

CHAPTER III

ONTOLOGICAL VIEWS

This chapter embodies a comprehensive and critical analysis of the ontological views of Ānandabodha, viz., the transcendental Reality called Brahman or Ātman is non-dual (advitīya), self-illuminating consciousness (viññāna) and supreme bliss (paramānanda).

3.1 Reality as non-dual

(Ekam, aditīyam) In his three independent works, viz., Nyāyādīpāvali, Pramāṇamālā and Nyāyamakaranda Ānandabodha expounds the Advaita doctrine of Identity of Brahman (Supreme self) with the Jivātman (Individual self) as propounded in the Prasthānatrayī and prominent Advaita Vedānta texts of his predecessors. His Nyāyādīpikā being a commentary on Prakāśātman's śabdanirṇaya explaining the doctrine of śabda-pramā (knowledge of verbal testimony) does not contain any significant discussion about the essential nature of the Supreme Reality i.e. Brahman.

In his Nyāyamakaranda and Pramāṇamālā these purvapakṣas are propounded by the orthodox schools, viz. Sāṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, which uphold the diversity of Individual selves. Ānandabodha explains all

these above doctrines, examines logical validity of their arguments and finally sets aside them pointing out their inconsistencies.

Sāṃkhya doctrine

The Sāṃkhya school advocates the doctrine of diversity of puruṣas (self) as found in the Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (400 A.D.) whom Ānandabodha quotes in his Nyāyamakaranda (p.18). It is stated there that plurality of puruṣas (Ātman) is established by three reasons - 1) definite adjustment of birth, death, and the sense organs; 2) non-simultaneity of activity, 3) diversity due to three attributes (guṇas) i.e. Satva, Rajas and Tamas (SK.18; NM. p.18). Kapila (900 A.D.) in his Sāṃkhyasūtras also advocates the diversity by saying that "Selves are many because of the worldly order" (Vyavasthāto nānā) (SS. 3.5). The main argument which the Sāṃkhya advocates are that if there were one puruṣa, when one is born, all human beings would be born; when one is born, all human beings would be born; when one dies, all would die; if there were any defect in the sense organs of one like deafness, then all would be deaf; but this is not perceptible in the worldly order and since there are several apportionments of death, birth and sense organs in case of different human beings, the diversity of Ātman stands to reason. Moreover, there is no one kind of activity of all human beings in

one particular time. While some are engaged in the activities full of virtues and non-attachment others are engaged in the actions are prohibited by the scripture which lead to the bondage of the soul in this transmigratory world. Thirdly, by different modifications of the three attributes, the plurality of soul is proved, for instance, in ordinary life, one who is sātvika is happy, another who is tāmasika is unhappy. Thus the vyavasthā (definite worldly order) is valid proof for the establishment of the diversity of puruṣas, according to the sāṃkhya school.

Ānandabodha, sets aside these arguments of the sāṃkhya adduced in favour of the doctrine of diversity. He maintains that the phenomena of birth, death and activity (Janana, maraṇa and karāṇa) cannot prove the diversity of Ātman since these are related to the physical body (Kṣetra) and not to Kṣetrajña (knower of the field) i.e. the Supreme self. These physical phenomena can only prove the plurality of physical bodies (kṣetra), not of the Ātman which is not different from the transcendental Reality Brahman (NM. p.19).

Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika doctrine

Though the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are originated as two different schools, yet because of the fact that the Nyāya accepts the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics and Vaiśeṣika accepts the

epistemology and logic, both form jointly one system of philosophy which is known as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The Self (Ātman), according to this school, is a unique substance. It has been defined as "one who recognises (Ny.Vā ON N.S.1.1.10), as that which employs sense-organs to their respective objects of cognition and also as "the substratum of consciousness, which itself is a product and non-eternal. It is defined also as different from body, sense-organs, mind etc. (NS.111.1.1, 111.1.2, 111.1.3). Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition are enumerated as special qualities of soul. (NS. 1.1.10). The souls are innumerable, because of the existing differences in the Universe. (V.S. 111.2.20). There are diverse souls in the diverse bodies. The Advaitin's view that the self is eternal consciousness is not acceptable to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

In brief, according to this school the diversity of souls is proved on the ground of the impossibility of explaining otherwise (anyathā-anupapattiḥ), the arrangement, order and distribution (vyavasthā) as perceived in the world, viz. when Caitra is happy, Maitra is unhappy. If the soul were to be only one everywhere all should be happy or unhappy at one and the same time (NM. p.5). But this is not the case as seen in the world. Kaṇāda, therefore, declares "nānātmāno vyavasthātāḥ (the souls are many due to the order (VS.111.2.20 NM. p.4).

Moreover, Pain (duḥkha) and pleasure (sukha) are the special attributes (viśeṣaguna) of the soul and not of the body, senses and the like, therefore the difference can not be explained with the help of Upādhis like body and others. A soul in one body acts to remove the pain in different parts like head, leg of that particular body only, and not in another. e.g. the soul in the body of chitra does not act to remove the pain in the body of Maitra. The syllogism to prove the diversity is given as follows:

Ātma dravyatvavyatriktā-parajātyādhārabhedā nānā
aśrāvāna Viśeṣagunā-dhikaranattvāt yaduktasādhanam
Yatha ghaṭādi

(NM. p.5-6)

(The self differs with the subgenus other than the dravyatva being the locus of the special qualities which are different from those of ear.)

The Atman is the locus of the special qualities (Viśeṣa guṇa) like intelligence (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha) and others.

Another syllogism has been set forth to prove the diversity of Ātman as follows:

Ātmā nānā
śarīrātma sambandha sambandhi tvāt śarīravat
śarīrāṇi svasmākyāsamkhyeya

tmabhirātmavanti Śarīratvāt

Sampratipanna Śarīravād

(The souls are many because it is associated with the relation between soul and the body. The bodies bear the souls equal in number of bodies).

All these said arguments of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school advanced to prove the diversity of the Ātman are rejected by Ānandabodha as follows:

The term in the sūtra vyavasthānupapatti, employed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to prove the diversity of Ātman is confusing, says Ānandabodha. He questions the import of the very term vyavasthā (order). If the vyavasthā denotes the common experience as chaitra is happy and Maitra is unhappy; then vyavasthā cannot prove the diversity. For it depends on the difference between Chaitra and Maitra which cannot be established without assuming the vyavasthā. Thus it leads to the fault of Parasparāśraya (interdependent) as without vyavasthā difference cannot be proved, and without the difference (bheda) vyavasthā cannot be proved (NM. p.9). If vyavasthā would mean, argues Ānandabodha, difference in pain and pleasure and not the difference in the locus (ādhārā) of pain and pleasure, then it cannot prove the diversity of the Ātman and their differences as the locus of pain and pleasure. The diverse attributes (guṇas) can reside in one locus (ādhārā) like the attributes such as cooking (pacana), burning (dahana) etc. as found in fire.

