

CHAPTER IV

EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIEWS

This chapter embodies Ānandabodha's epistemological views, in two sections. In the first section, topics, viz., empirical validity of means of knowledge (pramāṇas), validity of the vedic scripture in obtaining the knowledge of the Brahman, an established entity (siddha vastu), import of the Upaniṣadic statements, and Pravartaka (inducer or the motivator); in the second, the problem of avidyā, nature of avidyā, the theories of error have been discussed.

SECTION I4.1 Empirical Validity of Pramāṇas

In the Nyāyamakaranda and Pramāṇamālā Ānandabodha like his predecessors expounds Advaitic view that the Pramāṇas (means of knowledge), viz., Pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (anology), arthāpatti (presumption) and anupalabdhi or abhāva (negation) except the śruti or śabda (scripture or valid verbal testimony) are false because they form a part of this illusory empirical world. These above said Pramāṇas including the perception (pratyakṣa) which is

considered to be the supreme important means of knowledge on which other Pramāṇas depend for their validity, according to Ānandabodha, are products of indefinable and beginningless avidyā and eventually valid only in the limited sphere of the phenomenal world in a restricted sense. These Pramāṇas based on avidyā possessing the limited empirical validity cannot generate the highest knowledge of the trans-empirical reality called Brahman or Ātman. Hence the scripture (śruti or Veda) is the only means of knowledge (pramāṇa) enabling a seeker after the knowledge (mumukṣu) of the Supreme Reality called Brahman not being originated from the avidyā and so not limited to the false phenomenal world. (NM. p.145; PM. p.16).

In the Pramāṇamālā Ānandabodha at some length explains the reasons why the vedic scripture (śruti pramāṇa) is the only valid means in comparison with the direct perception (pratyakṣa) etc. about the knowledge of the Brahman, the Supreme Reality. He points out that the validity (Prāmāṇya) of any means of knowledge (Pramāṇa) is determined by its cognition of an object which is absolutely unsublated (abādhita) by any other later cognition belonging to the present, past and future times. But the Pramāṇas like perception etc. apart from the scripture, are not capable of generating the cognition of an absolutely unsublated object (atyanta abādhita viṣaya) either by themselves

(svataḥ) or Parataḥ (depending on other objects). Though perception and other Pramāṇas are self-valid in connection with their origination (utpatti) and cognition (jñapti) nevertheless these are not valid means for the knowledge of the absolute reality, Brahman. It is because without proving the Brahman which is totally beyond sublation (atyantābādha) a Pramāṇa cannot prove its validity. (sva samvedana pakṣepi svārthasyatyāntikambādha managamyā ta katham tadupahitamaryā datmanah Prāmāṇya madhyavaset (PM. p.12). Moreover, absolute nonsublation of an worldly object cannot be grasped by the limited direct perception (Pratyakṣa) because the sublation (bādha) which might occur in the future cannot be the object of the present perception (kālāntarabhāvino bādhasyedanamayogya tvenānupalamba sambhabāt , NM. p.12) . And in case of a series of direct perceptions succeeding ones cannot prove the validity of preceeding ones as the latter contain the same potency as the former and aultimately fail in generating the cognition of the Supreme Reality, Brahman. As the direct perception (pratyakṣa) is not capable of giving the knowledge of the Reality, other Pramāṇas such as anumāna (inference) etc. cannot also be authoritative means of knowing the Supreme Reality because all of them depend on the perception and without Perception they cannot function independently (yadā tu Pratyakṣasya eva etādr̥sigatistadā kaivakathā tadgocaravyā-ptyupajivino varakṣyānumanādeḥ (PM. p.12). Ānandabodha further

points out that the validity of perception and other Pramāṇas cannot be ascertained by Parataḥ (depending on other object) also as it will lead to the obvious fault of anavasthā (infinite regress) because the validity of the first perception will depend on the second, and the second on the third and so on and thus the cycle would not come to an end. Ānandabodha proves that the validity of perception and other pramāṇas neither by svataḥ (independently) nor by parataḥ (depending on other objects) cannot generate the supreme intuition of the transcendental reality called Brahman or Ātman.

To prove the validity of the scripture (śrutipramāṇa) regarding the brahmajñāna Ānandabodha maintains that the objects (viṣaya) of the Vedic scripture are beyond the limits of time, i.e. past, present and future and therefore the scripture can generate the cognition of the objects which are unlike that of the perception etc. unsublated (abādhita) by any succeeding sublatating knowledge (PM. p.4). The validity of scriptural means as the only means of the brahmajñāna can be verified from the positive and negative concomittance (anvyavayati) as the Brahman is known from the Vedic scripture only and not by any other means, as specified by the Upaniṣadic statement like satyam jñānam anantam brahma (Tait. Up. 2.1.1).

In the Pramāṇamālā Ānandabodha refutes the prima facie view which holds that the scripture (śrutipramāṇa) belonging to the phenomenal world cannot generate the knowledge of the transcendental reality. Ānandabodha maintains that as the unreal reflection (pratibimba) is considered as the means for the proof of real original object (bimba) similarly the vedic scripture though belonging to the empirical world is capable of illuminating the supreme reality i.e. Brahman. To substantiate his view Ānandabodha quotes the authority of Bādarāyaṇa's Brahmasūtra : sucakasca hi 'Śruterācaskṣate ca tadvidah (3.2.4) (the dream is indicative of future events according to the 'sruti', those wellversed in the science of dreams declare so). Saṅkara comments this text that notwithstanding the illusory nature of dreams, they are indicative of future events. The sight of a woman in a dream is considered as a sign of success in the work undertaken. (Chā. Up. V.2.8; PM. p.16):

Yathā karmaṣu kāmyeṣu striyam svapneṣu Pasyati/

Samṛdhiṃ tatra jāniyāt tasmin svapna nidarsane //

Just as a dream is suggestive of the good or bad events in future similarly the Sruti leads to the realisation of the Brahman. It cannot be argued that the knowledge of the reflection (pratibimba) is real and that real knowledge

serves as the source of knowledge of the real proto-type and not the unreal reflection itself. Ānandabodha asks whether the knowledge in general becomes the source, or the knowledge that is limited by its object becomes the source? Both the alternatives, according to Ānandabodha, are not tenable, for in the first alternative any knowledge, even of the jar, would be the cause of the knowledge of the Proto-type (prātibimba) which really is not the case. In the second option, knowledge, limited by object is accepted to be the source of the knowledge of proto-type (prātibimba) the unreal reflection which is also part of that original bimba. Thus, according to Ānandabodha false means like Vedic scripture can become the source of the knowledge of real entity called Brahman. Ānandabodha explains this point following another instance in his Nyāyamakaranda in a clear manner. He maintains that the nonsentient vowels also denote same real worldly objects. The momentary longness (dīrgha) or shortness (harsva) of vowels which are superimposed on them become the cause of the knowledge of the real objects as the word nāga clearly conveys the meaning of a serpent and the word naga of a mountain. In the same way the unreal reflections or the Pramāṇas which are the products of avidyā can produce the real cognitions and those cognitions which are in conformity with the objects are valid and those which are not, are invalid. To substantiate Ānandabodha quotes

from the Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti as follows:-

maṇi pradīpa prabhayoḥ maṇibudhyābhīdhaṇaḥ /
mithyājñāna viśeṣepi viśeṣārtha kriyām prati //

(NM. p.148; pv. II.58)

In the Nyāyamakaranda Ānandabodha sets aside the prima facie view which holds that the scripture is weaker than perception (pratyakṣa) when there arises any conflict between the scripture and the perception (NM. p.149) and that is why perception is the first and the strongest of all Pramāṇas. Ānandabodha maintains that there is no conflict between the scripture (śruti pramāṇa) and perception (pratyakṣa). The scripture is not weaker than the perception since the validity of the perception is only confined to the realm of the phenomenal world. On the contrary, the scripture, being able to give the knowledge of the transempirical objects is different from the perception and other means of knowledge. The scripture is authoritative and strongest of all Pramāṇas since it deals with the highest and faultless Reality, Brahman. The indicatory marks¹, i.e. (upakrama (beginning), upasaṃhāra

-
1. Upakramopasaṃhārabhyāso'pūrvatā phalam /
arthāhvādopapatti ca lingam tātparya nirṇaye //
 Sharma, Hardutta, Brahmasūtra Catuḥ sūtri, p.98;
 Radhakrishnan, S. Brahmasūtra, Introduction.

(conclusion), abhāsyā (repetition, apūrvatā (newness), phala (result) and arthāvāda (Praise or censure and upapatti (logic) indicate the import of the Vedānta texts as non-dual Brahman which is real (sat) as it is not sublated (abhādhita). In the Chāndogya Up; we see the upakrama when Uddālaka teaches his son - sadeva saumyedadagra āsīt (6.2.9). Starting the teaching of Brahman the father concludes (upasaṃharati) - etadātmymidam sarvam (Chā. Up. 6-8-7-16). Tatvamasi repeated nine times there which is abhāsyā. The apūrvatā lies in this that Brahman who is devoid of form etc. is to be known only by means of the Vedānta and by any well-established means of knowledge like pratyakṣa etc. The phala of Brahmajñāna is laid down in tasya tāvadeva ciraṃ yāvanna vimokṣe atha sampatsye - The only delay in his becoming Brahman is due to his body. As soon as the body is destroyed he will become Brahman. The arthāvāda is illustrated in venaśrutam Śrutam bhavati etc. - that by means of which even-unheard-of thing is heard, is Brahman. Upapatti is illustrated in Yathaikena mrutpiṇḍena sarvam mṛānmayam vijñātam bhavati, etc. This Upapatti proves that Brahman is changeless and it is only the Prakṛti which is changing (Satvikārā). On the contrary, the objects of direct perception and other pramāṇas are sublated, by the posterior real cognition, i.e. "this is not a serpent"

uttered by a trustworthy person (āpta). Thus, the latter, i.e. "this is not a snake, is stronger than the former i.e. "this is a snake". To substantiate Ānandabodha quotes the Jaimini-sūtra i.e. Pūrva parve pūrvadurbalyam prakṛtivat (JS.6.5.59; NM. p.150). (Among the preceeding and succeeding causes, the preceeding is the weaker. Ānandabodha also quotes Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Tantravārtika (2.18; NM. p.151):

Pūrvātparabaliyatva tatranāma Pratiyaṭām, /
anyonyānirapekṣānām yatra janma dhīyām bhavet //

(Among the cognitions which are independent in respect of their knowledge, the latter one is stronger than the former one.)

According to Ānandabodha, the Śruti or āgama is self-valid (svayam siddha) and divine. Hence it does not depend on other means of knowledge like direct perception etc., for the origination (utpatti) and cognition (jñapti) of the objects and therefore it is stronger than the perception. Moreover, according to Ānandabodha vaidika āgamas are different from the baudha-āgamas as these latter are the human creations and so are defective and prone to deception and to invalidity. But unlike these baudha-āgamas the scripture i.e. Veda being divine in nature is completely devoid of defects. But all the statements of the scripture are not relevant because those statements which deal with action (kriyā) and recommend same

(karmakāṇḍa) are meant for the ignorant ones who are eligible to perform these rituals.² But these injunctive sentences are of no use to the persons who have realised the supreme Reality Brahman as enunciated in jñānakāṇḍa following the direct method of the śrvaṇa (hearing), manana (meditation) and nididhyāsana (contemplation) and winning over the evils like anger, (Krodha) desire (kama) and so on. Thus there is no opposition between these two sentences as they are meant for two different types of persons, i.e. ātmavid and anātmavid.

According to Ānandabodha, the activity based on mithyājñāna (false knowledge) continues upto the realisation of the Supreme Reality called Brahman as a person being affected by the disease called bile (pitta) though very well knows the sweetness of sugar experiences it as bitter and therefore throws it away. In the same way, the persons very well knowing the false nature of the Pramāṇas carry on their worldly activities and realising the essential nature of the reality by means of the Vedic scripture only set them aside after realising the supreme nature of the Reality i.e. Brahman.

4.2 Import of the Upaniṣadic Statements

Like his Predecessors Śaṅkara, Sureśvara and others Ānandabodha in his works, mainly in the Nyāyamakaranda

(p. 155-179) and Pramāṇamālā (p.17-19) makes an attempt in expounding the Advaitic view i.e. the import of the Upaniṣadic statements (Vedānta vākya or āgamavākyas) as an established entity (siddha or Parinispāna Vastu), which is the supreme Reality called Brahman. In this connection Ānandabodha puts forth the Prima facie view of Śālikanātha (700-750 A.D.) as expounded in his Prakaranapañcikā (p. 239-241). He argues that the import of the Upaniṣadic statement can only be action (kārya or niyoga); but not any siddhavastu like Brahman as the Upaniṣadic statements cannot have any saṅgati (connection or relation) with the Siddhavastu like Brahman. This view of Śālikanātha has been completely refuted by Ānandabodha and he has established succinctly the Advaita view with sound logical reasonings.

