effective peace operations is crucial. To this end, the key questions must be addressed whenever events that may demand intervention appear on the horizon.

Accordingly, whether to intercede is a question that cannot be fully answered without also determining: when to intercede; that is, when does an action need to be launched to be effective? And how to intercede; that is, what form should the intervention take to be effective? who should intercede; that is, which party or parties and organizations are best suited tolead and/or contribute to an operation?

It appears that in the recent past, the international community and its constituent parts have moved too quickly to

intervene in places or in ways that were less than appropriate, although others argue that they often moved too late.

A Clear Definition of the Situation and its Challenges

The clarity in defining a situation, including a grasp of its causes, is vital to the success of any intervention that hopes to improve human conditions, while simultaneously limiting the risks faced by peace-keepers. An accurate understanding of the situation is vital to structure mission mandates that incorporate realistic operational goals, develop military doctrine appropriate to the specific circumstances, and arrive at a full appreciation of the possible consequences of particular courses of action before the actual operation. In addition, thought must be given at this stage to the problems of reconstruction after resolution of the conflict. Deficiencies in this area have been evident at the United Nations.

Sometimes the absence of clarity may be due to political differences among members of the Security Council. However, its agreed that the absence of clarity has often been the product of a lack of: a) solid intelligence; b) adequate awareness of historic and

cultural contexts; and, c) sound military advice reaching the highest decision-making levels of the United Nations at which operational mandates are written. Two remedies to these problems recommended by several scholars are: (1) when feasible, preparation of a joint technical survey for pre- deployment planning purposes; and, (2) establishing the post of Senior Military Adviser to the United Nations Secretary General and Security Council. Analysts suggest several means for effectively instituting each remedy. Preparing a thorough planning survey requires the participation of all components that would be involved in executing a prospective operation, including military advisers, civilian governmental and non-governmental organizations, political experts who understand the politics and cultures involved, and representatives of contributing countries. A pre-deployment planning survey should address all the following elements:

- the nature of the conflict and its root causes;
- the historic and cultural context;
- the full range of military requirements for intervention;
- the costs of intervention—financial and otherwise;
- the possible consequences of intervention;

- a plan for post-conflict reconstruction, including its requirements; and

- a list of mission-specific assets, identifying sources of specialised skills, capabilities, and equipment

Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Some experts think it vital to emphasise the importance of having a plan for post-conflict reconstruction in hand before deployment. This would help assure that those who write mission mandates, for example, at the United Nations Security Council, recognise from the outset the long-term commitment of resources needed to bring an operation to a successful conclusion.

It is well accepted that an operation is not truly finished until it restores a country to membership in the community of nations. This goal must be borne in mind from the beginning of the conflict resolution process. Among reasonable goals of a restoration plan would, therefore, be to reestablish "the normal conditions of law and order." This plan should be executed by "a preordained

structure," put in place during an early phase of an operation—and well ahead of a conflict's end.

Further, it can be argued that a reconstruction plan in effect provides an exit strategy. Too often in the past, the UN has found it easy to get involved but impossible to disengage, even, in some cases, after decades. The UN mission in Cyprus is a case in point. It is argued that open-ended peace-keeping commitments are failures. A viable reconstruction plan, that allows a country to function without a foreign crutch, should be given equal weight to military requirements in intervention decisions, using the restoration of normal law and order as the criterion, it proved that the UNTAC left work unfinished. The Transitional Authority ended after the formation of the constitutional authority to which the elections, staged by UNTAC, had led. But elections alone did not restore normality to Cambodia. Continuous international involvement is still required, although in a different form.

One way to assure that post-conflict reconstruction receives the attention it deserves, in the context of a given peace operation, is to establish a Director of Reconstruction—as a standard feature

of the organizational structure of peace operations. It is envisioned this director as having equal standing with the force commander and the humanitarian relief coordinator.