If the vyavasthā would mean the association of an object with different contradicting attributes (Virudha anekadharmatā vyavasthā), it is not tenable says Anandabodha as it cannot be said that pain and pleasure being opposed to each other cannot co-exist or can have no single locus since we find that a person whose upper part of the body is exposed to the sun and the lower part immersed in the cold water simultaneously experiences both pleasure and pain. The contact of the mind with the Atman produces both heat and cold simultaneously. Likewise the contact of the mind with the Ātman produces both pleasure and pain at the same time. The process of the simultaneous experience of pleasure and pain takes place because single tactile sense-organ (tvagindriya) comes into contact simultaneously with cold and heat. Both these contacts are controlled by the mind through sense-organs just as contacts of eyes with jar and the like are controlled through eyes. These two contacts controlled by mind give rise to only one cognition which has both heat and cold for its content (viṣaya). Though the origination of the special qualities of the soul is accepted simultaneously (a paryāyena) it is possible for pleasure and pain to be the object of one cognition due to the relation called Samyukta-Samavāya (connected inherence) with the internal sense-organs. Eventhough the origination of pleasure and pain is accepted in succession (paryāyena) they, can become

The object of one single cognition, one vanishing and other arising immediately. Thus, so far as the factor of the time is concerned the coexistence of pleasure and pain is not impossible (NM. p.11).

The opposition (virodha) between pleasure and pain cannot be said to be the relation of destroyer and destroyed. For, one unborn cannot destroy other; or one object-cannot destroy another existing in different place.

The opposition between pleasure and pain cannot be said as being of the nature of positive (bhāvarūpa) and negative (abhāvarūpa) which are not seen together, since pleasure and pain which are Pratitvandi can be observed in one soul as a bird and its absence is found in ether (ākāśa). Thus, it is proved that pain and pleasure cannot prove any real difference with regard to their locus, the self (NM. p.18).

The two syllogisms

put forth by the Nyāya school also cannot establish the diversity since the soul is not accepted by the Advaitins as the locus of special qualities. The special qualities, like pleasure and pain, being cognisable and perishable cannot be the attribute of the soul which is eternal, knower. The ether which is given as the example for this phenomenon according to Advaita is non-sentient, hence is not the valid dṛṣṭānta (example). Ānandabodha finally employs the following syllogism:

Vivādapadam anityam jaḍatvāt

(Ether is non-eternal being non-sentient (NM. p.21)).

The Śruti (scripture) also supports this view, by declaring - ātmanah ākāśa sambhuta (Ether is produced from the Ātman (NM. p.21)). The syllogism - ātmanāṇa is not sound, says Ānandabodha, for the hetu i.e. Śarīrātmāsambandha sambandhitvāt is annaikānta with sattājāti and is also sopādhika since Kāryatva is the Upādhi (condition).

The other syllogism - ātmadravyatva is involved with the fault of Siddhasādhana, if diverse bodies are accepted as having souls, the diversity of souls need not be proved again (NM. p.22-24).

Pūrva - Mīmāṃsā Doctrine

Ānandabodha is continuation of the refutation of the doctrine of diversity puts forth the view of Śālikanātha Miśra (700 A.D.) a distinguished advocate of the Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. In his famous work Prakaranapañcika Śālikanātha advocates that the selves are many because of the following reasons:

The diversity of souls in diverse bodies can be inferred from their activities (prayatna). When one perceives the activities of other people he infers the diversity of the souls since all those souls are not as the same that the perceiver has, but

different from it, as the object of its knowledge. The diversity or difference among the souls is proved by inference (anumāna) since the perceiver never infers that as the activities of his body are due to the effort of his soul residing in his body, similarly the activities seen in the bodies of others are also because of the efforts at his own soul. The different souls in different bodies of others are inferred. Thus, diversity of souls is proved.

Secondly, Śālikanātha argues that there is no valid means of knowledge (Pramāṇa) to prove the identity or unity of the Brahman with Jīvātman (Individual self). Direct perception (pratyakṣa) cannot prove it since it reveals form (rūpa), taste (rasa) and other objects differently and does not reveal all of them as one series of form (rūpa) or taste (rasa) or other objects and therefore direct perception does not prove the existence of the one and non-dual reality. If there would have been the cognition of series of forms (rūpadhārā) in the series of tastes (rasadhārā) the direct perception (pratyakṣa) might have established the Advaita. But there is no such experience of such cognition homosapiens. Hence Advaita or the Unity of all selves cannot be established by the testimony of the direct perception (pratyakṣa). Since pratyakṣa fails in proving Advaita all other means of knowledge (Pramāṇa) cannot prove Advaita since they all depend on perception (pratyakṣa) (NM. p.292, pp.336).

Thirdly, Śālikanātha argues that the Veda (Śruti or Scripture) cannot prove Advaita for the object of the Vedas is action (Kriyā). Hence the Veda is not Pramāṇa to know Brahman. Even if it be argued that the Vedic statements reveal the existence of objects, then how can the Vedic statements generate the idea of the existence of Brahman, for Vedic statements generate the ideas of many objects other than the Brahman (NM. 290-1, pp.337). Ānandabodha rejects the arguments of Śālikanātha by saying that just as the vyavasthā (order) of the grāhyagrāhaka relationship (knower-known) can be explained by imaginary different conditioning parts for the soul, so also, there is possibility of having in an additional ground of the existence of efforts and their absences on the part of the soul. For instance, eventhough there is cognition of sound existent in the space of ether by one's own ear, there is non-cognition of that sound by other person, similarly the experience of efforts (Prayatna) and its absence can be explained by presuming special parts of the (Parikalpita puruṣa Pradeśa Viśeṣāt, NM. p.29). Ānandabodha further argues that by perceiving different types of physical body doing the works and others being inactive the diversity of souls cannot be proved.

The difference between the two things viz. one perceptible and the other non-perceptible is not directly

seen like the wind shaking the trees. Thus Ānandabodha avers that the scripture (Sruti) is the only means of knowledge to prove the supreme Reality Brahman. Ānandabodha quotes two verses from Maṇḍana's Brahmasiddhi to substantiate his view which are as follows:

Sarvapratyavedye Vā Brahmarūpe vyavasthite,
Prapañcasyapraivilaya śabdena Pratipadyate
Pravitina Prapañcena tat rūpeṇa na gocaraḥ,
mānāntarasya iti matam āmanāyekanivandhanam,

(BS. IV.3.4. NM. p.298)

(Brahman in the form Sat appears as the locus of all cognitions and the Vedic word declares it as devoid of everything. It cannot be the object of any other valid means, ultimately scriptures are the only authority for this Highest Brahman).

Ānandabodha further contends that although the scriptures are the sentences, made of many words, yet they convey one homogeneous meaning. The word 'esa' in the sentence sa esa na iti na iti can be construed with the absolute absence of dualism. Thus Ānandabodha repudiates the doctrine of diversity advocated by the Prominent philosophical schools and establishes the Advaita doctrine of unity of the Supreme Self Brahman with the Individual Self jīvātman. Jīvātman, according to Ānandabodha,

being a false ceration of the beginningless nescience (anādi avidyā), has no separate existence from Brahman, since Brahman is the true essence of the Individual self. The false notion of Jīvabhāva continues as long as avidyā, persists.