Śālikanātha in his Prakaranapañcikā adduces the following arguments:-

The Upaniṣadic statements cannot denote a siddhavastu (an established entity) like the Brahman since the saṅgati (connection or relation) of the Upaniṣadic statements with reference to an established entity (siddhavastu) is not possible. People learn the meaning of words only by watching the usage and activity of older people. When a set of words is addressed by one person to another - whereupon the latter

person acts in a certain manner, it is clear to the observer that the meaning of the words pronounced must have been in the form of an injunction (vidhi) to do what the other person has done in the case of words where such an interpretation related to an activity is not possible, (sarvapuruṣānām tāvadvyūdhavyavahāre eva prathama śabdānāmv्युत्पत्तिरङ्गikaraniyā, na khalu vyavahāramantarena siddhārthanvākhyāne व्युत्पत्तिरवकल्प्यते (PP. p.240). Comprehension of the meaning must depend upon something indirectly connected with the terminations like imperative³ (lin) express the injunction directly,⁴ while other words denote things related to that injunction (vidhi) as the name of the act enjoined, the person enjoined and so on. Thus, the direct denotation of the veda must lie in the enjoining of something to be done (kārya). As laid down by Jaimini. viz. amṇāyasya kriyārtha tvādānarthakya mata dārthanam (I.2.1), the purpose of the veda lying in the enjoining of actions, those parts of the veda which do not serve that purpose are useless.

3. Vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇadhiṣṭasamprasna Pārthanesu
lin. Aṣṭā, 3.3.161.
4. Śabdāntarāṇi svārthesu व्युत्पत्त्यन्ते यathevati /
āvapodvapabhedena tathā kārye liṅgādayaḥ //
VM, II.10;12.

The saṅgati of the sentences is understood only through actions of elders⁵. e.g. A teacher address his student - "māṇavaka samidham ānaya" (Māṇavaka bring fuel sticks) and Māṇavaka immediately attempts to fetch the samidhas (fuelsticks). A child who stands nearby and hears the sentence of the preceptor and observes the action (kārya) of Māṇavaka, also acts similarly following the action of Māṇavaka. Thus, the injunctive power in the verbal form ānaya motivates a person for doing any kind of action (kārya). This kārya is expressed by the injunctive affix lin in the verb ānayapa (bring) and other words in the sentence like Māṇavaka, samidha and others which express their own meanings being related to kārya i.e. Māṇavaka as the agent of the āharanākārya and samidha as the object (karma) of it.

It cannot be said that when a person hears a sentence, putraste jāta, he becomes happy and his happiness can be inferred from the beaming expression of his face etc. As the cause of his happiness is the knowledge about the attainment of a desired object i.e. a son which is expressed by the sentence putraste jāta. And thus the sentence itself that has been heard is the cause of this

5. Vyavahāresubruddhānām vakyasravanabhavisul avapodvara/
bhedena Padānām śaktiniscayaḥ//vākyaarthamatrkā // VM, I.6.

knowledge. As the listener is having a keen desire for the birth of a son, the happiness of the listener, therefore is the result of the knowledge or understanding of the sentence putra ste jāta which simply states the fact and does not denote any kārya, and each and every word in a sentence would express its own individual meaning and nothing else (NM.p.147-148).

Though the cause of the happiness of the person who hears the sentence putraste jāta is the sentence itself, nevertheless the very sentence i.e. putraste jāta does not express the particular cause of the happiness, viz. the birth of a son.⁶ As there are numerous causes of happiness belonging to the past, present and future, at hand and at distance Parīśeṣa-anumāna (remnant inference) cannot prove a particular cause in this case. Śālikanātha quotes the definition of the Parīśeṣā-anumāna from the Nyāyabhāṣya : Prasaktapratīṣedhe sati anyatra aprasaṅgāt śiṣyamāṇe saṃpratyayah Parīśeṣaḥ. (Nya.bha on NS 11.5; NM. p.230). (Other possible things being denied and another different thing being impossible, the definite understanding about the remaining one is called Parīśeṣa). Since a number

6. Yadyapimukhaprasadadī atyantaduskaratvat,
PP. p.240.

of causes of happiness of the listener are possible, the pariśeṣa anumāna cannot determine the particular cause i.e. birth of a son.

Verbal communication (vyavahāra) can also denote particular connotation of the particular words. Since the verbal communication (vyavahāra) could be understood only after the knowledge of kārya, all words in a sentence should express the kārya only. When common usage of words is found referring to the established entities (siddhavastu) it should be understood in the secondary sense (lākṣaṇikārtha), as the principal meaning is incompatible with the rest of the sentence⁷ and it should express kārya. (PP. 241). And the kārya indicated by the sentence 'Putraste jātāh' is that of seeing the child born and would be equivalent to 'beholding it'. When a person uses any word for the established entity (siddha vastu), he uses it in the secondary sense (lākṣaṇi-kārtha) understanding the relation of words to actions (kārya). Thus, in the verbal communication also the saṅgati (connection) of the sentences is found with reference to kārya only.

-
7. mukhyārthabadhe tadyukto yayānyorthah Pratiyate/
ruḍheḥ Prayojanadvāsou lakṣaṇāśakti rarpitā"
Viśvanātha, SD, II.9.

The Upaniṣadic statements like satyam jñānam anantam Brahma (Tait. Up.2.1.1) should either denote the karya or should be related to the kārya (action) of knowing the Brahman. In the injunctive sentence (vidhivākya) i.e. ātṁāvā are draṣṭavyah śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyatmano va are darsanena sravanena matya viññānenedam sarva viditam (Brh. Up. 2.4.5; 4.5.6) the reward (phalā) of the kārya is knowledge of the Ātman which is expressed by the sentence etāvat are khalu amṛtatvam (Brh. Up. 4.5.15). Applying the maxim of rātrisastra 'Sālikanatha maintains that as the phala (reward) of the rātrisastra is not mentioned in the injunctive sentence viz. ahrmasena rātrim pivasamspe Yusena ghṛtam rasena (rai.S.5.7.20) and is taken from the nearly subordinate sentence i.e. Pratitisthanati ha va ya ete ya eta Upayanti; brahmavarchasvino- nnadi bhavati ya eta Upayanti⁸ (those who have recourse to these sacrifices become famous; those who have recourse to these become endowed with Brahmic glory and also partake rich food) where 'Pratisthā is pointed out as the phala. In the above case also no phala (reward) is expressed in the

8. 'Sābarabhāṣya on Jaiminisūtra IV-III.17, 18.

sense i.e. ātma vāre śrotavyaḥ (Brh. Up. 4.5.6) it should be taken from the nearby subordinate sentence i.e. etāvad are khalu amṛtatvam where amṛtatva (imortality) as the phala is expressed, which one obtains after the realisation of the Brahman.

The Upaniṣadic statements cannot prove the reality of the non-dual Brahman with its nature of supreme bliss as they are in conflict with other means of knowledge such as perception (Pratyakṣa). And the Brahman or Ātman shines in all perceptual cognitions and memory as the subject of the notion of I-consciousness (ahaṁpratyaya). The Brahman being self-luminous cannot be veiled by any other object by which it would not shine in its essential nature. Thus, the Brahmavādins creating a grand confusion regarding the Upaniṣadic texts as the means of the knowledge of Brahman (NM. p.161-162). Ānandabodha rejects all these arguments of Śālikanātha as follows:-

It is incorrect to say that the Parīśeṣa anumāna cannot prove the particular cause of the happiness of the person who hears the sentence Putraste jāta since the Parīśeṣa anumāna can very well prove the particular cause i.e. the birth of a son. Gautama in his Nyāyasūtras speaks of three types of anumāna⁹ (inference): viz., Pūrvavat, śeṣavat and

9. atha tatpūrvakam trividhamanumānam Pūrvavat 'śeṣavat samānyatodrṣṭaśch, Nyā. Su.1.1.5; see Sk.4.

sāmanyato dr̥ṣṭa. Explaining it Vātsyāyana says that Posterior (śeṣavat) is Parīśeṣa¹⁰; when cause is inferred looking at its effect as inference of rain from the swelling of a river.¹¹ In case of the person who becomes happy hearing the statement Putra ste jāta the effects like vadanavikasanādi indicate very well the putrajanma which is the cause of happiness by Parīśeṣa anumāna (Posterior effect).

It is not correct to imagine in this context the objects belonging to the past, present and future which are not seen as the cause of the happiness of the listener especially when the particular cause of happiness i.e. the birth of a son is very clearly known. A person after hearing the statement - putrastejāta feels happy on account of the birth of a son. Hence only putrajanma is the cause of his happiness and nothing else. Quoting from Vācaspati's Brahmatattvasamikṣā, a commentary on the Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana Ānandabodha severely criticises this attitude of the Mīmāṃsakas like Śālikanātha who do not accept the visible cause directly perceived. Vācaspati maintains that those who entertain doubts about the meaning of the scriptural statements may also entertain doubts about the chastity of their mothers and therefore about

10. Śeṣavatnāma Parīśeṣaḥ; Sa ca Pasakta-Pratiseḍheanyatrā Prasangat Śiṣyamāne sampratyaayaḥ, Nyā.bhā, on 1.1.5.

11. Yatra kāryeṇa kāraṇanumiyate. Ibid.

their parantage and family lineage. They thus doubting their own priestly class would not be eligible for the duties prescribed for them and so they would better leave the study of Mīmāṃsā (NM. p.163). Though there is possibility of other causes as a person never loves only one thing like birth of a son, but he may love and desire many other things like safe delivery of his beloved wife and others, as argued by Bhavanātha (780 A.D.) in his Nayaviveka (p.44; NM. p.164), still these other causes of the happiness i.e. safe delivery etc. negated by anvayavyatireka and by āvāpodpābhyām the meaning of the word putraastanaya becomes clear. Thus, the pariśeṣa anumana explicitly suggests the particular cause of the happiness of the listener which is birth of a son expressed by the sentence Putraste jāta.

In sentences (vākyas) which are a collection of words possessing compatibility, expectancy proximity and mutual relation¹² exists between Padas (words) and Padārthas (meanings), but Padas do not have relation with kārya (action). There are so many sentences like putrah te sukhi where the word Putra not being related to any action (kriyā) serves as the cause of happiness since the father becomes happy when

12. Vākyamsāt Yogatākāṅksā sattiyuktah Padoccayah. SD.2.2.

he knows the son to be happy. Hence it is reasonable to hold relation, between Pada and Padārtha (meaning) and not necessarily between Pada (word) and kārya (action). The denotative power of words is related to an appropriate word and not necessarily to the kārya. Ānandabodha employs the following syllogism:

Vivādapadāni na kāryānvita svārtha niyata
sāmārthyāni Padavat
Kāryapadavat (NM. p.168; PM. p.17).

As the very word kārya (action) conveys the sense of action and expresses its own meaning only, without a relation with any other particular action, similarly the power of all words should be related to objects in a general manner, not being related with any particular kārya (NM. p.170).

It is not proper to say that all the Vedānta texts are injunctive (vidhi-vākyas) and therefore lay down the action of knowing Brahman, since the laying down of the knowledge of the Brahman is of three types, viz. 'śābdi (verbal), bhāvanātmikā (contemplative) and sākṣātkārarūpā (direct realisation), and injunction is not necessary for these three kinds of the knowledge of the Brahman. Firstly, there is no need of any injunction (vidhi) for the verbal understanding

of the Brahman (śābdipratipatti), for a person who knows the meaning of the words properly and the power of the words in denoting particular meanings, could understand the import of sentences from the words themselves without any injunction (vidhi). Secondly, there is no need of any injunction for the bhāvanātmikā pratipatti (contemplative knowledge) as repeated meditation and thinking of the subject of the study is the cause of excellent knowledge (jñānaprakāśa) of the soul since no such excellence takes place in its absence. Thirdly, injunction (vidhi) is not necessary for Sākṣātkāra-rūpāpratipatti (direct realisation) since the sakṣātkāra (direct realisation) means either becoming the nature of Brahman (Brahma-svabhāva) or attainment of a complete state of supreme bliss and infinite peace by transformation of heart (antakarāṇa). The first i.e. brahmasvabhāva (the nature of Brahman), is eternal and naturally cannot be a karya (action); The second i.e. antahkaraṇaparīṇati is a reward (phala), which attracts a person by its natural excellence i.e. purification of mind, without any injunction (NM. p.170).