Ānandabodha also quotes numerous Śruti statements in support of his view which negate the diversity of Individual selves: (Bra.Up. 4.4.19; Pin.Up. 1.1; Sve.Up. 6.11).

If it be argued that the Śrutipramāṇa only proves the oneness of the paramātman (supreme self) and does not prove the Unity of the individual selves since the purport of the Upaniṣadic statements is only to prove the oneness of the Paramātman, it is not correct as the analogy of moon given in the Upaniṣadic statement i.e. eka eva hi bhutatmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitāḥ, ekadhābahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat (Brā. Up.11, NM. p.24) denotes the refutation of the difference (bheda) among the Jīvātman and does not refer only to the unitive nature of the Paramātman. The word eva of the above Upaniṣadic sentence clearly indicates the refutation of the difference between the Jīvātman and Brahman. Hence the purport of the Śrutivākyas is not the repudiation of the difference supposed to be existing in the Paramātman since no difference (Bheda) is possible in Brahman.

Again, it cannot be argued that as in the state of worldly life it is seen that when any object, for instance, a jar (ghaṭa)

is negated in one part of the ground it is presumed that ghaṭa exists somewhere else similarly the difference (bheda) though negated in the Paramātmān, it still can be found somewhere else. Because the Brahman is accepted as the cause of the whole universe, and so when anything negated in the cause (Kāraṇa) gets absolutely nullified in its effect (kārya) also. To substantiate his view Ānandabodha quotes from the Iṣṭasiddhi of Vimuktātman - the effect does not exist elsewhere than the cause. If a particular quality is absent in the cause where else can it be? (Is. 1.3; PM.p.4). Ānandabodha proves that since the difference is negated in the Paramātmān, any other object cannot be the substratum of the difference. Ānandabodha employs a syllogism

Vivādapadam bhedasamvedanam na Pramāṇa nivandhanam
anirupitapramāṇakatvād
Vedasamvedanatvād vā
Svapnabhedavabhāsanavad

(NM. p.55)

Ānandabodha further holds the view that the differences which are cognised in the phenomenal world are caused by the Upādhis (adjuncts) like physical body, and sense organs (dehendriya). The Ātman which is in reality, Brahman is attributeless (nirguṇa), it is not the enjoyer (bhoktā) of pleasure (sukha) and pain (duḥkha) etc. which are not qualities of the Ātman or Brahman.

The diverse feelings of pleasure and pain etc. can be explained with the help of the different Upādhis. Just as one Mahākāśa (ether) appears to be many in the form of ghaṭākāśa or grhākāśa etc. because of the diverse upādhis like a jar, a house etc. likewise the embodied self (Jīvatman) in one body feels pain or pleasure in different parts of the body like head or feet etc. which are the adjuncts of the self.

3.2 The Self-luminosity of the Ātman

Ānandabodha expounds the Advaita doctrine of the self-luminosity (Svayamprakāśatā) of the Ātman or Brahman as propogated in the Upaniṣads and earlier Vedānta texts (Brh. Up. iv 3.9; Kath up. 11.2.15, BG.xiii.17; 34). The Self-luminosity of the Ātman follows from the fact that unlike any other empirical inert object, for instance, a jar (ghaṭa) , the Ātman does not require any other light or object for its manifestation but it manifests everything else existing in the empirical world. Apart from the Ātman, no object of the world is self-illuminating, but all objects depend entirely on the Atman for their manifestation.

The self-illuminating nature of the Ātman is proved by the fact that men after knowing the real nature of the object whether favourable or unfavourable, endeavour to achieve only favourable ones and withdraw themselves from unfavourable objects (NM p.130, PM. p.17-18). D. The real nature of the objects whether good or

bad not known by the objects themselves as they are insentient, but known by the sentient Ātman. This worldly capability of determining the nature of the objects as good or bad undoubtedly proves that the Ātman is self-luminous.

Ānandabodha employs the following syllogism to prove the self-luminosity of the Ātman in his Nyāyamakaranda (p.131).

Vijñānam avacchedakātma prakāśādhīnam
avacchinna prakāśatvāt
Ya Uktasādhana
Sa Uktasādhya
Yathā daṇḍa prakāśādhīna daṇḍa prakāśa

In his Pramāṇamālā also Ānandabodha discusses this point mutatis mutandis but in this text the above syllogism has been modified as follows:

idam avachcedakaprakāśādhīnam
avacchinna prakāśatvāt
daṇḍi prakāśavat (PM. p.4)

In this connection Ānandabodha refutes the pūrvapakṣa view which upholds that the Ātman can become the object of mental perception (mānasa pratyakṣa viṣaya). And the Ātman cannot be

self-luminous since it depends on mind (mānasa) for its manifestation (pp. p.333).

Ānandabodha refutes this view by saying that the Ātman cannot be manifested by the mental perception since the Ātman cannot be the object of its own cognitive operation or psychosis (vṛtti) as one object cannot be both Kartā (subject) and Karma (object). For example, a sword which cannot cut as well as touch itself or a finger-tip which cannot touch itself at one and the same time. (NM. p.131, pp.335). Since the Ātman is the subject of all cognitions it cannot be an object of cognitions. Hence the purvapakṣa view is not valid, says Ānandabodha. Ānandabodha further refutes the view of Śālikanātha who in his Prakarṇa Pañcikā advocates Ātman as the subject of the cognition (vijnāna). Śālikanātha argues that the Ātman not perceived through the direct mental perception (manasa pratyakṣa) cannot be said to be self-luminous. For the Ātman is manifested in all the object-cognitions (sarvam-artha-samvitṣu) which depend on the sense organs (indriyadhīna) (NM. p.132). It cannot be said that because the Ātman is the recipient of the ultimate result of the action (kriyā). It (Ātman) is the object of the action since that would go against the functioning capability of the Ātman. (na khalu asya kriyāphalabhājah api karmabhāvahyatāḥ anātmani vrttiḥ virudhyate.) (NM. p.132).

For those who know the concept of karma (object) well, they advocate the object (karma) to be one connected with the fruit of the action inherent in something else, i.e. in the Kartā (Para-Samaveta Kriyāphalāsālitī karma iti karmavidaḥ. NM. p.132). This being the case, the Ātman is not the object like a person who strives to reach a town. (tathā sati na atmanah karmabhavaḥ gantṛvat (NM. p.133), e.g. when Caitra, goes to a town through the action of going inherent in him i.e. caitra, he becomes the enjoyer of the ultimate result i.e. reaching the town, yet Caitra is not the object (Karma) nor is the Ātman's functioning (atmanah vyāpāra) is contradictory in any manner. It is only the town that is the object (Karma), being connected with the fruit, produced by action of going inherent in caitra. Sālikanātha further argues that the Ātman cannot be perceived mentally since perception or cognition implies some object for it and as the Atman cannot be the object (Karma), it follows that the Ātman cannot be perceived. The cognition of a blue object manifests the Ātman which is its locus as 'not this' (nedam) and the blue object as 'this' (idam).