There would not be any kind of difficulty in knowing the essential nature of the Brahman as Supreme bliss and consciousness since the Upaniṣadic statements directly denote the established entity (siddhavastu) i.e. Brahman.

The Upaniṣadic statements cannot command something other than sidhavastu or direct any action (kārya), as their relation or connection (saṅgati) is with reference to the established entity like Brahman, but not with the kārya as wrongly pointed out by Śālikanātha (NM. p.171).

Following Saṅkara, Suresvara and Sarvajñātman Ānandabodha in his Pramāṇamālā (p.19) and Nyāyamakaranda (PP.257-269) points out that the Upaniṣadic statements like Vijñānam ānandam Brahma (Brh. Up.3.9.34) and tat tvam asi (chā. Up.6.8.7) denote the impartite or unitary sense (akhaṇḍārtha). He maintains that the import derived from the Upaniṣadic statements - vijñānam ānandam brahma and the like is akhaṇḍārtha (homogeneous), that is, free from all differences and relations and above all distinctions of subject and predicate or generic and particular etc. Ānandabodha sets forth the Pūrvapakṣa view as follows:-

The words Vijñāna and ānanda is the Upaniṣadic statement vijnānam ānandam brahma (Brh. Up. 3.9.34) cannot denote homogeneous meaning (akhaṇḍārtha) since vijñāna and ānanda cannot have the same primary meaning. If both the words would denote the same meaning they would be synonyms and being so they could not be used simultaneously in the same sentence. As the synonyms only express the individual

meanings one after the other in a sentence and do not give collective sense, they are called the synonyms and hence the simultaneous use of the synonyms is not logical (NM.p.258; PM.p.19).

The faculty of implication (lakṣaṇā)¹³ cannot also give the secondary meaning of the words vijnāna (consciousness) and ānanda (bliss) since in the case of implication (lakṣaṇā) one word either vijnāna or ānanda would suffice to denote the desired object i.e. Brahman following the literary rule i.e. if a thing is produced by one cause, then the other cause, not contributing and acting in a distinct manner from that first cause, becomes unnecessary.

(nispāditakriyā karmāṇe avisesabhidhāyinaḥ sādhanasya sadgababtatatuoatag NM. 259). Thus the words vijñāna and ānanda would denote the attributes of the Brahman instead of the homogeneous meaning (akhaṇḍārtha), i.e. Partless, non-dual Brahman.

The locus-attribute relationship (guṇa-guṇibhāva) is neither possible between two mutually altogether different objects, for instance, cow and horse, nor two identical objects, like the relation of a locus and its nature,

13. Mukhyārthavādhe tadyoge ruḍitotha anyortha lakṣyate/
yat sa Proyojanāt Lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā //

Mammata, KP, II. 4.

therefore, to prove the logical tenability of the relation i.e. guṇaguṇibhāva (locus-attribute relation) existing between the Brahman i.e. guṇi (locus) and viññāna or ānanda as guṇa (attribute), some sort of difference (Bheda) is to be admitted. And thus, the appropriation of difference (bheda) will lead to the sublation of the doctrine of absolute identity promulgated by the Upaniṣadic statements like ekamevādvitīyam (chā.Up. 6.2.1).

Ānandabodha sets aside this prima facie as follows:-

The words viññāna and ānanda in the statement viññānam ānandam brahma denote the akhaṇḍārtha (homogeneous meaning) since though there is no difference (bheda) between the indicated meanings (lakṣyārthas) of the words ānanda and viññāna nevertheless there is difference (bheda) as to what they intend to exclude (lakṣārthabhedabhāvepi vyavacchedya vibhedatah / viññānanandapadayoh paryāyavyarthātā kutah (NM. p.260).

Although in the said statement viññāna and ānanda have only one indicated sense (lakṣārtha) i.e. Brahman, nevertheless they are useful as they differ in their 'exclusive capacity (vyavacchedya) and required for negating different objects.

The word vijnāna (consciousness) excludes the objects which are different from itself (vijnanetara) and similarly the word ānanda from that which are ānandetara (different from ānanda). Anandabodha explains this fact by an Prakṛṣṭapṛakāśaḥ candrah (that is which is resplendent with light is moon).

When a person is asked which is the moon among the luminaries in the sky he answers, the one which is having protracted resplendent light is moon. In this sentence there is neither reference to any quality of the moon nor the relation of the moon to that quality except an identity of the moon with the profuse light. It is known from this identification that though shining is common to all other lights still the moon is different from them since it is having superior brightness. And protractive (prakṛṣṭa) alone cannot be proper answer to above question for the identification of the moon since the protractive (prakṛṣṭa) is possible in a place with dense darkness. Similarly, brightness (prakāśa) alone cannot be an appropriate answer, for it is in the sun which has not the same nature or characteristic as that of the moon. The answer i.e. Prakṛṣṭapṛakāśaḥcandrah aims at showing particularity and thus, there is the difference between implied sense of the words 'Prakṛṣṭa and Prakāśa' as well as the identity between them and moon's own definition. Hence the word Prakṛṣṭa (resplendent) is not irrelevant in so

far as it dispels the doubt that it is the glowworm which is not full of bright light; the 'word' light (prakāśa) is not irrelevant as it also dispels the doubt that it is pitched darkness. (NM. p.261). Thus, although the implied meaning (lakṣārtha) is one still the different words have each a distinct purpose in excluding this or that thing. In view of this fact it cannot be argued that the words become mere synonyms and therefore redundant in a sentence.

Ānandabodha employs the following syllogism:

Vijnānādivākyamakhaṇḍārtthaparam

lakṣaṇavākyatvād

yadittham tattathā

yathā prakṛstaparakāśah candraḥ

yathā vā pṛthvbughnodarākāra kumbhaḥ

(NM. p.263; PM. p.19)

Ānandabodha here also quotes from the Pañcapādikā Vivaraṇa of prakāśātman who asserts that each of the words in the statement vijnānam ānandam brahma though has a distinct meaning of its own, still they, on account of their one content, denote a homogeneous meaning (akhaṇḍārtha). The words vijnāna, ānanda and sat denote the Para (higher)

apara (lower) and highest sāmanya (generality) respectively. The word sat (existence) conveys the highest generality since it is omnipresent pertaining to all objects but the meaning of the word viññāna comparatively limited as it is seen in the lesser number of objects and the same of the word ānanda is still further restricted because it is almost non-existent apart from the Brahman. But all these three words are used in the same sāmanādhī-karaṇa (same case-relation or same location or predicament or apposition) and therefore they express their own sāmanya or jāti (generality) in a general sense and the Brahman, which is bliss in a particular sense (NM. p.249; PV.415).

Ānandabodha further maintains that in the statements of definitions or definitives (lakṣaṇavākyas) like gandhavatī Prthivi words never occur for exclusion directly, but denote particular qualities of an object and by themselves exclude the opposite entities. Thus, the exclusion is not the meaning of any word in a lakṣaṇavākya but a secondary function. The lakṣaṇavākyas only describe the nature of the objects and therefore they impart akhaṇḍārtha. Quoting from Vacaspati's Brahmatattvasamikṣā¹⁴ Ānandabodha points out that in case of the bahubrihi samāsa¹⁵ (the attributive compounds)

14. NM. p.264.

15. anekamanyapadārthe, Ast. 2.2.24; anekam Prathamantamanyapadarthe vartamanam va samasyate sa bahubrihi. Si.k.2.2.24.

two or more words ending in the first case affix form a compound, denote another new thing not connoted by those words individually, for example, dandi kamaṇḍalu and vaiśvadevī āmiksā. In the bahubrihi samāsa the word dandi denotes the person who carries the stick and not the stick itself; similarly in the other case vaiśvadevī denotes āmiksā (curd of milk and whey, a mixture of boiled and coagulated milk) that is offered to Vaiśvadevās. Thus, though there are two words having distinct meanings still in bahubrihi both of them impart an unitary meaning (akhaṇḍārtha).

Ānandabodha maintains that the theory of akhaṇḍārtha has been accepted not only by the Advaitins but by other systems of philosophy also. The vaikaraṇas (Grammarians) accept the akhaṇḍārtha (one single meaning) of the Prātipadika¹⁶ (the crude form of a substantive; a noun in its uninflected state before receiving the case-terminations) and Prathamāvibhakti¹⁷ (first case affix). For example, the word pot in the statement "Pot is black" (kṛṣṇaḥ ghaṭaḥ) and nominative case signifies the same pot also.

16. arthavaddhāturapratyah Prātipadikam, Ast. 1.2.45.

17. Prātipadikārthalingaparimāṇavacanamātre Prathamā Ast.2.3.46.

The Buddhists admit akhaṇḍārtha with regards to the words viññāna and bhinna (different) when they say viññāna is different. Everything being a form of cognition (viññāna) for the Buddhist viññānavādins there is no difference anywhere¹⁸ apart from the viññāna by which one could determine the meaning of the word difference. The prābhākara mīmāṃsakas also admit akhaṇḍārtha as they admit difference (bheda) as the very nature of objects and hence the word denoting the object and the word bhinna (different) have the same meaning. The Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas also admit akhaṇḍārtha. Thus the statement viññāna manandam brahma denotes the unitive Brahman and not ānanda (Bliss) and viññāna (consciousness) as the attributes of the Brahman as wrongly pointed out by the Pūrvapakṣa.

Ānandabodha further points out that all sort of difference i.e. sajātiya (homogeneous), vijātiya (dissimilar) and svagata (belonging to one's self) are negated by the Upaniṣadic statements like ekavemādvitīyam (Chā.Up. 6.2.1) and nehananasti kincana (Brh.Up.4.4.19) etc. Therefore the

18. Dr̥śyam na vidyate bāhyam cittam citram hi dr̥śyate/
Deha-bhoga-pratiṣṭhānam cittamātram badāmyaham.//
Lamkāvatārasūtra, cittamātra, verse 23.

b) Viññāna-parināmoyam vikalpo yad vikalpyate/
Tenatannasti tenedam sarvam viññaptimātrakam//
Triṃsika-viññapti-verse 17.

locus-attribute relation (guṇa-guṇibhāva) based on difference is not possible for the Brahman. The identity that implies an absence of difference (bheda) and the locus-attribute relation (guṇa-guṇi sambandha) which implies a difference cannot go together because of the obvious flaw of the contradiction as found in case of a jar (ghaṭa) and the absence of it which is not possible in one and the same substratum. Since the guṇagūṇibhāva is impossible in the case of the Brahman it is established that viññāna and ananda denote homogeneous meaning (NM. p.267).

Ānandabodha maintains that the statement Tat tvam asi (That thou art) (Chā. Up. VI.8.7) indicates the identity of jīva (the individual self) and the Brahman (Supreme self). The above mahāvākya signifies the partless ultimate reality when viewed under three relations as has been postulated by Suresvarācārya in his famous work Naiṣkarmyasiddhi. The three relations are that of apposition (sāmānādhikarānya) between the terms, that of substance and attribute (Viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya) and that of the implied and the employing between the deeper self and what is denoted by the two terms (lakṣaḥlakṣaṇa sambandha). Of these the appositional relation (sāmānādhikarānya) is as in the proposition 'That is this Devadatta' (Saḥ ayam Devadattaḥ) where that (sah)

signifying Devadatta as related to past time, and 'this' (ayam) signifying Devadatta as related to present time are both intended to refer to one and the same individual. So also in the case of the present mahāvākya 'Tat tavam asi', it is the intended reference to one and the same spirit in 'that' (tat) signifying spirit characterised by mediacy (parokṣatvaviśiṣṭa), etc. and in 'thou' (tvam) signifying spirit characterised by immediacy (aparokṣatvādiviśiṣṭa), etc. The relation of substance and attribute (Viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya) is as in the statement 'This is that Devadatta' the relation of substance and attribute is between Devadatta as related to past time which is the primary meaning (vācyārtha) of 'that' and Devadatta as related to present time which is the primary meaning of 'this', excluding the difference between the two; so in the tat tvam asi the relation of substance and attribute is between self characterised by mediacy, etc. which is the Primary sense of Tat and self characterised by immediacy, etc. which is the primary sense of Tvam excluding the difference between the two. Thirdly, the relation of the implied and the implying (lakṣalakṣana) is between the words that (Saḥ) and this (ayam) or between their meanings and the identical Devadatta, divested of conflicting attributes viz., being related to past and present time; so in the Tat tvam asi also the relation of the implied and the implying is between the terms Tat and Tvam or their meanings and the identical self, bereft of conflicting attributes such as mediacy and immediacy etc.