Ānandabodha briefly refutes the above mentioned view of Sālikanath. He opines that if the Ātman would have been different from its cognition and at the same time would not have been the object (karma) thereof, it would not depend on cognition

(vijnāna or samvid) for its manifestation. That which is manifested by cognition is necessarily its object. As the Ātman cannot be the object of its cognition (vijnāna) it logically follows that it cannot be manifested by cognition (vijnāna) because being manifested by cognition (vijnāna) is being pervaded (vyāpya) by 'being an object of cognition just as 'śimsapāness' (śimsapātva) is pervaded (vyāpya) by treeness (vrkṣatva). When 'treeness' is denied (vyāvartamāna) in a particular object, it is obvious that 'śimsapāness' is also per se absent there. Similarly, if the Ātman is not the object of cognition (vijnāna) it cannot be manifested by cognition (NM. p.135). Ānandabodha finally employs the syllogism:

Samveditā na Samvidadhīnaprakāśah

Samvitkarmanāmantarenaparokṣatvāt

Samvedanavaditi (NM p.160).

(The cogniser does not depend on cognition for his manifestation because he is not the object of cognition but is self-luminous like cognition itself).

Thus, Ānandabodha refutes Śālikanātha's views and proves the vedāntic doctrine of self-luminosity of the Ātman, as propounded in the earlier texts of the Advaita Vedānta.

Ātman as Vijnana (consciousness) :

Ānandabodha in his Pramāṇamālā and Nyāyamakaranda expounds the Advaita doctrine of Supersensuous Reality termed Brahman or Ātman as consciousness (vijnāna) as expounded in the fundamental texts of Prasthānatraya and those of his celebrated predecessors".¹ With the help of a number of scriptural statements (Srutivākya) and valid reasonings he establishes the Advaita doctrine that Brahman is of the nature of Pure Consciousness (visudha vijnāna) which constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. As Brahman is devoid of attributes (nirguṇa), consciousness cannot be its attribute. Consciousness, according to Advaita Vedānta, being itself Brahman is not identical with the empirical knowledge expressed by the terms like jñāna, buddhi etc., and consciousness (vijnāna or samvid) is trans-empirical and transcendental.

According to Ānandabodha pure consciousness (visudha vijnāna) is self-luminous (svayamprakāśa) (PM. p.13, NM. p.137) which does not require any other object for its luminosity. Since all the empirical objects are manifested by this supreme light no object can illumine supreme consciousness, Brahman which is therefore self-luminous and self-proved.

Presentation and refutation of the Nyāya view :

Ānandabodha differs from the view put forth by the Nyāya-school which does not approve the

1. Brh. Up. iii.a.28; Tait. Up.ii.1; BG.XIII.17.

theory of self-luminosity of the consciousness (vijñāna), as expounded by the preceptors of the Advaita philosophy. According to the Nyāya, school the Self (Ātman) is essentially a pure substance (dravya). The knowledge (jñāna or buddhi) being one of the adventitious qualities of the Ātman (NS.3.2.8). (Vārtika on N.S.: 3.2.8) resides in the Atman. Hence samvibh or Vijñāna is not self-luminous (svayam prakāsa).

Ānandabodha asks the question whether vijñāna (consciousness) cognises objects when in itself it is luminous or otherwise (NM. p.137). If the consciousness manifests objects being itself unmanifest then there would arise doubt whether a pot is cognised or not, i.e. when a person cognises a pot after that pot-cognition, he does not doubt whether he has seen the pot or not as he is sure of the pot-cognition. Hence it is proved that consciousness at the time of manifesting an object manifests itself since there does not arise any doubt concerning the cognition. Without admitting the self-luminosity of the cognition (vijñāna) the determination of the cognition of any object would not be possible (NM. p.137). Ānandabodha therefore employs the following syllogism:

Vijñānamārtha Prakāśanasamaye Prakāśate

tadupadhavanantaram sandehāyogyaha arthavat (NM. p.138).

(Consciousness manifests itself at the time of manifestation of object

because after the cognition of an object doubt does not arise about that cognition.
like the object)

If it be said that consciousness (viññāna) manifests an object being itself manifest by another consciousness then it does not stand to reason. For it will lead to infinite regress (anavasthā), because for the manifestation of the first cognition a second will be necessary, and for the second, a third (NM. p.138-139). Thus, the process would not come to a logical end. Moreover, numerous cognitions of the worldly objects cannot occur at one and the same time. The worldly objects like a jar (ghaṭa) and others are insentient by nature and consequently they are not self-luminous. Nor are they manifest by one another. If it be argued that consciousness though insentient, manifests an object, like the eyes, which though insentient manifest a visible object, Ānandabodha rejects this view saying that the alternatives involved in it are not admissible. Manifesting is producing manifestation. The manifestation produced by consciousness is either non-different from the object of the cognition or manifestation is different from the object of cognition. The manifestation (prakāśa) is not the nature of object since an insentient object and manifestation (prakāśa) cannot be identical with each other like a liquid and a solid, and the momentary manifestation cannot be identical with an object which is subtle in nature (NM. p.141-2).

Nor can it be said that Prakasa (manifestation) is something other than the object, and is an attribute of the object (arthadharmā) generated by the cognition (viññāna); for if it would have been the case, there would not have been manifestation of the past and future objects, though actually such a manifestation is always seen (asti ca tayoh abi avabhāsaḥ).

Again, if manifestation (Prakāsa) were to be internal (antaram) it is nothing but the cognition (viññāna) if were to be non-sentient, (jaḍa), would manifest neither the object nor its own nature. Then the entire world would be blind (jagat āndhyam prasajyeta). Therefore it must be admitted that cognition (viññāna) is self-luminous and also manifests the objects. (NM. p.142). Just as light dispelling darkness helps the eye sight in its operation and illumines itself and the object without requiring any other light, in the same way the Ātman manifests itself and the objects without the need of any intervening object (NM. p.143).

Criticism of the Yogācāra View

The Yogācāra, one of the four schools of the Buddhist philosophy otherwise known as Viññānavādins for advocating viññāna (consciousness) as the supreme Reality, argues that the viññāna is not eternal (nitya) but momentary (kṣaṇika).

To prove the validity of the momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) of the viññāna this school points out that cognition of blue (nila) is different from the cognition of yellow (pita). The individual cognitions like the cognition of blue etc. arise and perish and so no cognition can be said to be eternal, maintains the Yogācāra school.

Ānandabodha refutes this view by saying that the momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) of cognition cannot be proved by any means of knowledge. The argument, viz. "when 'blue' is cognised 'yellow' is not cognised" is not capable of proving the momentariness of the cognition. In all individual cognitions (samvedana vyakti) like the cognition of blue (nila) etc. there underlies one basic cognition (viññāna) which is identical with all these subsequent cognitions. Hence the eternality of the cognition or consciousness is absolutely valid and logical.

Secondly, the contention of the Yogācāra school, viz. the individual cognitions like the cognition of blue are momentary, is not tenable according to Ānandabodha because there would not be the cognition of difference (bheda) among the cognitions without a conscious self or viññāna, the perceiver of their differences. The cognition of different cognitions presupposes the Ātman which is of

the nature of viññāna. Since no other object or entity except Ātman or viññāna can determine the difference, the consciousness (viññāna) is proved to be ternal (nitya) (NM. p.134-44).

3.3 Bliss (Ānanda)

Following the Prasthānatrayī and the texts of his Predecessors Ānandabodha in his Pramāṇamālā contends that as the individual soul (jīvatman) is identical with the supreme self both are of the nature of absolute bliss² 'tathacamaya mānanda svabhavaḥ syat ātmatvāt Paramatmavat (p.3). This blissful nature (ānandasvabhava) of the self (Ātman) is experienced in everyday life as the object of supreme love. To substantiate his view Ānandabodha quotes the statement of Yajñavalkya from the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, ātmanastu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati (2-4-5) i.e. the Ātman is dearer than any other object in the transmigratory world. It is seen in this empirical world that there is hierarchy among the objects loved by a person e.g. a son is dearer than a friend, and a wife is dearer than a friend. Following the hierarchy the self is the dearest of all. (PM. p.2).

2. Brh.Up.III. 9.28; iv.3.19,20,21, 32,, i.4.8; ii.4.5; iii.4.2; iii.5.1; chā.Up.vii.23.1; vii.24; Tai.Up.ii.4, 7,9; iii.5.1.

Ānandabodha asserts that the blissful nature of the Ātman is further proved by Ātman's non-relation with any kind of evil which is non-self (anātman). If the nature of the Ātman were not ānand (bliss) it would not have been loved by all the beings and would have been devoid of Paramapremāspadabhāva (being the receptacle of the Supreme love), for without the nature of Supreme bliss (Paramānanda svabhāva), the nature of the Supreme love of the Ātman (Paramapremāspadabhāva) is impossible since the nature of Supreme bliss (paramānanda svabhāva) is co-related with the Supreme love for the self. (NM. p.175).

Ānandabodha further says that the expression of a living being such as "I should not be born again (mā na bhuyām bhuyāsam) indicates the blissful nature of the Ātman, because all human beings experience sufferings in this transmigratory world caused by nescience (avidyā) and they endeavour to attain the Supreme bliss, which is the essential nature of the Ātman. They also desire not to come back again to this mundane world. Since all the human beings love their own selves they therefore endeavour to achieve only those mundane objects which are favourable to the Ātman, rather than to our physical body.

The opponent argues that the expression of human beings like "I should not be born again in this mundane world."

(mā na bhuyām bhuyasam) does not denote blissful nature of the Ātman, but fear of suffering (duḥkhabhaya) which a man tries to avoid along with the birth in the Samsāra in best possible way; this is because of fear of pain, caused by the destruction of physical body etc, (NM. p.175) as pointed out in the Bhagavadgītā (XIII.8).

Then Ānandabodhe sets aside this purvapakṣa argument by saying that though there is fear of suffering arising out of pain caused by the destruction of physical body etc., still pain belongs to the upādhis (adjuncts) like the body (sarīra) etc. Hence pain cannot be the cause of fear of suffering but the enjoyment of mundane objects (bhoga) is the cause of suffering. A person becomes miserable because of his enjoyment of undesirable objects. Hence the enjoyment of objects resulting in misery and painful experience creates an urge in a person to attain the Supreme bliss which is nothing but the self (Ātman) dearly loved by a person.

In the Pramāṇamālā Ānandabodha argues that unlike the worldly objects the Ātman endowed with the Supreme bliss is obly whole heartedly loved by every person. Hence every person rejects and hates the worldly objects and finally attempts to attain the Supreme bliss after experiencing the miserable condition of the mundane world and realising the blissful nature of the self which is both all-pervasive and transcendental.

To prove this Ānandabodha employs the following syllogism:

Jivascha paramānanda svabhāvaḥ
Ya uktasādhya na bhavati
nasau uktasādhanah
Yathā ghaṭaḥ
na cayamuktasadhano na bhavati
tatsolanna noktasādhyā (PM. p.2)

(individual soul has the nature of highest bliss since it is the subject of the supreme love as the object which has not of the highest nature of bliss, cannot be the subject of Supreme love as a jar which has not the nature of Supreme bliss. Hence it is not the subject of Supreme love).

Ānandabodha explains the nature of bliss (ānanda). He firstly differentiates brahmānanda (Brahman-Bliss) from the mundane pleasure and then explains the positive nature of bliss (ānanda).

Brahmānanda, according to Ānandabodha, is eternal (nitya) ubiquitous (vyāpaka) and not limited by any upādhi (adjunct). It is transcendental and altogether different from the mundane pleasure expressed by the terms like Sukha or duḥkhābhāva etc. Brahmānanda is not an object of love as a

source of enjoyment (upabhogasādhana) like a piece of Sandal (candana) or a woman (vanitā) (NM. p.174). Since these are perishable and always prone to painful experiences.

Ānandabodha argues that there is difference between Brahmānanda and Sāṃsārika-ānanda (worldly happiness), otherwise no difference in one's delight and the delight of another in the empirical world would be found. The empirical pleasure experienced in the achievement of the dearest objects is non-sentient (jaḍa), finite, limited and mere semblance (ābhāsa) of the Supreme-Bliss, for all the creatures are originated from the bliss. Ānandabodha quotes from the Brh. Up. in his Pramāṇamālā to substantiate his position (PM. p.1 Brh. Up. 4-3-32).

According to Ānandabodha, brahmānanda is positive (bhāvarūpa) and not negative by nature (abhāvarūpa) such as absence of misery (duḥkhābhāva). Ānandabodha in his Pramāṇamālā employs the following syllogisms to prove it:

Ānando duḥkhābhā na bhavati tadanirupyatvāt
Yadittham tattathā
Yathā ghaṭaḥ (PM. p.1)

(Bliss is not absence of misery since it cannot be proved like a jar).

ānando bhāvarupaḥ

Pratiyogyanirupyatvāt

ghaṭavat (PM. p.1)

(Bliss is positive because it does not depend on its counterentity like a jar)

Ānandabodha explains in his Pramāṇamālā that the knowledge of the absence of jar (ghaṭābhāva) depends on the knowledge of ghaṭa since ghaṭa is the counterentity (Pratiyogī) of ghaṭābhāva (absence of jar (PM. p.4). But the knowledge of jar does not depend on the knowledge of its absence (abhāva). So ghaṭa is a positive entity (bhāvapadārtha). Similarly ānanda (bliss) is experienced without the knowledge of its absence. Therefore ānanda is a positive entity (bhāvapadārtha) like a ghaṭa.

Ānandabodha further maintains that ānanda (bliss) and duḥkhābhāva (absence of misery) are two different entities. Hence the relation of entity and counterentity cannot exist between them. (PM. p.1) as ānanda and duḥkhābhāva are experienced separately by a person since without the latter the former i.e. ānanda is experienced in this world. For example, says Ānandabodha, when a person hears all of a sudden a sound of a lyre (vipañcī), he experiences ānanda which is positive by nature and not merely the absence of misery. Thus,

Ānandabodha established the Advaita view that ānanda is of positive nature (bhāvarūpa). As it would be discussed later on in the chapter of mokṣa, according to Ānandabodha, the nature of the Supreme Reality is bliss, pure and Simple without any tinge of duḥkha or duḥkhābhāva (absence of misery).