Ānandabodha maintains that one has to understand the sentence Mahāvākya Tat tvam asi in the same way as the sentence 'This is that Devadatta', e.g. two persons have seen one Devadatta at some place and time and that later the same two people have come across the same Devadatta at another place and time. Of the two, one may recognise him to be Devadatta, while the other may not. Then the first would tell the second, 'This is that Devadatta'. Here the informer does not mean that the two places and times are the same, nor does he mean that the two Devadattas under those two conditions are not in some respects different. Devadatta when previously seen may have been very stout while Devadatta as seen later might be lean. The statement does not mean that the stout Devadatta is in all respects the same as the lean Devadatta; but what is recognised by stoutness or leanness. So when it is said 'This is that Devadatta', no identity is posited between the leanness of Devadatta and the stoutness of Devadatta. Omitting these accidental qualities, viz. leanness, stoutness, etc., what is qualified by them is asserted to be the same. Similarly, when the individual self, the ego, to which agency and enjoyment belongs, is distinguished from pure being, and the latter alone is asserted to be identical with Brahman. Thus Part of the usual meaning of 'Individual self or 'Thou' is abandoned and part of it is retained, while by 'That' also is not meant as usual the pure

consciousness, which is remote (Parokṣa). By 'That' pure consciousness alone is meant, and by 'Thou', the pure self, free from agency etc. is meant. So Ānandabodha asserts, the sentence expresses apposition (sāmānādhikaraṇa) between the two, Brahman and individual soul.

The meaning of the sentence is understood by means of the (jahadajahallakṣaṇā) (exclusive-non-exclusive implication) which is defined as 'when part of the primary sense of a word is discarded and part of it accepted'.¹⁹ This type of implication is also called 'bhāgatyaḡa lakṣaṇā'. As in the above said sentence differences in the accidental qualities of Devadatta are ignored, and Devadatta in himself is taken as the referent. Ānandabodha employs the syllogism:

Tatvamasivākyamakhaṇḍārthanisṭham
akāryakāraṇadravyavarttitve sati
Samānādhikaranatvāt
S'oyam devadatta iti vākyavat

(NM. p.269; PM. p.19)

Ānandabodha further states that the statement tat tvam asi is to be interpreted in a different way unlike the statement nīlamutpalam and mṛṇamayaghaṭaḥ since the former i.e.

19. Yatra Vācyaikadesatyāgenaikedesanvayastatra jahadajahati lakṣaṇā. Nyā. K. p.290.

nīlamutpalam is a statement of a substance (dravya), characterised by the property of Utpalatva and a quality characterised by the property of nīlatva (blue-ness).

The later sentence i.e. mṛṇmayam ghaṭaḥ is having two substances, i.e. mṛt and ghaṭa in kārya kāraṇasambandha (cause and effect relation). In the first sentence i.e. nīlam utpalam though sāmānādhikaranyajñāna (despite their difference in connotation they are intended to denote the same thing) and viśeṣanaviśesyata jñāna (the knowledge of a certain thing which while being characterised by utpalatva has also the characteristic of nīlatva viz. nīlabhinnamutpalam nevertheless the Tat tvam asi cannot be interpreted in the similar way. In case of nīlamutpalam, the relation of the meanings of the two words as viśeṣaṇa and viśeṣya presents no logical difficulty but it does so in the case of Tat tvam asi. For the primary meaning (vācyarth) of Tvam is aporokṣatvā-divisiṣṭacaitanya and that of Tat Parokṣatvādiviṣiṣṭacaitanya which cannot be related in the abhedasamsarga way on account of their inherent opposition. To avoid this logical impasse the lakṣaṇa is resorted. In other words, the meaning of abhedā (identity) being impossible taking the vācyārtha, the lakṣārtha viz. aporokṣatvādyupalakṣitacaitanya and parokṣatvādyupalakṣitacaitanya is accepted. This removes

the contradiction and it is proved that the identity conveyed by the proposition is that between these two. This stage is called as lakṣalakṣanabhāvajñāna, the visiṣṭa being the lakṣaka and the upalakṣita the lakṣa. Thus abheda is not a samsarga type as in nīlamutpalam which involves duality, but what is known as svarupabheda. In other words the ultimate logical significance of Tat tvam asi is the ultimate Reality which discards all adjectives or Predicates as incompatible with its nature the suddhacaitanya not a samsrṣṭārtha but on akhaṇḍārtha.

Secondly, in case of the statement mṛṇmayam ghaṭaḥ there is kārya-kāraṇa relation but the conditions in the Tat tvam asi is different as there is no cause and effect relation between Tat and Tvam. Hence Tat tvam asi cannot be interpreted on par with the sentence mṛṇmayam ghaṭaḥ, maintains Ānandabodha.

4.3 The Pravartaka (motivating force)

Śālikanātha in his Prakaranapañcikā (PP.428-433) to prove kārya (what ought to be done or work) as the Pravartaka (motivator) argues as follows:

I. The kārya (work or act) is Pravartaka (motivating force) which includes all the orders and prescriptions in Practical

life urging a person to act. In the verbal expression, kārya is regarded as the Pravartaka which repeats itself in praiṣās (an order, command or invitation) and the like. When an action is ordained by a senior to a junior it is called praisa, the action is called āmantrana when it is agreed by two equal people and it is named adhyesana when it is requested by a junior person (PP. 430; NM. p.187).

II. Kārya (work) is the chief thing (pradhāna) to be achieved through various actions playing the role of motivating forces (kṛtisādhyam Pradhānam). It is the kārya which is kept in view and with reference to which action is directed (NM. p.187). There are two factors in this definition of kārya, viz. kṛti-Pradhānatā (the chief thing to be achieved through action) is kṛti-prayojanatā (the aim of that action) which is known by the mental cognition (mānasavaseya) while kṛti-sādhyatā (the possibility of being accomplished through action) is realised by inference (anumāna). In this way the karya is known by two Pramāṇas, viz. mental cognition and inference (anumāna). There is no conflict between these two pramāṇas as found in case of the rice which is cognised directly but its cooking turning it into odana is initially inferred by a person. When the kārya is properly grasped then it motivates a person to accomplish it e.g. a child after knowing 'this is my kārya undertakes the activity which can accomplish it. The activity

of a baby towards breast-feeding is also due to the grasping of kārya (pp.266; NM. p.187-188).

III. Kāryata cannot be identical with the iṣṭasādhana since former is always of the nature of kṛti + sādhanā (possibility of achievement through the action). Kāryatā always takes the form of an incomplete action, involving a process and therefore it is seen neither in past, nor in present but always related to future. But iṣṭasādhana is instrumentality with regard to the desired result (iṣṭa) and hence can be realised in connection with any object and therefore is not always related the future since it can be connected with the past or the present objects also (pp.428), e.g. a tired person considers the moon as the instrument (sādhana) of his delight but never thinks it as obtainable by his effort. Thus, in the moon there is sādhana but not kāryatā as both are distinctly different from each other like fire and ice, and therefore are not synonyms, and thus karyata cannot be defined as iṣṭasādhana (NM. p.188-189).

IV. In the practical life the command O, caitra, bring water (caitra jalam ānaya) urges caitra to the activity of bringing water. All the words in such sentences, other than the injunctive 'affix (vidhi liṅ) express their own meanings. Then, by the process of inclusion and exclusion (āvapodhārābhyām) the injunctive affix (liṅ) expresses this kārya (work) and the

other words in the sentences express their own meanings as connected with this kārya. In the vedic texts also, the injunctive sentences like agnihotram juhuyāt swargakāmaḥ express kārya (something to be brought about). The import of all words therefore should be kārya (pp. p.430; NM.p.190-191).

V. In the vedic texts the injunctive affix (liṅ) in the verbal form juhuyāt on account of its relation to the word swargakāma in agnihotram juhuyāt swargakamāḥ indicates the apūrva since the person for whom the directive is meant being qualified on account of his desire for heaven would not be enthusiastic to undertake the activity, the consequent impossibility of its use towards the production of reward (phala) which is everlasting. And this element which is useful for the production of phala is to be determined by the law of presence and absence i.e. activity being present the reward is produced and not otherwise. The apūrva created by the process of the ritual leads a person to the attainment of heaven and merely the action which is in process (PP.441; NM. p.191).

VI. In the sentence agnihotram juhuyāt swargakāmaḥ the word swargakāmaḥ expresses neither the reward (phala) i.e. heaven nor the agent of that action, (kartā) but indicates the person, directed for that kārya. A person who recognises

the kārya as his own is called niyojya or enjoined to do that kārya (PP. p.433). A person becomes niyogya when kārya expressed by that sentence is realised by him as his own. This kārya is named as niyoga since it provides an incentive that person, motivates him for leading to that activity (PP. p.441). It is niyoga that lasts till the phala takes place. Thus, apūrva is of a link between the action performed in the present and the phala obtained in future. Niyoga is related to niyojya (the person directed for that action) being the source of his desired object and is related to phala being the immediate cause of it (NM. p.193).

VII. Since niyoga is supposed to produce the result (Phala) it is not regarded as subordinate to Phala. Niyoga cannot be a true niyoga unless there is a niyojya (the person directed for that activity who infact, undertakes the activity which is the source for his desired end (phala)). Niyoga thus needs phala only as the end of the actions of the agent with whom it is directly connected. This relation between niyoga and phala can be compared to the relation between the master and the servant. Without the servant the master cannot be a true master and yet it is the master that is more important person of the two. Similarly phalas like swarga and others though oblige niyoga being the end of the action, niyoga is more important than swarga like the master (PP. 443). Niyoga

therefore, is accepted as the import of the sentence as a whole (NM. 190).

VIII. Following the practice in the worldly life, the saṅgati of the sentence is understood in kārya. When there is a doubt about the meanings of words, they are settled from the context or from the words of sentences e.g. Yavamayaḥ caruḥ! In this sentence the meaning of the word yava is doubtful and is settled from the nearby sentences like athānya ausadhayo mlāyante. In the same way, the meaning of the injunctive affix in vedic sentences like agnihotram juhuyāt swargakāmaḥ and others is settled from the words occurring nearby, viz. swargakamah. The word swargakāmaḥ has a double purpose as it indicates the person eligible to undertake the activity as well as the reward (phala) of that activity. Thus, it proves the existence of apūrva or niyoga which is the link joining the two ends i.e. the activity and the phala. Thus, apūrva is accepted as the meaning of injunctive sentences in the vedic texts.

Ānandabodha in his Nyāyamakaranda refutes the arguments of Śālikanātha as follows:-

I. Ānandabodha questions the significance of the word Prādhānya in the definition of kārya viz. kṛtisādhyā Prādhānam

kāryam. Ānandabodha argues that Prādhānya with reference to kṛti would be applicable only to either phala (reward) or to its sādhana (instrument). The mind also does not grasp anything as Pradhāna besides these two. If Pradhāna would mean as being the cause of both phala and its sādhana then it would eventually result in the acceptance of Iṣṭa-sādhanatā as the Pravartaka (NM. pp.203-205).

II. 'This is my kārya' is not at all a notion, but a desire to act. This is grasped by the mental cognition (Mānasāvaseya) and therefore is the object of the knower's cognition only. Being so, it does not establish any concrete object. Though the rise of the moon is desired for coolness no activity is expected because the moon is not attainable by any effort. The desire to act (cikirṣā) is a desire and yet is different from all other ordinary desires and therefore it has an unique distinct import (NM. p.208).

III. Kāryatā over and above iṣṭa-sādhanatā is not realised as no one acts without understanding it as iṣṭa-sādhana. Praisas (command) lead to action only when it is realised that they are the means (sādhana) for the desired reward. (Phala). Citing the words from the Prakaranapañcikā Ānandabodha proves that Śālikanātha himself does admit the

necessity of iṣṭa-sādhanatā for creating the activity, when Śālikanātha says 'karma which by itself is of a painful nature becomes a kārya (a thing to be done). The cause of this is the state of being an instrument for phala through which kāryatā is attained. By their very nature, actions are the causes that produce misery, but the knowledge of their being kārya (necessarily to be done) depends on the knowledge of their instrumentality towards phala. (pp.p.429). Bhavanatha (740 A.D.) also supports this view when he says in his Nayaviveka (p.38) that a rational being undertakes an activity thinking 'this is my kārya' only when he realises it to be the means of his desired end (p.39). Thus iṣṭa-sādhanatā includes kāryatā also and thus kāryatā is not different from iṣṭa-sadhanatā. (NM. p.205).