Individual Self (Jīvātman)

Following Śaṅkara Ānandabodha states that Individual soul (Jīvātman) is not different in reality from the Brahman, the transcendental Reality (na ca paramātmā jīvātmanastatvato vyatiricyata ityapāditamaḥastad (NM. p.25-26). Ānandabodha employs the following syllogisms in his Pramāṇamālā to prove the non-difference as follows:

- a) Jīvaḥ Paramātmanastatvato na bhidyante
ātmatvāt
Paramātmavat (PM. p.3)
- b) Vivādādhyāsītā Jīvaḥ Prativādinastatvato na vyatiricyante
jīvatvādātmatvadvā
Prativādivat (PM. p.3)

According to Ānandabodha, the Individual soul (jīvātman) is a false projection of Avidyā (nescience) which has in reality no existence. It is Brahman which because of the beginningless nescience does not realise its essential nature i.e. existence-

consciousness and bliss (sat-cit-ānanda) and considers himself as jīvātman. Ānandabodha like his predecessors uses example of the ether (akāśa) to explain the jivahood of the Ātman, the Supreme self. He says that as the ether though one and all-pervasive, appears to be numerous because of limitations of ear-hole (karṇaśaskula), similarly the Brahman being limited by the physical body appears to be diverse which is a false notion (tattatkarṇa saṣkulīmaṇḍalāvacchinnasya nabhasa statra tatra srotrabhāvavat tattadbhōgāyatanādyavaccheda-jivabhava bhedasya tatrata tatra bhogopapattyā kimane kātma kalpanā-durbyasena, NM p.26-27) Ānandabodha also uses the example of reflection or type (Pratibimba) and proto-type (bimba) to elucidate the same. As the one bimba appears to be diverse in the form of Pratibimbā (reflections) similarly one Brahman appears to be numerous Individual selves. (bimba pratibimbayoḥ Pratibimbanamiva ca Parāspāramalīkanīrbhāsa eva, PM. p.3).

Ānandabodha further asserts that the difference (bheda) which is found in this transmigratory world among the Individual selves as one is a scholar and other is a fool, is unreal (asatya) and illusory based on Avidyā (PM. p.8).

As Jīvātman (Individual self) is identical with Brahman, the Supreme Reality, it is also of the nature of Supreme bliss (Paramānanda). Ānandabodha employs the following syllosim :

jivasca paramānandasvabhābah
Paramapremāspadatvāt
ya uktasadyo na bhabati
nāsauvuktasādhanaḥ
yathā ghataḥ (PM. p.2)

Thus Ānandabodha proves that jīvātman (Individual soul) is not a real entity but Brahman itself. And the difference (bheda) is unreal and aupādhika (conditional).

The Problem of the World

Ānandabodha following the Prasthānatraya and the texts of his predecessors' explains the nature of the world (jagat) in his three works, viz., Pramāṇamālā, Nyāyamakaranda and Nyayadīpāvali. He puts forth the view that the world (jagat) is false (mithyā) designed by anādi avidyā (beginningless nescience). However, the phenomenal world is not absolutely unreal (tuccha) like sky-flower (ākāśakusuma) and not also real like Brahman. Although the world thus has phenomenal reality, compared to the Ultimate Transcendental Reality i.e. Brahman, the world is false (mithyā).

The prove the falsity (mithyātva) of the world

Ānandabodha in his Nyāyamakaranda and Pramāṇamālā employs the following syllogism:-

Prapancaḥ avidyāvijṛmbhitah

jādyadrśyatvāhetubhyām

rajatasvapnadṛśyavat

(NM. p.128; PM. p.11)

(The world is a product of avidyā, because it is non-sentient and perceptible like the perception of silver and dream).

Explaining the nature of two hetus (reasons) i.e. jaḍatva (non-sentient) and drśyatva (perceptible) in the Pramāṇamālā ³ Ānandabodha says that the non-sentient (jaḍatva) nature means the absence of self-luminosity (anātmaprakasatva) or being the nature of a - samvidrūpatvam and therefore is of the nature of the negation or exclusion with regards to the Supreme Reality. While perceptibility (drśyatva) as a rule means being seen by something other than itself (sva-atirekid-arsāna drśyatvam). These two hetus i.e. jaḍatva and drśyatva, according to Ānandabodha, are not possible in case of the Ātman or Brahman since it is pure consciousness (visudha vijñāna) and self-lumionous (svayāṁprakāsa) as proclaimed by the Upaniṣads (Brh. Up 3-9-28; Kath.15, Sweta. Up.6.14; Mund. Up.2.2.10).

In the Nyāyadīpāvali (P.1) Ānandabodha employs one more syllogism as follows:-

vivādapadam (jagat) mithyā

dr̥syatvāt

yathā rajatam Ubhayavādyavivādāspadam (ND. p.1)

(The object of dispute i.e. the world, is false because it is an object of perception like the silver in the shell).

Ānandabodha proclaims that the said syllogism is devoid of fallacies (hetvābhāsa or hetudoṣas).

The opponent argues that if the phenomenal world is unreal (vivādāpadam mithyā), then the world cannot be a substratum of the hetu i.e. dr̥syatava (perceptible) since the substratum should be always existent or real object, otherwise the hetu cannot reside in pakṣa (locus)

Ānandabodha refutes this by saying that though the world is accepted as unreal, it is not absolutely unreal (tuccha) like the sky-flower (ākāśakusuma) as its phenomenal reality has been accepted. The world being false also can be a substratum (pakṣa) as implied in the above syllogism. Thus the pūrvapakṣa argument does not stand to reason.

Ānandabodha further contents that an absolutely non-existent object also can be a substratum in a negative inference (vyatireka anumāna) e.g. Vandhyāsutah Vaktā na bhavati

acetanatvāt

pasānavat

Ānandabodha says that though a positive or an affirmative term (astivācaka) is impossible with reference to an absolutely non-existent object, the negative term (nāstivācaka) can be used for a non-existent object. Otherwise there would not be a single term to express the non-existent entities. When one expresses a statement that a negative term is not possible in case of absolutely non-existent entities, he admits a negative term, since negation (abhāva) means absence of something. To substantiate this view, Ānandabodha quotes a verse from the Pramānavārttika of Dharmakīrti (600 A.D.) the great Buddhist philosopher.

Vidhānam Pratiṣedham ca muktivā śabdosti nāparah ।

Vyavahāra sa castasu neti prāptātra muktatā ॥

(PM. p.2; PV.4.225)

Ānandabodha further maintains that the hetu, (dr̥syatva) is not involved with any of the following defects.