IV. Kāryatā cannot be accepted as the Pravartaka for kāryatā by itself does not lead to any activity. If kāryatā were to mean the principal end of effort, it would result in being of the nature of phala and thus would not be Pravartaka. If it be said that kāryatā related to phala creates the activity towards sādhana, then that would be absurd. Kāryatā meant for one objective cannot create (kriyā) for the different. Moreover, in the injunctive sentence there is no word which expresses this kārya and the sāṅgati

(synthesis) of all words in the injunctive sentence cannot denote the kārya also. Thus the injunctive affix (liñ) does not necessarily denote kārya (NM. p.210).

V. There is no possibility of the production of apūrva (not known before). Ānandabodha argues that the Mīmāṃsakas are simply making a very simple proposition unnecessarily very difficult and complicated. He takes up the illustration of daśapūrṇamāsa sacrifices which themselves consist of a number of subsidiary sacrifices. Ānandabodha points out that subordinate sacrifices performed earlier and on specific days, cannot be reasonably supposed to contribute to the apūrva created by the entire sacrifice. Thus, according to the Mīmāṃsakas also the apūrva generated by an action does not directly produce the phalāpūrva but instead produces only intermediate apūrvas, which later produce the phalāpūrva. In other words, this would mean that action releases a chain of apūrvas mutually connected with earliest and ultimately related to phala or final reward. According to Ānandabodha, it would be much easier, and reasonable also to understand kārya (action) itself directly related to reward by doing away with the hypothetical apūrvas (NM. p.221).

Ānandabodha further maintains that if apūrva would be action itself it would be the object of other Pramāṇas and therefore would lose the very nature of being apūrva (not

known before). If apūrva is something beyond kārya, then it would not be known through the statements for the saṅgati (synthesis) of sentences denotes only kārya. And without being the object of other Prāmaṇas, the relation of apūrva also could not be understood because, for the knowledge of relation, knowledge of the related is a necessary prerequisite. It cannot be said also that injunctive affix (liṅ) in the vedic texts has a specific power by virtue of which it generates the apūrva. Even when its relations with other words are not understood it possesses knowledge about an unique subject. For it is not proper to do away with this expectancy of relation, which as a rule resides in words. (NM. p.217).

VI. The word swargakāma specifically mentions the person addressed and does not necessarily indicate niyoga. Ānandabodha asserts that it would be too narrow a view to admit that a person only undertakes the activity which proves to be an instrument for his desired object, a person desiring to exclude others from the group utters the words grāmakāma bhukṣe where the word grāmakāma being qualification distinguishes the persons from others. It is clear that the bhojana is by no means a grāmāsādhana. The word swargakāma in the same manner distinguishes the person from the common

people, by laying down a specific qualification of the desire for attainment (NM. p.217).

VII. The illustration of a master and a servant, given for proving the Principal nature (prādhānya) of niyoga is not a suitable one. There are two kinds of efforts intimately related to a sentient subject; The master makes efforts for himself to oblige the servant because of his own ends. Similarly the niyojya performs actions to fulfil his own desires. His actions thus are guided by his desires and not by niyoga. Niyoga can be compared to a master in the said example but it is not pravartaka and consequently cannot be the pradhāna. Further, there is not any sentient person to play the role of a master, to whose interests the Pradhāna would belong. Again, it is absurd to accept that niyoga itself refers to heaven (swarga) as its own meaning, for the two are by their nature distinct from each other and a desired object of the effort of a sentient being refers to others as its instruments. In the present case the heaven is the desired object and aim of the efforts of a sentient person, who is desirous of heaven and the heaven refers to niyoga as its instrument. The heaven therefore, which is the phala with reference to niyoga cannot be its instrument (sādhana) (NM. p.218).

VIII. The words like yava are used in practical life for dīrghasuka etc. (a kind of rice). When they occur in the veda their meaning could be determined from the concluding portion of the sentence (vākyāśeṣa). The apūrva cannot be taken to be indicated by the injunctive affix (liṅ). If apūrva is accepted to be known by some other pramāṇa then the vedic sentences would be anuvādakas only. Therefore though there is simultaneous utterance of the injunctive affix with the word swargakāma the injunctive affix cannot be accepted as indicating the apūrva (something new not known before). Thus the sāṅgati of the vedic sentences should not be understood the apūrva (NM. p.220).

Refuting completely Śālikanātha's view Ānandabodha maintains that iṣṭa-sādhana is the motivator (pravartaka). To substantiate his view Ānandabodha cites the words of Vācaspati Miśra who, in his commentary on Maṇḍana's Vidhiviveka observes - "The injunction conveys iṣṭa-sādhana as intimately connected with the prominent meaning of an action to be performed" (kartavyatā ekārthasamavāyini samihita sādhana viddhi (NM. p.197). Ānandabodha maintains that being the object of kṛti (kṛti-uddeśyatā) need not be accepted as something over and above kṛti-sādhya. In the above said definition there are two factors, viz. kṛti-sādhya and

ekārthasamavāyitā. The first one i.e. kṛti-sādhya excludes the objects, already accomplished, e.g. the rain on a dry land, which is the result of kārirīṣṭi performed by the sacrificer, is also desirable to the farmers. But not who are not enjoined to perform the iṣṭi as it is not sure (kṛtisādhya) by them. The other word ekārthasamavāyini (intimately connected with kartavyatā) limits the field of iṣṭa-sādhanatā, because the objects in future such as the final reward etc., are kṛtisādhya (obtainable by efforts) nevertheless are not intimately connected with kartavyatā. Thus iṣṭa-sādhanatā is Pravartaka (which prompts a person to act).

Ānandabodha further says that mere desire cannot be pravartaka for desire is seen also with reference to the final reward (Phala). This desire for phala is unable to urge anyone to any activity, if the knowledge of instrumentality is absent. Besides the desire for phala cannot be accepted as the cause of the activity towards its sādhana, for then, the desire of anything, say a jar, would lead to activity towards any other thing like cloth and others, and the result would be a chaos (Nm. p.198). Hence mere desire, like the mere knowledge of iṣṭa-sādhanatā cannot become Pravartaka. So, the knowledge of iṣṭa-sādhanatā should be accompanied by desire for act as a Pravartaka.

4.4 SECTION II4.5 The Problem of Avidyā :

Ānandabodha in his two works, viz., Pramāṇamālā (p.10-11) and Nyāyamakāraṇḍa (pp.114-126) expounds the nature of avidyā or māyā (nescience) as it is propounded in the Prasthānatraya²⁰ and the texts of his predecessors.²¹ He maintains that avidyā cannot become the material cause of illusion if it is understood as false knowledge (mithyājñāna) or the negation of knowledge (vidyābhāva). Avidyā being the material cause (upadāna kāraṇa) of world-illusion is supposed to be a dravya (substance) and in neither of these two senses avidyā can be regarded as a substance. Further, avidyā is beginningless (anādi) and indefinable (anirvacanīya). According to Ānandabodha, the indefinable nature of avidyā is determined following the nature of the effects (kārya) of the avidyā which is not something (apramāṇika), because the occasional happening of an effect (kārya) necessarily requires the operation of a cause and without a material cause (upadāna kāraṇa) no effect (kārya) can be produced merely by the

20. Brh. Up. IV.3.20, IV.4.3; IV.4.10; Iśa.Up.10.11 Kāṭha, Up.2.4, 5; Muṇḍ. Up. 1.2.8; 9; Śwet. 5.1.

21. BSSB, I.4.3, II.2.2., I.2.23, IV.3.14, II.1.33, I.3.19; Bhāmati I.2.7; PP. p.98.

instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa). All effects (kāryas) except dhvaṃsa (destruction) are produced by material cause (NM. p.122). An unreal effect cannot be a creation of a real material cause. The object which has no existence, no efficacy (śakti) to produce kāryas cannot be a material cause also. As neither that which exists (sat) nor non-existent (asat) can be the substratum (āśraya) of the illusory object, a cause (kāraṇa), therefore, which is neither sat (existent) nor asat (non-existent) is to be admitted as the cause of illusion (bhrama) or world-appearance. The world-appearance is unreal, so it cannot be the effect of a real substance and it cannot also emerge out of an unreal substance which cannot be the cause of any existing thing. Hence the cause must be avidyā which is neither real (sat) nor unreal (asat)

'NM. p.123; PM. p.10). In his Pramāṇamālā Ānandabodha rightly quotes from Vācaspati's Brahmatattvasamikṣā which is a commentary on the Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana Miśra (670-720 A.D.) that Āvidyā is called anirvacanīya because it is a hypothecatal category which cannot be described as real, unreal, both or neither and is therefore indescribable (anirvacanīya) (ata eva uktam ācārya Vācaspatinā Brahmatattvasamikṣāyām sadosadubha yānubhayādi Prakārairanirvacanīyatvoamevahyavidyānāmaavidyātvamiti (PM. p.10). Thus, by the nature of its effects, viz., illusion as anirvācyā or anirvacanīya is the nature of avidyā as

anirvācyā is determined. Avidyā is regarded to be anādi (beginningless) because if some other cause of avidyā is admitted it will lead to the fault of infinite regress (anavasthā) (NM. p.123-124). In this way the beginningless and indescribable avidyā is the cause of the worldly illusion. (yat tat anādi anirvācyam rajatādi upadāna sa eva saṁkaram avidyā siddhyanti (NM. p.124).

According to Ānandabodha the acceptance of such a category is merely the logical consequence of indicating some possible cause for the illusion of the world. For, considering the nature of the illusion as it is existent, its cause can only be something which is neither real nor unreal. As the nature of such a category which is neither real nor unreal cannot be specified hence it is indefinable (anirvacanīya) (PM. p.10).

Ānandabodha points out that avidyā is proved through arthāpatti (presumption) (PM. p.11; NM. p.). As without avidyā there would not be the appearance of the utterly non-existent objects like horn of a human being; and there would not be sublation (bādhā) of the real objects.

4.6 The locus of Avidyā :

Only in the Nyāyamakaranda Ānandabodha has elaborately dealt with the problem of the locus of avidyā but not in his

other works viz., Pramānamālā, Nyāyadīpāvali and Nyāyadīpikā. The two theories viz. Brahmāśrita avidyāvāda (the theory upholding Brahman as the locus of avidyā) and Jīvāśrita avidyāvāda (the theory which upholds jīvātman as the locus of avidyā) which are evolved and developed by Pre-Ānandabodha Advaita philosophers are systematically analysed and examined by Ānandabodha. That the Brahman is the locus advocated by 'Saṅkara',²² Sureśvara²³ and his followers but Maṇḍana and his follower Vācaspati propound the theory of Jīvāśrita avidyā in their celebrated works like Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya, Naīskarmyasiddhi, Brahmasiddhi²⁴ and Bhāmati²⁵ respectively. The Upholders of the theory, viz., Jīvāśrita avidyā advocate that the Brahman cannot be the locus of avidyā for the following reasons:-

Firstly, Brahman is pure consciousness (visudha cit), Self-luminous (svayam prakāsa) and of the nature of light (Prakāśasvabhāva) whereas avidyā is of the nature of darkness

22. BSSB, 1.4.3, Parameśvarāśrayā māyāmayī Mahāsusuptih.

23. NS. PP.105-106, Brhad.Vār.Part I, PP.55 to 58, verses 175 to 182; Part II, P.675 to 677, Verses 1215-1227.

24. BS. PP.10-11, Part I.

25. Bhāmati, Adhyāśabhāmati, I.1.4, 1.2.1, 1.4.1, 1.46.

(aprakāsa). Hence there is contrariety between Brahman and avidyā like light and darkness. Because of the contradictory nature avidyā cannot exist in the Brahman (NM. p.309).

Secondly, the Brahman being omniscient (sarvajña) is completely devoid of avidyā. It will cease to be omniscient if it would be considered as endowed with avidyā. The existence of avidyā, therefore is not logically possible in the Brahman (NM. p.313).

Thirdly, the Brahman cannot be the locus of avidyā, for in that case the system of bondage and emancipation (bandha mokṣa vyavasthā) cannot be logically explained; bondage, according to the Vedānta, is avidyā itself and mokṣa is nothing but the absolute cessation of avidyā which veils the Ātman and projects it as something else and the realisation of one's own essential nature. One cannot achieve emancipation as long as avidyā is not completely perished. Hence by providing Brahman as the locus of avidyā the whole system of bondage and salvation will collapse since avidyā will be located eternally in the Brahman and consequently mokṣa would not be achieved. (NM. p.314).