- 1) Svarūpasiddha hetvābhāsa (unproved)

For, Svarūpasiddha occurs if the hetu remains absent in the pakṣa. In the given syllogism - Vivādapadam mithyā dr̥syatvat, the hetu i.e. dr̥syatva remains present

in the pakṣa i.e. the world. Hence it is bereft of Svarupasiddha fallacy.

2) Vyāpyatvāsiddha (unproved)

It is not involved with vyāpyatvāsiddha, since the condition (upādhi) required for this fallacy is not present in the given syllogism.

3) Virodha (Contrary reason)

The hetu i.e. dr̥ṣyatva is not involved with virodha (Contrary reason). For Virodha-hetvābhāsa occurs if the hetu proves the absence of sādhya. But here dr̥ṣyatva does not prove the absence of sādhya i.e. mithyātvābhāva because the Ātman, the transcendental reality is not accepted as the object of perception like a jar (NDI p.5).

4) Savyabhicāra (discrepant reason)

Ānandabodha further maintains that the hetu i.e. dr̥ṣyatva is free from the fallacy called savyabhicāra (discrepant reason) (since savyabhicāra co-exists with the sādhya partially. But it is not possible because unlike jagat the Ātman cannot become the object of

perception as it is self-luminous. The other thing that could be urged as real as well as perceptible is the cessation of avidyā which would be perishable if it is different from the Ātman. If jagat is identical with the Ātman, the former would be self-illuminating and not an object of perception. Thus, there is no scope for the fallacy called Savyabhicāra.

5) Bādhita (annulled)

According to Ānandabodha, the hetu dr̥syatva is not involved with the bādhita (annulled) fallacy for it occurs only when the absence of sādhya becomes established by another pramāṇa (means of knowledge). But in case of the said syllogism, - Vivādapadam mithyā dr̥syatvāt there is no other means of knowledge to prove the reality of the world which is sādhyaābhāva. Direct perception (pratyakṣa) cannot prove the reality of the world for it only illuminates the object, not its reality. Inference (anumāna) also cannot prove the reality of the world since it depends on perception. Comparision (upamāna) shows only similarity between two objects and does not prove reality or unreality of any object. Presumption (arthāpatti) also proves thing which is seen or heard but which is impossible to be

explained by other means of knowledge. But presumption cannot prove the reality of the world since the worldly objects cannot be explained as those seen in a dream. And finally non-perception (abhāva) also cannot establish the reality of the world which is a positive entity (bhāvapadārtha). Hence as there is no means of knowledge to prove the absolute reality of the world, the hetu i.e. dr̥śyatva is not bādhita (annulled)

6) Satpratipakṣa (inconclusive reason)

The hetu becomes involved with the fallacy called satpratipakṣa (inconclusive reason) if there is another hetu to prove the absence of sādhya, but in case of the said syllogism i.e. Vibādapadam mithyā jādātīvāt two hetus can be accepted viz. abādhya (not being nullified) and arthakriyākāritva (serving a useful purpose). Both of these hetus cannot prove the reality of the world since abādhya is contradictory to sādhya i.e. mithyātva itself and arthakriyākāritva (serving a useful purpose) can be applicable even to the objects in dreams, which are not real. Thus the hetu i.e. dr̥śyatva is devoid of all fallacies and it is a valid reason (sadhetu) to prove the falsity of the world, contends Ānandabodha.

Moreover, Ānandabodha rejects the Difference (bheda) supposed to be existing among the objects of knowledge (jñeya padārthas). Since it is unreal caused by Avidyā and perishable, no means of knowledge (pramāṇa) can prove the validity of Difference (bheda) Direct perception cannot cognise bheda (difference) for the following reasons:-

Firstly, direct perception (pratyakṣa) cannot manifest the Difference alone, for without the knowledge of an object and its counter-entity (pratiyogī), the Difference alone cannot be perceived.

Secondly, direct perception cannot manifest the Difference (bheda) first and then the objects, or the objects first, then the difference, since the cognition being momentary cannot have more than one function (vyāpāra) at one and the same time, though cognition (vyrtti or jñāna) does not disappear immediately in the next moment and continues for two and three moments. There cannot be any other function (vyāpāra) of cognition other than its own origination (Utpatti) (NM. p.33).

If it be argued that origination (Utpatti) of cognition is not a function (vyāpāra) of cognition since it cannot be related to that which is originated (jāta) as origination (Utpatti) of jāta (who is born) is virtually impossible. Nor

the origination of cognition can be related to ajāta (which is not originated), since function (vyāpāra) can be of an existent object (bhāva padārtha) (NM. p.34).

Ānandabodha refutes this by saying that cognition (vṛtti or jñāna) is not kāraka (agent) since kāraka produces an effect (kārya) but cognition does not create any addition to the worldly object as it is impossible with past and future objects. It is never seen that a locus (ālambana) has vanished or has come into existence and its attribute has an existence in the present (NM. p.34). Hence the manifestation of the object (arthāvagraha) is the nature (rūpa) of cognition. The notion of Difference is understood in the secondary sense (lakṣaṇā) as in the statement of there is a head of Rāhū (rahoḥ sirah). As Rāhū, (one of the nine planets) has, ipso facto, no head and the head (sira) is itself Rāhū, similarly Difference (bheda) is not a real entity but an illusion as that of the head of Rāhū. Ānandabodha further says that cognition depends on its origination and therefore this very origination is accepted as its function (vyāpāra) (NM. p.35) To substantiate Ānandabodha quotes from the Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana Miśra - api ca janma eva buddheḥ vyāpārah arthāvagraha rūpāyāḥ (BS. p.45; NM. p.35). The very origination of cognition which has the nature of the manifestation of object is its function.)

Thirdly, perception (pratyakṣa) cannot manifest both objects and Difference since the cognition of difference depends on the object and its counter-entity (pratiyogī) e.g.

to know the difference separately from the object from a distant place which is beyond perception, the remembrance (smṛti) of that object has to be admitted along with the perception of the object in front. Similarly, to know the difference separately from the object at hand the two different cognitions of object and the counter-entity (pratīyogī) have to be admitted. These three cognitions, i.e. the object, the counterentity and the Difference cannot be cognised simultaneously. Thus perception cannot manifest the difference as well as the object. Ānandabodha maintains that since direct perception (pratyakṣa) cannot cognise the Difference (bheda) no other means of knowledge (pramāṇa) can cognise it as all of them depend on the direct perception. Inference (anumāna) depends on the perception (pratyakṣa) for the knowledge of relation of vyāpya and vyāpaka. Hence inference fails in proving the reality of the Difference. (NM. p.38). Verbal testimony (śabda) also depends on the knowledge of Difference between word and its meaning. Presumption (arthāpatti) is of the nature of a necessary assumption as oil can be had only from the sesamum. It also depends on the perception. Hence for the presumption (arthāpatti) also the knowledge of Difference is necessary and for the knowledge of Difference the knowledge of presumption is necessary. This leads to the fault of interdependence (parasparāśraya). Thus, presumption cannot prove difference (bheda). Similarly upamāna also cannot be the means

for cognising Difference, since it has for its object the similarity in two things that are proved by other means. Non-cognition (abhāva) also does not cognise difference since its existence depends upon Difference between the thing excluded and from which it is excluded. Non-cognition (abhāva) is dependent on knowledge of Difference and hence cannot be a valid means for establishing Difference (NM. p.38).