Fourthly, there cannot be the order of the teacher and taught if the Brahman is accepted to be the locus of avidyā. As he becomes a teacher who is completely devoid of avidyā as it is said brahmaveda Brahmaiva bhavati (Mun. Up.III.2.9)

and a taught is always with avidyā. If avidyā exists in the Brahman no such teacher and taught relation is possible.

Ānandabodha refutes all these arguments of the pūrvapakṣa advanced against Brahmāsrita avidyāvāda as follows:-

Firstly, Ānandabodha argues that the Brahman can be the locus of avidyā since the opposition between the Brahman and avidyā because of their nature of light and darkness respectively as pointed out by the Pūrvapakṣa is baseless. There is no such opposition between Brahman and avidyā, since avidyā is not negative (abhāvarūpa) like darkness. It is not the absence of light (Prakāsa), but indefinable (anirvacanīya) as it is not sat (real) nor asat (unreal) nor both sadasat (real-cum-unreal) nor something else different from sat, asat, sadasatbhinna. Hence there is no harm, says Ānandabodha, in considering Brahman to be the locus of avidyā.

According to Ānandabodha, an object which is not of the nature of light (prakāsa) is not inert (jāda) and therefore would not be opposed to any entity whose nature is light. For insentient worldly objects are cognised by light and the entire non-sentient world is illumined by the supreme consciousness (cit) identified with the self-luminous Brahman²⁶

26. Kāṭha Up. V.15; Śvet. Up.6.14; Muṇḍ. Up.2.2.10

Brh. Up. IV.3.9.

itself. Therefore the relation of the location and the object located (āśrayāśrayī bhāva) between the Brahman and avidyā is logically tenable (NM. pp.318-328).

It cannot be argued that if avidyā which is of the nature of darkness, would be located in the Brahman whose nature is Prakāsa, then there would not be any other light to remove avidyā; because the transformation of mind (antakarāṇa Paripatibhedarūpam Prakāśāntaram) caused by the constant practice of śravaṇa (hearing), manana (reflection) and ninidhyāsana²⁷ (contemplation) taking the form of intuitive supreme light dispells avidyā in toto, says Ānandabodha. He illustrates the point by giving the following examples. As the sunrays fallen on the glass mirror (darpaṇa) are capable of burning the grassblades similarly the supreme light arising out of constant meditation on the self destroys avidyā (dr̥śyate hi darpaṇasahakṛtārka Prabhayā dagdṛtvam NM. p.321).

Just as the katakaraja (the dust or powder made of kataka plant) planed in muddy water causes the mud to settle down and it itself settles down thereby cleaning the water clear like crystal (yathā khalu katakarajaḥ Prakṣiptam Pāthasi rajontarāvile rajontarāṇi samharan svyamapi samhṛiyamāṇamanāvilam pāthaḥ

27. Brh. Up. II.4.5; IV.5.6.

kurute) similarly the constant meditation on the Supreme self destroys all the impurities like avidyā etc. residing in mind. Further, as the bamboo fire destroys itself without any support in the similar way antakaragapariṇati (mental transformation) destroys all the aspects of avidyā (evamiyam aikātmyavidyapyasesa Pramātradi bhedanivartaka niraśrayā sati sāmyati (NM. p.322) and finally vanishes with its effects.

Secondly, about the objection, viz. As the Brahman is omniscient (sarvajña) avidyā cannot exist in the Brahman, Anandabodha argues that Brahman, though omniscient (sarvajña) can be the locus of avidyā since the omniscience (sarvajñatva) of the Brahman is not opposed to its being the locus of Avidyā which is admitted to be its cause (avidyāvatttaya evā sarvajñatva iti brumah NM. p.323) Omniscience of the Brahman is possible in three ways I) valid means of knowledge (Pramāṇa) II) through illusion (bhrānti) or III) innate intelligence (svabhāvasiddhyā va prajñayā). Since all the valid means of knowledge belong to the world of bheda (difference) they cannot express the supreme Reality and its omniscience in a valid manner.

Secondly, the illusion cannot exist for one who does not have avidyā. And thirdly, even innate intelligence (svabhāva

sidhi or Prajñā) cannot know the whole of the universe without avidyā, for the puruṣa or the Ātman by nature, has neither attachment nor any relation²⁸ based on avidyā with world objects. In this way avidyā implies Paramātmā and does not negate it (NM. p.324).

Thirdly, as to the prima facie argument regarding the impossibility of the existence of bondage and emancipation (bandamokṣavyavasthānupapatti), Ānandabodha points out that these two conditions caused by avidyā are on par with the objects seen in a dream. When avidyā itself is removed, these conditions of bondage and emancipation are neither expected nor logically desirable in the Brahman and without avidyā, these two conditions cannot properly be explained also (NM. p.325).

Fifthly, Ānandabodha counteracts the argument, viz. impossibility of the teacher and taught relation of Pūrvapakṣa that arrangement of teacher and taught (guru śiṣyavyavasthā) is possible because the difference between teacher and the taught takes place only in the realm of avidyā and would cease to exist on its removal (guruśiṣyavyavasthāpi Samanayaga-ksamaiva) (NM. p.325).

Ānandabodha refutes the theory known as Jīvāsrita avidyāvāda upheld by Maṇḍana Miśra and his follower Vācaspati

Misra in their works Brahmasiddhi and Bhāmati²⁹ respectively.

Ānandabodha argues that Jīvatman (individual self) cannot be the locus of avidyā since Jīvatman is not a separate entity. The unity of Brahman and Jīvatman is proclaimed by the Upaniṣadic authority i.e. anena Jīvena ātmanā anupravesa (chā. Up. 6.3.7; 2.3). Those who advocate Jivāsritaavidyāvāda argue that Brahman cannot be the locus of avidyā for Brahman is of the nature of light and avidyā is of the nature of darkness and therefore both avidyā and Brahman are opposed to each other. This logic is also applicable in case of Jivāsritaavidyā vāda. As jīvatman is not separate from the self-luminous Brahman and avidyā is of the nature of darkness. Thus the opposition which is supposed in case of Brahman as the locus is unavoidable in the case of Jīvatman as the locus of avidyā. (NM. p.309).

It cannot be said that though unity of Brahman and Jīvatman is real (tāttvika) still the difference (bheda) between Brahman and Jīvatman is the creation of avidyā and hence it does not go against the authority of the śruti (scripture), and thus Jīvatman can be considered to be the locus (asraya) of avidyā. According to Ānandabodha this view is baseless since it leads to parasparāśraya (interdependence) Jīvatman would depend on avidyā for its difference and avidyā would depend on Jīvatman for its locus (āśraya).

It is argued that there is nothing illogical in case of āvidyā and it can possibly reside in a liberated person. Ānandabodha rejects this view since as long as avidyā is not fully dispelled one cannot be a mukta or liberated person.

Thus, according to Ānandabodha a person gets bound to this illusory world due to his avidyā and dispelling the same completely he attains the mokṣa i.e. the Supreme Brahman.

4.7 Theories of Error (Khyātivāda) :

The concept of bhrama (illusion) or viparyaya (error) has been accepted as a form of invalid knowledge (apramā) by almost all schools of Indian philosophy.³⁰ Moreover, error is an erroneous cognition of one thing as another thing or an illusory perception of one thing as another. Valid knowledge (Pramā) is the apprehension of an object as it is while error is the cognition of an object as it is not. The sanskrit term for error is 'khyāti' (cognition) derived from the root khyā meaning, 'to perceive' or 'to manifest'. Among the Indian philosophers the ways of explaining error widely differ as they advocate a theory of error suited to their respective metaphysical views.

30. Singh, B.N, Indian logic, p.26.

There are five prominent theories of bhrama (error) propounded by the schools of Indian philosophy, viz., the theory of self-apprehension (ātmakhyāti), the theory of non-being's apprehension (asatkhyāti), the theory of non-apprehension (akhyāti), the theory of misapprehension (anyathākhyāti) and the theory of indefinables apprehension (anirvacanīyakhyāti)³¹. All these theories of error have been classified into two groups viz, satkhyāti and asatkhyāti. According to the former, an error is the cognition of the existent (sat). There are three theories under sat khyati, viz. anyathākhyāti, ātmakhyāti and akhyāti. According to the theory of asatkhyāti, an error is non-existent being.³² Ānandabodha explains all these theories in his three works - Pramāṇamālā, Nyāyadīpāvalī and Nyāyamakaranda. Apart from the anirvacanīyakhyāti advocated by the Advaitins Ānandabodha like Sankara³³ refutes all these theories pointing out duly the logical fallacies and finally establishes the validity of the Advaita theory called anirvacanīya khyāti.

31. Sastri, S.Kuppuswami, A Primer of Indian logic, p.123.

32. Singh, B.N., Indian Logic, p.26.

33. BSŚB, Adhyāsabhāṣya.

Ātmakhyāti (Self-apprehension) :

The theory of error called ātmakhyāti (self-apprehension) is advocated by the Yogācāra school of Buddhist philosophy otherwise known as Vijñānāyāvādins. Error (bhrama) according to this school, is the external manifestation of the internal cognition (jñānakārasyeva vahiravabhāsa) (NM. p.99). The Yogācāra idealist school advocates that the entire world is an illusion, a reflex or a thought-image. Nothing is real except consciousness (viññaptimātra) or mind (cittamātra). Just as a man with defective eyesight sees the vision of double moon, or floating hairtuft before his eyes, or a moving circle in a firebrand, or the fatamorgana in a desert, or takes bubbles for crystals, in the same way the ignorant man who has not attained the absolute wisdom (samyag-jñāna) sees the vision of diverse colours and forms and acts on the presumption that they are real. They are the projections of the mind³⁴ and appear as something external.³⁵

34. Vijñaptimātramevaitad asadarthāvabhāsanāt, yathā taimirikasyasat Keśacandrādi darśanam. Viṃsatikā of Dharmakīrti.

35. Yadantar-jñeyarūpam tu bhirvad avabhāsatē/Ālambanaparikṣā, 6.

The diversity of things and the plurality of innumerable Persons, in short, the whole universe and its inhabitants are creation of the mind.³⁶ In the nacre-silver illusion the subjective silver-form of cognition appears as the form of an external object. The 'silver (rajata) is not absolutely unreal. It is real as a form of the internal cognition, but the mistake consists in taking it to be the form of an external object. The 'silver (rajata)' is a mental fact whereas in the illusion it is taken for an extramental fact. The Yogācāra school does not recognise any cogniser other than the momentary idea. So, according to this school, in illusion a momentary idea cognises itself as external. As utterly non-existent object like ether-lotus (ākāśapadma) does not appear, there must be a vitiation of the general rule, viz. 'It is, as it appears' (yad yathā pratibhāsate tat tathā eva iti autsargika anyathātvam). (NM. p.99). The cognition, viz. 'this is not silver' must be accepted as sublating 'thisness'. It involves the flaw of gaurava (prolixity) in assuming the denial of both silver, the locus (āśraya), and 'thisness' can be sublated being external. The silver, thus remains

36. Dr̥śyam na vidyate bāhyam - cittam citram hi dr̥śyate.
Dehabhoga-pratiṣṭhānam cittamātra vadāmyaham.
Laṅkāvatārasūtra/cittamātra of Dharmakīrti, verse 23.

internal as of the nature of cognition. The Yogācāra school also argues that the sublation (bādha) of thisness negates the existence of silver in front as well as anywhere at distance, perception being impossible of a thing at a long distance. Thus, one has to accept that the silver is identical with perception (NM. p.100).

Ānandabodha sets aside the view of Yogācāra by arguing that when the silver aspect is accepted as internal, the appearance of externality, though unreal, has to be accepted. Besides, if objects are accepted as internal then in the case of the superimposition of fire on a heap of gunjas (a small shrub of that name bearing a red black berry) there would be the possibility of perceiver's body being on flame (PM. 9). If that existence in cognition also is unreal, then the superimposed thing would be completely non-existent or indescribable. It cannot be said that the thing existing in cognition is not unreal, but only does not create any effect (PM. p.10), since there would not be any action of a person, desirous of fire towards that object. To avoid this contingency, the Yogācāra school has to admit that the objects though actually existing internally appear as external, and thus external appearance causes the activity of a person. Ānandabodha maintains that the object itself externally causes the action

and it is needless to imagine any internal object which is incapable of creating any effect externally (PM. p.10). The fallacy of gaurava (Prolixity) is defect only in presumption. Here the sublative cognition is not imagined, by any one but is a self-evident experience of all. So the acceptance of internality of the external object is untenable, maintains Ānandabodha.

Asatkhyāti (theory of non-being's apprehension) :

The theory of error called asatkhyāti is advocated by the Mādhyamika school of the Buddhist Philosophy. According to this school, error is the cognition of an absolute non-existent object (atyanta asantamartham avabhāsayanti samvid eva vibhrama) (NM. p.102). This school advocates that an absolute non-existent object (atyanta asat padārtha) appears in error, for instance, in shell-silver illusion, an absolute non-existent object appears externally. The appearance of an absolute non-existent object in illusion is proved by the sublating cognition i.e. 'this is not silver' after understanding the error, 'this is silver'. When the sublating cognition (bādhakadhi) i.e. 'this is not silver' arises, the silver which appears in illusion gets negated and thus, the non-existence nature of silver is proved. Since the object of error i.e. silver is sublated it is not sat (existent object) but only asat (non-existent)

object which can appear in an illusion. Cognition itself has illuminating special power acquired by its previous cognition, which is called nescience (avidyā). The power is called nescience (avidyā). In the place where shell-silver error occurs, there is no silver and consequently there is no sense-object contact, still there arises the silver-cognition because of internally differentiated residual impressions (saṃskāra vāsanā) (NM. p.110); PM.8, ND p.5).

It is further argued that if there is no appearance of the absolute non-existent object in error there cannot be the sublating cognition, i.e. "this is not silver" after its real cognition. The object of the sublative cognition, for instance, 'this is not silver', is the non-existent object. The non-existent object appears by its own nature, not as real (NM. p.111).

The sublative cognition shows the unreal nature of the silver that appears as real in error. As the existence of objects is to be accepted as they appear, and as there is conflict between the illusory cognition and the sublative cognition, it is sound to admit the appearance of non-existent object in illusory cognition.

Ānandabodha refutes all these above said arguments. He criticises the view by arguing that the sublating cognition

(bādhakādhi) which negates the illusory cognition. "this is silver, "does not prove the non-existent object supposed to appear as object of illusory cognition. Even if the illusory cognition becomes devoid of object, there is no harm since there is one type of cognition known as vikalpa which is also devoid of object. It is said by Patañjali in his Yogasūtra (sabdajñānānupāti vastūsunyo vikalpaḥ) (Y.S. 1.9; NM. p.109). As illusory cognition is objectless similarly Vikalpa cognition is objectless. Hence there is no validity of admitting appearance of a non-existent object in illusory cognition, for the supplement of an object to the sublative cognition. Secondly, the so-called 'appearance of asat' never becomes an object of immediate cognition.

Ānandabodha illustrates this point quoting from the Iṣṭasiddhi of Vimuktatman i.e. na hi nari sṛṅgam bhāti gaviva. According to Ānandabodha, an asat (non-existent object) cannot be an object of direct cognition as a horn is not seen in case of a man as in case of a cow.

Further, Ānandabodha questions the object of the capacity. If the object of the capacity (sāmarthyā) is said to be non-existent, is it then produced (kārya) by the capacity or indicated (jñāpya)? The non-existent object cannot be a

kārya (produced). Again, if the capacity of a cognition produces it who else will be there to manifest it? It also cannot be indicated by the capacity (jñānasāmarthya). Thus, the view of Mādhyamika is untenable.

Akhyāti (The theory of non-apprehension)

Ānandabodha in his Pramāṇamālā, Nyāyadīpāvalī and Nyāyamakaranda thoroughly criticises the theory of non-apprehension (akhyāti) propounded by the Prābhākara school of purva Mīmāṃsā in the following way.

The followers of the Prabhakara School propagate the doctrine of the self-validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya) of saṃvid (knowledge)³⁷ and reduces all error and doubt to simply an absence of knowledge. All knowledge, according to this school, is valid³⁸ which prompts us to activity. According to this school, what is called error or illusion (viparyaya)

37. Kinca svata eva yadupapadyate --- mitau ca kacidanupapattanar stiti svayamprakāśaiya yuktā, PP. p.173.

38. Yathārtha sarvamebeha vijñānamitisiddhaye Prābhākara gurorbhava ssamiunah Prakāśyate. PP.V.53, p.4.

is not false knowledge. If all cognition is self-luminous (svapprakāsa) and therefore true (yathārtha), the consciousness expressed in the judgement "this is silver" cannot be erroneous. When one mistakes a piece of shell for silver, the error is due to the failure to distinguish the two different elements in it, i.e. the idea of silver and the impression of "this". One mixes up the perceived and the remembered elements in one single psychosis. The object of a cognition is the thing which is presented to consciousness. In "this is silver" what is presented to consciousness is "silver" and not "shell". One does not cognise the shell as silver, for the shell never enters into consciousness. The idea which is remembered does not agree with the fact, since the judgement "this is silver" is superseded by the judgment "this is only a piece of shell" when the knower picks up the piece. The error is due to akhyāti or non-apprehension, of the difference between the given and the remembered elements. The perceived element, "this", and the remembered element, "silver", are true; only there is non-discrimination(Ākhyāti) of the two factors as distinct. This non-discrimination is due to certain defects of the sense-organs and to the suggestion of the similarity between shell and silver, which rouses the mental residuum (samskāra) of the silver previously cognised. This

This unconsciousness of the distinction between the given and the remembered elements leads to action. In actual experience there is no difference between the valid and the invalid cognitions of silver, since both give rise to the same kind of activity on the part of the agent. Thus, an error is not a unitary cognition but a composite of two cognitions whose distinction is not apprehended, and not a positive misapprehension but a negative non-apprehension.

According to the prābhākaras, the recollective nature of the cognition of silver is proved by Parīśeṣa³⁹ (elimination) or remainder (NM. p.58). The cognition of silver arises by means of a direct contact between the silver and the eyes. The shell (sukti) cannot be accepted as the content (ālambana) of the silver cognition because that which appears in the cognition can be only its content, and it goes against the experience. Due to non-discrimination the illusory cognition of silver appears as similar to the cognition of a real silver, and this prompts some practical activity which is similar to that prompted by the real silver. Consequently one bends down to pick the 'silver' and is disappointed to find merely a piece of shell. Then it is realised that 'this' is not silver. The Prābhākara sets forth the syllogism as follows:

39. 'Sālikanātha, Prakaraṇapañcikā, pp.51-52.

Idam smaranam

Anākalita rajatasyānutpadyamānatvāt

Yadittham tattathā

yathobhayavādyavivādaspadam rajatasmavanam

(NM. p.62)

(The silver-cognition is memory, because it does not arise in a person, who has not seen silver earlier, which is like this, is like that:- the cognition which does not arise in a person, who has not seen the object before, is memory - like the common cognition of silver.)

In a dream the memory of past experience is revived by some unseen agency(adr̥ṣṭakāraṇa) and appears like cognition because that which is recollected is forgotten.

In the error of a yellow conch (Pitaḥsankhaḥ) there are really two cognitions, one apprehending the yellowness of the bile, and the other apprehending the substance of the conch without apprehending its whiteness. Then, because a substance and a quality always stand in mutual expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), the two apprehensions cannot remain unrelated, and consequently the manifestation appears as similar to the manifestation of a real yellow conch. In the illusion of the double moon the rays issuing from the two eyes give rise to two different cognitions of the moon which is one and the illusion persists inspite of the fact that the oneness of the

moon is not forgotten. This is not a case of memory-
 obscuration. Here as in the 'yellow conch', illusion there
 is a non-discrimination between two cognitions and not
 between one cognition and one memory image as in the shell-
 silver illusion. In all these illusions the non-discrimination
 is caused by defects. Defects simply disturb the normal
 functioning of a cause; they cannot give rise to a different
 effect. A defective seed of wheat results either in a
 deficient growth or in no growth, but it cannot produce a
 barley-plant. Similarly, the defect of the sense produce
 either an incomplete cognition of the nacre or no cognition,
 but they cannot produce the cognition of an entirely different
 object, viz. the silver.

Ānandabodha sets aside the theory of akhyāti as
 follows:

The prābhakara defines error as vivekāgraha (non-cognition
 of difference between cognitions and their objects).

Ānandabodha asks a question: what does the term vivekāgraha
 denote? In the Nyāyadīpāvalī (p.9) Ānandabodha suggests four
 possible alternative answers and discards them viz. bhedāgraha
 (non-cognition of difference), bhedakāgraha (non-cognition
 of the maker of difference), paraspara bhāvāgraha (mutual
 non-cognition) and asamsargāgraha. Bhedāgraha means

non-cognition of difference either between the two cognitions or between the cognition and the object. The difference between the cognitions cannot be said to be non-cognised, as cognitions are self-luminous (svayamprakāsa). The objects also are manifested through this cognition. Moreover, difference is accepted by the prābhākaras as the very nature of objects. Hence the words conveying non-cognition (vivekāgraha) cannot be proper with difference when objects are manifested. Two contradictory attributes i.e. the appearance of nature (svapratibhāsa) and the non-appearance of difference (sva-svabhāvabhutabhedapratibhāsa) cannot be accepted to be residing in one object.

Secondly, the word bhedaka in the bhedakāgraha would either mean bhedotpādaka (producer of the difference) or bhedajñāpaka (indicator of difference). As difference is nothing but the object itself, producer of difference would mean producer of object. Thus, the word bhedakāgraha would imply that without understanding the jar-maker (ghaṭakartā) one cannot know the jar (ghaṭa) which is not tenable. The other alternative i.e. bhedajñāpaka is similarly absurd, as the word bhedaka cannot mean any sense and without the awareness of sense, activities are seen to be undertaken (ND. p.9). By the indicator of difference one cannot take differentiating

qualities or special qualities of the object (bhedyah
dharmah). If they are known difference also would be known,
if they are unknown, there would not be any activity. If
it is said that some of the qualities are known and some like
shellness etc. are unknown, then the person desiring silver
may proceed towards a stone whose stoneness is not known.
The cognition of similarity also cannot be accepted as the
cause of activity as activity is seen in the case of yellow
conch (Pitah sankhah) though it is not similar to the white
one.

Thirdly, Parasparābhāvagraha means non-apprehension
of the absence of one into or from the other is also untenable.
when the word 'this' (idam) denotes the object in front and
when 'silver' (rajata) is remembered both the objects are
known and the difference which is of the nature of either of
them also must be known. There is no non-apprehension of
difference. When difference (bheda) is accepted as the
nature of positive entity (bhāvarūpa) and so non-apprehension
of difference becomes impossible.

Fourthly, asamsargāgraha is the a-tādātmyasya a-samavya-
syavaagraha. The non-association implies absence of association
which, ultimately would not be different from the objects

appearing either as 'this' or as 'silver'. As absence of a jar is not different from the ground (bhūta) so also the absence of association is not different from that which is related 'this' (idam) or 'silver'. Therefore, non-association (atādātmya) should be accepted as non-different from the positive entities bhāvapadārthas which appear in the cognition.

II) In the shell-silver illusion, the silver (rajata) cannot be accepted as an object of memory since the cogniser can point out the object in front by finger as silver (NM. p.75). And the defects in the sense organs cannot also prevent the capacity of producing effect as there are some cases of defects where altogether a new effect results.

III) It is untenable to say that the untrustworthy nature is because of inconsistency of cognitions with their objects because self-validity of cognitions is due to their being cognitions and not because of being non-contradictory (avyabhicāreṇa). (NM. p.75).

IV) The inference put forth to prove the recollective nature of silver-cognition is illogical since the perceptive nature of silver-cognition is proved.

V) In the instance "conch is yellow" (Pitaḥ sankṣaḥ) non-cognition of non-relation cannot be accepted when yellowness and conch are cognised. It is unnecessary also since the case can be well explained by superimposition as in the case of shell-silver.

VI) The theory of akhyāti fails to explain the activity of a person desirous of silver towards the object in front. The activity of the sentient is produced only by cognition and never by a non-cognition. The cognition of similarity is present there in the non-cognition accepted by Prābhākara but it is contradictory to the experience. The cognition 'gavaya is similar to cow (go sadrso gavayaḥ) cannot be the cause of the activity towards a gavaya of a person desirous of a cow. Besides, the non-cognition of non-silver may result in negligence. The activity for a person desiring silver towards 'this' is reasonably due to desire of that object (silver), otherwise there would be mutual conflict as a person desires one and acts towards another (NM. p.71). The silver cognition has for its content the object in front as it invariably causes the effort for a person desirous of that.

VII) The sublative nature of 'This is not silver' does not lie in the non-cognition of difference. The statement i.e. all cognitions are true does not stand to reason. So the theory of akhyāti is untenable, maintains Ānandabodha.