In the Nyāyamakaranda (PP 44-51) Ānandabodha refutes two characteristics of Difference (bheda), a) it is of the nature of a thing (vastusvarūpa) and b) it is the attribute of a thing (dharma svarūpa). It is argued that Difference (bheda) is the very nature of positive entities (bheda svabhāvāḥ sarve bhavāḥ) (NM. p.44). Perception (pratyakṣa) which cognises the things as such, has for its object also the mutual exclusion (pratyakṣam paraspara vyavṛttivisayam NM.44). In direct perception (pratyakṣa) the object appear as having an exclusive nature. The experience, establishing the existence of blue, establishes also its Difference from yellow and the like. Indeed, Difference (bheda) as distinct from the things cannot be explained as. If it is accepted as distinct from the object, it should be experienced differently. Difference between the two, i.e. the object and its Difference (bheda), must be known by another Difference. Thus it would lead to the fault of anavasthā (infinite regress). If Vidāraṇa (dichotomy)

is accepted as the very nature of difference, it is easier to accept the same as the object (atha na bhedo bhedāntarabhedyah tasya svabhāvato bhedāt hante astu vastu eva tathā lāghavāt.

(NM. p.44).

Ānandabodha refutes this prime facie view by saying that if that whose nature is vidāraṇa (bheda) would be identified with object, then there would not be unitive feature the objects since oneness or unity coexistent with non-difference conflicts with difference. (bhedasya vidāraṇatmano vasturūpatve na kincana ekam vastu syāt (NM. p.46). The knowledge of difference consists of two parts i.e. the locus (ādhāra) and counterentity (pratiyogī) of difference, as in the form this is different from that where this is the locus of difference and 'that' is the counterentity. If difference is identical with the locus, then one and the same object would be cognised in two forms, viz., the object and the counterentity. Then there would not be the knowledge of the 'one' object. Like the oneness of the object, the plurality which is the collection (samāhāra) of many Individual things, would become impossible. Again, the difference cannot be the third entity apart from oneness and plurality, as flavour (gandha) is from form (rūpa) and taste (rasa) because oneness and plurality are opposed to each other. The denial of one leads to the existence of others, like perishability and non-perishability where if perishability denied, non-perishability becomes affirmed.

Difference is of the form of blue only in relation to yellow and the like and not in relation to the blue itself. The object is only one in the form of blue and different in relation to other entities. But Ānandabodha explains that the difference (bheda) being of the nature of a positive entity, is originated from the cause of that entity and hence should not require the counter-entity (pratiyogī). If it requires, then that would be contradictory, for the object by itself does not require any such thing. Thus difference (bheda) does not require any other thing for its origination, not also for its existence. If establishment of one's individual nature is mutually dependent, not even one will be established.

3. If the existence of blue is dependent on the existence of yellow and vice versa, the existence of any one of the two will not be proved for the obvious flaw of interdependence (Parasparāśraya).

4. For blue and the like, there is no requirement of mutual dependence in case of dealing with empirical objects (artha-kriyā) for the person desirous of blue never takes up yellow and like. Sentient being is in need of an all of a only and only. Hence positive entities do not require another positive entity. From this, it is clear that if difference is a positive

entity (bhāva Padārtha) it cannot require any other positive entity, for as Difference (bheda) requires the counter-entity (Pratiyogī) it could not be of the nature of a positive entity. Thus Difference (bheda) cannot be said to be positive in nature according to Ānandabodha.

5. It is argued that difference (bheda) is the attribute (dharma) of the object, and it can be perceived. Though another difference between difference and the object is admitted still there cannot be the fault of infinite regress (anavasthā). Because when the very basic idea is not in danger and nullified, the anavasthā (infinite-regress) is not a fault in the argument. The root (mūla) here means the original reason, is, the Primary knowledge of the difference (bhedajñāna). This can be had in the indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpakajñāna). In the indeterminate knowledge (savikalapakajñāna) the difference and the object appear simultaneously then in the determinate knowledge one appears as the difference and the other as the counter-entity (Pratiyogī, p.49).

Ānandabodha refutes this view by saying that the knowledge of locus-attribute relation (āśrayāśrayībhāva) between the difference and the object is impossible without the knowledge of difference. e.g. for the knowledge of a man possessing stick (dandi) one must know both the stick and the man

differently. Similarly the knowledge of difference, whether it appears as a locus as in 'the difference of jar' or as an attribute as in 'jar is different from the Pillar' should necessarily be preceded by the knowledge of difference. In the Pramāṇamālā (p.5). Anandabodha remarks that one cannot know the locus-attribute relationship (āśrayāśrayibhāva) or dharma-dharmibhāva) between the two objects from distance. Thus the knowledge of difference does require the knowledge of another difference which is of the nature of difference. Thus the succeeding differences cannot be proved without the establishment of the preceeding differences. And that preceeding ones cannot be proved without proving the original difference. Thus it leads to infinite regress (anavasthā).

6. Anandabodha points out further that as difference (bheda) cannot be proved either as the Svabhāva (nature of the object) or a-svabhāva (different from the object) it also cannot be proved as Svabhāvāsvabhāva sammuccaya or Svabhāvāsvabhāva vilakṣaṇa. The combination (samuccaya) of Svabhāva and a-svabhāva would be contradictory like the combination of a positive and negative characteristics. The third alternative (vilakṣaṇa) from Svabhāva and a-svabhāva is also impossible. Thus, the nature of difference is inexplicable.

Thus Brahman or Paramātmān is the one, non-dual, transcendental Reality. The plurality of the Ātman as propounded by the orthodox schools like the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prabhakara school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā is untenable, according to Ānandabodha, as it is not based on valid reasoning and scriptural authority. Secondly, Brahman is of the nature of Pure consciousness (visudha vijñāna) and self-luminous (svayamprakāśa). Further this consciousness is eternal and not momentary as advocated by the Yogacara school of Buddhist philosophy. Thirdly, Brahman or the Ātman is of the nature of pure bliss (Paramānanda) And the nature of bliss is positive (bhāvarūpa) as the cessation of misery (duḥkhābhava). And this supreme bliss is experienced in the state of mukti (emancipation) when the individual soul (Jīvātman) is completely devoid of beginningless nescience (Avidyā or Māyā).

Fourthly, the individual self (Jīvātman), according to Ānandabodha, is not a real entity; it is not different from Brahman. The difference (bheda) which appears between the Brahman and the Jīvātman is illusion created by the binding and blinding Avidyā.

Fifthly, the world (jagat) is not real like the Brahman, Though it has empirical reality nevertheless it is false

(mithyā) in comparision with the transcendental reality,
Brahman.

Sixthly, the difference (bheda) supposed to be existing among the objects of knowledge in this empirical world is in reality false (mithyā), an illusion designed by the Avidyā. Hence there is no means of knowledge (Pramāṇa) to prove the reality of the difference (bheda) as it is not a real entity.