Anyathākhyāti (Theory of misapprehension)

Ānandabodha also criticises the Bhāṭṭa theory of error and pointing out logical flaws adequately sets aside it in his works. The theory of error which is known as anyathākhyāti or viparitākhyāti has been propounded by the Bhāṭṭa school of the pūrva Mīmāṃsā. However, the theory of error postulated by the term anyathākhyāti which slightly differs from that of Bhāṭṭas.

According to the Bhāṭṭa school error is an appearance of an object in the form of another, for instance, in shell-silver error, shell (sukti) appears in the form of silver (rajata) which is an apprehension of another object i.e. shell. Hence illusory cognition arises in the form - This is silver (iyam sukti) in the substratum of real shell. An error manifests a real object in the form, of a different object which too is real.⁴⁰ In all cases of illusory perception it is only the relation between the subject and predicate elements, e.g. 'this' and silver', which is unreal and appears to be real. The related object) however are always real.

40. Tatra sūktikarajatādījnānam sūktikākhyam bhavam
sūktikārūpeṇa sadrūpam bhāvāntarasya rajatasya yat
sadrūpam rajatarūpam tena rūpeṇa grunhād bhrāntam
bhavati. NR or SV, Niralambana p.117.

Accordingly an illusion is a positive mis-apprehension in which the mistake consists in identifying two unrelated real objects under the influence of vicious subjective and objective conditions.

The Bhāṭṭas argue that an absolute non-existent entity cannot appear in error and also an existent object cannot appear in error since the sublating cognition arising in the form of 'this is not silver' after the error, proves that since the object of erroneous perception i.e. silver (rajata) gets sublated by the object of real cognition i.e. of shell, it is not sat (existent) because sat padārtha cannot have sublation (bādhā). The object of erroneous perception, is not asat (unreal) for its appearance (atyantasatah arthasya pratibhasasambhavat NM. p.81). Thus, the object of error not being asat and not being sat (real), is to be accepted as appearing in form of another object, for instance, it is the piece of shell that appears as a silver. The term anyathā (otherwise) in the term anyathākhyāti, according to Bhāṭṭas, refers to the appearance of the object, i.e. it is an cognition (khyāti) of an object as what it is not (anyathā). As the silver witnessed in the locus of shell is not absolutely unreal, for the sublating cognition which cancels it in form of 'this' is not silver' proves its reality, for the time being. The sublating cognition only

sublates the identity of silver with the object in front i.e. shell, and implies the existence of silver in another place or some other place, but not absolute non-existence of silver (anyathābhāsaśahidamkaraspada tādātmyanisedhatma NM. p.82.).

The Bhāṭṭas uphold the view that abhāva or asat (non-existence) is not complete absence like sky-flower (ākasa kusuma), but absence of another positive entity. Hence, Kumārila, the propounder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy contends in his celebrated work 'Śloka-vārtika'.⁴¹ Abhāva is another positive entity, in respect of other objects, and not something else as that which is impossible to be explained.

Absolute non-existent object (atyanta asat padārtha) cannot be an object of cognition, but the non-existent object, which is expressible in the form of an existent object, can become the object of cognition, for instance, in shell-silver illusion, since shell, though non-existent, being expressible in the form of existent object becomes the object of erroneous cognition "this is silver". And shell invariably becomes the object of effort for a person desirous of silver. This proves that shell (sukti) itself

41. bhāvantara abhāvanyo na kaschid vyapeksayā. SV, 3.23; NM. p.83.

appears in the form of silver (rajata). Further, the Pratyabhijna (recognition) in the form of "this appeared as silver so far that takes place after the rise of the sublating cognition (bādhakadhi) proves that shell appears otherwise i.e. in the form of silver.

Ānandabodha criticises the Bhāṭṭa theory of anyathā-khyāti as follows:

He argues that a cognition cannot arise without a corresponding object. If in the shell-silver illusion, silver is supposed to be existing elsewhere then the cognition of silver cannot take place.

As Bhāṭṭas contend that non-existent object cannot have appearance in perception, Ānandabodha questions the appearance of an object denoted by 'this' as silver. As a matter of fact, shell exists in its own nature, but the nature, identical with silver, is not real, by which it can become the object of cognition, the silver can not be real, for the sublating cognition would not have any object (badhadhiyah niralambanapātāt) (NM. p.85) as a real cannot be sublated. The validity of the sublation "this is not silver" is an all-accepted truth. The assertion of the reality of silver would reverse it and would make the first cognition i.e. 'this is silver' as valid. Even through the

non-existence of silver does not resemble the sky-lotus, silver being existent elsewhere still the silver existing elsewhere cannot be the object of cognition. The existence of one object, i.e. of shell cannot deny the absolute non-existence of the other object. The relation of identity of silver with shell does not explain the cognition because if the so-called identity is present here it cannot be sublated, and if absent cannot be the object of cognition. This mutual identity should either be real (sat) or unreal (asat). It could not be of a third category. The two objects, which are regarded as of the nature of mutual negation (anyonyābhāva), are accepted as acquiring the forms of each other. But according to Ānandabodha, this acquireness of the form of each other is inexplicable. If it is the same as the object denoted by 'this', then there would not be cognition of 'silver'. If it is of silver only, it would be cognised at any place as on the wrist of a beloved, and not here as 'this' (idam). If it is a third entity like a jar, transcending both the idam and the rajata then the cognition as 'silver' would certainly be impossible. So this explicability, contends Ānandabodha is the same as indescribability of the object of error.

Apart from this, the non-existence (asat) is common to both the silver and its identity. Hence there is no harm in admitting the non-existence of silver itself,

though a non-existent object cannot be an object of illusory cognition. The existence of silver can be accepted as the shell itself. It would not be opposite to the experience (anubhava), since the opposition cannot be proved. There cannot be opposition between two cognitions since cognitions can have the object like colour, taste etc. The opposition (virodha) cannot be nature of conflict between existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) in one positive entity as these two aspects are not seen in one entity. It cannot be argued that as in an eunuch, where two bhāva and abhāva are seen, hence there can be existence and non-existence in one positive entity, for abovesaid example of eunuch is not an appropriate one on the strength of which there would be contingency of appearing both the shell and the silver together. Thus, silver existing elsewhere cannot be logical proved by the Bhāṭṭas, contends Ānandabodha.

Anirvacanīyakhyāti (the theory of indefinables apprehension)

The Advaita school expounds the view that so long as the illusion of a snake or silver lasts there comes into being the corresponding object which is logically indefinable. The Advaita school maintains that in the rope-snake illusion the snake must actually be present where it is seen, though

it enjoys merely a temporary existence so long as the illusion lasts, and because it can be neither absolutely real, nor absolutely unreal, nor both together, it must be indefinable.

Ānandabodha maintains that the term anirvacanīya is used in order to explain that the object of error is not existent (sat), or non-existent (asat) or existent cum non-existent (sadasat). However, anirvacaniyatā (inexplicability) does not mean inability of expression at all since there would be a contingency of keeping mum. (NM. p.119).

But the term anirvacanīyatā means sadasadvilakṣaṇa (distinct from existent and non-existent). Ānandabodha defines sadaasadvilakṣaṇatā as distinction from both the aspects defined (avacchinna) by distinction of every aspect (ekaikaprakaravilaksanya vavacchinno bhaya prakaravilaksanam lakṣaṇam āśriyate (NM. p.112). To prove this, Ānandabodha in his Pramāṇamālā employs the syllogism as follows:

Vivādapadam anirvācyam

bhādhyatvāt

Yad uktasādyamam na bhavati na tat Uktasāadhanam

Yathā ātmā

Further in Nyāyamakaranda Ānandabodha points out that the object of illusory cognition like silver is sadasad-vilakṣaṇa is proved by the means of knowledge (Pramāṇa) called arthāpatti (Presumption).

The object of error is not verifiable and may therefore appear to be unreal but no knowledge without a corresponding object is conceivable. Hence the reality with which knowledge acquaints us is not always of the same kind, and that the objects of error are of a type which is ontologically different from that of the common objects. The cognition of the objects of error can be explained only by admitting their distinct nature from both the existent and the non-existent.

They being distinct from asat are perceived and being distinct from sat are sublated (NM. p.113).

In this connection Ānandabodha puts forth the view of prakāśātman who in his Pañcapādikā vivaraṇa defines anirvācya as distinct from the absolute and the empirical reality. According to him sublation (bādha) is a negation on account of the upādhi (adjunct) of the object. anirvācya (indefinability) therefore is defined as that which becomes the subject matter for the cognition of sublation and which

arises on account of the cognition that sublates (NM. p.126). Vivaraṇakāra accepts three types of reality (sattā) viz., the absolute reality of the Brahman, the empirical reality of ether etc. (akāśādi) which is characterised by the adjunct of māyā and the phenomenal reality of silver etc. characterised by the adjunct of Avidyā. Thus, there is no contradiction between the former cognition i.e. 'this is silver' and the latter one i.e. 'this is not silver'. The silver experienced in the former cognition is produced by avidya and latter cognition gives the absence of the absolute and the empirical reality and proves the unreality of silver (rajata).

Ānandabodha maintains that as in the view of anyathā-khyāti the silver existing in some other place appears as being in front similarly in the view of anirvacanīyakhyāti silver (rajata) though distinct from existent object appears as existent. In the later cognition also, the existence of silver never appears, on the contrary, it sublates it. Thus, there is no contradiction in the experience by accepting silver as distinct from both the existent and non-existent. The latter cognition sublates the empirical reality of silver, since the silver is created by the avidyā which is sublated when its substratum i.e. the shell is realised. The silver in illusion which is unreal appears as empirically

real. It is the appearance which is sublated by the later cognition, since what is cognised there cannot be refuted there only. Otherwise the shell also would be refuted like the silver. One cognition in this way cannot sublate the other one, it can only indicate its otherwiseness (anyathābhāva). Thus, the sublation would take the form as 'upto this time it appeared as silver, not now'. And the sublation cannot be admitted in the same phase since it would be contradictory to the previous cognition. Further, one cognition cannot disprove the content of other cognition so far as cognitions are limited to their own contents (NM. p.121). To admit a contentless cognition would mean to accept the Mādhyamika Buddhist view, which negates the external existence of contents (NM. p.121).

Ānandabodha is his Nyāyamakaranda puts forth the definition of anirvācya as jñānanivartya (that which can be sublated by knowledge) from the Iṣṭasiddhi (p.3) of Vimuktātman (NM. p.124). Ānandabodha proves that the definition of Vimuktātman is not inconsistent since the describable Ātman is never sublated and the sublative silver etc. are indescribable. But the nature of sublation cannot be proved since cognitions restricted to their contents cannot sublate the content of other cognition. Ānandabodha supports

the definition of anirvācyatā as the objectivity of sublation which means the complete cessation of Avidya along with its effects (savilāsa avidyā nivṛttih eva bādhaḥ tadgocaratā anirvācyatā (NM. p.25). Thus the theory of anirvacanīyakhyāti is logically sound, maintains Ānandabodha.

Further, Ānandabodha examines the interpretation of the term anyathā given by the Bhāṭṭas. He refutes the concept of anyathā by arguing that this this another (anyathā) can exist neither in the substratum of shell-silver cognition, nor anywhere else. For its existence elsewhere cannot be proved neither by anubhava (experience) nor by anupapatti (impossibility of otherwise explanation). Three kinds of cognitions which arise in connection with shell-silver illusion are (a) cognition of silver itself (b) cognition of sublation of silver and (c) recognition of silver. These cognitions cannot prove the existence of silver else where (anyatra). The cognition of silver shows silver as aspect of "this". The cognition of sublation determines the absence of silver in front. Thus Ānandabodha points out that the object of erroneous cognition cannot be anywhere else like that of eating other in dream (svapne nabhobhaksana) which has no existence in waking state. (NM. p.92). Further, the existence else where of the object of erroneous cognition cannot be proved by anupatti (impossibility of otherwise explanation).

Ānandabodha examines the nature of sublation
 (bādhadhi) i.e. This is not silver. According to him,
 the sublating cognition does not consist in the denial of
 identity (tādātmya); it recounts the silver on the object
 'this' and denies that aspect alone and not all the identities.
 After the denial of the cognition of two different objects
 between which identity (tādātmya) is supposed to be existing
 arises as the two trees appear identical from a long distance,
 but when the identity is denied, there is no appearance of
 two trees distinct from each other. The sublating
 cognition "This is not silver denies the nature of silver
 but not the identity of silver with shell.